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ABSTRACT

As Europeans expanded across North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, they parceled their territorial acquisitions into a variety o f administrative
subdivisions. Naming and dividing the land became an integral part o f the project o f
colonization; the conquest o f territory involved the transformation o f unknown places
into clearly defined jurisdictions. This dissertation examines the invention o f one
jurisdiction, the province o f Maine, viewing the evolution o f its boundaries as a reflection
of the growth o f state power in the region. Taking issue with the tendency o f historians
to treat places as if they were objective facts o f the environment, it argues that territories
are symbolic artifacts that legitimize the possession o f resources by one group to the
exclusion o f others. Seeing an inextricable link between social and territorial boundaries,
it ties the development o f the territory o f Maine to the formation o f an alliance between
property owners and the state. The alliance promoted a vision o f territoriality in which
the land was divided into clearly marked jurisdictions exclusively governed by particular
towns, counties, and provinces. These jurisdictions, in turn, granted and protected clearly
marked estates that were the exclusive property o f individuals; property rights and state
sovereignty reinforced one another. This English system o f territoriality was not without
competitors; other visions o f the land became attached to different social arrangements.
To Native Wabanakis, the right to use the land flowed from membership in Active kin
groups that included both human beings and the spirits o f surrounding animals and
natural features. Territory was defined not in terms o f exclusive boundaries but as an
emanation o f the bonds o f affinity between people and their human and non-human
neighbors. French officials o f the same period treated their possessions adjacent to the
Gulf o f Maine as a network o f military, economic, and missionary outposts that upheld
the authority o f church and state in a peripheral region. English notions o f territoriality
gained precedence over others because the alliance between the state and property owners
facilitated the large-scale mobilization o f human and material resources in trade and
warfare. Confident that their investments in real estate would be protected by the
government, land speculators drew migrants and capital from both sides o f the Atlantic to
develop their holdings in Maine. New England's armies, meanwhile, were bolstered by
the support o f tens o f thousands o f soldiers and taxpayers who recognized that their
collective interests rested with the defense o f English frontiers in Maine. The victory o f
this alliance resulted in the consolidation o f Maine as a bounded territory. Far from being
unproblematic facts o f the environment, Maine's borders are the physical traces o f a
historical process in which English colonists acquired vast quantities o f natural resources
at the expense o f their French and Indian rivals. To give legitimacy to these conquests,
the colonists promoted a form o f sovereignty characteristic o f English-speaking North
America: the land, under this system o f territoriality, was construed as a measurable
object to be possessed by individuals and protected by the state.

ix
Reproduced with perm ission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

RULED WITH A PEN:
LAND, LANGUAGE, AND THE INVENTION OF MAINE

Reproduced with perm ission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INTRODUCTION
FERDINANDO GORGES’S MAINE

Just as none o f us is outside or beyond geography, none o f us is
completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is
complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons
but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.
--Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism

The history o f Maine began around 1622, in the mind o f a West Country knight
named Sir Ferdinando Gorges. Former commander o f the Channel defenses and long
time advocate o f American colonization, Gorges had worked tirelessly for nearly two
decades toward the establishment o f an English settlement on the coast o f northeastern
North America. By 1620, he had taken a seat on the Council for New England, which
possessed a royal patent to all the lands between the fortieth and forty-eighth parallels of
the continent. The territory was systematically distributed to the members o f the Council,
and in 1622 Gorges and his partner, Captain John Mason, won a charter to form a colony
between the Merrimack and Kennebec rivers. With the consent o fth e Council, Gorges
and Mason called the colony "the Province o f Maine," probably after the French county
o f the same name, or perhaps as a result o f repeated references to "the Maine” - the
mainland —in previous charters.1

1 James P. Baxter and Mary Frances Faraham, eds., Documentary History o f the State o f Maine. 24 vols.
(Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1889-1916), 7:65-71. (Future references to this series cited as

2
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When Gorges and Mason received another grant for roughly the same territory
seven years later, they rechristened it Laconia after the lakes o f the interior, where they
hoped to launch a fur trading enterprise. Ten days earlier, the partners had divided their
holdings in two, with Mason receiving the territory southwest o f the Piscataqua River,
renaming it New Hampshire. Gorges's share, which extended from the Piscataqua River
to the lower Kennebec River, was named New Somersetshire in 1635, after the
proprietor’s home county. Finally, in 1639, four years after the Council for New England
had reverted its patent to the crown, Gorges obtained a royal charter for his province, and
definitively reverted to the original name. "We do name, ordain and appoint," Charles I
declared in his letters patent, "that the Portion o f the Main Land and Premises aforesaid
shall forever hereafter be called and named the Province or County o f Maine, and not by
any other Name or Names whatsoever."2
The name did indeed become permanent, although there was little in the history o f
Gorges's grant that promised that it would. The courtier attracted few migrants to his
colony and by the time o f his death in 1647 the province o f Maine remained more
imaginary than real, drawn in maps and described in charters but having little palpable
reality beyond a few fishing posts and straggling farms. The eastern portion o f the grant
became a virtually independent colony known as Lygonia, and by 1658 the colony o f
Massachusetts Bay had annexed both Maine and Lygonia, renaming them Yorkshire.
Having sprung like Athena from the mind o f a single man, the fledgling province o f
Maine struggled to live beyond its infancy. The lands claimed by Gorges had been given

DHSM.) On the origins o f the name, with a brief bibliography, see Charles E. Clark, Maine: A
Bicentennial History (New York: Norton, 1977), 85-86.
2 DHSM. 7: 224.
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other names a century earlier, such as Norumbega and Tierra de Corte Real, and Maine
only narrowly avoided the same fate as these stillborn labels.3
The fleeting quality o f such names reminds us that there is a distinction to be
made between the concept o f Maine and the territory it represents. Royal charters and
proprietary maps referred to concrete places with an undeniable physical existence rivers, bays, landmasses, islands —but the labels appended to them, and the ways in
which they were grouped together, were the products o f human imagination. Water
flowed between the banks o f the Kennebec, but it was a human decision to call it a river
and a political act to make it the eastern boundary o f a colony. As the Mexican historian
Edmundo O'Gorman once pointed out, America did not have a hidden essence waiting to
be discovered, but was imaginatively created by Europeans trying to reconcile the
findings of Columbus with their inherited understandings o f the world.4
This distinction is worth bearing in mind, for historians and social scientists have
traditionally treated places as containers o f action rather than products o f human agency.
When we refer to the history o f a place we usually mean the history o f the people who
lived within its borders, not o f the locale itself. This habit o f mind is understandable: by
treating place as a constant, scholars have been able to get a fix on social dynamics, either
by comparing one region to another or by tracing the development o f a single society
over time. Yet this tendency has also produced what geographer Edward Soja calls "a

3 Emerson W. Baker, Edwin A. Churchill, Richard D'Abate, Kristine L. Jones, Victor A. Konrad, Harald A.
Prins, eds., American Beginnings: Exploration. Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega
(Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
4 Edmundo O’Gorman, The Invention o f America: An Inquiry into the Historical Nature o f the New World
and the Meaning of Its History (Bloomington. Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1961). See also John H.
Elliott, The Old World and the New. 1492-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Anthony
Grafton, New Worlds. Ancient Texts: The Power o f Tradition and the Shock o f Discovery (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ed., America in European
Consciousness. 1493-1750 (Chapel HiU, N. C.: University o f North Carolina Press, 1995).
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critical silence, an implicit subordination o f space to time" that obscures the subjective
and imaginative dimension o f place. Different communities and individuals have their
own separate ways o f organizing and representing space, and these differences belie the
assumption that places are mere containers. Created through the engagement o f people
with their environment and sustained by social interaction, landscapes are as dynamic and
mutable as human society.5
The "critical silence" of historians on this question is most audible in their
division o f history into separate national and regional categories, a practice reinforced by
disciplinary rules that force them to become specialists in the history o f one country or
another. By placing the history o f colonial North America into courses on the United
States before the Civil War or Canada before Confederation, scholars reify present-day
political boundaries, as if it were possible to extend the forty-ninth parallel backward in
time. This anachronism is lamentable, given that boundaries in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries were fluid and often contradictory and the history o f colonization
marked as much by failures as successes. Worse still, in treating current borders as
natural, scholars promote a teleological view o f history in which European conquests
become inevitable and native claims to the land are virtually erased. Though the political
map o f North America now seems neutral and uncontested, it was created through

5 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion o f Space in Critical Social Theory
(London: Verso, 1989), 15. On the subjective dimension o f place, see Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and
Place: The Perspective o f Experience ('Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1977); D. W.
Meinig, ed., The Interpretation o f Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essavs (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979); Denis E. Cosgrove. Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape (Totowa.
N. J.: Bames and Noble, 1985); Barbara Bender, ed., Landscape: Politics and Perspectives
(Providence, R. I.: Berg, 1993); Stephen Feld and Keith H. Basso, eds., Senses o f Place (Santa Fe,
N. M.: School of American Research Press, distributed by University o f Washington Press, 1996),
John A. Agnew, "The Devaluation of Place in Social Science," in John A. Agnew and James S.
Duncan, The Power o f Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations
(Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 9-29.
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centuries o f struggle in which possession o f the land was transferred from Indians to
colonists and from one colonial state to another. A full account o f the colonization o f the
Americas must begin with the recognition that boundaries, both past and present, are
ideologically charged symbols that reflect and determine the ownership o fth e land by
competing groups.6
This is not to say that historians or geographers have given short shrift to
questions o f land use and ownership. Beginning in the middle o f the twentieth century,
the "Berkeley School" o f historical geography, led by Carl Sauer and his students, took a
more sustained look at the role o f land in the colonial societies o f the Americas. Reacting
against positivist scholars who reduced human geography to spatial science, the Berkeley
School sought to recapture geography's cultural and historical dimensions. Sauer was
particularly interested in how cultures and the natural environment shaped one another
over time, paying special attention to the formation and evolution o f "landscapes" -traces o f human occupation such as fields, pastures, houses, and orchards that revealed
the cultural imprint o f different peoples.7
One o f Sauer's students, Andrew Hill Clark, adopted this method o f historical
geography to the examination o f specific regions over time, focusing on places where
Europeans had conquered indigenous peoples and colonized their lands: New Zealand,

6 On the anachronism of national boundaries in colonial North America, see James Axtell, "A
North American Perspective for Colonial History," History Teacher 12 (1979): 549-62; on the
tentative nature o f early colonization, see John G. Reid, Nova Scotia. Maine, and Acadia:
Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1981); on
the ideological content o f boundaries, see J. B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge and Power,” in Denis
Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds.. The Iconography o f Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988); idem., "Secrecy and Silences: The Hidden Agenda o f Cartography in
Early Modem Europe," Imago Mundi 40 (1988): 111-30.
7 Carl 0 . Sauer, "Foreward to Historical Geography," Annals o f the Association o f American Geographers
31 (1941): 1-24; idem, Agricultural Origins and Dispersals (New York: American Geographical Society,
1952); idem, The Earlv Spanish Main (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1966).
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Prince Edward Island, and Acadia. Clark's own students at the University o f Wisconsin
extended this approach into other parts o f North America where settler societies had been
established, such as the St. Lawrence River Valley, southeastern Pennsylvania, and
backcountry Virginia.8 In recent years, environmental historians have shifted the
emphasis from culture to nature, examining the ecological consequences o f the invasion
o f European people, plants, and animals into the Americas.9
While these works have served as an invaluable corrective to geographers
dismissive o f history and historians oblivious to the natural environment, most scholars
continued to treat geographical regions as boundaries for their studies rather than as
historical variables in their own right. Interested in the relationship between nature and
society, the Berkeley School tended to view the land as an object that was acted upon
rather than a subjective category whose meaning could change over time. Sauer and his
followers believed that nature, land, and geographical region were profoundly shaped by
human activity but were nonetheless ontologically distinct from society. The problem
with this assumption, as some critics have pointed out, is that the land is itself a culturally
defined concept that is organized by the human imagination.10 "Place," as geographer YiFu Tuan has written, "at all scales from the armchair to the nation, is a construct of

8 Andrew Hill Clark, The Invasion o f New Zealand bv People. Plants and Animals: The South Island (New
Brunswick. N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1949); idem. Three Centuries and the Island: A Historical
GeogTaphv of Settlement and Agriculture in Prince Edward Island. Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1959); idem. Acadia: The Geography o f Earlv Nova Scotia to 1760 (Madison. Wise.:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); R. Cole Harris, The Seieneurial System in Earlv Canada: A
Geographical Interpretation (Madison, Wise.: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1966); James T. Lemon, The
Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical Study of Earlv Southeastern Pennsylvania (Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and Frontier Perspectives on
the Earlv Shenandoah Valiev (Charlottesville, Va.: University o f Virginia Press, 1977).
9 The best known environmental histories o f colonial New England are Carolyn Merchant, Ecological
Revolutions: Nature. Gender, and Science in New England (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1989); William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians. Colonists, and the Ecology o f New
England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983).
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experience; it is sustained not only by timber, concrete, and highways, but also by the
quality o f human awareness."11 The Berkeley School's emphasis on the external shape o f
landscapes left it blind to the symbolic and subjective dimensions o f place, the ways in
which nature was cognitively devised category rather than an objective fact.
The philosophical assumption that nature and society are separate categories,
interrelated but with different essences, has informed most historical writing on territorial
issues. The tendency among historians has been to treat regions such as Maine as parcels
of territory that were transferred from one people to another or that were reshaped by
human effort. But the European conquest o f North America involved a great deal more
than the simple cession o f territory; it entailed the erasure o f an existing landscape and
the invention of another. The creation o f the states and provinces o f North America were
the product o f a social transformation by which Europeans gained control over the natural
resources o f the continent while simultaneously developing rationales for their
possession. The land was not simply conquered by Europeans; it was also reimagined in
such a way that it legitimized the creation o f a new social order. Unfortunately, a
division o f labor among historians has kept them from linking the invention o f new
territories to the evolution o f colonial society. Much has been written o f an antiquarian
nature on the history o f American placenames, and generations o f scholars have devoted
their careers to explaining how Europeans managed to conquer North America.12 But

10 On nature as a cultural concept, see Roy Ellen and Katsuyoshi Fukui, eds., Redefining Nature: Ecology.
Culture and Domestication (Oxford: Berg, 1996)
11 Yi-Fu Tuan, "Place: An Experiential Perspective," Geographical Review 65 (1975): 165.
12 The most far-ranging study o f this kind is George R. Stewart, Names on the Land: A Historical Account
of Place-Naming in the United States (New York: Random House, 1945).
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virtually no one has attempted to systematically link the creation o f particular places to
the emergence o f new patterns o f human relations.13
This dissertation attempts to fill this void by examining the development o f the
territory o f Maine from the early seventeenth century to the fall o f New France, seeing its
history as the simultaneous creation o f a place and a social order. What makes Maine a
particularly interesting subject o f study is its marginality: perhaps more than any other
part of the continent, the lands adjacent the Gulf o f Maine during this period were
contested ground.14 In the first century and a half o f European colonization, portions of
the territory between the Piscataqua and the St. John rivers were claimed by five separate
English colonies, the French provinces o f Canada and Acadia, dozens o f Wabanaki bands

13 A number of studies have examined the different strategies that Natives and colonists used to mark and
defend their claims to the land. Most prominent among these Patricia Seed, Ceremonies o f Possession in
Europe's Conquest of the New World. 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Donna
Merwick, Possessing Albany. 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); Cronon, Changes in the Land. One o f the few scholars to systematically link the
development of a territory to particular social coalitions is Thongchai Winichakul, in his Siam Mapped: A
History o f the Geo-Bodv o f a Nation (Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1994).
14 Colonial Maine has also been marginal in the historiographical sense, at least until the 1970s. While
Massachusetts was for many years the focus o f most scholarly writing on early American history, Maine
typically was treated as a historical footnote, an outlier that did not conform to the model set by the Bay
Colony. Even those historians who placed northern New England at the center o f their anention continued
to use Massachusetts as the standard against which Maine's history was measured. Charles Clark, for
example, pointedly drew a contrast between the hard drinking, loose living West Country fishermen of
early Maine and the stolid Puritans o f southern New England. Edwin Churchill called into question Clark's
portrait of Maine, claiming that the early colonists were "an ordinary lot o f men," but his implicit definition
o f what was "ordinary" - a peaceful, orderly community —suggested that the Puritan colony was a point of
reference. It has only been in the past thirty years that scholars have begun to treat Maine not as a pale
reflection of Massachusetts but as a border region with its own distinctive characteristics. Historians and
archaeologists such as Emerson Baker, Gretchen and Alaric Faulkner, Kenneth Morrison, and John G. Reid
have brought into focus the significance o f Maine as a zone o f culture interaction, where Native peoples
and colonists lived, traded, intermarried, and fought with one another over a course o f generations. Their
research has revealed that in some ways colonial Maine bore greater resemblance to contemporaneous
frontier areas such as western New York and backcountry South Carolina than it did to southern New
England. See Emerson Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward': The Failure o f Anglo-Indian Relations in Early
Maine" (Ph.D. diss., College o f William and Mary, 1986); Edwin A. Churchill, "Too Great the Challenge:
The Birth and Death o f Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676" (Ph.D. diss., University o f Maine, 1979); Alaric
Faulkner and Gretchen Faulkner, The French at Pentagoet. 1635-1674: An Archaeological Portrait of the
Acadian Frontier. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, No. 5 (Saint John, N. B. and Augusta,
Me.: New Brunswick Museum and Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1987); Kenneth M.
Morrison. The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal o f Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations

Reproduced with perm ission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
and villages, and even for a short time by the Dutch. Over several generations, the Gulf
of Maine became a geographical laboratory in which various placenames and boundaries
gradually took hold while others withered away. Ultimately, Maine developed as an
exactly-measured state jurisdiction whose boundaries have remained unchanged since
1842. My aim is to recapture the lost alternatives o f the colonial period and to explain
why one way o f organizing the land persisted while others did not.
A fundamental premise o f this study is that territorial boundaries did not become
"real" - real in the sense that they impinged on people's actions - until a critical mass of
individuals accepted their validity. One might draw an analogy in this respect between
territories and money. Although they may occasionally take the physical form o f paper
bills or coins, units o f currency are essentially symbols that denote the worth o f goods
and services. They only have substance when they become the nexus through which an
array o f human transactions such as buying, selling, lending, and investing take place. A
dollar lacks value unless the people who engage in these transactions accept it as legal
tender; that is, if they consider it to be an adequate symbol o f economic worth. For a unit
o f currency to gain this status, it needs to be supported by wide range o f institutions and
individuals: a central bank that issues paper money and is able to redeem its bills, a large
number o f merchants and banks willing to accept it as tender, a commercial economy that
depends on cash transactions. These people and institutions must not only support the
currency, but also depend on it. By allowing people to defer the completion o f economic
exchanges indefinitely, money removes the need for barter and permits them to carry out

(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), John G. Reid, Acadia. Maine, and New Scotland:
Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1981).
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transactions over a wider geographical area. Banks, businesses, and customers would not
be able to carry on their daily affairs if they lost faith in the value o f the dollar.
The same might be said o f a territory. Like money, placenames and boundaries
are symbols that do not gain currency until a wide cross-section o f people and institutions
begin to use and depend on them. Ferdinando Gorges’s imaginary province o f Maine
became real because a host o f groups took a shared interest in its existence: settlers who
held their land titles under Gorges, investors with shares in his company, royal officials
with ties o f patronage and clientage to the colony's promoters. A social network was
created out o f a shared desire to extract the fruits o f the land and this web o f
interdependency was both sustained and responsible for the continued existence o f Maine
as a territory. The boundaries o f Gorges's province were real only to the extent that the
constituent members o f this network could protect them, and the land claims o f Gorges's
grantees were valid only to the extent that his province was real. Far from being
objective attributes o f the natural environment, the territories o f Gorges and other
colonial projectors were social creations: as geographer Robert David Sack has put it,
"society and space are... mutually constitutive, each requiring and altering the other."15
The survival o f Maine as a name and a particular kind o f territory -- a bounded
and exclusive jurisdiction -- was, in other words, also the triumph o fth e social network
that gave backing to its existence. This network consisted not only o f people and
institutions, but a whole host o f social arrangements: the invention o f the territory o f
Maine was inextricably entangled with the growth o f state power and the development of
a distinctively Anglo-American form o f private property within its borders. The

15 Robert David Sack, Homo Geograohicus: A Framework for Action. Awareness, and Moral Concern
(Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 2.
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consolidation o f public institutions and private property in the region depended on a
particular way o f seeing the land; as territory was brought within the English sphere o f
influence it was re-imagined as the exclusive property o f individuals and the sole
jurisdiction o f governments. The pages that follow examine how this way o f representing
the land facilitated the growth o f English power in the region.
The first two chapters are sketches o f three kinds o f territory in circulation in
Maine during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one belonging to native
Wabanakis and the others to French and English colonists. These competing visions of
the land were sustained by coalitions o f people whose interests were attached to their
existence. The first chapter examines Wabanaki notions o f territoriality, showing how
knowledge and social relationships were written into the landscape through stories and
daily activities. Territorial boundaries were an emanation o f these relationships and were
inseparable from the social ties that bound communities together and distinguished them
from their neighbors. Because patterns o f kinship and alliance were ambiguous and in a
constant state o f evolution, such boundaries were imprecise, permeable, and negotiable.
The Europeans who arrived in the region during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries radically altered the map o f land ownership in the region, erasing Wabanaki
claims and drawing new ones o f their own. The second chapter turns to the development
o f boundaries in European maps o f the region, tracing the connections between state
formation, the evolution o f property rights, and the growth o f geographical knowledge.
French and English maps reflect a different pattern o f state power in their respective
empires, the latter characterized by an alliance between property owners and governments
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and the former exerting its influence through forts, missionary outposts, and alliances
with Wabanaki groups.
The remainder o f the dissertation addresses the question o f why the English
territorial vision gained precedence over the others. The third chapter looks at how
governments and landowners in London and Boston were able to win a measure o f
control over large portions o f Maine's territory. Groups in England and Massachusetts
Bay sought ownership o f Maine's natural resources but could not do so directly because
o f their distance from the colony. The solution was to exploit the extensive networks o f
communication that connected Maine to the wider world. The position o f people within
these networks shaped both how they viewed and controlled the lands o f the region.
Ownership o f the land was also contested by the region’s native inhabitants, who
mounted a lengthy resistance to English expansion. The following chapter focuses on the
encounter between English and Wabanaki notions o f territoriality, treating land disputes
as a moral as well as a political conflict. The transcripts o f treaty meetings between the
two groups reveal that the two groups were divided by more than a desire to own the
same lands; they also the different moral responsibilities they attached to ownership o f
the land.
Ultimately, this conflict led the two groups into the battlefield, in a series o f
imperial wars that began in 1688 and ended with the fall o f New France in the Seven
Years War. The final chapter offers a geographical interpretation o f this military
struggle, emphasizing the connections between the civilian and military worlds. The
strategies, tactics, and war aims o f the groups who fought these wars were shaped by the
kinds o f logistical and moral support civilians lent to their soldiers. At the same time, the
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terms on which the English conquered Wabanaki and French lands were determined in
large part by the nature o f their war effort.
Language, broadly construed to include forms o f communication such as maps
and rock art, looms large in these sketches. Ownership o f the land required groups to first
imagine their territories and then to mark and defend them.16 Language, both as a
medium of representation and as a means o f communication, was central to all these
activities. It follows that differences in the nature o f land ownership were closely tied to
the ways in which various societies used language: whether they were literate or used
abstract symbols, whether they placed a high value on politeness or on self-assertion,
whether their transportation networks spanned large distances or were limited in extent.17
The development o f European territories in Maine were predicated on a language
o f abstraction, an ability to reduce the complexities o f the human and natural universe to
scientific laws and orderly principles. This way o f describing the world -- which
included distilling territories into a more tractable form by rendering them as geometric
figures on maps -- was, as James C. Scott has pointed out, closely related to the "state's
attempt to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the
classic state functions o f taxation, conscription, and prevention o f rebellion."18
Instruments o f statecraft such as cadastral maps, tax valuation lists, muster rolls, and

16 On this point, see idem., Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge University Press,
1986), Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography No. 7, esp. 20-33.
17 In this respect, I am following in the footsteps o f scholars such as Karl Deutsch, Harold Innis, and
Richard Brown, who all have asked how communications allows people to gain power over the land and
over each other. See Harold A. Innis Empire and Communications (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); Karl
W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Inequality
(Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1966); Richard D. Brown, Knowledge Is Power The Diffusion of
Information in Early America. 1700-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
18 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), 2. On this point, see also Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities. 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), esp. 163-85.
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customs records not only allowed governments to tighten their control over Maine's
territory but also shaped the terms on which people conceived o f this territory. Called
into being by a stroke o f Ferdinando Gorges's quill, Maine was in a very real sense ruled
with a pen.

A Note on Terminology
A study that spans nearly two centuries and involves several highly distinct
cultures and languages strains any attempt to find a standard orthography or system o f
dating, but I have tried to follow a consistent set o f rules throughout. All English dates
have been changed to New Style, so that February 3,1702 in the original appears as
February 3, 1703 in the text; French dates have been left as they are recorded in the
original documents. English quotations have been transcribed verbatim, with the
exception o f abbreviations such as &, yt, and Govr, which have been rendered and, that,
and Governor. French quotations are translated into English in the text, with the original
provided in the footnotes. The letter 8, used by many French writers for the diphthong o f
Algonquian languages, has been changed to w or on. Because Wabanaki languages are
written according to several different orthographic systems, I have left most Wabanaki
words as they were spelled in the original.
The term Wabanaki itself needs explaining, since its meaning is ambiguous and
its uses have been various. It was probably used originally by Montagnais Indians, who
in speaking to the French referred to the peoples living to the east as "Dawnland" or
"Eastland" people —or Wabanakiak. In their own languages, these groups called
themselves as arenabeak (in the dialect spoken at Norridgewock, along the Kennebec
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River), alnobiak (in Western Abenaki), or skijim (Maliseet), all meaning "the people."
French people had difficulty pronouncing and transcribing the initial w sound in the
Montagnais, and generally called these groups Abenaquis or Abenakis. Explorers in
Acadia also called the coastal groups living between the St. John and Saco rivers
Etechemins, possibly a transcription o f the Maliseet term for themselves, leading many
recent historians to believe that they were a separate people.19 These groups formed a
confederacy with the Mi'kmaq and several villages o f Canadian Indians in the eighteenth
century, and began referring to themselves as Wabanakis, a term that was probably
borrowed from the Montagnais via the French, but is still current today.20 Some scholars
distinguish between Abenakis, a narrower term for Wabanakis living in northern New
England and southern Quebec, and Wabanakis, a broader term that includes the Mi'kmaq,
Maliseets, and other culturally similar groups. Although this dissertation concerns
mainly the former groups, I have chosen the broader term because the constant swirl o f
migration and cultural exchange in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries makes it
difficult to draw clear boundaries between particular groups.
In referring to the native people o f North America more generally, I have used the
term "Indian," rather than Native American (U. S. English), Native (Canadian English),
or First Nations People (also Canadian English), because o f its simplicity and general
currency. Any pejorative associations connected to the name are unintended.

19 Several authors, most recently Bruce Bourque, have argued that the Etechemins were a separate ethnic
group that occupied the Penobscot and Kennebec River drainages in the early seventeenth century and
were later displaced eastward as a result o f disease and military conflict. See Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity
on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," Ethnohistorv 36 (1989), 257-84. Dean Snow, on the other hand,
has chided such scholars for their uncritical reading o f the source material and has argued against the
theory o f Etechemin mass migration. See Dean R. Snow, "The Ethnohistoric Baseline o f the Eastern
Abenaki." Ethnohistorv 23 (1976): 291-306.
20 The name Mi’kmaq is inflected with the animate plural -aq; "Mi’kmaqs"is as ungrammatical
as"Iroquoises" or "Chineses."
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Algonquian refers to a language family as well as its speakers, who despite great social
differences share some common cultural traits. Algonquin refers to a tribe living in
present-day western Quebec and eastern Ontario.
Finally, I have used the terms objective and subjective in a very specific sense.
By objective, I mean relating to things (objects) rather than people (subjects). An
"objective" argument is one that is based on the observation o f inanimate things rather
than a "subjective" consideration o f social relations. O f course, the distinction between
objects and subjects is culture-bound, since many things that Europeans considered
inanimate -- rocks, trees, stories - might have been seen as animate subjects by
Wabanakis. So "objective" propositions are objective only in the sense that the speaker
bases his or her arguments on the observation o f things he or she considers to be
inanimate and divorced from the social world.
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CHAPTER I
GLUSKAP’S FOOTPRINTS

In all the land and everywhere in the Eastland, there is nowhere where it
does not show what Kuloskap did.
--Passamaauoddv Texts (1921)

Long ago, when there was nothing but forest, sky, and sea, Gluskap fell from a
hole in the heavens and splashed into the ocean. Dazed by the fall, he sank until the briny
water filled his mouth and entered his nostrils. Coughing and sputtering, he came to his
senses and struggled to the surface. When he looked around there was little to see: water
surrounded him in every direction and above him was only sky. He squinted harder and
saw a large canoe bobbing in the distance. The giant slowly swam to the canoe and,
gripping its sides, lifted himself into it. He discovered a large paddle at his feet and
dipped it into the water, taking long strokes as he looked in the distance for signs o f land.
After many days o f paddling, he grew tired and decided to rest. Still fruitless in his
search for the shore, he used his magical powers to turn his canoe into rock. Slowly it
grew, until it formed a great granite island, so large that millions o f fish came from all
around to look at it. The island is now known as Newfoundland. Gluskap lived on this
island for a while but he grew tired o f spending his days alone and decided to set off in
search o f adventure. He built himself another canoe and paddled south until he
discovered the mainland, where he made his new home.
18
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Tall pines soared above the rocky coastline o f this place, which he called the
Dawnland because it was the first place on the continent to see the sun every morning.
When Gluskap first arrived, he saw that the rivers were too muddy, so he reached for his
bow and cleared the murk from their waters. Then he dug passages in the ground so the
water would run to the ocean. As he finished this task, he noticed that all the animals
lived near the sea. He told some o f them to move to the forests and the mountains
because there was not enough for them to eat on the coast. They complained that it was
too cold in the interior, but he persisted, and the moose, the deer, and other animals went
to live in the forest. Gluskap was pleased with what he had done but still felt an itch for
adventure. He set off to explore new parts o f the Dawnland and everywhere he left his
indelible mark on the landscape.
Near Cape Canso, he chased a man who had transformed himself into a beaver,
throwing a rock at him which landed in the water and turned into an island. He kept
pursuing the beaver all the way to the mouth o f the St. John River, where he threw a clod
of earth that landed and became Partridge Island. Another day, at Broad Cove on Cape
Breton, a giant whale washed up on the shore and people and animals came from all
around to see it. Each species took muscles from the whale; the moose putting them on
its back, the beaver in its tail, and human beings placing them on their legs. But soon the
whale began to stink, so Gluskap took out his bow and arrow and shoved it into the water.
The carcass o f the whale became an island in the middle o f the cove.
On another occasion, Gluskap heard that a village near Moosehead Lake was
being terrorized by a giant moose who was eating all the village's inhabitants. Gluskap
heeded the villagers’ pleas for help and set off to hunt the moose. As he ran after the
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creature, he made footprints with his snowshoes, which can still be seen in the rocks near
Sebec River. After many days o f scouting and tracking he finally found the moose and
slew it with his arrows. He dragged the cadaver to his camp and gutted it, giving the
intestines to his dog, who let some drop into the water as he ate. The intestines became a
streak o f white rocks at the bottom o f the bay near Cape Rosier. Then he cooked the
moose, and overturned his kettle after he had finished his meal. The kettle is now Kineo
Mountain.
Remarkable natural features elsewhere had similar stories behind them; the
reminders o f Gluskap's actions were so ubiquitous that when people found stones that
resembled a human form, they assumed they were self-portraits that the giant had left
behind. Gluskap eventually left the Dawnland and paddled o ff to a distant country, many
years' journey to the south or the east. But he left behind his children, the human beings
he had fashioned with arrows shot into trees, who kept his memory alive by telling tales
about what he had done.1
When storytellers related Gluskap’s feats to their listeners, they were vague as to
when they happened, as if it were so long ago that it scarcely mattered anymore. But if
asked where they took place —and usually they did not need to be asked - they were
always highly specific. Sometimes they told the stories as they passed the site o f their

1 Charles Leland. The Algonquian Legends o f New England (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1884); John
D. Prince, Passamaquoddv Texts. Publications of the American Ethnological Society, vol. 10 (New York:
G. E. Stechert & Co., 1921; Wilson D. Wallis and Ruth Sawtell Wallis, The Micmac Indians of Eastern
Canada (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 317-37; Ruth Holmes Whitehead, Stories
from the Six Worlds: Micmac Legends (Halifax: Nimbus, 1988); American Friends Service Committee,
The Wabanakis o f Maine and the Maritimes: A Resource Book about Penobscot. Passamaouoddv.
Maliseet. Micmac and Abenaki Indians (Bath, Me.: Maine Indian Program, 1989), section C, 2-26; Frank
G. Speck, "Penobscot Tales and Religious Beliefs," Journal o f American Folk-lore 48 (19351. 1-107;
idem, "Penobscot Transformer Tales," International Journal o f American Linguistics 1 (1918), 187-244.
Western Abenakis have similar stories about the transformer-giant Odzihozo, who created river channels
and lake basins by dragging his body over the ground, and made hills and mountains by forming piles of
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occurrence, with the landscape acting as a key that called to memory Gluskap's actions.
To the people o f the Dawnland, the natural environment was a vast repository o f stories,
not only o f Gluskap, but o f personal anecdotes, family histories, accounts o f battles
fought long ago, tales o f hunting expeditions, and rumors o f magical transformations. As
people crossed a river, passed by an unusually shaped rock, or spotted a familiar island,
they were often prompted to speak o f a momentous event or odd occurrence that had
happened there. The stories that Gluskap's children told o f these places acted as a kind o f
mental map that oriented themselves in the world, a map that not only told them how to
get from one place to the next but also rooted their identity and their understanding o f the
world in local surroundings.
By comparison, contemporary maps that depict the same region before the arrival
o f Europeans seem sparse and lifeless. Reduced to two-dimensional space on a sheet o f
paper, Gluskap's country appears as a thin outline o f coast and an interior streaked with
the names o f various linguistic or tribal groups. The rivers are sinuous lines and nothing
more, the mountains only shaded areas, and stories are nowhere to be seen. While
adequate for the purposes o f their authors - to distinguish and locate ethnic groups -these maps fail to express the wealth o f associations that Dawnlanders attached to the
places where they lived. By emptying the landscape o f these local meanings, modem
cartographers turn the natural environment into a mere backdrop, a setting against which
people act out their lives. Geography becomes an incontrovertible fact, bereft o f human
agency.

dirt with his hand. See Gordon M. Day, "Abenaki Place Names in the Champlain Valley," International
Journal of American Linguistics 47 (1981): 143-71.
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To recapture the human element o f the land requires us to imagine it not as a
context, but as a medium. Dawnlanders lived their lives through their environment, not
against it. Continually moving from one place to the next in pursuit o f sustenance, they
developed patterns o f living that connected daily routines with the places where they
were carried out. Locales became encrusted over time with layers o f significance,
developed through experience and communicated from one generation to the next
through stories and anecdotes. The landscape was animated by the imagination o f the
Dawnlanders and organized according to their patterns o f movement and activity.2
The reverse was also true: the physical realities o f the environment directed
human experience along certain channels. Seasonal fluctuations in the location o f flora
and fauna forced families to periodically shift residence, and these shifts o f residence
made them familiar with certain preferred paths, waterways, and campsites. As people
passed through these channels, they inevitably came upon places that evoked memories.
Encoded as stories, these recollections allowed the landscape to "speak" to the
Dawnlanders, to remind them o f their personal and collective past. Such stories were
thought to have a life o f their own, independent o f the speaker who told them. They often
imparted a moral message, reminding tellers and listeners o f the obligations they owed to
their fellow beings. Many o f Gluskap's adventures were cautionary tales that illustrated
the dangers o f not sharing with those in need or the dire consequences o f overhunting
game animals. The routines o f daily life, which led people to regularly pass by the places
that evoked such stories, reinforced these moral lessons through repetition. Locales
became a kind o f compass that kept people on a straight social path. To Gluskap's

2 On the notion o f landscape as a medium, see Christopher Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places.
Paths and Monuments (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 7-34.
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children, the natural environment was not so much a setting as an actor, a guardian
keeping a watchful eye over their well-being.3
An accurate map o f the Dawnland, in this light, requires its maker to do a great
deal more than plot villages and tribes at the correct coordinates o f latitude and longitude.
To understand the terms on which Wabanakis possessed their land —and the ways in
which it possessed them —it is necessary to consider the places where they lived as sites
o f experience and memory. Though they appear as thin lines or blank spaces in
contemporary maps, the forests, rivers, lakes and mountains o f the region were alive with
the signs o f human occupation for thousands o f years before the arrival o f Europeans.
Through their daily activities and storytelling, the inhabitants o f the Dawnland, like their
father Gluskap, left footprints everywhere they went. They left not only physical traces
o f their existence, but also stories, paintings, songs, and dances, all o f which animated
their natural surroundings and filled their lives with meaning. A faithful map o f human
occupation in the Dawnland would allow us to begin tracking these footprints, seeing the
landscape as something that was directly encountered and actively imagined by its
inhabitants.

The Yearly Round
Gluskap's children did not treat the landscape as an idyll, to be passively observed
while sitting still. Nor did they view it from on high, as would an eagle surveying the
panoramic scene beneath. Instead, they approached it level, from behind the gunwale o f a

3 On the didactic qualities o f storytelling, see Robert M. Leavitt, "Storytelling as Language Curriculum," in
William Cowan, ed., Actes du quatorzieme concres des Algonouinistes (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1983), 27-33. There is a similar connection between places and stories in other parts o f North America:
see Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits In Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Anache
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canoe or treading along a winding path. They knew the lay o f the land by actively
engaging their environment, learning its dimensions through paddle strokes and footsteps.
At the time that Europeans first encountered them, Wabanakis drew nearly all the
necessities o f life from their immediate surroundings. Animals provided them with meat,
clothing, tallow, quills, and a variety o f bone tools. From plants, they made dishes o f
com, squash, acoms, and berries, as well as medicines, emetics, and other curatives.
From trees, twigs, bark, and resin, they fashioned not only their houses and their canoes
but baskets, dishes, and boxes. With stones, they made arrowheads, axes, and pendants;
with clay they made pottery. Dependent on the environment for all their material needs,
Wabanakis developed an encyclopedic store o f ecological knowledge, including a canny
ability to remember when and where game, fish, seals, plants, and other resources would
be most abundant. Constantly consulting and revising this mental map o f resources,
Wabanakis periodically moved from place to place in search o f the plants and animals
that gave them life.
The paths that they took differed from one area to the next, for the Dawnland was
patchwork o f different environments, each with its own distinctive physiography and
ecology. People grafted their settlement and subsistence patterns on to their local
environment so as to make optimal use o f their surroundings. The result was a highly
diverse map o f settlement in the Dawnland, with populations adapting themselves to the
natural environment o f their particular area. Subsistence strategies also changed over
time, as fluctuations in plant, animal, and human populations forced people to exploit a
continually evolving mix o f resources. It is difficult to recapture the full diversity and
variability o f subsistence patterns and it would be misleading to speak o f a single

(Albuquerque, N. M.: University o f New Mexico Press, 1996).
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"traditional" or "pre-contact" way o f life among the Wabanakis. But it is possible, at the
risk o f over-generalization, to adumbrate four major patterns o f settlement that
predominated in the Dawnland on the eve o f European colonization.
On the northern half o f the Nova Scotian peninsula and the northeastern part o f
New Brunswick, as far as the Gaspe - roughly the area occupied in historic times by the
Mi'kmaq ~ people tended to spend their summers on the coast and winters in the interior,
taking advantage o f seasonal variations in the availability o f fish and game. Most groups
lived year-round along the banks o f a river, making seasonal movements upstream and
downstream. In the spring, as the river ice began to break up, families paddled downriver
to the bays, coves, and estuaries o f the coast, where they set up fish weirs to catch
migratory fish such as salmon and alewives on their spawning runs. In the summer, men
went fishing off the coast for flounder, cod, skates, and other inshore-feeding fish, and
also hunted for sea mammals such as walruses and seals. Women, meanwhile, dug up
shellfish such as clams, scallops, and mussels. Throughout the spring, summer, and fall,
men also hunted migratory birds such as loons, herons, and geese. As temperatures
cooled and food became less abundant on the coast, people moved inland for the winter,
where they hunted for large game such as moose, caribou, and deer, and went trapping for
smaller animals such as beaver. On Cape Breton Island the pattern was reversed, with
people spending their winters on the coast and their summers by the interior lakes.4
Immediately to the southwest o f the Mi'kmaq was a zone o f coastal settlement
stretching from the Bay o f Fundy to southern New England. People in this region tended
to live year-round along the estuaries o f major rivers or at the mouths o f smaller streams.

4 Frances L. Stewart, "Seasonal Movements o f Indians in Acadia as Evidenced by Historical Documents
and Vertebrate Faunal Remains from Archaeological Sites," Man in the Northeast 38 (1989): 55-77; James
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Lying at the intersection o f fresh-water and maritime environments, estuaries provided
families with an abundance o f resources throughout the entire year. During the summer,
families lived much as they did in northern Nova Scotia: hunting seals and walruses on
offshore islands; digging clams, oysters, and other shellfish on the tidal flats; catching
fish with nets, spears, and lines. But during the winter, people remained close to the
coast, feeding themselves on shellfish and game caught at the heads o f estuaries. Some
families between Penobscot Bay and the St. John River spent the winter in partially
submerged houses that sheltered them from the blustery winds o f the coast. In the spring,
they moved upriver and set up weirs and nets to catch the runs o f migratory fish. They
then returned to the coast, occasionally assembling in large villages where they traded
and feasted with people from nearby areas.5
A third cluster o f communities was concentrated along the valley o f the upper
Connecticut River and the eastern shores o f Lake Champlain. The rich intervales o f this
region offered an abundance o f plant and animal resources and supported a large human
population. Toward the end o f the prehistoric period, from about the fourteenth century
onward, people tended to live year-round in villages along the valleys o f rivers, or at the
confluence o f lakes and rivers. For several hundred years before then, communities had
become increasingly attached to certain spots along rivers, to which they returned every
year during the warmer months to gather nuts and acoms. Beginning some time after
1000 AD, they complemented these activities with horticulture, raising com, beans, and

A. Tuck, Maritime Provinces Prehistory (Ottawa: National Museum o f Man, 1984), 72-75.
5 David Sanger, "Testing the Models: Hunter-Gatherer Use o f Space in the Gulf o f Maine, USA," World
Archaeology 27 (1996): 512-26: Tuck. Maritime Provinces. 49-54: Douglas C. Kellogg, "Why Did They
Choose to Live Here? Ceramic Period Settlement in the Boothbay, Maine, Region," Northeast
Anthropology 48 (1994): 25-60; Bruce Bourque and Steven L. Cox, "Maine State Museum Investigation of
the Goddard Site, 1979." Man in the Northeast 22 (1981): 3-27.
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squash in the fields near their villages, although wild plants still remained a more
significant part o f their diet. From the main villages, men went on occasional forays to
nearby rivers and lakes to catch fish and eels or to forested areas to hunt and trap deer,
bear, mink, bobcat, and other animals. Villages also served as ceremonial centers, with
large numbers o f people regularly congregating at certain spots for feasting and
exchange.6
Between the Connecticut River Valley and the coast was a region o f upland
settlement. The northern arm o f the Appalachian Mountains reaches through the center
of Dawnland as far as western New Brunswick, with a ridge o f peaks that includes the
White Mountains and Mount Katahdin. Amidst these mountains lie dozens o f lakes that
are the sources o f the large rivers o f the region, which run from the upland areas to the
bays and inlets o f the coast. People living in the upland region tended to prefer to settle
near rapids or waterfalls where the fishing was good, as well as at the outlets o f lakes and
the confluence o f streams and rivers, which were ideal for trapping beaver.
Archaeologists know comparatively less about this region, and it is possible that inland
sites may have been temporary camps set up by people from other areas.7
Subsistence strategies within each region depended on the calculated management
of risk. Because the availability o f particular plant and animal species fluctuated over
time, people had a vested interest in exploiting as wide a variety o f species as possible.
Large ungulates such as deer and moose were the hardest animals to track and kill but

6 William A. Haviland and Maijory W. Power, The Original Vermonters: Native Inhabitants. Past and
Present. 2nd ed., (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 1994), 85-204.
7 David Sanger, "The Ceramic Period in Maine," in idem, ed., Discovering Maine's Archaeological
Heritage (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1979), 106. Southern New England
was similarly divided into estuarine, riverine, and upland populations. See Kathleen J. Bragdon, Native
People of Southern New England. 1500-1650 (Norman. Okla.: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1996), 5579.
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they provided hunters with a large caloric payoff and were the object o f the longest
hunting expeditions. Knowing that these expeditions carried hunters away from home for
weeks with no guarantee that they would return with quarry, communities balanced the
risks of hunting large game by exploiting plants and animals that provided fewer calories
but were easier to procure.
Most o f the burden o f providing communities with a daily supply o f food fell on
the shoulders o f women. The general rule in native communities was that adult men
caught vertebrate fish and hunted mammals, while women, children, and the elderly
brought home wild and domesticated plants as well as shellfish and other marine
invertebrates. Women’s activities tended to be less physically demanding but more
continuous than those o f men: they were charged with cooking meals, caring for their
children, dressing and stretching skins, sewing clothes, making containers, fetching wood
and water, and gathering a regular supply o f shellfish, nuts, acorns, and berries. Women
generally stayed within a day's journey o f their homes, making short trips to the fields to
tend to their crops or to the mud fiats to dig for clams.8
Because women ranged less widely than did men, the location o f settlements
tended to be closely linked to the demands o f female activities. While fish and big game
provided more calories than did plants and shellfish, hunting was inherently risky - a
season o f bad fortune brought with it the threat o f starvation. The food gathered by

8 For early historical evidence of women's work, from the perspective of European males, see Reuben G.
Thwaites, eds., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 18961901), 3:99-101 [future references to this series appear as JR]; Christopher Levett, "A Voyage into New
England." Collections o f the Maine Historical Society. 2 (1847): 79-109. On the intensification o f
exchange in the late prehistoric period, see Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the
Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh and Jonathan E. Ericson, eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in
North America (New York: Plenum Press, 1994), 23-46; Robert G. Doyle, "Analysis o f Lithic Artifacts:
The Identification, Petrologic Description, and Statistical Analysis o f the Lithic Artifacts Recovered from
the Turner Farm Site," in Bruce J. Bourque, Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A
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women, on the other hand, provided a more regular if less abundant source o f calories and
acted as a hedge against failure in the hunt. Families tended to move their homes to
places where women could find a plentiful store o f food. Thus families in coastal areas
generally moved only when women had used up the store o f shellfish in their vicinity. To
avoid depleting the stock o f clams in their flats, women generally dug up only older and
larger clams, judged by the size o f their siphon holes, and left the smaller clams to grow
to maturity. Once the larger clams were taken, they were forced to move to a new flat to
find fresh stocks o f shellfish. The decision to shift camp was probably taken primarily by
women in response to the depletion o f clam banks. It made little sense to travel long
distances to dig for clams when their nutritional value was relatively light. The
potentially large returns derived from hunting, on the other hand, justified long journeys
in pursuit o f game, making the location o f dwellings relatively less important for hunters.
A similar logic led families in other areas to choose the site o f their homes on the basis of
female activities.9
The choice o f a home was limited not only by the availability o f resources but by
the presence o f other people. Archaeologists have uncovered ample evidence of
population growth throughout the Dawnland for at least a thousand years before the
arrival o f Europeans. The trend throughout the Ceramic period -- a term archaeologists

Gulf of Maine Perspective (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), Appendix 6.297-316.
9 David Sanger, The Carson Site and the Late Ceramic Period in Passamaouoddv Bav. New Brunswick.
Archaeological Survey o f Canada, Paper No. 135 (Hull: Canadian Museum o f Civilization, Mercury
Series, 1987), 71-72, 81-83, 117; Mary Beth Williams and Jeffrey Bendrememer, "The Archaeology of
Maize, Pots, and Seashells: Gender Dynamics in Late Woodland and Contact Period New England," in
Cheryl Claassen and Rosemary A. Joyce, eds., Women in Prehistory: North America and Mesoamerica
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 136-52. Basing his figures on the reports of
French observers, Robert L. Kelly has estimated that the Micmac in the early seventeenth century drew
40% of their total calories from fishing and 50% from the hunt See Robert L. Kelly, The Foraging
Spectrum: Diversity in Hunter-Gatherer Lifewavs (Washington. D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1995), 68.
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use to describe the era from the introduction o f pottery around 500 BC to the beginnings
of European colonization —was for people to exploit a greater variety o f species o f both
plants and animals, to hunt and gather smaller and more marginal species o f animals, and
to hunt and fish in less productive territories. Human skeletal remains in Casco Bay have
also shown evidence o f stunted growth among children, probably due to starvation or
malnutrition. In all likelihood, population pressures forced people to find new sources o f
food and to become more protective o f the resources they already had. There is
considerable evidence o f a tendency towards sedentism throughout the Dawnland during
this period as communities became increasingly attached to certain river valleys or
estuaries, living there year-round or returning to them at regular intervals. This increased
sedentism, combined with the need to find new sources o f food, encouraged women as far
north as the Saco and Kennebec rivers to adopt horticulture towards the end o f the
Ceramic period.10

Time and Space
The arrival o f European colonists in the seventeenth century threw the native
societies o f the Dawnland into disarray, with far-reaching effects on settlement patterns.11
Epidemic diseases carried by the colonists laid waste entire communities, killing about

10 Bruce J. Bourque, Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A Gulf o f Maine
Perspective (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), 222,255; David R. Yesner, "Population Pressure in Coastal
Environments: An Archaeological Test," World Archaeology 16 (1984): 108-127; David R. Yesner,
"Seasonality and Resource 'Stress’ Among Hunter-Gatherers: Archaeological Signatures," in Ernest S.
Burch, Jr., and Linda J. Ellanna, eds., Kev Issues in Hunter-Gatherer Research (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 15168; Haviland and Power, Original Vermonters. 133-45,154.
11 William Wicken has contended that the Mi'kmaq had suffered gradual population loss in the sixteenth
century as a result o f diseases contracted from their contacts with European fishermen, the spread of
diseases preceding the establishment o f colonies. But his argument is based on a single documentary
source compounded by a host o f hypotheticals, and may not apply to the Wabanaki groups living in Maine.
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three-fourths o f the total native population. Those who survived often fled to
neighboring villages or moved to new areas to avoid the spread o f disease. The migrants
sometimes carried old subsistence strategies to their new homes: by the late seventeenth
century, villages as far north as the St. John and Penobscot rivers practised horticulture,
probably introduced by migrants from the south and the west. The expanding scale o f the
fur trade also may have led Wabanaki men to change their hunting practices, putting
greater effort into trapping small mammals such as beaver, mink, and squirrel. Yet even
by the eighteenth century, the pattern that had developed in the Ceramic period remained.
Communities still followed a seasonal round that involved regular movements along
rivers and estuaries in search o f seasonally available resources.12
Consider the calendar o f the village o f Norridgewock, as described by its Jesuit
priest, Sebastien Rale, in the first quarter o f the eighteenth century. Norridgewock was
the northernmost settlement o f the Kennebec drainage, lying near the confluence o f the
Kennebec and the Sandy rivers. Despite the ravages o f disease and warfare, it remained
one o f the largest Indian villages in Maine, with a population o f several hundred at the
time o f Rale's writing. As they had done since at least the sixteenth century, the
inhabitants o f the village cultivated com, beans, and squash, depending on domesticated
plants for a large portion o f the calories in their diet. In a letter written to his brother in
1723, Rale remarked that the men o f the village had overhunted large game in recent
years, making deer, elk, beaver, and bear very scarce in their vicinity. The lack o f game

See Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760” (Ph.D. diss.,
McGill University), 190-97.
12 Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, "European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The
Timing of the First Epidemics." Ethnohistorv 35 (1988): 15-33; Harald E. L. Prins, "Cornfields at
Meductic: Ethnic and Territorial Reconfigurations in Colonial Acadia," Man in the Northeast 44 (1992):
55-72. Dean Snow has argued that the for trade provided communities on the Penobscot River with a
hedge against crop failure, which encouraged them to experiment with horticulture in the seventeenth
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meant that they had been forced to rely even more heavily on agricultural produce than
before.13
According to Rale, the Norridgewocks' calendar consisted o f a series o f seasonal
movements that accommodated the requirements o f planting and harvesting their fields
while taking advantage o f seasonally-available wildlife. They planted their com in the
spring and did their last tilling early in June. Then they conferred among themselves to
decide on a suitable coastal spot to live until harvest time. Having reached a consensus,
they then made their way to the sea where they lived off shellfish, seals, birds, and other
animals for several months. They returned to their main village in late August to gather
their harvest and subsist on com, beans, squash, nuts, and acorns until early November,
when they went to the coast for a second time. Rale testified that they ate well during this
season, living on an abundance o f large fish, shellfish, fruit, sea birds, and numerous
kinds o f game. They returned to their village in mid-winter when the men separated from
the rest o f the village to hunt large game further upland. In the springtime, the men came
back to the village and went to nearby rivers to catch migrating fish. At the same time,
the women began sowing seeds, starting once again the annual round o f activities.14
One way o f thinking o f the Norridgewocks' calendar is to imagine it as a pair o f
overlapping circuits, one tracing their passage through time, another their movement in
space. In both circuits, the villagers moved progressively from one activity to the next,
but their progress was cyclical, always returning them to familiar places at yearly

century. See Dean R. Snow, The Archaeology o f New England (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 56.
13 JR. 67: 213; Harald E. L. Prins and Bruce J. Bourque, "Norridgewock: Village Translocation on the New
England-Acadian Frontier," Man in the Northeast 33 (1987): 137-58.
14 JR. 67:213-19. The Norridgewocks' yearly round probably would have been quite different at the
beginning o f the seventeenth century. When Samuel Champlain visited the Kennebec River in 1605, its
headwaters were still occupied by other groups o f Indians. See H. P. Biggar, ed., Complete Works of
Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-36), 1:311-23.
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intervals. Men and women were constantly on the move -- canoeing from the village to
the seashore, walking from the fields to the woods -- but their travels brought them back
to the same spots year after year. This pattern conformed to a tendency o f communities,
observable elsewhere in northern New England during the Ceramic period, to organize
their lives around focal places such as the village and the estuary. Because the rhythms
of the natural world regulated both their daily pursuits and shifts o f residence, the passing
o f the seasons represented the most important divisions o f the Wabanaki calendar. The
year was broken into periods o f natural abundance that anchored activities in space and
time -- sowing and fishing at the village during the spring, digging for clams and hunting
seals on the coast in the summer.
At Norridgewock, time was measured according to the intersection o f human
experience with the patterns o f the natural environment. The villagers counted years by
winters, because the winter represented the hunting season. Shorter units o f time were
also marked by natural cycles: days by the rising and setting o f the sun, months by the
waxing and waning o f the moon. The months drew their names from seasonal activities.
April was known either as anmsou-kizous, "the moon in which we catch an abundance o f
herring", or kikai-kizous, "the moon in which we sow". July was the moon in which
blueberries were ripe (sattai-kizous) and eel fishing began (matsinipenanmous),
September the moon o f acom gathering (maouinai-kizous), and November the moon o f
the beaver hunt {pekouamhani-kisoits). Given the diversity o f subsistence patterns in the
region, it is hardly surprising that neighboring communities had different names for the
months or that these names changed over time [see Table 1.1].15

15 Sebastien Rasies, A Dictionary o f the Abnaki Language, in North America, ed. John Pickering, in
Memoirs o f the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences, n. s., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Charles Folson, 1833),
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Wabanaki families tended to remain in places as long as food was abundant and to
work only as hard as was necessary to satisfy their immediate needs. The result was that
people ordered their days according to the tasks they had to perform, rather than to a rigid
schedule. Early European observers were often struck by the Wabanakis’ apparently
relaxed attitude toward the passage o f time. ”[T]heir days are nothing but pastime. They
are never in a hurry," remarked the Jesuit Pierre Biard in 1616, after having spent several
years in the fledgling colony o f Acadia. "Quite different from us, who can never do
anything without hurry and worry."16 The Sieur de Diereville, who visited Acadia some
seventy years afterward, noted that the Wabanakis "do not calculate the years by days,
weeks, or months, only by the nights, or by events o f importance which occur during
them, and frequently they let the time pass without keeping account o f it."17
The French, as Biard pointed out, were more conscious o f time than the
Wabanakis and demanded greater precision in its measurement. To the colonists, time
was palpable: something that could be spent, saved, or wasted, like money. Wabanakis,
by comparison, cared very little for these matters, being oblivious to the ticking o f clocks
and the demands o f fixed schedules. The difference was as much social as conceptual.
Broadly speaking, increased precision in time measurement has almost always been
associated with a growing scale o f human organization. In large-scale societies such as
Baroque France or the modem West, the coordination o f a multitude o f activities over
large areas makes it necessary to adopt units time are artificial, such as the twenty-four

478. On the names o f months, see also Gordon M. Day, "An Agawam Fragment," International Journal of
Linguistics 33 (1967): 244-47.
16JR ,3:85.
17 Sieur de Diereville, Relation o f the Voyage to Port Roval in Acadia or New France [1708], trans. Mrs.
Clarence Webster, ed. and intro. John Clarence Webster (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933), 172. Indians
counted years by winters, because wintertime was the hunting season: see Public Archives o f Canada,
Archives Nationales, Serie C l 1A, vol. 122, fol. 185 [future references to this series appear as PAC, AN].
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hour day or the seven-day week. The complex division o f labor in such societies means
that the pace o f work varies greatly from one vocation to the next. When people o f
different walks o f life communicate with each other, they need to use notions o f time that
have no necessary connection to their particular activities. The solution is to adopt
systems of measurement that are arbitrary and abstract, suited to the requirements of
large-scale activities but divorced from local contexts.18
But in small-scale societies where there is little division o f labor, people tend to
root their understanding o f time in experience. The important markers o f time are local,
not abstract. Just as Wabanakis saw the cyclical passage o f time in terms o f seasonal
activities, their understanding o f linear time —time as an arrow o f sequential events —
was framed in equally concrete terms. The important signposts o f history for them were
not numerical dates, but events that were local, idiosyncratic, and often highly personal: a
battle in which many villagers lost their lives, the day on which an infant died, a year in
which a comet was sighted in the sky. Because Wabanakis valued knowledge that was
acquired first-hand, they tended to personalize their understanding o f time, to place
themselves at the center o f the temporal universe. Storytellers in the Dawnland always
related historical events as if they themselves had been witnesses.19
Notions o f space were similarly framed in terms o f immediate experience. Just as
the months o f the calendar were linked to particularly activities, placenames served as a
map of locally available resources. The names given to many o f the bays, lakes, and

18 A. Irving Hallowell, "Temporal Orientation in Western Civilization and in a Pre-Literate Society,”
American Anthropologist 39 (1937): 647-70; Anthony F. Aveni, Empires o f Time: Calendars. Clocks, and
Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Carlo M. Cipolla, Clocks and Culture. 1300-1700 (New York:
Norton, 1977); Samuel L. Macey, The Dynamics o f Progress: Time. Method and Measure (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1989), 3-61; E. P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial
Capitalism,” Past and Present 38 (1967): 56-97; Gerard T. Moran, "Conception o f Time in Early Modem
France: An Approach to the History o f Collective Mentalities," Sixteenth Century Journal 12 (1981): 3-19.
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rivers o f the region suggest the intimate association between space and activity:
Passamaquoddy ("place where the pollock are taken"), Cobbosseecontee ("sturgeon
gathering place"), Kenduskeag ("eel-weir place"), Manesdayik ("place o f collecting
clams"). Other names call to mind the eye o f a traveller looking to set up camp near a
pleasant prospect: Penobscot ("where the rocks widen"), Wulastukw or the St. John
("beautiful river"), Androscoggin ("river o f rock shelters"). As elsewhere in native North
America, Wabanaki placenames imparted cultural and ecological knowledge that was
passed on from one generation to the next. Although people sometimes disagreed about
the precise meanings o f names, it was generally understood that places were intimately
linked with human activities.20
To Wabanakis, the landscape consisted of a host o f places whose attributes were
defined by the engagement o f people with their immediate environment. There was no
such thing as a culturally empty space; all natural features o f the land were filtered
through human experience. This view o f the land shared very little with the abstract
forms o f land measurement that Europeans rediscovered during the Renaissance:
Euclidean geometry, which allowed people to imagine space in terms o f ideal,
quantifiable shapes with regular dimensions, and Ptolemaic geography, which enabled
them to identify any point on the globe as a set of coordinates o f latitude and longitude.
The Euclidean universe presumed a number o f discrete forms, such as points, lines, and
shapes, that could be identified and measured according to their intrinsic properties: a

19 Speck, "Penobscot Tales," 35.
20 Fanny H. Eckstorm, Indian Place-Names o f the Penobscot Valiev and the Maine Coast. University of
Maine Studies in History and Government, 2nd ser., 55 (1941); American Friends Service Committee, The
Wabanakis o f Maine, section D, 22-23; Edwin H. Churchill, "The Evolution o f Maine Place Names,”
Maine Historical Society Quarterly 29 (1989): 66-90; Henry Lome Masta, Abenaki Names. Legends.
Grammar and Place Names (Victoriaville. Que.: La Voix des Bois-Francs, 1932); Patricia O. Afabie and
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square always had four sides, the angles o f a triangle always added up to 180°. Because
the regularities o f such forms never changed, their existence was independent o f context.
By the same token, standardized measures o f distance and size were also context-free:
just a pound o f lead weighed the same as a pound o f feathers, a mile o f valley and a mile
o f mountain were o f equal length.
By contrast, Wabanakis valued geographical knowledge that was dense with local
context; rather than isolating objects from their surroundings, they made connections
between the two. None o f their languages contained exact words for abstract shapes such
as triangle, square, and circle. Instead, they had a rich vocabulary for indicating the
qualities o f objects or relationships between objects. As in other Algonquian languages,
the Wabanaki lexicon contains a potentially infinite variety o f compound words, made by
combining verbs and nouns with affixes that modify their meaning. Many o f these
affixes, as well as various verbs and nouns, indicate location, shape, or direction. For
example, the Norridgewocks' word for land, as translated by Rale, was ki. When the
locative suffix -ek was added, the word became kik, "on the ground." The prefix spem-,
meaning "above" or "on high", produced spemkik, "above the ground", or heaven.
Alternatively, the prefix aranm-, "inside" or "under", made the word aranmkik, or hell. A
recent dictionary o f Western Abenaki includes over a hundred affixes denoting spatial
relationships or attributes.21
This manner o f word formation meant that Wabanaki representations o f space
were necessarily relational: they situated one object in terms o f another and indicated

Madison S. Beder, "Place-Names," in Ives Goddard, ed., Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 17
(Languages) (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1996), 185-99.
2'.American Friends Service Committee, Wabanakis o f Maine, section D, 69-74; Gordon M. Day, Western
Abenaki Dictionary. Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Service, Paper 128,2 vols. (Hull, Que.:
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shape as an attribute, not an abstraction. Context was an essential element in the
representation o f place and direction. Descriptions o f places without any local context
were useless to Wabanakis because they did not attach themselves to any o f the
guideposts by which they oriented themselves in the world. Instead, they placed value on
words and phrases that were thick with references to familiar landmarks, that emphasized
relationships rather than ideal forms. Even measurements o f distance were relative,
expressed in units o f a human scale. Short distances were represented as "looks" - the
furthest extent a person could see along a stretch o f river - while travel to more remote
places was measured in terms o f days and nights o f journey."
Wabanaki perceptions o f space and time were rooted in a distinctive way o f
knowing the world, which was shaped in turn by the patterns o f their daily activities.
Educated Westerners often equate intelligence with an ability to reason abstractly and
treat literacy as a necessary element o f education. These presumptions are rarely
questioned in a world where social success is difficult if not impossible without a degree
of formal learning. But in a small-scale society where survival depends on a direct
engagement with the natural environment, abstract reasoning has little utility and formal
learning is o f less value than the skills acquired through first-hand experience.
Wabanakis spent their entire lives developing a store o f wisdom about their environment,
taught by example and mastered through observation and practice. Men learned to tell
the size, age, and condition o f moose and deer simply by looking at their tracks,

Canadian Museum o f Civilization, 1994); Rasies, Dictionary. 455,497,533.
-- Paul J. Lindholdt, ed., John Josselvn. Colonial Traveler A Critical Edition o f Two Voyages to NewEneland [1674] (Hanover: University Press o f New England, 1988), 97; Frank G. Speck. Penobscot Man:
The Life History of a Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 79.
The Algonquian tendency to look for connections between subjects and objects is not limited to
descriptions of space. Many nouns always carry a possessive prefix —the Norridgewock word for father
was never "father" (*mittangous) in the abstract, but "my father" (nemi'ttangous), "your father"
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developed a detailed knowledge o f the migratory patterns, mating habits, and physiology
o f a wide variety o f species, and became highly skilled at tracking and marksmanship.
Women gained an equally impressive understanding o f botany, being able to identify
hundreds o f species o f plants, recall the medicinal properties o f herbs and roots, and raise
numerous domesticated crops. Such knowledge had value precisely because it was local
and idiosyncratic; the people who had the most thorough knowledge o f their immediate
environment were those who were best able to survive.

Paths and Knowledge
If islands and rivers were evidence o f Gluskap's deeds, paths and trails were the
visible residue o f human activities. As they moved from clam-digging to berry-picking
or made the rounds o f their trap lines, people cut trails through the brush or left tracks on
the ground. Because they were both the product and the conduits o f human action, travel
routes came to stand metaphorically for the activities they made possible. Just as months
and placenames drew their meaning from human action, trails and rivers gained
significance from their uses. Not surprisingly, paths were a recurrent motif in Wabanaki
culture: in the dictionary he compiled while living at Norridgewock, Father Rale listed
the local term for road or path (anoudi) and a host o f variants: ourighen (a good path),
matsighen anoudi (an evil path), tekouankanoutsesen (an ascending path),
penankanoutsesen (a descending path), pekaganoutsesen (a crossing path),
panbebetganoutssesen (a winding path), sasaghisoui (a straight path), ouani’te (a path in
the snow that no longer appears because the snow has melted). He also included a
number o f terms describing activities related to paths, including cutting a trail, searching

(kemi’ttangous), "his/her father" (wemi'ttangous).
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for a road, and praying while travelling. The expression to cut someone’s path
{nenitoupenaran nenitou'kasan, "I cut his path") meant to take a shortcut to talk to
someone who was already en route.23
Because they were evidence o f people's daily activities, paths came to represent
the distinctive life experiences o f individuals and groups. Among hunter-gatherers, it is
common for people to describe their personal histories as a matter o f following old trails
and blazing new ones. This tendency is true o f collectivities as well as individuals, since
paths were used by entire communities. The identity o f Wabanaki families was linked to
the networks o f rivers and paths they used for hunting, fishing, and gathering. According
to the ethnologist Frank Speck, who did fieldwork among the Penobscots early in the
twentieth century, hunting ranges in upland areas were traditionally known as nzi'bum,
literally "my river," and were marked by a set o f crossing trails that radiated from a
central campsite. Along these trails, people carved or painted their family emblems on
trees and rocks or cut out birch-bark silhouettes which they placed at the edges o f their
territory. The emblems were adopted after the animals most abundant in their lands or
because their family shared some characteristic with the animal. The animals themselves
were known as ndo'dem, or "my co-relative".24

23 Rasle, Dictionary. 384,411.
24 Tilly, Phenomenology of Landscape. 37-67; Frank G. Speck. Penobscot Man: The Life History of a
Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 77-78,203-17; Fannie
Hardy Eckstorm, Old John Nentune and Other Maine Indian Shamans (Portland, Me.: SouthworthAnthoensen Press, 194S), SO. In Algonquian languages, the word "totem," or odem, means a group of
people tied together by kinship; the Wabanaki name for S t Francois, Odanak, or "village," is a variant of
the same term. Totems also referred to the animals that were emblems o f families or groups (in Penobscot,
according to Frank Speck, they were known as ntuiem, or "my partner o f a strange race”). A French census
of 1736 mentions several emblems used by Wabanaki families, such as the bear, turtle, partridge, beaver,
and oner. A joint lener sent by the Noiridgewocks and their allies in 1721 represents each group by a
totem, as do the signatures of sagamores on treaties and land deeds. Totemic animals were distinct from
guardian spirits in that they could be spoken o f openly and were not subject to prohibitions against being
killed or eaten. See "Denombrement des Nations Sauvages,"l736, PAC, AN, Serie Cl IA, vol. 66, fols.
236-37; Frank G. Speck, "The Family Hunting Band as the Basis o f Algonkian Social Organization,"
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Family members believed that they were descended from a common ancestor and
shared stories about how this ancestor came to be. The inhabitants o f the estuaries o f the
Penobscot and St. John rivers, for example, believed that their origins lay in an encounter
that Gluskap had with a giant bullfrog who had swallowed the world's supply o f water.
Suffering from drought, both people and animals implored Gluskap to confront the
bullfrog and the Gluskap accorded their wish. He travelled to the bullfrog's lair and
politely asked him to release the waters, but the frog refused. Gluskap responded by
felling a tree that landed on the bullfrog's back, sending the water flushing out in a great
torrent. Some people were so eager to quench their thirst that they immediately dived
into the stream o f water and in so doing were transformed into turtles, lobsters, fish, and
other sea creatures. The descendants o f these animals took their family emblems from
these ancestors and made their homes near the stream o f water, which, according to one
version o f the story, had become the Penobscot River.25
The web o f connections that tied hunting territories to personal and family
identity meant that travel along trails and rivers was more than a matter of getting from
one place to the next. By habitually following certain routes for their hunting, families
established and reinforced bonds o f affinity between themselves, their ancestors, and the
animals and other spirits who dwelled on their land. Men who used the same hunting

American Anthropologist 17 (1915): 301; Theresa M. Schenck, "The Algonquian Totem and Totemism: A
Distortion of a Semantic Field, " in David H. Pentland, ed.. Papers o f the Twenty-Eighth Aleonauian
Conference (Winnipeg. Man.: University of Manitoba Press, 1997), 341-53; letter of Abenakis and their
allies to the English, July 28,1721, in James P. Baxter, The Pioneers o f New France in New England
(Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1894), 112-15.
25 Speck, "Penobscot Transformer Tales," 200-2; W. H. Mechling, "The Malecite Indians, with Notes on
the Micmacs," Anthropologica. 1st ser., 7 (1958), 111. By the nineteenth century, many o f the "salt water"
families with fish, turtles, or other sea creatures as their totems had moved upland. Speck speculated that
salt water families, whose myths o f origin were not shared by upland families, may have been migrants
from southern New England. But recent archaeological research has shown that there were distinct
estuarine and upland populations in Maine for thousands o f years before European contact The creation o f
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trails every winter developed a superior knowledge o f their local environment and tended
to have greater success in the hunt than less experienced partners. From a Wabanaki
point o f view, this success was best explained not in terms o f factual knowledge but as a
consequence o f the social bond that developed between hunters and their game.
Wabanakis believed in a reciprocal relationship between people and neighboring
animals, sustained by a continuous flow o f exchanges between the two groups. The
animals were thought to be persons - "bodies animated by a rational spirit," according to
an eighteenth-century French observer —who allowed themselves to be killed if hunters
treated them with proper respect. People went to great lengths not to offend their prey,
hanging the bones of dead animals on trees, cutting out fishes' eyes so the fish would not
see who had killed them, and never burning the bones o f animals. If the animals were
shown appropriate courtesy, they would reward hunters by giving themselves as prey, and
in some cases by acting as the hunters' guardian spirits. If not, their spirits would refuse
to be reborn and the hunters' lands would be depleted o f game. Because men could not
have success in the hunt without the favor o f the animals they pursued, it was important
to develop a sense of familiarity between themselves and the animals' spirits. The
creation o f this bond o f trust required hunters to establish channels that linked them with
their quarry: paths that led them to the same places year after year and rituals that
expressed their respect for the animal spirits.26

a single Penobscot "tribe" that included both inland and coastal populations was probably a post-contact
phenomenon resulting from generations o f intermarriage and social interaction between the two groups.
26 Diereville, Relation. 161; JR, 3:131-35; "Memoiie sur les sauvages Abenakis par M. le Cardinal, 1723,"
Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres. memoires. et autres documents historioues relatifs a la
Nouvelle-France. 4 vols. (Quebec: Imprimerie A. Cote et Cie., 1883-85), 3:96-97 (future references to this
series appear as CDRH); Rasies, Dictionary. 470; Frank G. Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism," American
Anthropological Association Memoirs. 6 (1919), 238-88; Speck, "Penobscot Tales," 22-27; Eckstorm, Old
John Neptune. 37,97; Calvin Martin, Keeners o f the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur
Trade (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1978).
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Travel renewed the ties that attached people to their surroundings and reinforced
the feeling o f kinship they had with their animal relatives. Paths were not merely a
means o f transportation but a social medium that connected people with their natural
environment. A similar flow o f interaction allowed families to cultivate harmonious
relations with their human neighbors. Wabanakis often described political alliances as
paths that were kept clear through constant use. If the paths were not followed, if the
allies failed to keep up the constant flow o f transactions necessary for effective
communication, they would become overgrown and disappear. It was commonplace for
orators in the Dawnland to exhort their allies to keep the paths between their villages free
o f obstacles.
One o f the earliest recorded uses of this metaphor was spoken in 1653 by a
Wabanaki ambassador, in response to an incident that had taken place the previous
winter. Five men from a Connecticut River village who were hunting in the lands south
of the St. Lawrence River had been caught and tortured by Algonquins from Sillery, who
mistakenly thought the hunters were Iroquois lying in ambush. When the prisoners were
brought back to Sillery, a Montagnais chief identified them as Wabanakis, and the
Algonquins released two o f them, sending them to their country with orders to bring back
a representative o f their village. Soon after his arrival at Sillery in May 1653, the
Wabanaki ambassador laid out several strings and belts o f wampum in the house o f a
Jesuit, which he explained one by one to his Algonquin counterparts.
The first belt had a violet and white pattern that illustrated the route between
Sillery and his village. Lifting it up, he told the Algonquins, "Behold the route that you
must take to come and visit your friends." The belt, he continued, depicted the all lakes,
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rivers, mountains, portages, and waterfalls to be passed on the way. "Note everything,"
he implored them, "to the end that, in the visits that we shall pay one another no one may
get lost. The roads will be easy now, and no more ambuscades will be feared. All
persons who are met will be so many friends." The knowledge contained in the wampum
belt allowed both parties to prevent misunderstandings o f the kind that had happened in
the winter and gave them a means to explain themselves when such mishaps did occur.
The third string o f wampum, made in the form o f earrings, made this point clearer.
"Those," said the ambassador, "are for piercing your ears, in order that we may speak to
one another as friends are wont to do, and that we may take part in one another's
councils." As the ambassador and his listeners knew, alliances could not exist without
continuous communication, and the significance o f paths, literally and metaphorically,
was that they made this interaction possible.27
Paths were also a medium in the sense o f being a material upon which people
could inscribe their thoughts and memories, a kind o f natural canvas. Knowledge to the
Wabanakis was not an abstraction but a palpable object, something that was alive. To
acquire a piece o f knowledge was to form an alliance with it, much in the same way that
people formed political unions with their neighbors or reciprocal relationships with
animals. Such alliances could only be sustained through constant renewal, since a
person's skills were easily lost without frequent practice. A common method o f
remembering bits o f knowledge was to encode them in the landscape, either by making a
physical inscription upon a rock or a tree or by taking mental note o f a certain place.

27 JR. 40:195-209, cit. 205. The path or road was a frequently-used metaphor in diplomatic speaking
throughout eastern North America. See "Glossary," in Francis Jennings, ed., History and Culture of
Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties o f the Six Nations and their League
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 121.
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Because paths regularly brought people back to these familiar places, they constantly
revived knowledge that would otherwise be forgotten. Trails themselves were a form o f
knowledge that could be taught, learned, and remembered; Rale's dictionary includes an
entry for the term neki'kinoussaran, literally, "I teach him/her the path."28
The physical layout o f Rale's own mission at Norridgewock provides an example
o f how information could be written into places. During his thirty years at
Norridgewock, Rale presided over the construction o f a large, well-adomed church east
o f the village's palisade, as well as two smaller chapels, one dedicated to the Virgin Mary
and the other to the Guardian Angel. Both chapels were built on the path leading to the
woods and the fields, and Rale observed approvingly that whenever people passed by the
chapels, they went inside to offer prayers. The location o f the chapels next to the village's
main path was probably strategic, for it integrated Christian ritual into the daily activities
o f the villagers. When leaving to go to the fields in the morning and returning to their
homes later in the day, men and women always passed by the two chapels, which
reminded them to pray and acted as avenues o f communication with the spiritual world.29
The village's path in this case played a role analogous to the Christian calendar.
The round o f sabbaths, saints' days, fast days, and holidays punctuated the year with
reminders o f important events in the life o f Christ and his apostles. The names o f these
holidays in Wabanaki were often vivid and literal descriptions o f these events: Easter was

28 Rasies, Dictionary. 445. Penobscot storytellers often prefaced their tales by saying, fVawigi:
ndatlokagan, or "Here lives my story.” See Speck, "Penobscot Tales,” 34. On the significance of
knowledge among northern Algonquians generally, see Robin Ridington, "Knowledge, Power, and the
Individual in Subarctic Hunting Societies," American Anthropologist 90 (1988): 98*110.
29 JR. 67: 85-87; Prins and Bourque, "Norridgewock,” 148-49. Fixing ideas in places was a common
Jesuit practice; Jesuit novices remembered religious precepts by building "memory palaces" that attached
the precepts to frequently-visited spots. See Frances A. Yates, The Art o f Memory (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1966); Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace o f Matteo Ricci (New York:
Viking/Penguin Press, 1985).
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ni etwousi kigh'housisa, "when he resurrects", the Ascension was ni edoutsi spemkik
ariransa, "when he ascends to Heaven", the Assumption was ni edoutsi sang-Mari
spemkik aroussaresa, "when blessed Mary ascends to Heaven". Though these days were
celebrated by all, their significance could be highly personal. The missionary o f the
Wabanaki village o f Odanak (St. Francois), near Trois-Rivieres, reported that his
parishioners were eager to leam about the lives o f their patron saints and showed great
joy when they were told that it was their saint's day. Some kept painted images o f their
patron and even tried to adopt his or her characteristic virtues. The calendar in these
instances served the same purpose as the layout o f the village, imparting and reinforcing
Christian concepts through constant repetition. Knowledge was encoded into the cycles
o f daily life, making it possible to retain important ideas by following familiar paths and
observing the passage o f the seasons.30
Far from being wholesale European introductions, these practices were accepted
by the inhabitants o f Norridgewock and Odanak precisely because they conformed to
native ways o f thinking. Wabanakis had themselves developed a variety o f methods for
remembering ideas with the aid o f the landscape, some of which had been in use for
thousands o f years. The most visible o f these methods were travel shrines and rock art,
many examples o f which still scatter the landscape o f New England and the Maritimes.
Travel shrines were heaps o f material —usually stone, but occasionally brush or sticks placed at the sides o f trails or pathways where important historical or mythological events
had occurred. When travellers passed by a shrine, they threw a stone or some other

30 Rasies, Dictionary. 455; JR, 63:35. Other Christian concepts have similarly evocative names in
Wabanaki languages —in Western Abenaki, the crucifixion is sidakwatahodwogan, "being struck right to
the wood", and the incarnation is called alnobaiosowogan, "he becomes a human being” or more precisely,
"he becomes an Indian". See Joseph Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues (Quebec:
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object on the heap as a way o f commemorating the event. A notable example o f such a
shrine was the pair o f stone heaps known as "the Two Brothers," erected at a Casco Bay
conference between Massachusetts officials and the leaders o f Norridgewock,
Anmesokkanti, and Naurakamigou in June 1701. At the end o f the conference, the two
parties agreed that they should commemorate their alliance by raising two heaps o f stones
because, as the Indian delegates put it, "We understand it better than signing o f a
writing." At a place known as Andrews' Point, the commissioners o f Massachusetts each
laid foundation stones and the other English added smaller stones until they had formed a
square pyramid. The Indians made a "roundish" pyramid nearby. Andrews' Point was
renamed Two Brothers Point, and whenever the English or Indian delegates passed by the
caims, they added stones to the two heaps as a symbol o f their continued alliance.31
Natural features o f the landscape could serve a similar purpose, allowing people
to recall past events by associating them with the places where they occurred. Various
points o f land surrounding the Penobscot village o f Panawapskik (Indian Island) were
named after incidents in the seventeenth-century war against the Mohawks, and the
names survived into the twentieth century. At a ledge in Passadumkeag Stream about
five miles from its mouth, a company o f old women had been killed by raiding Mohawks,
who scalped them and impaled their bodies on stakes. The pointed boulder where the
event took place is known locally as Psinkwandissek, or Scalping Rock. On another

Leger Brousseau, 1884), 13; Day, Western Abenaki. 1:32,450,458.
31 William N. Sainsbury, J. W. Fortescue, Arthur P. Newton, eds.. Calendar o f State Panets. Colonial
Series: America and the West Indies. 44 vols. (London: Public Record Office, 1860-1969), vol. 20 (1702),
fols. 119,810 (future references to this series are cited as CSPV. Samuel Penhallow, The History of the
Wars o f New-Eneland with the Eastern Indians... [1726] (Cincinnati: Dodge and Harpel, 1859), 16.
Examples of travel shrines have been found not only in New England but throughout the Americas and in
small-scale societies around the world. See William S. Simmons, Spirit o f the New England Tribes: Indian
History and Folklore. 1620-1984 (Hanover. University Press o f New England, 1986), 251-56; Stephen C.
Jett, "Cairn and Brush Shrines in the United States Northeast and Southeast" Northeast Anthropology 48
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occasion, the Penobscots captured a Mohawk and brought him back to Panawapskik,
putting him to death on a square boulder located at the end o f the village's main path.
They buried him there, but soon afterward they found the grave full o f stones: the
Mohawks, according to rumor, had stealthily taken his body away and filled the hole with
rocks. The Penobscots kept the memory o f this event alive by recounting its details when
they passed the boulder, the outcropping o f rock acting as a mnemonic device that
preserved historical knowledge.32
Natural features o f this kind were more than symbols, for in many cases
Wabanakis considered them to be alive, to be inhabited by spirits. In his account o f his
first voyage to the Kennebec River in 1605, the French explorer Samuel de Champlain
noticed a cape along the river - probably Hockomock Point, a high bluff near the river’s
mouth -- where people left arrows whenever they passed by it. According to Champlain,
they believed that "unless they do this, misfortune will befall them." Several decades
later, the fur trader Nicolas Denys observed a tree that floated in the water not far from
the St. John River. Nearby Indians called it a "manitou" (a spirit) and made offerings of
peltries and arrowheads when they encountered it. Writing in the same decade as Denys,
the English naturalist John Josselyn noted that when Indians in New England were cured
o f diseases, they sent wampum belts and furs "to the Eastward, where there is a vast Rock
not far from shore, having a hole in it o f an unsearchable profundity, into which they
throw them."33 The offerings that Wabanakis left to the spirits o f these places were

(1994): 61-67.
32 Speck, Penobscot Man. 192-94; Churchill, "Evolution o f Maine Place Names," 72.
33 H. P. Biggar, ed., The Works o f Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922, 1:
316-17; Nicolas Denys, The Description and Natural History o f the Coasts o f North America (Acadial
[1672] (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1908), trans. and ed. William F. Ganong, 117; Lindholdt, John
Josselvn. 96. See also Denys, Description. 112; CDRH. 3:98.
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probably intended as tokens o f respect, meant to preserve a sense o f mutuality between
travellers and the spirits o f the land. Failure to observe these practices would have
displeased the spirits, leading them to bring bad luck to the travellers. Unusual natural
features such as floating trees and oddly-shaped rocks were similar to animals in that they
were sentient beings who possessed great power. People could harness this power and
use it in their own favor, but only if they managed to avoid offending the spirits.
Certain points o f the landscape acted as preferred channels o f communication
with the spirit world, some formed by nature but others made through human effort. At a
few sites in northern New England, people engraved ledges o f rock with images o f
people, animals, and other forms. Typically, these rock carvings are located next to water
and beside major thoroughfares o f travel. In some cases, such as the petroglyphs on the
shore o f the Kennebec River near present-day Solon, there are over a hundred distinct
figures depicted at a single site. At Solon and at other petroglyph sites in the Dawnland,
the etchings feature many o f the motifs characteristic o f rock art among North Americans
generally and northern Algonquians in particular: phallic figures, vulvaforms, men in
canoes, men with raised arms or horns, animals such as moose or deer, mythical figures
o f Algonquian legend such as the homed serpent and the thunderbird, and shapes such as
dots, lines, and crosses [see Figs. 1.1-3]. In both New England and in other parts o f
North America, these images were usually associated with shamanism.34

34 Roger B. Ray, "The Embden, Maine, Petroglyphs," Maine Historical Society Quarterly 27 (1987): 1423; idem., "The Machiasport Petroglyphs," Maine Historical Society Quarterly 25 (1985): 22-39; Dean R.
Snow, "The Solon Petroglyphs and Eastern Abenaki Shamanism," in William Cowan, ed., Paners of the
Seventh Aleonouian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1976), 281-88; idem., "Rock Art and
the Power of Shamans," Natural History 86 (1977): 42-49; William A. Haviland and Matjory W. Power,
"Visions in Stone: A New Look at the Bellows Falls Petroglyphs," Northeast Anthropology 50 (1995): 91107; Churchill, "Evolution o f Maine Placenames,” 75; Marion Robertson, Rock Drawings o f the Micmac
Indians (Halifax: Nova Scotia Museum, 1973); Campbell Grant, The Rock Art o f the North American
Indians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 53-55; Kenneth E. Kidd, Indian Paintings o f the
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Known at Norridgewock as meteourenouak, shamans were men, and sometimes
women, who sought power with the assistance o f the spiritual world. They typically had
one or more guardian spirits (known in Penobscot as a baohigan), who enabled them to
foretell the future and brought them good fortune in hunting and other activities. Both
the shaman and his spirits were able to change shape, transforming themselves into
animals, human beings, balls o f fire, or other objects. The baohigan would do its
master's bidding, but only if the shaman found the means to communicate with it. The
success o f shamans depended upon this skill, for the spirits needed to be cajoled into
working in their interests. People could come into contact with the spirits in their dreams
or by entering a trance state through a combination o f fasting, sweat baths, meditative
isolation, or repetitive drumming and chanting. When shamans reached these altered
states of consciousness, their souls left their bodies, journeying to distant regions,
performing remarkable feats, and speaking with other spirit beings.35
Before they went into a trance, people often went to places that conducive to
communication with the spirits. Spots near the water were preferred, for it was thought
that the underwater world was a spiritually-charged place where people could find both
valuable substances such as shell and copper, as well as mythological beings such as the
great homed serpent. Numerous scholars have argued that the rock art sites o f northern
New England, all located near water, were sacred places that shamans used as a gateway

Great Lakes. 2nd ed. (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1967).
35 Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism,” esp. 249-53; Eckstorm, Old John Neptune, esp. 5,97; CDRH. 3:97;
Rasies, Dictionary. 471. Rile lists the singular form, meteourenou. Speck translates the term baohigan as
"instrument of mystery”, but in his recent dictionary o f Western Abenaki Gordon Day glossed the
morpheme bao- as "exert personal power by wishing, wish with power", suggesting that a more apt
translation might be "grantor o f wishes". See Day, Western Abenaki Dictionary, xxix.
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to the spirit world.36 The figures etched in stone were probably depictions o f the spirits
and images they encountered when their spirits journeyed out o f their bodies. When
shamans returned to rock art sites, the etchings they found there were guides that linked
them back to the spirit world, providing them with a map o f the paths their souls had
taken in previous journeys.
While the intended meaning o f these maps was accessible only to their authors, it
is likely that people who had acquired a degree o f shamanistic knowledge could "read"
the etchings o f others, to the extent that they could decipher the significance o f common
motifs. The readers could then use the maps sketched by others to help induce a trance of
their own. The location o f rock art sites along travel routes suggests that they were meant
to be treated in this way and were not merely mnemonic devices but a form o f
communication. Rock carvings were palimpsests, texts whose originals were constantly
being rewritten but never entirely erased. When shamans visited the petroglyphs, they
preserved memories o f their own visions by inscribing them in stone, and also drew
power from the etchings of previous visitors. Because rock art tended to be located at
well-frequented places -- the Solon site, for example, was near a fishing spot not far from
the village Norridgewock -- it became one o f the methods by which spiritual knowledge
was passed on from person to person and from one generation to the next.37

36 Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone," esp. 97-107; Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism," 253; Ray,
"Machiasport Petroglyphs," 33-4.
37 Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone,"; Speck, 'Tenobscot Shamanism,". Recent scholarship on rock
art in North America provides many relevant cross-cultural comparisons: see especially Joan M. Vastokas
and Romas K. Vastokas, Sacred Art o f the Algonkians: A Study o f the Peterborough Petroglyphs
(Peterborough, Ont.: Monsart Press, 1973); Annie York, Richard Daly and Chris Amett, They Write Their
Dream on the Rock Forever Rock Writings o f the Stein River Valiev o f British Columbia (Vancouver:
Talonbooks, 1993); Thor Conway, Painted Dreams: Narive American Rock Art (Minocqua, Wis.: North
Word Press, 1993); idem, "Scotia Lake Pictograph Site: Shamanic Rock Art in North-Eastern Ontario,”
Man in the Northeast 37 (1989): 1-24.
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The value o f such knowledge was social as well as instrumental, for it bound
people together through their shared experiences and beliefs. The spirit journeys encoded
in petroglyphs, like the stories that dwelt in travel shrines and natural features, had
significance not only because they reminded people o f important truths or because they
contained useful advice. Their telling and retelling also brought people together and
formed bonds o f solidarity between those who shared such knowledge. The inhabitants
of Panawapskik all knew that hundreds o f places in the vicinity o f their village contained
fragments o f their collective history. The recounting o f the stories that made up this
history brought tellers and their listeners together, giving each a sense o f membership in
the community. The landscape in this sense was a symbolic resource that helped to
establish and sustain human relationships. To know the names o f places and the stories
that lay behind them was to ally oneself with a particular worldview, a shared set of
understandings about the workings o f the world. By learning these points o f reference,
people gained a sense o f belonging, both to their community and to their natural
surroundings. At Norridgewock and other places in the Dawnland, people were inclined
to say, nekak'santekandamen ioukki, or "I am attached to this land."38

Hunting Territories
By aligning themselves with those who shared an attachment to the land, people
also drew a line o f difference that separated their community from outsiders. To hunt
along a stream and its tributaries, to use the estuary o f river, to walk along a set o f paths,
was to lay claim to the land, to establish a set o f reciprocal bonds that made the
environment a part o f one's self. Those who did not follow the same paths were

38 Rasies, Dictionary. 388.
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outsiders, who lacked both knowledge and experience o f these paths and as a
consequence had not established a right to use the land. Whether this bond between
families and their environment constituted a form o f ownership is a question that has
been hotly disputed by scholars in this century.
Among the first writers to weigh in on this matter was Frank Speck, whose
fieldwork among the Penobscots, Montagnais, and other tribes in the first half o f the
twentieth century led him to develop the notion o f "northern Algonquian hunting
territories." Through interviews with hunters, Speck discovered that many Algonquianspeaking groups in the Northeast divided forested areas into clearly-defined hunting tracts
that belonged to particular families and were heritable. On the basis o f his reading o f
historical sources, Speck argued that this practice developed before the arrival o f
Europeans and was rooted in the ecological realities o f North America's northern
deciduous forests. Because groups in this region were relatively dependent on the meat
of smaller, sedentary mammals such as beaver and squirrels, the geographical distribution
of animal resources in their territories did not fluctuate greatly from one year to the next.
By comparison to subarctic hunters, whose pursuit o f migratory animals such as deer and
caribou forced them to range widely across the tundra, Wabanakis were more likely to
subsist on a familiar network o f rivers and trails to which they returned every year.
Because their livelihood depended on the animals killed along these routes, hunters
developed a degree o f proprietary interest in their territories and were more inclined to
protect their traplines against the incursions o f trespassers.39

39 Speck, "The Family Hunting Band,” 289-305; Frank G. Speck and Loren C. Eiseley, "The Significance
of the Hunting Territory Systems of the Alongkians in Social Theory," American Anthropologist 41
(1939): 269-80.
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Speck's description o f Algonquian hunting territories was challenged in a 19S4
article by Eleanor Leacock, who called into question both their aboriginality and their
significance in the historical period. Basing her claims on documentary research and
interviews conducted with Montagnais from Quebec’s Lower North Shore, Leacock
found that hunters seasonally moved from one hunting territory to the next depending on
the abundance and scarcity o f game. Families were somewhat protective o f their
trap lines, but allowed other hunters to use their territories to hunt for deer, caribou, and
other animals taken solely for their meat. Leacock argued that hunting territories did not
exist before the development o f the European fur trade and contended that exclusive
hunting territories existed only in the case o f animals taken for sale rather than those
captured for use. The latter point was later extended and applied to colonial New
England by William Cronon, who maintained that Indians claimed use rights to specific
resources rather than full ownership o f the land itself. The terms on which groups held
usufruct rights to different species o f game depended on the distribution and migratory
habits o f the animals: sedentary animals such as beaver were more likely to give rise to
well-defined hunting territories than more migratory species such as moose or deer.-10
A more recent study by Harald Prins has also cast a shadow o f doubt on the
empirical basis o f Speck's notion o f Algonquian hunting territories. Through interviews
with Mi'kmaq and Maliseet families, Prins reconstructed the history o f land use in the St.
John River Valley in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with an eye toward mapping
the geographical distribution o f hunting activities. Instead o f finding a clearly-drawn set

40 Eleanor B. Leacock, "The Montagnais 'Hunting Territory' and the Fur Trade," American
Anthropological Association Memoirs 78 (1954); idem., "Relations o f Production in Band Society," in
Eleanor B. Leacock and Richard B. Lee, eds., Politics and History in Band Societies (Cambridge:
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o f territorial boundaries, Prins discovered considerable overlap in the hunting tracts o f
different families, consistent sharing o f resources, and a remarkable fluidity in tribal
alignments. Dismissing Speck's notion o f hunting territories as ahistorical and overly
rigid, Prins suggested that Wabanaki groups in the nineteenth century, and probably
earlier, organized their lands into ambiguously defined hunting "ranges" whose territorial
limits were permeable and whose geographical extent changed according to the
availability o f game and the distribution o f human population.41
Yet there is documentary evidence o f Wabanaki hunting territories dating to the
early eighteenth century; whether they corresponded Speck's well-defined "tracts" or
Prins's vaguely delineated "ranges" is open to dispute. The earliest description o f
Wabanaki territoriality was written in 1710 by an anonymous Jesuit missionary. "These
Indians divide hunting territories amongst themselves, each family head having a river
where he goes to hunt," he observed. "[A] man o f another family would never hunt there
without running the risk o f being accused o f theft, for which he would have to make
amends if the owner were convinced o f his guilt." Twenty-one years later, the surveyorgeneral o f New England's forests, David Dunbar, made a similar observation. On a visit
to the Penobscots to inquire about lands that he wanted to purchase, Dunbar spoke to a
former resident o f Norridgewock named Captain Nathaniel, whom he considered "a very
senceible man." Nathaniel told Dunbar that "it is the received opinion o f every Indian
that by nature, each has an interest in every individual spot o f ground, and that it is

Cambridge University Press, 1982), 159-70; William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians. Colonists, and
the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 58-70.
41 Harald E. L. Prins, "Tribulations o f a Border Tribe: A Discourse on the Political Ecology o f the
Aroostook Band o f Micmacs (16th-20th Centuries)" (Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research, 1988),
203-87; see also Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759, Ethnohistorv 36
(1989), 274-75.
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inalienable," but that "they agree for peace and order sake among themselves, to have
certain rivers, ponds, and tracts o f land for their particular fishing and hunting." In 1764,
the surveyor Joseph Chadwick confirmed Dunbar's report, indicating that along the
Penobscot River, "their hunting ground and streams were all parcelled out to certain
families, time out o f mind."42
All three writers indicated that hunting territories were a tradition o f long
standing, not a recent innovation. Although there is no documentary proof o f the
existence o f hunting territories in the seventeenth century, circumstantial evidence
suggests that they predated European contact. Archaeological findings at Ceramic period
sites in Maine's interior indicate a heavy reliance on beaver and other sedentary animals;
over 90% o f the faunal remains at some sites consist o f beaver bones. Even in the
historical period, Wabanakis trapped beaver as much for their meat as their pelts; during
his 1711 voyage from Nova Scotia to Quebec, Major John Livingston and his Indian
guides subsisted mainly on beaver as they passed through Maine's interior. This
dependence on sedentary animals probably fostered a more pronounced sense o f
territoriality among hunters.43
It is possible that the introduction o f the fur trade made hunters more protective of
their lands, but given the modest scale o f the fur trade before the 1620s, it hardly seems

42 "Relation par lettres de l’Amerique septentrionalle," PAC, AC, Serie C l 1A, vol. 122, fols. 302v-303 (my
translation; the original reads: "Ces Sauvages se partagent entre eux les endroits de chasse, chaque chef de
famille a une riviere ou il va la faire et ou un homme d'un autre famille n'oseroit aller chasser a moins qu'il
ne veuille qu'on 1'accuse de larcin auquel il faut qu'il satisfasse sil en est convaincu."); Lt. Gov. Dunbar to
Mr. Popple, from Fredericksfort, Nov. 17,1730, CSP. vol. 37 (1730), fol. 533, pp. 345-46; Joseph
Chadwick, "An Account o f a Journey from Fort Pownal —now Fort Point —Up the Penobscot River to
Quebec, in 1764.11Bangor Historical Magazine 4 (18891:143.
43 Dean R. Snow, "Wabanaki Family Hunting Territories," American Anthropologist 70 (1968): 1143-51;
Arthur E. Spiess, "Archaic Period Subsistence in New England and the Atlantic Provinces," in Brian S.
Robinson, James B. Petersen, and Ann K. Robinson, eds., Earlv Holocene Occupation in Northern New
England. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology 9 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation
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likely that the territories were a product o f European contact. A more credible
explanation is that population pressures in the Ceramic period forced families to develop
more exclusive claims to the places where they hunted and fished. When large numbers
o f people are competing for scarce resources, there is a tendency to establish social
controls that prevent over-exploitation, such as stinting (intentionally limiting one's use of
a resource) or to introduce property rights (which exclude others from using it). In
arranging river basins into hunting territories, Wabanakis gave each family sole
responsibility for managing the tract from which its members drew their livelihood. If
someone overhunted his territory, he ran the risk o f offending the animals who lived near
his river, making it likely that these animals would refuse to let themselves be killed in
future years. It was therefore in the hunter’s interest to limit his annual hunt and to
prevent others from using his lands. Chadwick noted that Penobscot families hunted only
once every third year, killing two-thirds o f the beaver and leaving the rest to breed.
"[T]heir Beavers," he added, "were as much their stock for a living as Englishman's cattle
was his living." The absence o f such controls would have depleted the stock o f beavers
and led to disputes between families over the right to hunt prized areas.44
The rights that families enjoyed to such territories were established through
customary use and reinforced by experienced hunters' superior knowledge o f familiar
environments. When hunting trails became overgrown —when the channels that linked
hunters to their quarry were not used -- hunters effectively relinquished any prior claim to
use of their hunting grounds. If outside observers had attempted to map the distribution

Commission, 1992), 176-78, Appendices B-C; "A Journall o f the Travails o f Major John Livingstone,"
February 23,1710/11, C§P, 25 (1710-11), fol. 673.
44 Chadwick, "An Account," 143. Frank Speck remarked that Penobscots left portions o f their hunting
territories fallow every year. See Speck, Penobscot Man. 207.
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o f hunting territories in any single season, they would have been able to identify certain
families with their respective hunting trails. But if they kept records for a longer period,
they would have been forced to draw a more complicated picture. Changes in the
distribution o f resources constantly forced families to move to new areas and find new
hunting trails. More importantly, families themselves were in a state o f continual
evolution, as births, deaths, marriages, and adoptions changed their composition. Sons
replaced fathers as heads o f household, newly-weds moved in with their spouses’
families, boys came o f age and joined the hunting party. If a family became too large, or
if there was not enough game to support it, people might split from the main lodge to find
a territory of their own, marking its paths with a new family emblem.45
Although Harald Prins claims to have refuted Speck's theory o f hunting territories,
their descriptions o f hunting practices are not necessarily incompatible. In any one
season, hunters would have been dispersed into their respective territories, each family
distinguishing itself by using a particular network o f rivers, lakes, and trails. But as
people formed friendships and gained new kin, they inevitably moved into new hunting
territories and abandoned old ones. Anthropologist Jose Mailhot has observed this
pattern among the present-day Montagnais-Naskapi o f Labrador; because o f marriages,
births, deaths, and evolving friendships, people in this region typically move into new
hunting territories once every five years. Such moves are almost always a direct
consequence o f changing social relationships and Mailhot argues that the territorial

45 Speck, Penobscot Man. 208-209,229-30.
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distribution o f band members during a hunting season is "a spatial projection o f operative
kinship ties at that precise moment."46
To treat hunting territories as containers in which people lived out their lives, in
other words, is to put the cart before the horse. As they passed through various stages o f
the life-cycle, people formed new social relationships and dissolved others; the changing
use o f hunting territories reflected these changes. Land use was so integrated into the
cultural world o f Wabanakis that it was impossible to separate questions o f ownership
from patterns o f kinship. Because the land was filtered through the lens o f people's daily
activities, it made little sense to treat it as an alienable commodity. More accurately, it
was a source of life that provided Wabanakis with all the materials they needed to
survive; food, clothing, shelter, transportation. Material sustenance was so closely tied to
the land that people at Norridgewock said that they "ate" their fields. To deny a family
land under such circumstances was to condemn it to starvation -- an unthinkable act
among the Wabanakis, who shared food as a matter o f course. Family hunting territories
allowed people to enjoy the fruits o f the land equally and represented a form of
communal sharing. To equitably share the land's common wealth, villages allotted
hunting territories to individual families so that each would have enough resources to
feed itself.47

46 Jose Mailhot, "Territorial Mobility Among the Montagnais-Naskapi o f Labrador," Anthrooologica. n. s.,
28(1986): 92-107, cit. 104.
47 Rasies, Dictionary. 407. Indians in southern New England also said that they "ate” the land and it was
common among North American Indians to describe hunting grounds as a "plate" from which all could eat
See Bragdon, Native People. 136; "Parolles des sauvages Onnondaguez, a Monsieur le marquis de
Vaudreuil," Montreal, January 28,1710, PAC, AN, Serie C11A, vol. 31, fol. 91; Victor P. Lytwyn, "A
Dish with One Spoon: The Shared Hunting Grounds Agreement in the Great Lakes and S t Lawrence
Valley Region," in Pentland, Papers o f the Twenty-Eighth Algonquian Conference. 210-227. Judging from
Speck's map o f nineteenth-century hunting territories in Maine, the tracts seem to have been similar in size,
all being large enough to feed an extended family.
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Because it was membership in a community that gave a person rights to the land,
the boundaries o f land ownership were shaped by the limits o f sociability. Property rights
are primarily social, not legal, in character: broadly defined, they are relationships
between people with respect to the right to use certain objects. If a family "owns" a tract
of land, it is because its neighbors recognize that it has established an exclusive claim to
its use. The concept o f ownership necessarily draws a line o f distinction between people
who enjoy these rights and those who do not. A shared right to the land implies a sense
of mutuality, and if this right is not extended to others it is because they are outsiders,
people who do not belong to the community. The Western legal tradition has tended to
treat these matters implicitly, emphasizing not relationships between people but the
relationship between the object and its owner. The strength o f a claimant's rights to the
land, from this point o f view, is based on the extent to which he or she has developed a
rationale for its exclusive enjoyment: someone might claim possession to a piece o f land
by inheritance, by purchase, by custom, or by discovery. Wabanakis were more inclined
to make the social character o f property explicit, paying greater attention to the human
consequences o f dividing the land. The most important consideration from this
perspective was not the strength o f an individual's claims to ownership but the effect of
land tenure on human relations.48
It was this emphasis on the social dimension o f land ownership that represented
the most important difference between English and Indian notions o f land tenure, more so
than the distinction between usufruct rights and absolute rights to the land. The concept
of usufruct originated in Roman law, which had a highly restrictive definition o f property

48 Bragdon, Native People. 135-9; Cronon, Changes in the Land. 54-81; Alan Barnard and James
Woodbum, "Introduction,'' in Tim Ingold, David Riches, James Woodbum, eds., Hunters and Gatherers. 2
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as an absolute and inalienable right held by individuals. Usufruct, literally "use and
enjoyment," was a residual category that accounted for cases o f land use that did not fit
this narrow definition. English common law, by contrast, allowed much greater latitude
in the definition of real property rights and accommodated customary uses o f forests,
commons, and rivers. The records o f every colony in New England are replete with
examples o f usufruct rights: water rights, fishing rights, mill rights, rights o f way. Rather
than accepting an anachronistic separation o f absolute and usufruct rights, it makes far
greater sense to treat ownership, as Henry Sumner Maine once put it, as a socially
recognized "bundle o f rights and duties."49 Because colonists and Indians used the land
differently, it follows that the bundle o f rights that each group accorded to land owners
was not the same. The intensive farming practices o f the English forced them to rework
large swaths of territory and they tended to see land ownership as a matter o f possessing
surface area. Wabanakis, on the other hand, were likely to view possession in terms o f
the paths and rivers that gave them access to plants and animals. But the two groups were
distinguished by more than the kinds o f rights they accorded to the land; the manner in
which these rights were asserted and protected was altogether different. Wabanaki land
tenure was characterized, to a degree that would have been unimaginable to the English,
by an inextricable connection between land use and patterns o f sociability. Because the
land was owned communally, the most important criterion in determining ownership was

vols. (Oxford: Berg, 1988), 2:4-31.
49 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History o f Society and Its Relation to
Modem Times (18611 (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), 148.
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the degree o f social integration into the collectivity, rather than the strength o f legal title.
50

Territorial Disputes: Three Cases
Land claims were consequently enforced not according to a rigid set o f rules but
as improvised responses to specific situations. Extant evidence o f land disputes —the
few examples involve land contested between tribes rather than within communities -suggests that the resolution o f these conflicts was a matter o f diplomacy rather than
jurisprudence. The parties involved were as much concerned with smoothing over
misunderstandings as they were with protecting their territorial claims. The quarrel that
took place in the first decade o f the eighteenth century between inhabitants o f the
Wabanaki village o f Odanak and their Montagnais and Algonquin neighbors offers an
illuminating example o f this approach to settling disputes. By 1700, Odanak was a
community o f several hundred people on the St. F ran cis River, with a population largely
of refugees from northern New England. The village had been established by Sokoki
migrants from the Connecticut River around 1670 and had a drawn a steady stream of
Wabanaki refugees since then, particularly in the bloody aftermath o f King Philip's War
and its northern sequel. This stream became a flood in 1700, when Jesuits moved the
mission o f Saint Franpois de Sales from the Chaudiere to the St. Franpois River. The
Chaudiere mission was itself the product o f relocation, having drawn much o f its
population from the mission village o f Sillery, originally established for Montagnais
converts in 1637. Two prolonged wars against the English between 1688 and 1713 had

50 Tim Ingold, The Appropriation o f Nature: Essavs on Human Ecology and Social Relations (Iowa City:
University of Iowa Press, 1987), 130-64.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
driven hundreds o f new refugees to Odanak, swelling its population with migrants from
the Connecticut River Valley and Lake Champlain, as well as more distant regions such
as the Merrimack and the Kennebec rivers.51
The hunting territories o f Odanak at this time extended well beyond the
immediate area o f the village, and many inhabitants went far afield in search o f game. In
the winter o f 1705, a band o f about 60 families from Odanak crossed the St. Lawrence
River to hunt in the region south o f Lac St.-Jean.52 According to some French locals, the
Wabanakis o f Odanak had begun to hunt in this area only in the past five or six years, and
had had little success in capturing beaver nearby. Going no farther than forty or fifty
miles from Trois-Rivieres, they had caught few beaver and no moose. With the
encouragement o f French fur traders, the Wabanakis in 1705 went further afield, making
their way up the St. Maurice River into territory usually hunted by the Montagnais and
the Algonquins. The season was a success: the Wabanakis, joined by a number o f
Hurons from Lorette, took 350 moose hides as well as beaver and marten furs, which they
traded at Trois-Rivieres and Quebec. But it was also marred by quarrels with their
neighbors over hunting rights. On one occasion, a Wabanaki hunter wrested a moose
hide from the hands o f an Algonquin hunter named Miniomeiguici, accusing him o f
hunting on Wabanaki territory. Miniomeiguici raised his hatchet at his accuser and was
stopped from striking him at the last moment by another Wabanaki. A seigneur from
Trois-Rivieres later remarked that many at the time were afraid that a war would erupt
between the two groups.

51 Gordon M. Day, The Identity o f the Saint Francis Indians. Mercury Series, Canadian Ethnology Service
Paper No. 71 (Ottawa: National Museums of Man, 1981), 11-35; Pere-Andre Sevigny, Les Abenaouis:
Habitat et migrations f!7e et 18e sieclesl (Montreal: Editions Bellarmin, 1976), 161-5.
52 The following account is based on the documents contained in PAC, AC, Serie C l 1A, vol. 25, fols. 29-
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In the spring, a Wabanaki sagamore named Tekwerimat and his son Louis found
traps in his territory and, being short o f provisions, decided to follow the trapline until it
led to its owner. They agreed that once they had found the trapper, they would ask him
for some food and inform him that he was hunting on their land. Tekwerimat and Louis
soon arrived at the cabin o f Joseph Marachicatik, a Montagnais who had been hunting
south o f Lac St.-Jean that winter. The Wabanakis told him that he had placed his traps on
Wabanaki territory and asked for restitution. Marachicatik complied, giving them six
moose hides and offering to let them stay the night. The next morning, he told them
where they could find caches o f food and provided them with a sleigh for their voyage
home. Tekwerimat and his son assumed that the matter was resolved, but the next fall
they received a summons from the intendant o f New France to respond to a complaint by
the agent o f the Compagnie du Canada in Tadoussac, Francois Hazeur.
Hazeur, a prominent merchant who sat on the governor’s council, complained that
the Wabanakis had ravaged the district to the south o f Lac St.-Jean, killing all the moose
and other animals and leaving the Montagnais and Algonquin hunters o f the region
unable to pay their debts. Some o f the hunters, now dependent on Hazeur for supplies,
had applied to a headman from near Lake Mistassini for the right to hunt on his band's
grounds. Hazeur asked for restitution and suggested that the Wabanakis be forbidden
from hunting north o f the St. Lawrence River. When Louis arrived before the council, he
explained that the territory where they had been hunting was closer to Trois-Rivieres than
to Lac St.-Jean and that the lands belonged to his father, who had inherited them from

47, 75-85; vol. 27, fol. 55.
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Louis’s grandfather. Louis insisted that the Montagnais were in the wrong, for they "had
in effect killed the Abenakis by killing all the Animals o f that place."53
Though he did not mention it at the time, Louis's family background helps to
explain the confusion over hunting rights. Tekwerimat was almost certainly a successor
o f Noel Negabamat, the most prominent o f the original neophytes at the Jesuit mission o f
Sillery. Negabamat was a Montagnais from the north shore o f the St. Lawrence, who had
first encountered the French at the trading post at Tadoussac. He grew interested in their
religion and at the invitation o f Father Paul Le Jeune he became the first settler o f a new
mission village at Sillery. While the mission itself was a failure, Negabamat was
baptized in 1639 along with his wife and children. His faith was tested soon after the
baptism, when a smallpox epidemic swept through Sillery, afflicting Noel and killing
four of his five children. He was deeply affected by their loss, and early in the 1640s he
began calling himself Tekwerimat, probably an alternative spelling o f the Montagnais
word Outagaouerimon, or "he grieves their death." These trials only strengthened his
attachment to Christianity, and over the next several decades he distinguished himself
both as a trusted ally o f the French and a peacemaker among Indians. Three years after
his death in 1666, his family resuscitated his name in an elaborate ceremony at Sillery,
bestowing it upon a Tadoussac war captain formerly called Negaskaouat.S4
The Louis Tekwerimat who presented himself before French officials in 1706
was, by adoption or direct descent, either the grandson or great-grandson o f Noel

53 PAC, AC, Serie C l 1A, vol. 25, foL 35-36v. (My translation; the original reads: "les dites montagnais
ont Comme tue les abennaiquis en tuant touttes les Bestes qui estoient en cet endroit la.")
54 J. Monet, "Negabamat," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography. 1:516; Antoine Silvy, Dictionnaire
Montagnais-Francais [ca. 1678-84] (Montreal: Presses de lUniversite du Quebec, 1974), 10; James Axtell,
The Invasion Within: The Contest o f Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985), 61-2.
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Negabamat. Louis' family had probably moved from Sillery to St. Frantjois de Sales in
the 1680s and then to Odanak around 1700. According to French officials, his father had
become a powerful sagamore at Odanak, receiving tribute from many o f his neighbors.
He was known by two names: Tekwerimat to the French, and Outakamachi'ouenon to the
Wabanakis. (In the dialect spoken at Odanak, the word machinawinno means "dead
person"; his name was almost certainly a direct translation from the Montagnais.)55 In all
likelihood, the family continued to hunt the same territories their ancestors had
established in the seventeenth century. But their identification with the Wabanakis had
made the continued use o f these lands a touchy issue, for the hunting districts on the north
shore o f the St. Lawrence had customarily belonged to the Montagnais and Algonquins.
The influx o f war refugees from northern New England, which had brought Odanak more
mouths to feed, probably led the inhabitants o f the village to test the boundaries o f these
territories. The Montagnais and Algonquins understandably viewed their hunting trip as
an incursion into their lands and reacted accordingly.
The aggrieved parties resolved their dispute through a delicate balancing act
between aggressive assertions o f their respective rights and conciliatory attempts to
resolve their differences. Indians did not have a court system nor a sovereign authority
charged with enforcing the law. Instead, when someone had trespassed on their lands or
had done them some other injury, they defended themselves through their own exertions
or with the support o f their kin. Threats o f retaliation were one o f the most effective
means o f protecting territorial boundaries under these circumstances, for they forced

55 Day, Western Abenaki. 1:282. One o f the signatories o f a 1749 dedicatory letter from Odanak to the
chapter o f Chartres was Michel Terrouermant. Possibly Terrouermant and Tekwerimat (also spelled
Tekouerimat or Thek8erimat) are the same name. See JE, 69:71; Day, Identity o f the S t Francis Indians.
88.
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potential intruders to consider the consequences o f their actions. If the Wabanakis
entered the hunting grounds with "hatchets in their hands" and "knives at their wrists," as
it was rumored, the Montagnais were wise to take notice. But the disadvantage o f violent
threats was that very often people were forced to make good on them, creating a desire
for revenge on the part o f the trespasser and his kin. This desire could be satisfied only
by another act o f violence, which would in turn lead to further acts o f vengeance: in short,
a cycle o f bloody retribution spiralling out o f control.S6
Matters rarely came to such a head, for Indians had more peaceful means of
settling their quarrels. Above all, they depended on exchanges o f gifts and words as a
way of mending social wounds and compensating injured parties for their losses. Just as
an arrowhead or beaver skin could placate the spirits o f sacred places, a similar token o f
respect, combined with a few words o f apology, could erase the resentments aroused by
trespasses and other injuries. Gift-giving was a well-established custom under these
circumstances. If a hunter pursuing a moose was led to enter another’s territory, he
always gave a present o f furs to the family that owned the land. Similarly, when
travellers entered into the territory o f another group, they were expected to pay a few
skins as tribute. Such presents symbolically recognized the proprietor’s claims to
stewardship of the land and ensured that there would be no misunderstandings between
the intruder and the offended party. "The greatest offense one can make against an Indian
is to accuse him o f stealing," said Godefroy, Sieur de Saint-Paul, a seigneur o f Trois-

56 "Declaration Messurs Les Directeurs Generaux de la Compagnie de la colonie de Canada," Chicoutimi,
21 mat, 1705, PAC, AC, Serie C l IA, vol. 25, fol. 84. Wabanakis also protected their lands with magic.
According to Frank Speck, shamans used their powers o f divination to detect any intruders on their
territories. The shamans then called on their guardian spirits to punish the intruders. See Speck,
"Penobscot Shamanism," 244.
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Rivieres, "but the Tribute they demand from other Indians is not considered by them to be
theft or pillage but as a right that is due to them."57
Such exchanges fostered a sense o f goodwill between people by creating a bond
o f trust between the giver and the recipient.58 They also helped to establish the channels - the paths -- that made communication possible. Exchanges o f words and goods through
these channels allowed people to develop a sense o f community and a degree o f shared
interest. An obstacle in the path, such as a land dispute, could threaten this feeling o f
mutuality. But people were more inclined to remove the obstacle, to settle or to forget
the dispute, than they were to abandon the path altogether. Thus Tekwerimat, mindful o f
the need to appease his French and Montagnais allies, backed down from his claims. The
Wabanakis gave up their hunting territories on the north shore o f the St. Lawrence and
did not return again until the nineteenth century. The desire to preserve peace with their
neighbors ultimately outweighed the Wabanakis' legitimate claims to ownership o f the
land through customary use. The intervention o f the French in this respect was crucial,
for Tekwerimat did not want to jeopardize his alliance with them for the sake o f a few
moose hides and beaver skins.59
In cases where the social distance between opposing parties was greater,
Wabanakis tended to be less forgiving. If paths did not exist or were overgrown, there
were few channels for resolving disputes peacefully and little incentive to do so. The

57 Deposition o f Godefroy de Saint Paul, PAC, AC, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 25, fol. 41. For examples o f foreign
travellers paying tribute, see JR, 12:187-9; Joseph Francois Lafitau, Customs o f the American Indians
Compared with the Customs o f Primitive Times [1724 ], ed. and trans. William N. Fenton and Elizabeth L.
Moore, 2 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974), 2:185.
58 On the social significance o f gift-giving, see Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for
Exchange in Archaic Societies, translated by W. D. Halls (London: Routledge, 1990), and Marshall
Sahlins' extended commentary on Mauss in Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. 1972), 14983.
59 Gordon M. Day, "Western Abenaki," in Bruce G. Trigger, ed.. Handbook o f North American Indians.
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potential for violence in such cases increased dramatically. The inhabitants o f Odanak
took a more rigid position when it was their enemies, not their allies, who encroached
upon their lands. When English colonists, spurred by rapid population growth and a
burgeoning economy, began to eye the fertile lands o f the upper Connecticut River valley
in the early 1750s, the Wabanakis who hunted and planted in these regions had little
interest in accommodating them. Since the late seventeenth century, the Wabanakis and
the English had squared off in five bloody wars, with each side developing a growing
sense o f antagonism toward the other. The latest round, part o f a larger imperial struggle
between France and Britain, had ended in 1749 with the signing o f a treaty between the
Wabanakis and the provinces o f New England at Falmouth in Casco Bay. Far from
ending hostilities, the treaty merely reduced them in scale. Over the next few years, the
two sides wrangled over the return o f war captives, compensation for peacetime murders,
and English incursions into Wabanaki lands.
In July 1752, delegates from Odanak met in Canada with Captain Phineas
Stevens, commander o f New Hampshire's Fort Number 4, to complain about the arrival
o f a surveying party sent by a land speculating company to a meadow near the Indian
village o f Cowass (Koes) on the upper Connecticut River. In the presence o f the
governor o f Canada and Mohawk representatives from Kahnawake and Kanehsatake,
Odanak's chief orator, Artiwaneto, told Stevens that the elders o f village had allowed the
English to settle as far as Schaghticoke but he would not permit them to take "one inch"
more. He continued that the English could live and trade on the coast, but that "we
expressly forbid you to kill a single beaver or take a stick o f wood from the lands where
we live." Stevens responded that the surveying party had not been authorized by the

vol. 15 (Northeast)_(Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 152.
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government and asked if recent attacks on English settlements were made in response to
incursions on Indian lands or as vengeance for the murders o f Wabanakis by Englishmen.
Artiwaneto explained that the previous year's attacks were carried out because the English
had murdered a man and woman from Odanak, but that recently two backwoodsmen had
been killed and two others captured because they had gone trapping in Wabanaki
territory. "Listen, our English brothers," he said, "this is the Indian way; among us, if we
find people on our lands we take their game and if they resist we break their heads."60
Artiwaneto's bald threat contrasted with the more diplomatic tone o f Indians who
lived closer to English settlements. The inhabitants o f villages near the coast, such as
Norridgewock and Panawapskik, were more cautious in the wording o f their grievances
to New England's officials. Since they lived far away from the French colonies -- about
two or three weeks journey from Quebec —and within a few days o f the closest English
settlements, they were dependent on the English for guns, powder, and other trade
articles. They also had borne the brunt o f English attacks in recent wars and did not want
to break the tentative peace they now enjoyed. While many at Norridgewock and
Panawapskik retained an attachment to the French, a sizable pro-English faction had
emerged in recent decades as it became clearer that peace would not be possible without
some form o f Anglo-Wabanaki entente. When Loron (Laurent) Sauguaaram, a leading
sagamore o f Penobscot, spoke to Massachusetts officials at Fort St. George in August
1751, he complained that an Englishman had built a house on Matinicus Island in

60 "Paroles des Abenakis de St. Francois au Capitaine Stevens," CDRH. 3:509-12, quotations on 510 and
512. (My translation; the original of the first quote reads: "nous vous defendons tres expressement de tuer
un seul castor, ny prendre un morceau de bois sur les terres que nous habitons." The second quote reads:
"Ecoutez, nos freres les Anglois, quelle est notre maniere sauvage; entre nous des personnes que nous
trouverions sur les terres que nous possedons, nous prendrerions leur chasse et s'ils faisaient quelque
resistance nous leur casserions la tete.") Indian threats against English trappers on the upper Androscoggin
River led the government of Massachusetts to pass a law forbidding all trapping north of English

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71
Penobscot Bay, where the Indians hunted birds and seals. Rather than threatening the
English officials with violence, he reminded them that according to the terms o f the treaty
they both signed in 1725, colonists were not allowed to live on the island. ”[T]hat Island
is our Livelihood," he told them, adding that the treaty "says we shan't loose a Foot o f
Ground."61
Sauguaaram had himself been a signatory o f the 1725 treaty and had acted as the
leading negotiator o f the Wabanaki delegation. Since then he had expended great effort
in rallying other Wabanakis to respect the peace and forcing the English to abide by the
terms of the treaty. His work had helped to clear a path between the Penobscot Indians
and the government o f Massachusetts, which, he hoped, would allow them to redress each
other's grievances in a peaceful manner. But the Anglo-Penobscot alliance was
constantly threatened by conflicts between colonists and Indians. In the summer o f 1751,
the settler at Matinicus, Ebenezer Hall, had shot and killed two Indians, burying them in
his garden. In a deposition made three years later, one o f his servants explained that Hall
had entertained and lodged Indians during their hunting season, but one day late in the
summer, thinking that a war had broken out, he had fired upon two hunters passing near
his house. The murders were cause for violent retribution, but the sagamores o f
Penobscot, in deference to the terms o f the 1725 treaty, decided to resolve the matter by
applying to the governor o f Massachusetts for Hall's removal. Two years later, after
receiving several more complaints from the Penobscots, including a letter in which they
threatened to remove Hall themselves, the government finally took action, issuing an
order for his expulsion from the island in June 1753. The Penobscots' reluctance to resort

settlements or east o f the Saco truckhouse. See DHSM. 23:443-4.
61 DHSM. 23:416. Matinicus had been a favorite spot for English traders and fishermen since the early
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to violence in this case was a consequence o f their desire to live harmoniously with their
English neighbors. Unlike the Odanaks, who lived a great distance from English
settlements, the Penobscots could not afford to be uncompromising in the defense o f their
lands.62
The most important consideration for the Penobscots was not the strength o f their
claim to the island but the human consequences o f land use. The island was their source
of food, their "Livelihood," which they would gladly share with others. If their guests
acted in an unsociable or hostile manner, as did Ebenezer Hall, the Penobscots withdrew
their hospitality. Yet they did so in a way that would not threaten the peace by offending
their allies in the Massachusetts government. Territorial boundaries were inseparable
from social boundaries, for Wabanakis willingly shared with their friends and kin, but
were indisposed to do so with their enemies.

Inside the Wigwam
This attitude toward land ownership meant that land claims were always
somewhat ambiguous, for the lines that divided social groups from each other were not
always clearly drawn. It is wrong, in this respect, to imagine the Wabanakis as they are
sometimes represented in modern-day maps: as well-bounded tribes with an unchanging
territorial base.63 A better approach is to think o f political relationships in terms that the
groups themselves would have understood. As Benedict Anderson has argued, nations

seventeenth century.
62 DHSM. 23:448-9,451-2. Loron's son had died in the last war and he was at pains to prevent further
deaths from warfare.
63 On this point, see Prins, "Tribulations o f a Border Tribe," esp. 120-202; David L. Ghere, "The
'Disappearance' o f the Abenaki in Western Maine: Political Organization and Ethnocentric Assumptions,"
American Indian Quarterly 17 (1993): 193-207.
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and other polities are "imagined communities," organizations created by human intellect
and sustained through communication. Words keep these communities together, for
people cannot feel an affinity for one another unless they share their ideas and
experiences. Words also allow people to represent themselves collectively, to see large
groups, whether they number in the hundreds or the millions, as a single unit. To gain a
faithful understanding o f the social universe o f the Wabanakis, we need to retrieve the
vocabulary they used to describe themselves and their relations with others.64
The organizing principle o f the Wabanaki political world, and o f eastern North
America generally, was kinship. Wabanakis spent most o f their years with an extended
family group who lived together in a single wigwam or a number o f wigwams placed
together.65 At regular intervals, they joined together with other families in villages or
large camps to perform certain tasks, such as planting, fishing, and feasting, but the
family band remained the fundamental social unit throughout the entire year. A family
was a valuable source o f support, for its members looked after each other both materially
and socially. When men had bad luck in hunting, they went to their relatives to obtain
food; when travellers went on long journeys, they stayed overnight in the homes of their
kin. And when someone had been caused an injury, he or she turned to family for
assistance. People consequently measured their political power in terms o f the number o f

64 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Snread o f Nationalism
(London: Verso, 1983).
65 Archaeologists have recently discovered the remains o f a longhouse at Norridgewock, the only known
example o f such a structure in Maine. See Robert S. Grumet, Historic Contact: Indian People and
Colonists in Today's Northeastern United States in the Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries (Norman.
Okla.: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1995), 82-4.
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kinfolk they had: at Norridgewock, the expression nemesairangoudamen meant both "I
have many relatives" and "I have many allies."66
Since the family group was a source o f social support, Wabanakis defined kinship
inclusively so as to bring as many people as possible within the family circle. Wababakis
sometimes referred to their cousins as siblings and spoke o f their friends as cousins or
brothers. This practice confused many Europeans, who thought it odd to be called cousin
or brother by near-strangers. When the English explorer Christopher Levett visited Casco
Bay in 1624, he was told by local sagamores that he should be their cousin. "[Y]ou may
imagine I was not a little proud," he commented wryly in a later account o f the voyage,
"to be adopted cousin to so many great kings at one instant."67 Behind Levett's bemused
remark was a very real difference in the ways in which English and Wabanakis defined
kinship. In England, one o f the central roles o f the family was to transmit property from
one generation to the next. Lineal kin - that is, relatives descended from the same line,
such as fathers and sons —tended to have close attachments to each other, because
property was passed on from parents to children. Collateral kin -- relatives not descended
from the same line, such as cousins and siblings —had weaker ties to each other, and
those who were not blood relatives were considered to be outside the family altogether.68

66 Rasies, Dictionary. 499.
67 Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 87. See also the Sieur de Diereville’s surprised reaction at being
called brother by a Micmac acquaintance. Diereville. Relation. 150-1.
68 Consider John Demos’ description of kinship in the Plymouth Colony: "Direct bloodlines were accorded
a special sort of precedence in the family feeling o f the colonists: a man was involved, first o f all, with his
wife and children, and then with his grandchildren. Somewhat less intense was the relation to his own
brothers and sisters, and to their children. Parent-child; grandparent-grandchild; brother (or sister)-brother
(or sister); uncle (or aunt)-nephew (or niece): this was the general order o f priority." Demos, A Linle
Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (London: Oxford University Press. 1970), 124. See also
Alan Macfarlane, The Family Life of Ralph Josselin. a Seventeenth-Centurv Clergyman: an Essav in
Historical Anthropoloev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 105-43. Two o f Josselin’s
cousins were prominent figures in early Maine; Henry Josselyn was a magistrate in Gorges’s province and
James Josselyn was a naturalist who wrote a book on the natural and social worlds of New England.
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Wabanakis did not accumulate much property during their lifetimes and what
little they owned was buried with them when they died. The transmission o f property
was consequently a minor consideration in the Dawnland and figured very little in the
reckoning o f kinship. What did matter was the need to share the risks associated with
hunting and planting. All hunters, no matter how skilled, at times faced runs o f bad luck
and failed to bring animals home to their families. Similarly, a summer o f drought or
blight might cause crops to die, leaving a village without a harvest. Such failures caused
hunger and even starvation if people were left to their own devices. But if a family could
turn to a network o f in-laws, siblings, cousins, and friends for food during times o f
hardship, the consequences o f bad luck in hunting and planting were much less severe.
Collateral kin were as valuable as lineal kin in this respect, for cousins and siblings often
dwelt in areas where game was more abundant or nuts and berries more plentiful. The
importance of this social tie may explain the Wabanakis' elaborate vocabulary for
describing collateral kin. In Wabanaki languages, there are four terms for sibling: "my
brother" (spoken by a male), "my brother" (spoken by a female), "my sister" (spoken by a
male), and "my sister" (spoken by a female). There are also single words that describe
male and female cousins (each with a different form for male and female speakers), and
equally concise terms for more complicated relationships, such as "my father's sister's
daughter's husband" (spoken by a male).69

69 Eckstorm, Old John Neptune. 50; Speck, Penobscot Man. 203-6,229-30; Rasies, Dictionary. 498. On
the connection between property and systems o f kinship, see Lewis Henry Morgan, Systems o f
Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family. Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge, No. 17
(Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1871); Friedrich Engels, The Origin o f the Family. Private
Property and the State [1884] (New York: International Publishers, 1972); Elisabeth Tooker, "Women in
Iroquois Society," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, Marianne Mithun, eds., Extending the Rafters:
Interdisciplinary Annroaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 109-23.
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The flexible nature o f Wabanaki kinship made families open-ended, always
capable o f bringing new members within their fold. The connection between kinship
terms and actual relations o f consanguinity was more tenuous among the Wabanakis than
in Europe, and names such as "father" or "cousin" were often meant to imply a set o f
social obligations rather than an actual blood tie. This practice allowed people to express
all social relationships in eastern North America, even relations with near-strangers, in
the language o f kinship. Units o f political association larger than the family band were
understood as metaphorical extensions o f the family circle. Alliances, for example, were
often described as wigwams, in which various peoples lived under the same roof. Early
in the eighteenth century, the villages o f the Dawnland formed a confederacy with the
Mohawks o f the St. Lawrence Valley and Algonquian groups to the north and the west.
According to oral tradition, they described the confederacy as a wigwam enclosed by a
great fence. In the middle o f the wigwam was a fireplace, which was kept at the Mohawk
village o f Kahnawake. The fence symbolized the confederacy agreement, and all those
who tried to escape from it -- those who violated the terms o f the alliance -- would be
whipped by the "father" o f the confederacy, the Ottawas, who had played a leading role in
the formation o f the league. The wigwam itself symbolized the peace between the
members o f the confederacy, for the peoples living within it had to act as a family.
"There would be no arguing again," it was said. "They had to live like brothers and
sisters who had the same parent." All the members o f the confederacy except the Ottawas
described themselves as siblings o f graded ages. The Penobscots, who by the eighteenth
century had become the most influential Indian group in their region, were considered the
eldest brother o f the Wabanaki communities.70

70_Lewis Mitchell, Wapapi Akonutomakonol: The Wampum Records: Wabanaki Traditional Laws, rev.,
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The symbol o f the wigwam resonated because the home was the focus o f family
life. It was also a symbol o f order, o f social boundaries. For practical reasons, family
members each had reserved places within the house according to their age and gender. In
the cramped space o f the wigwam, it was difficult to move without disturbing others, so
people performed all their activities while sitting in their assigned place. Fathers and
mothers sat at the back o f the house behind the fire, while boys and girls sat on the sides.
A place o f honor was always reserved for guests. Even when the family broke camp and
moved to a new area, the seating plan remained the same. From outside the wigwam, it
may have appeared that families were in constant movement but within the wigwam the
social spaces o f the family were fixed. At confederacy councils, the delegates had
assigned places that symbolized their place within the alliance. In metaphorical terms,
this meant that the hierarchy o f the confederacy would remain constant no matter how
much the world changed around it. Wabanaki members sat on one side o f the fire, with
the Penobscots acting as their leading spokesmen, while western delegates sat at the
opposite side, with the Ottawa representative holding a whip, symbolizing his paternal
authority over the other league members.71
The fireplace at the center o f the delegates was itself a metaphor, represented by a
large wooden hoop in the council house at Kahnawake. As in other cultures, the hearth

ed., and trans. Robert M. Leavitt and David A. Francis (Fredericton, N. B.: Micmac-Maliseet Institute,
University of New Brunswick, 1990), 40. On the confederacy, see Frank G. Speck, "The Eastern
Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," American Anthropologist 17 (1915): 492-508; Willard Walker, Robert
Conkling, Gregory Buesing, "A Chronological Account o f the Wabanaki Confederacy," in Ernest L.
Schusky, ed., Political Organization of Native North Americans (Washington, D. C.: University Press of
America, 1980), 41-84. On the Ottawas' role in peace negotiations among eastern North American Indians,
see Gilles Havard, La Grande Paix de Montreal de 1701: Les voies de la diplomatic franco-amerindienne
(Montreal: Recherches amerindiennes au Quebec, 1992), esp. 138n.
71 W. C. Orchard, "Notes on Penobscot Houses," American Anthropologist 11 (1909): 601-6; Speck,
Penobscot Man. 27-34; Wallis and Wallis, The Micmac. 226-8; Adrian Tanner, Bringing Home Animals:
Religious Ideology and Mode o f Production o f the Mistassini Cree Hunters (New York: St. Martin's Press,
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was a symbol o f domesticity because the fireplace was always the focal point o f the
home. A council fire stood for the polity itself because the hearth implied, by metonymic
extension, the family that sat around it. The image o f the fire also evoked the ephemeral
nature o f alliances, since friendships, like campfires, die out if they are not continually
renewed. When the confederacy members met at the council house, they marked the end
o f their speeches by presenting belts o f wampum, which they hung on the wooden hoop
that symbolized the fire. Orators said that the belts were "brands" that they placed in the
fire to keep it burning brightly. If they failed to stoke the fire by adding new belts every
three years, it was assumed that the fire would be extinguished and the confederacy with
it.72
In Penobscot, people figuratively referred to wampum as gelusewangan,
"speech," and it was believed that the belts contained or embodied the orations o f the
delegates. A single bead o f wampum was known as a "word," and people could "write"
belts by stringing varicolored beads into a pattern and "read" them later by deciphering
the pattern.73 The hanging o f belts around the hoop at Kahnawake symbolized the
renewal o f alliances through the exchange o f words. The purpose o f such speeches was
to create bonds o f affection and trust among the delegates. The confederates rarely
expected their meetings to produce clearly-worded policies or binding pacts. Instead,

1979), 73-87; Speck, "Eastern Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," 497.
72 Speck, "Eastern Algonkian Wabanaki Confederacy," 496-7; idem, "The Functions o f Wampum among
the Eastern Algonkian," American Anthropological Association Memoirs. 6 (1919); Willard Walker,
"Wabanaki Wampum Protocol," in William Cowan, ed., Papers o f the Fifteenth Algonquian Conference
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1984), 107-22.
731 put these terms in quotes because wampum belts were not strictly speaking a system o f writing.
Written texts symbolically represent components o f language such as phonemes and words. Wampum
belts, on the other hand, embody stories and ideas and do not stand for specific linguistic formulations.
Holders of the belts usually tell their stories in their own words and do not worry about adhering to their
original phrasing. See David R. Olson, The World on Paper The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications
o f Writing and Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 69-71.
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their orations served much the same purpose as a stone thrown on a travel shrine or an
arrow left at Hockomock Point: they regenerated alliances by keeping channels o f
communication open. The paths that they cleared in council allowed the allies to air their
grievances, make amends for injuries, and resolve conflicts peacefully. But if they did
not periodically renew their friendship, the paths would become overgrown and the fire
would flicker out.74
This way o f imagining alliances was fitting to an oral culture, in which units o f
political association did not exist "on paper" but needed to be constantly and actively
renewed and recreated. Reciprocal bonds, established through ties o f kinship and
reinforced through sharing and gift-giving, were the social glue that held people together
and imbued them with a sense o f common purpose. Since land use was one o f the means
by which these social ties were expressed, territoriality in the Dawnland was
characterized not so much by lines o f division as by links o f reciprocity. The strength o f
land claims was commensurate with the intensity o f social ties. Families shared their
land in the same way they shared their food -- in fact, the two were inseparable in their
minds -- and would willingly let allies hunt on their territories if the visitors demonstrated
their goodwill by paying furs as tribute. Land dealings, from this perspective, were social
rather than economic transactions. If one group allowed another to hunt on their lands,
they effectively invited them into their wigwam and signaled that they would treat each
other as kin. Such an invitation benefited the host as well as the guest, for the arrival o f

74 Michael K. Foster, "Another Look at the Function o f Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils," in
Jennings, ed., History and Culture o f Iroquois Diplomacy. 99-114. Other valuable items such as beaver
skins could serve the same purpose as wampum. When Noel Negamabat visited the Kennebec River in the
winter of 1650-1, he brought with him a bundle o f furs, which he presented as a gift to John Winslow, the
Plymouth colony’s agent at Cushnoc. He told Winslow that the furs were his "word”, which he "added" to
the word of the governor o f New France, delivered by Father Druillettes. He expected that Winslow would
transmit both their messages (the gift and his speech being one and the same) to the governor o f Plymouth.
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new kin into a community swelled the ranks o f its warriors and widened the circle o f
sharing, providing all concerned with greater military and material security.75
When strangers began arriving from across the ocean, Wabanaki sagamores
treated them as potential allies and eagerly sought to win their favor by exchanging
presents and inviting them to live near their rivers.76 The wording o f early land deals
between Englishmen and coastal sagamores suggests that Wabanaki leaders in the early
part of the seventeenth century understood land deals as alliances, rather than commercial
transactions. The preamble o f the 1638 deed stated that the sagamores "are Inclined to
have the English Inhabit amongst us," adding that English settlement would eventually
make the natives o f the region "Strengthened against our Enemys the Tarenteens
[Mi'kmaq] who yearly doth us Dammage." The sagamores were "Likewise... purswaded
that [settlement] will be for the good o f us and our posterity." The deed conveyed the
coastal area between the Merrimac and Piscataqua rivers to the English but allowed
Indians to continue hunting, fishing, and fowling within the same tract. The sagamores
received a gift o f coats, shirts, dried foods, and other items in return for the land, with the
"Chief Sagamore" o f the region, Passaconaway o f Pennacook, being promised a yearly
payment o f one coat o f trucking cloth by the English settlers.77

See JR, 36: 83-5.
75 One example o f such a transaction is the invitation made in 1719 and 1723 to the inhabitants o f Odanak
to "go eat the beaver’s tail” in the Foxes' lands south o f the Great Lakes. The Foxes, who had been at odds
with the French for over a decade, were poised to enter a war against the Illinois, Sauteurs, and Ottawas.
Their invitation to the Wabanakis to come live in their lands was an attempt to recruit warriors for the
impending conflict. The inhabitants o f Odanak, mindful o f governor Vaudreuil's disapproval o f the Foxes’
gambit, ultimately refused the invitation. See Vaudreuil au Ministre, October 11, 1723, PAC, AN, Serie
Cl 1A, vol. 45, fols. 148-9v; JR, 67: 129.
76 For early attempts by sagamores to lure French and English colonists to settle on their lands, see Levett,
Voyage. 88,92-3; JR, 2:249,3:269; Vovages o f Samuel de Chamnlain. 1 :294; Marc Lescarbot, History
of New France [1618] (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1907), transl. and edited by W. L. Grant, 3 vols.,
1:355.
77 H. W. Richardson, W. M. Sargent, L. B. Chapman, and E. C. Bowler, eds., York Deeds. 18 vols.
(Portland, Me.: J. T. Hull 1887-1910), vol. 8, fol. 16 [future references to this series appear as York
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The terms o f purchase were typical o f seventeenth-century Anglo-Wabanaki land
transactions. Many other deeds stipulated that Indians could continue to hunt and plant
on the lands sold to the English, even though these tracts nominally belonged to the
purchasers. From a Wabanaki perspective, the "sale" o f land in 1638 may in fact have
been a declaration o f alliance whereby the sagamores o f the region invited the English to
come live with them and received trade and military support in return. The articles they
received in exchange for the land, in their eyes, were a form o f tribute that the English
paid to show their respect for the original owners. The sagamores had little to lose in the
transaction, for the epidemics o f 1616-19 and 1634 had ravaged native New England,
leaving coastal areas with only a small fraction o f their former population. With their
villages greatly reduced in size, native communities probably had more land than they
needed and it was in their interest to find new sources o f support, including trade with
Europeans.78
Needless to say, the sagamores did not know that the purchasers were the crest of
a human tidal wave that would soon swamp all o f New England. Nor did they fully
understand that the English, who had never heard o f Gluskap and knew nothing o f what

Deeds!. The date o f the deed is listed as 1629, and the purchase had supposedly been made while the
colonists were still living in England, but this date is almost certainly the result of forgery. The sale of land
was probably made in April 1638, when the Reverend John Wheelwright and his followers, expelled from
Massachusetts because of their involvement in the Antinomian crisis, decided to make a settlement at
Exeter in present-day New Hampshire. See Charles E. Clark, The Eastern Frontier The Settlement of
Northern New England. 1610-1763 (Hanover, N. H.: University Press o f New England, 1970), 37-9.
78 Emerson W. Baker, ’"A Scratch with a Bear’s Paw': Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine."
Ethnohistorv 36 (1989): 235-56; Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, "European Contact and Indian
Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics," Ethnohistorv 35 (1988): 15-33; Arthur
E. Speiss and Bruce D. Spiess, "New England Pandemic of 1616-1622: Cause and Archaeological
Implication," Man in the Northeast 34 (1987), 71-83. Deeds drawn up later in the century tended to give
the English purchasers exclusive rights the land but as late as the 1680s, English farmers in York County
paid a peck of com every year to Madockawando, the leading sagamore of the region in recognition o f his
suzerainty over their lands. See depositions o f John Boden and Richard Webber, December 27,1736, in
Samuel Waldo, A Defence of the Title o f the Late John Leverett... (Boston: Kneeland and Green [?], 1736),
Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 4098; State o f the British and French Colonies in North America
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he had done, imagined the landscape in a manner entirely different from their own. To
the colonists, the country where they chose to settle was literally a new England, a blank
slate on which the landscape o f old England could be redrawn. Over the next several
centuries, they busily covered the land with their own distinctive footprints ~ turning
forests into fields, meadows into towns, bays into harbors -- with consequences that
Gluskap's children could not ignore.

(London: A. Millar, 1755), reprinted 1967 by S.R. Publishers, Johnson Reprint Corp., 25-27.
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TABLE 1.1. WABANAKI CALENDARS, 17TH-19TH CENTURIES.
Gaspe,
17thC

Norridgewock
18thC

Penobscot
19thC

Odanak
19thC

Jan.

time o f great cold

hard times/
winter moon

New-year’s
greeting moon

Feb.

fishing moon

wind scatters leaves
over crust o f snow

bough
shedding

M ar.

abundant fishing

egg-laying moon

moose-hunting
moon

Apr.

fishing herring/
sowing moon

alewife moon/
spearfish moon

sugar-making
moon

May

covering the com

planting moon

planting moon

Jun.

when we bank up
the com

seals rise on water

hoeing moon

Jul.

blueberries ripen/
eel season

berry ripe moon

hay-making
moon

Aug.

large sun/long days

seals fattening/

harvesting
com moon

moon

Sept.

gathering acorns

animal rutting/
corn-reaping
reddening o f leaves moon

Oct.

when the shores
freeze

leaf falling/
ice forms on shores

leaf-falling
moon

Nov.

rivers begin to
freeze

making holes in
ice to hunt beaver

rock-cod moon

ice-forming
moon

Dec.

tomcods ascend
the river

the moon is long

big moon/
winter coming/
Xmas eve moon

winter moon

Sources: Chrestien Leclerq, Relation o f Gaspesia. 138-9; Rasies, Dictionary. 478; Speck, Penobscot Man. 263-4;
Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues. 223. For the sake o f brevity the word "moon" has been
omitted in some entries.
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FIGURE 1.1. CANOES IN ROCK ART.

(a)

(b)

(d)

(c)

(e)
Canoes in rock art, from: (a) Lake Kejimkook, N. S.; (b) Solon, Me.; (c) Agawa Rock, Lake Superior, Ont; (d) Solon,
Me.; (e) Lake Kejimkook, N.S. Drawings of canoes and other boats are a common motif in petroglyph sites
throughout North America, and are probably associated with the travels of the shaman's spirit Sources: (a,e)
Robertson, Rock Drawings of the Micmac Indians: (b,d) Snow, "Solon Petroglyphs”; (c) Grant The Rock Art of the
North American Indians.
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FIGURE 1.2. ITHYPHALLIC THEMES IN ROCK ART.

(e)

V
(0

(g )
Ithyphallic themes in rock art, from: (a-f) Solon, Me.; (g) Machiasport, Me. To Wabanakis, spiritual power and sexual
potency were closely related, indeed inseparable from each other. Men may also have seen an analogy between the
pursuit of game and the pursuit of women - present-day Cree hunters in James Bay jokingly use the same expressions
for "he shoots" and "he ejaculates”, "shotgun” and "penis", "gunpowder” and "sperm", "gun sheath" and "condom". '
See Colin Scott, "Science for the West, Myth for the Rest? The Case for James Bay Cree Knowledge Construction," in
Laura Nader, ed., Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry into Boundaries. Power, and Knowledge (N. Y.: Routledge,
1996), 75. Sources: (a-f) Snow, "Solon Petroglyphs”; (g) Ray, "The Machiasport Petroglyphs”.
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FIGURE 1.3. HUMAN HEADS IN ROCK ART.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Human heads in rock ait, from: (a) Bellows Falls, Vt; (b) Dighton Rock, Taunton, Mass.; (c) Peterborough, Ont.; (d)
Fairy Point, Missinaibi Lake, OntThe horns on the heads of human figures are symbols of their shamanic power.
Similar figures, also with haloes and power lines emanating from their heads, are found throughout North America and
around the world. Sources: (a) Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone,"; (b) Mattingly, Picture-Writing of the
American Indians: (c) Grant, The Rock Art of the North American fndians: d) Thor Conway, "Scotia Lake Pictograph
Site".
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CHAPTER H
DRAWING LINES

Before I built a wall I ’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out.
And to whom I was like to give offence.
-R obert Frost, "Mending Wall"

Suppose it were possible to lay all the maps ever drawn o f Maine end to end and
in chronological order. If this column were wrapped around a spinning reel and viewed
through an aperture, one could see all the maps in rapid succession, like a film. Imagine
for a moment how this film might appear. In the opening scenes the foreground is the
Atlantic Ocean, crisscrossed by rhumb lines, dotted by clusters o f fishing banks, and
decorated with fanciful sea monsters swimming at the edges o f the frame. The interior o f
the continent is largely blank, with the exception o f a scattering o f names along the coast,
indicating geographical features such as rivers and bays. The shoreline itself takes shape
only gradually, evolving from a wavering, inchoate shape into an precise tracing o f the
jagged coast o f northern New England.
Soon the major rivers o f Maine —the Androscoggin, the Kennebec, the Penobscot
- begin to snake their way into the interior, revealing their sources among the lakes and
highlands o f the region. The map also becomes cluttered with the signs o f human
occupation: a scattering o f European settlements huddled against the coast, a number o f

87
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Indian tribes farther inland. Colonies appear, indicated as free-floating words slightly
larger than the names o f the Indians. Eventually, a number o f boundary lines divide these
colonies from each other, though not from the Indians, who in a matter o f time seem to
vanish altogether. At first the boundaries are clumsily drawn and flicker wildly from one
map to the next. But after a while they gain a certain consistency and vary only in their
details. As these lines become more fixed, the rugged, lopsided diamond shape o f the
state of Maine emerges, bounded to the west by the inverted triangles o f New Hampshire
and Vermont, and to the north and east by the gaping mouth o f Quebec and the scraggly
parallelogram of New Brunswick.
Suppose that this film had a narrator, or several narrators, for it tells at least three
different stories. In one version, the story would be one o f growth, o f the cumulative
expansion o f European knowledge about the territory o f Maine. In the earliest maps this
knowledge was tentative, hypothetical, based on explorers' sketches o f the coast, added to
scraps o f information gleaned from Indians, and supplemented by a heavy dose o f
educated guessing. Through a process o f trial and error, Europeans gradually produced a
more precise picture o f the territory, methodically plotting the coast and the interior on
mariners' charts and surveyors' plats. The steady accumulation o f empirical observations
produced an image o f the territory that was more scientific, if less colorful. The
Penobscot River in the earliest maps had been the site o f the mythically opulent city o f
Norumbega;1 by the close o f the eighteenth century the river’s meanderings close to the

1 Historians since the nineteenth century have puzzled over the origins o f the name Norumbega, some
suggesting that it was a corruption of a Wabanaki word, others that it is derived from the name Norvegia,
or Norway. But no one has yet considered the possibility that Norumbega was a variant spelling o f
Norimberga, the Latin name o f the city state o f Nuremberg. Early in the sixteenth century, Nuremberg was
an important center of humanist scholarship and the printing trade. Its printers were especially known for
their woodcuts and copper engravings - Albrecht Durer’s works being the most famous examples —and
these skills made Nuremberg one o f the mapmaking capitals o f Europe. Europe's oldest existing globe,
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coast had been measured to the last rod and its sources farther inland dutifully recorded
by military engineers. The effect o f several centuries o f such painstaking observation
was to transform, in the European imagination, a formless terra incognita into an exactly
measured landscape.2
This transformation was not innocent, for the story o f expanding knowledge is
connected to a second narrative, a story o f conquest. The dimensions o f the American
landscape, recorded and described by explorers and colonists, were more than an object
of idle curiosity for Europeans. Maps o f the Americas gave them information that
allowed them to steer their ships safely into harbor, to find the interior waterways o f the
continent, to catalogue and lay claim to the natural riches o f the land. Cartographic
knowledge in these respects was a faithful handmaiden o f colonial enterprise.
As early as the sixteenth century, mapmakers placed flags and coats o f arms on
the North American continent to symbolize the sovereignty o f various European powers

dating from the late fifteenth century, was made by a citizen of Nuremberg, Martin Behaim. The city was
also a major commercial center in the sixteenth century and its merchants had provided financial backing
for several Spanish ventures in the New World. Given that early maps o f America were largely a product
of the imagination, sixteenth century cartographers —many o f whom lived or had received their training in
Nuremberg -- may have placed the name Norumbega in the New World as a patriotic flourish or as a nod
to their financial backers. Norumbega in New World maps often appears as a wealthy city surrounded by
forest, the mirror image o f Nuremberg in the Old World (see, for example, Gerard Mercator’s map o f 1569,
Fig. 2.2). In his 1548 map o f America, Giacomo Gastaldi gives the northeastern part of North America the
name Nuntmberg, not Norimbega. Possibly, cartographers saw parallels between ancient Germany and the
New World. German humanists such as Konrad Celtis, who had written a 1495 history o f Nuremberg
titled Norimberea. had since the late fifteenth century revived and reprinted classical texts describing
Germany as a land populated by "wild" yet free tribes, who dressed in animal skins and lived by the hunt.
These classical texts were widely circulated among citizens of Europe's republic o f letters (John Milton, for
example, placed Norumbega in its classical context in Paradise Lost ! Being humanists themselves, most
map printers were familiar with these texts and perhaps thought that Norumbega was an apt name for the
northern regions o f America, which were also inhabited by "wild", forest-dwelling folk. On Nuremberg,
see Gerald Strauss, Nuremberg in the Sixteenth Centurv: Citv Politics and Life Between Middle Aces and
Modem Times (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976); Schama, Landscape and Memory. 81-100;
on Norimbega, see Samuel Eliot Morison, The European Discovery o f America: The Northern Voyages. A.
D. 500-1600 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 464-70,488-91; Richard D'Abate, "On the
Meaning of a Name: 'Norumbega1and the Representation o f North America," in Emerson W. Baker et al.,
eds., American Beginnings: Exploration. Culture, and Cartography in the Land o f Norumbega (Lincoln,
Neb.: University o f Nebraska Press, 1994), 61-88.
2 On the expansion o f geographical knowledge of northern New England, see Baker et al., American

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90
over its territory and people. Over time these quixotic claims to continental empires,
made on the basis o f a hazy knowledge o f the coastline, became self-fulfilling prophecies.
Early in the seventeenth century, colonization companies sponsored by the crowns o f
France and England began to exploit the natural resources o f eastern North America
through a combination o f trade and settlement. The French and English colonies asserted
their authority over a widening swath o f territory, extending their government over all
who lived within their respective jurisdictions.
If the expansionist impulses o f Europeans remained constant throughout the
colonial period, the means by which they marked their conquests did not. A third story o f
the film --less perceptible but just as important as the other two -- is one o f changing
form, of an evolution in the methods by which cartographers represented the limits o f
state power. In the earliest maps, European powers planted their flags in the middle o f
the continent, writing the proposed names o f new colonies in large letters across the lands
they claimed to possess. By the early years o f settlement, the flags had disappeared, but
the names remained. In a few maps, they were separated by dotted lines or colored wash,
but in most cases there were no boundaries on the map. In French versions, the names o f
native tribes were often written alongside the names o f colonies, and portions o f the
continent seemed to belong simultaneously to New France and the Indians. Early maps
also depicted a growing number o f settlements along the continent's coastline and river
valleys, represented by dots, crosses, and clusters o f houses.
Cartographers o f the eighteenth century continued to use the vocabulary
developed by their predecessors —boundaries as lines, settlements and forts as points,
colonies and tribes as free-floating names —but they reshuffled its order o f emphasis,

Beginnings, especially chapters 1-3.
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giving increasing attention to the definition o f boundaries. Mapmakers began drawing
lines between colonies, some o f them following the course o f rivers and others running
straight through the interior. By the beginning o f the nineteenth century, the boundless,
ambiguously defined polities typical o f the early cartography o f the region had
disappeared almost entirely. Mapmakers now carved the eastern half o f the continent into
a number o f multicolored jurisdictions, each separated from the other by clearly drawn
lines: a motif familiar to anyone who has ever consulted a twentieth-century atlas or road
map.
The emergence o f boundary lines in the eighteenth century was o f great
consequence to the inhabitants o f Maine, for their region had been a borderland from the
earliest years o f European settlement. In other parts o f North America, colonies had
expanded outward from territorial nuclei formed early in their existence: Canada had
taken shape along the St. Lawrence, New Netherlands and New York along the Hudson
River, Maryland and Virginia in Chesapeake Bay. But the lands between the St. John
and Piscataqua rivers had seen a succession o f colonies rise and fail ~ Sagadahock,
Laconia, New Somersetshire, Lygonia, Acadia, Devonshire, Georgia —each o f them
laying claim to portions o f the same territory but none o f them managing to establish
exclusive jurisdiction over their lands. Far from being dominated by a single colony, the
region was defined by a series o f borders that separated one colony from the next.
The distinctive character o f the region makes it necessary to approach its early
history not in terms o f the growth o f a single colony but as a gradual evolution o f political
borders. The emergence o f clearly drawn boundaries in the eighteenth century represents
a watershed in this history, yet has been the subject o f surprisingly little attention among
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historians. Perhaps the Anglo-American tendency to see frontiers and boundaries as
distinct subjects has blinded historians to the continuities between the two. Content with
the geographer's dictum that one is an area and the other a line, most scholars have treated
the frontier as the exclusive province o f social historians and boundaries as the bailiwick
of high diplomacy. But as Lucien Febvre once remarked, frontiers and boundaries are
variations on the same theme: both are the envelope o f the state, the outer edges o f
political power. While linear boundaries are virtually the sole expression o f this concept
in present-day maps, past societies have imagined and protected their peripheries in a
variety of ways, from the marches o f Carolingian Europe to the defensive walls o f the
Chinese empire. These kinds o f frontiers were not supplanted by the linear boundaries of
the modem map until after the sixteenth century, as the territorial state began to squeeze
out other forms o f political organization.3
Seen in this light, the replacement o f free-floating polities with well-bounded
states in maps o f Maine during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was inseparable
from the growth o f state power in the region. Boundaries are never neutral or merely
descriptive; they decide what belongs to whom and allow governments and landowners to
exert control over places and people. The transformation o f frontiers into boundaries
during the eighteenth century was part o f a larger complex o f social and political changes
that ultimately served to produce the territorial state in North America. Our map film
depicts this process in miniature, graphically illustrating how the vaguely-defined borders
of seventeenth-century Maine became the exactly surveyed lines o f the present day. But

3 Lucien Febvre, A Geographical Introduction to History, with a contribution from Lionel Bataillon, trans.
E. G. Mountford and J. H. Paxton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932), esp. 304. See also Michel Foucher,
L'invention des frontieres (Paris: F. E. D. N., 1986); Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State
Formation in the Modem World (London: Polity Press, 1996). The French use the same term for boundary

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
it also presents this change as if it were the inexorable unfolding o f a grand plan, wholly
independent o f human agency. This image is illusory, for the development o f boundaries
was the cumulative product o f countless decisions by political officials, military leaders,
and ordinary people. By rewinding the reel and examining it frame by frame, we can
recover the human side o f the story, seeing each map as product o f its social and political
context.

Two Kinds o f Map
The earliest European cartographers o f North America were faced with a blank
slate, a continent o f which virtually nothing was known. But if the land was new to them,
the techniques they used to represent it were not, for the mapmaking art was centuries old
by the sixteenth century. Political maps had an especially long and distinguished lineage,
for cartography had always been a tool o f political elites. The development of
mapmaking as a craft in ancient Europe and Asia was closely related to the emergence of
states as a form o f political organization, since rulers on both continents found maps to be
a useful aid in monitoring and controlling the more distant parts o f their dominions.
Political maps in the ancient and medieval world served a multitude o f purposes, from the
evaluation o f land values to the planning o f pilgrimages. They took an equally diverse
number o f artistic forms, ranging from the mappae mundi o f medieval Europe to the
"fish-scale" property maps o f Ming China. But in the broadest terms, cartographers
tended to use a combination o f two basic motifs in preparing maps for political purposes
[see Fig. 2.1]. The first was a pattern o f nodes and links, a map in which strategic points
o f the political landscape such as cities and forts were connected together by a network o f

and frontier (frontiere).
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rivers and roads. This kind o f map was well suited to the planning o f military campaigns
or the collection o f tribute and taxes, for it illustrated the lines o f communication that
allowed rulers to control the peripheral regions o f their dominions. The second pattern
was one o f bounded areas, o f a page divided into shapes by straight and curving lines.
This motif allowed rulers to identify and separate different jurisdictions or, more
commonly, to record the ownership o f real property. In general, the second pattern was
reserved for plans o f a small scale, and was characteristic o f cadastral maps, which
illustrated property rights in land.4
The first European maps o f the New World tended to be o f the first type, with the
difference that political centers were linked to the Americas by an ocean rather than a
river. The earliest maps were generally compilations o f nautical knowledge, which
illustrated the features o f the American coastline and the rhumb lines that allowed
European navigators to find their way safely into harbor. This knowledge o f was o f
greatest interest to pilots and adventurers, who purchased portolan charts made by
cartographers in the Atlantic ports.5 The mapmakers usually conferred with pilots and
shipmasters from nearby areas, who provided them with sketches and descriptions o f the
coast. The cartographers supplemented these sketches with information drawn from older
maps, from which they copied the missing portions o f their charts. The portolan charts

4 On the connection between cartography and the state, see J. B. Harley, "Maps, Knowledge, and Power,"
in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, eds., The Iconography o f Landscape: Essavs on the Symbolic
Representation. Design, and Use o f Past Environments (Cambridge University Press), 277-312. On the
emergence of cartography as a consequence o f the growing scale o f societies, see Denis Wood, The Power
of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), esp. 38-39. For cross-cultural comparisons, see J. B. Harley
and David Woodward, eds., The History o f Cartography. 2 vols. to date (Chicago, University o f Chicago
Press, 1987-); Norman J. W. Thrower, Maps and Civilization: Cartography and Culture in Society
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); P. D. A. Harvey, The History o f Topographical Maps:
Symbols. Pictures and Surveys (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980); Peter Whitfield, The Image o f the
World: Twenty Centuries o f World Maps (San Francisco: Pomengranite Books, 1994).
5 Portolan charts were nautical maps that were commonly used in the Mediterranean during the Middle
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were suitable for shipboard use, providing navigators with careful tracings o f the
coastline, along with the compass roses and rhumb lines that allowed the pilots to find
their bearings and set their course [see Fig. 2.2].6
The workshops that drew the portolan charts were the cartographic equivalent o f
medieval scriptoria, being small guilds o f skilled artisans working with pen and ink to
produce elaborately decorated documents. Although they did make copies o f their works,
mass reproduction was beyond their means; by the end o f the sixteenth century they had
become specialists in customized maps made for an exclusive clientele o f merchants,
shipmasters, and pilots. Members o f the wider public who had an interest in New World
exploration had to turn to maps issued by the urban printing presses o f Germany, Italy,
and the Netherlands. At first made with woodcuts, then by copper engraving, printed
maps o f the Americas were often inserted as supplementary sheets in editions o f
Ptolemy's Geoeraphia that kept readers abreast o f recent exploration in the New World.
Unlike portolan charts, which scattered the coastline with flags and coats o f arms, printed
maps tended to be cautious in illustrating political jurisdictions, leaving boundaries
ambiguous and including only colonial claims that were beyond dispute. Wanting to
reach as broad a public as possible, commercial map printers avoided alienating potential
buyers by taking sides in territorial disputes. This political neutrality meant that
commercial cartographers stood at a distance from the crowns and merchants who backed
colonial ventures and were not privy to conversations with explorers. Printed maps were

Ages. They were drawn on vellum and were generally accompanied by a written text.
6 Tony Campbell, "Portolan Charts from the Late Thirteenth Century to 1500," in Harley and Woodward,
History of Cartography, vol. 1,371-463; Morison, European Discovery. 326-38; Seymour I. Schwartz and
Ralph E. Ehrenberg, The Mapping of America (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1980), 38-40.
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consequently o f little value to navigators, since they were based on information that was
often ten or twenty years out o f date.7
But for ordinary readers commercial maps provided a compendium o f European
knowledge about the world and illustrated widely shared understandings about the extent
of colonial claims in the Americas. Gerardus Mercator's celebrated 1569 world map
offers an example o f how learned Europeans might have imagined North America in the
mid-sixteenth century [see Fig. 2.3]. At first glance, the form o f the map seems familiar
enough; the continent's coastline has roughly the same shape that it has today and is
crisscrossed by a grid o f longitude and latitude. But upon closer examination, the
political landscape o f the map appears alien to present-day sensibilities. The names o f La
Florida, Apalchen, and Norombega -- a colony, a tribe or mountain range, and a quasimythical place - are written in the same size type, as if they belonged to the same
category o f place. New France (Nova Francia) apparently embraces the entire region
surrounding the St. Lawrence River, yet Mercator also recognizes native cities such as
Honguedo (a settlement o f Gaspe, incorrectly placed near the site o f present-day
Quebec).8 The territorial limits o f the colonies, furthermore, are left ambiguous since
there are no boundary lines on the map other than the colored wash that tints the
coastline.
This apparent confusion was not simply a product o f Mercator's ignorance o f the
New World, for his illustration o f Europe jumbles together political labels and
geographical features in a similar manner. Political jurisdictions such as France and

7 Lloyd A. Brown, The Storv of Maps (New York: Dover Publications, 1949), 113-79. Mapmakers did
have to please local officials, since maps, like other printed materials, had to pass inspection by
government censors.
8Jacques Crevel. Honguedo ou rhistoire des premiers easpesiens (Quebec: Gameau, 1970).
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England are mixed together with the cultural regions o f Germany and Italy, and boundary
lines are entirely absent. Far from being exceptional, Mercator’s approach to the
representation o f political jurisdictions was typical o f sixteenth-century cartography.
Like other mapmakers o f his time, Mercator used the writings o f the Alexandrian
geographer Claudius Ptolemy as a model for his work. Although none o f Ptolemy's maps
survived, European cartographers tried to duplicate the image o f the world described in
his Geoeraphia. and their maps were consequently based as much on classical models as
they were on contemporary reality.9
Cartographers o f the late Roman Empire and Middle Ages had paid little attention
to the definition o f boundaries in world maps, being more concerned with the location o f
important places and the direction o f roads and rivers that connected them. The typical
map placed the emperor or the pope at the center o f the world, with roads radiating out
from his seat o f power in Rome or Constantinople. This cartographic form was a graphic
expression o f the concept o f imperium, or the absolute authority o f the emperors and
popes. The power o f popes and emperors was thought to extend to the ends o f the earth,
making it impossible to represent the outer boundaries o f the empire on maps.
Boundaries might separate provinces or kingdoms, and outposts might mark the limits of
effective political control, but the ends o f the Empire and Christ's Kingdom, which were
imbued with spiritual significance, could never be drawn.10

9 James R. Akerman, "Cartography and the Emergence of Territorial States in Western Europe,"
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting o f the Western Society for French History 10 (1982), 85-87.
10 Pol Trousset, "La frontiere romaine et ses contradictions," in Yves Roman, ed.. La frontiere: seminaire
de recherche (Lyon: GDR-Maison de 1’Orient, 1993), 25-33; C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers o f the Roman
Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). The Romans
made a crucial distinction between fines, which were the boundary lines o f particular provinces, and limes,
which were outposts that defended areas under Roman control: one might imagine the distinction as one
between a boundary map and a map o f links and nodes.
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By the early years o f European exploration in the Americas, the ideology o f
imperium had been adopted by many monarchs in Europe, who were eager to curb the
power o f the papacy and to gain an upper hand over noble magnates within their own
dominions. Most promulgated an attenuated version o f imperium, under which the
absolute authority claimed by early modem monarchs was limited to their own kingdoms.
But concepts o f imperium became more expansive in the New World, which was open to
legitimate conquest by Christian kings because it was peopled by "heathens." Limits to
colonial possessions in the Americas were set only by the competing claims o f other
European powers, which forced the crowns to develop distinct spheres o f influence on the
continent. Cartographers recognized these spheres o f influence by recording the names of
colonies and placing royal coats o f arms at the center o f their territories. But it made little
sense to draw boundaries between these territories, not only because their frontiers were
poorly defined, but because each crown held out the possibility o f further conquests.11
O f course, the symbolic representation o f state sovereignty on maps had only a
tenuous connection to the actual control exercised by Europeans in North America during
the sixteenth century. Aside from a few failed attempts at permanent settlement, the sole
European footholds on North American soil north o f Florida were makeshift stations
established by traders and fishermen during the summer months, which were privately
funded and did not depend on the approval o f the crown. The weakness o f royal
authority in these regions did not necessarily undermine the crowns' claims to their
possession, for imperium was an innate quality o f the monarchy distinct from the actual

11 On the Roman model and its early modem interpretations, see Anthony Pagden, Lords o f All the World:
Ideologies of Empire in Spain. Britain, and France, c. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1995); Patricia Seed, Ceremonies o f Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World. 1492-1640
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 179-93.
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power exercised by Icings. The French crown had taken the St. Lawrence River, or New
France, under its jurisdiction because it had established an exclusive right to its
possession: whether it chose to exercise this right or not was immaterial. There was, in
other words, a vast gulf between the theory and practice o f sovereignty in the New World.
The nodes-and-links pattern o f early maps allowed cartographers to finesse this problem
by leaving the actual extent o f colonial possessions open to interpretation.

Merchants and Monopolies
The gap between theory and practice began to narrow in the seventeenth century,
as trading companies from France and England established permanent settlements on the
mainland. Faced with increasingly intense competition in the cod fisheries and fur trade
during the last decade o f the sixteenth century, merchants in the Atlantic ports looked for
new sources o f fish and furs and sought monopolies over existing fishing grounds and
trading posts. Many entrepreneurs also supported the idea o f establishing permanent
colonies, which prevented competitors from landing on American shores and provided
their backers with a continual supply o f commodities. Like monopolies, permanent
settlements depended on the support o f the crown, since they required a royal charter that
excluded others from their territory. Although many smaller operators opposed such
monopolies, politically influential investors in both France and England used their
connections at court to obtain colonial charters in the first decade o f the seventeenth
century.12

12 On the controversy over monopolies, see Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History o f an
International Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 52-94.
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In 1603, five years after the marquis de La Roche's disastrous attempt to settle lie
de Sable, Henri IV o f France created a commission to draw up a new colonial charter for
New France, which was ultimately awarded to Pierre du Gua, sieur de Monts, a Protestant
soldier who had been appointed governor o f Saintonge as a reward for his service to
Henri during the Wars o f Religion. The charter gave de Monts a ten-year monopoly over
trade in the lands lying between 40° and 46° o f latitude, or "La Cadie", the name being a
variation o f L'Arcadia or l'Acadie, a term found in many sixteenth-century maps.13
Around the same time, West Country investors in England were sponsoring a
series o f reconnaissance voyages to the Gulf o f Maine in the hope o f finding new sources
of fish and other commodities. Ships commanded by Bartholomew Gosnold in 1602,
Martin Pring in 1603, and George Weymouth in 1605 all returned from their voyages to
New England with abundant supplies o f fish and furs, as well as a number o f Indian
captives. They also brought back promising reports o f rich winter fishing grounds off the
coast o f New England, raising hopes that the region might serve as a base for year-round
operations. In 1606, a company o f investors from Plymouth applied for and received a
colonial charter from James I, who granted them all the lands between 38° and 45° of
latitude in North America not in the possession o f the French.14
Both the English and French companies soon moved to make good on their
claims. In 1604, de Monts set out from Le Havre with a Saintongeais pilot, Samuel de
Champlain, to chart the coasts o f the Bay o f Fundy and establish contacts with the
Indians o f Acadia. Champlain remained for three years, mapping the coast between Cape

13 David Buisseret, Henrv IV (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 138-39; DHSM 7:1-6; "Defense
du Roi...," PAC. AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. I, fol. 48-51.
14 Faith Harrington, '"Wee Tooke Great Store o f Cod-Fish': Fishing Ships and the First Settlements on the
Coast of New England, 1600-1630," in Baker et al., American Beginnings. 192-97; DHSM. 7:6-12.
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Sable and Cape Cod and helping to establish a small settlement at Port Royal. Toward
the end o f his stay, in 1607, a party o f Englishmen led by George Popham, son o f Lord
Chief Justice John Popham, established a rival colony at the headwaters o f the Kennebec
River. Both colonies were short-lived: the settlement at Port Royal was abandoned in
1613 after it was sacked by a fleet from Virginia, while the Popham colony barely lasted
a year, with many o f its inhabitants dying from disease and hunger. Yet the two colonies
represented the beginnings o f a determined effort to establish a permanent European
presence in North America, an effort that would bear fruit in the ensuing decades.
Compared to the seasonal voyages o f sixteenth-century fishermen and fur traders,
these enterprises required enormous expenditures on the part o f their financial backers.
With little chance o f receiving immediate returns on their investment, colonial companies
had to supply and outfit ships to transport the settlers, furnish them with several months'
provisions and a stock o f merchandise to trade with Indians, and advance the funds and
materials necessary to build houses and fortifications. While fishing voyages received
their backing from small circles o f creditors in the port towns, colonial ventures
demanded a much larger outlay o f capital and depended on wider networks o f investors.
In England, the projectors responsible for these colonies looked to inland commercial
centers for new sources o f credit and found a large and diverse group o f investors who
were becoming increasingly speculative and aggressive in their dealings. In France,
merchants o f various port towns banded together to support colonial enterprise jointly.
With access to a more substantial pool o f capital, seventeenth-century entrepreneurs in
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both countries had a better chance to succeed in New World ventures than their
predecessors o f the previous century.15
To protect their territories against competitors, colonial investors also needed
political backing from the crown, typically in the form o f a charter. This kind of
recognition tended to be difficult to obtain, for when monopolies were granted they
frequently gave rise to cries o f corruption and political favoritism. Faced with a threat to
their livelihood, rival firms vociferously and often successfully opposed the charters, as
when the protests o f Malouin merchants forced King Henri HI to revoke the monopoly he
had granted in 1588 to Etienne Chaton and Jacques Noel for the fur trade in Canada. The
success o f colonial companies consequently depended on their ability to enlist the support
o f gentlemen and nobles with influence at court and to convince the wider public that
royal charters were necessary to the well-being o f colonial enterprise.16
Pursuing political leverage and a far-flung network o f investors, colonial
companies undertook extensive public relations campaigns, designed to convince others
of the benefits o f overseas colonies and the need for trade monopolies to ensure their
success. Beginning with Richard Hakluyt, colonial promoters from the late sixteenth
century issued dozens o f books, handbills, and pamphlets describing riches o f the New

15 Carole Shammas, "English Commercial Development and American Colonization, 1560-1620," in K. R.
Andrews, N. P. Canny, and P. E. H. Hair, eds., The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in [reland, the
Atlantic, and America. 1480-1650 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 151-74; Patrick
McGrath, "Bristol and America, 1480-1631," in idem., 81-102; Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise and Empire:
Merchant Investment in the Expansion o f England. 1575-1630 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1967), esp. 23-25; Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade. Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the
Genesis of the British Empire. 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 310-12; Marcel
Trudel, The Beginnings o f New France (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 68-70. The English and
French undertook different investment strategies. The English relied above all on joint-stock companies,
which were legal corporations that spread the risk o f colonization among a large pool o f investors, while
the French raised funds through informal networks o f merchants, shipmasters, and courtiers.
16 Henry P. Biggar, The Early Trading Companies o f New France: A Contribution to the History of
Commerce and Discovery in North America (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1901), 34-35; Trudel,
Beginnings of New France. 58-60. On English political controversies surrounding monopolies, see Linda
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World and exhorting their readers to take the lead in exploiting them. Published by the
printing shops o f Paris and London, this propaganda circulated throughout the provinces,
finding a ready market among nobles, merchants, and gentlemen seeking outlets for their
capital.17
Many o f the publications included maps drawn by pilots and officials who had
visited the colonies. Like the texts they illustrated, these maps were colored by the
political interests o f their authors, presenting an image o f the New World that legitimized
the claims o f the colonial companies. The first printed maps o f Acadia and New France,
included as plates in Marc Lescarbot's Histoire de la Nouvelle France, reinforced the
colonial vision o f Monts and his lieutenant, Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt. Lescarbot
was Poutrincourt's lawyer and had accompanied him to Port Royal in 1606, returning to
France the following year when Monts's charter was revoked. In 1609, he published an
account o f his stay in Acadia, to which he added an idiosyncratic history o f sixteenthcentury voyages to North America and an epic poem recounting a raid led by the
Mi'kmaq sagamore Membertou on a village at Saco.
Like the accompanying text, the several maps included in Lescarbot's work were a
mixture o f informative detail and thinly-veiled propaganda. His large-scale map o f New
France and Acadia [Fig. 2.4], copied from Champlain's sketches o f the coast and
engraved by Jan Swelinck, depicted the Bay o f Fundy for the first time in a European
map. The plate's imagery suggested the importance o f fish and furs to the colony, dotting
the sea with fishing banks and scattering the coastline with wigwams. A cornucopia o f
maize and grapes at the lower left-hand comer illustrated the region's potential wealth,

Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Earlv Stuart England (London: Routledge, 1993), 134-60.
17 Rabb, Enterprise and Empire. 25-26.
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and the Bourbon coat o f arms, placed above it, signified royal sanction o f Poutrincourt's
enterprise. The various crosses placed at points o f French control also reminded the
reader that the colony was an outpost o f Christianity. This symbolism equated the private
interests o f Lescarbot's client with the public good, making it clear that the colony not
only brought profits to its investors, but extended Christian knowledge and royal
authority into the New World. Since Poutrincourt had intensively lobbied for the renewal
of his monopoly since 1607, Lescarbot's map amounted to a graphic legal brief on his
client’s behalf.18

"Upon View o f the Mapps"
Although it is their promotional quality that is most striking, the maps
commissioned by early colonizing companies also had utilitarian value. The leaders o f
the companies were faced with the problem o f controlling and developing lands that lay
an ocean away. Maps were a vital tool to these men, for they gave a concrete form to
their possession, which was otherwise an abstraction. A clearly-drawn plan enabled
investors to survey their lands as if they were a chessboard on which various pieces —
settlers, forts, ships -- could be played. With their possessions laid out before them on a
map, the shareholders o f companies had a ready knowledge o f limits and location o f their
patents, making it possible to sell, divide, or bequeath them with relative ease. One o f the
most notable instances o f this way o f using maps was the division o f the New England
patent. Following the failure o f the Popham colony, the members o f the Plymouth
company had put the settlement o f New England on hold, devoting their funds to fishing

18 Marc Lescarbot, History o f New France, ed. and trans. W. L. Grant (Toronto: The Champlain Society,
1907); "Lescarbot, Marc," in DCB 1:469-72; Schwartz, The Mapping of America. 88-90.
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expeditions instead. But the growing number o f vessels sailing to fish in the wintertime
off the coast o f New England in the second decade o f the seventeenth century had revived
interest in permanent settlement.19
In 1620, a group o f over forty gentlemen and nobles led by Sir Ferdinando Gorges
formed the Council for New England, a body that assumed control over the northern
portion o f the original 1606 charter. Two years later, the council divided the patent into
shares, with each member o f the council receiving a tract o f land along the coastline.
Lacking any first-hand knowledge o f the region, the council assigned shares "upon view
of the mapps," which provided knowledge o f the location and names o f rivers, bays, and
islands. The boundaries o f each individual tract were defined by rivers and imaginary
lines that extended through the interior. The Duke o f Lenox, for example, was given a
patent for rectangular tract extending fifteen miles eastward from the mouth o f the Saco
River and thirty miles northwest into the interior. A second division took place at
Greenwich in 1623, with the council presenting King Charles I with a map o f all the
coasts and lands o f New England, carefully apportioned into 20 individual shares. The
division o f the patent was recorded in a 1624 map by Sir William Alexander, the Earl of
Stirling, who had himself received a charter for Nova Scotia in 1621. The map was
printed in support o f Alexander’s own claims in Nova Scotia, but it also took note o f the
grants o f the Council for New England, inscribing the names o f each shareholder along
the coastline to indicate the tracts they had received [see Fig. 2.5].20

19 Only six or seven English vessels fished on the New England coast in 1620; by 1624 the number had
risen to fifty or so. See Harrington, '"Wee Took Great Store o f Cod-Fish,'" 203-207.
20 DHSM 7: 20-45, 61-64 , 73-75, cit. 63.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106
Brian Harley has singled out Alexander's map as an instructive example o f the
imaginative power o f cartography.21 Not only did the map erase all signs o f native
possession in the region it described, it allowed the patentees to divide a distant region
into political jurisdictions and alienable property. Without ever having laid eyes on the
New World, Harley points out, the Council neatly portioned New England into shares to
be held in perpetuity. Yet this power had its limits, since the division o f shares was
essentially meaningless if the Council did not succeed in establishing and protecting its
monopoly. Determining the boundaries o f a tract was only the first step o f land
ownership: full possession would come only when the boundaries were also marked and
defended. While the Council had successfully completed the first step, the second and
third steps, as they were soon to learn, would be far more difficult.
The division of the patent was never consummated and the inaction o f most of the
patentees left the initiative for settling New England in the hands o f Gorges and Captain
John Mason, who had recently completed a six year term o f service as governor of
Newfoundland. In 1622, Gorges and Mason had obtained a joint charter for the province
of Maine, which extended from the Merrimack to the Sagadahock rivers, reaching sixty
miles inland. The following year, the Council issued a grant o f 6,000 acres in Maine to
Christopher Levett, a mariner from Somersetshire, and several months later Levett sailed
to New England to trade for furs and to find a suitable spot for settlement. When he
arrived, he found numerous fishermen and traders plying the coastal waters, even though
the New England charter’s banned ships from visiting the coast without a license.
Determined to defend the Council's authority in New England, Levett approached one o f

21 J. B. Harley, "New England Cartography and the Native Americans," in Baker et al., American
Beginnings. 309-11.
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the leading traders in Casco Bay and reminded him that he was acting against the law.
The trader dismissed Levett's charge out o f hand. Claiming that the Council had "sent
men over into [New England] with commissions, to make a prey o f others," he told
Levett that "he cared not for any authority in that place, and though he was forbid to
truck, yet would he have all he could get." He was both willing and able to defend this
claim against his rivals, Levett noted, having seventeen pieces o f ordnance and fifty men
on his ship.22
The trader did not speak only for himself, for many other small operators chafed
at the Council's restrictions. The year before, Gorges had sent his son Robert along with
Captain Francis West to New England to enforce the company’s regulations, but the
fishermen o f the region - "stubeme fellows," as West called them - paid him no mind.23
The problem was that the Council's monopoly lacked teeth: Gorges and his colleagues
received neither financial nor military backing from the crown and did not have the
means to defend thousands o f miles o f coastline against well-armed fishermen.
Independent operators could ignore the warnings o f West and other company agents,
since in practical terms the company possessed little authority on the American side o f
the Atlantic.
To prevent their competitors from fishing and trading on the coasts, colonizers
would have to establish permanent outposts manned by company agents. Lacking the
means to fund such stations itself, the cash-strapped Council issued land grants to
individual entrepreneurs, assigning them exclusive rights to fish and trade at strategic
points along the coast. In return, these entrepreneurs upheld the authority o f the Council

22 DHSM 7: 64-73, Levett, Voyage. 89-91.
23 Quoted in Innis, Cod Fisheries. 73. The fishing monopoly was revoked by Parliament in 1624.
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in New England and in many cases pledged to bring over a required number o f settlers
within a stipulated term o f years. Beginning in the early 1620s, the Council allotted the
islands and bays o f New England in a piecemeal fashion to various merchants,
gentlemen, and colonizing companies. As early as 1622, Gorges had established a fishing
station at Damariscove Island, and over the next ten years other English investors
launched operations at Cape Newagen, Piscataqua, Monhegan, Pemaquid, and Richmond
Island. Fur trading posts also sprung up along the region's waterways, some supported by
West Country merchants, others by the Plymouth colonists o f southern New England. By
the early 1630s, these outposts were joined by a growing number o f permanent settlers
who farmed the lands adjacent to the coast and along the banks o f rivers.24
Although the growth o f English settlement strengthened the Council's grasp o f the
region, it did not eliminate challenges to its authority. Land grants merely shifted the
burden o f defending claims onto the shoulders o f individual patentees. For those who
held patents to fur trading posts, the defense o f title often involved violence or threats of
violence since there was no civil authority that protected their trading rights. Traders had
a vested interest in keeping their rivals from encroaching on their territories because
competition for furs allowed Indians to sell to the lowest bidder and thereby reduce the
traders' profits. Often the only way they could keep their competitors from trading
nearby was to threaten them with muskets and shot.
The fur trade was a high-risk enterprise that promised enormous profits but also
entailed the possibility o f heavy losses and violent confrontation. Like privateers and

24 Edwin A. Churchill, "English Beachheads in Seventeenth-Century Maine," in Richard W. Judd, Edwin
A. Churchill, and Joel W. Eastman, eds., Maine: The Pine Tree State from Prehistory to the Present
(Orono: University o f Maine Press, 1995), 52-54; Francis X. Moloney, The Fur Trade in New England1620-1676 (Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1967), 27-40.
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pirates, the men who engaged in the trade were often adventurous types eager to get rich
quickly. Some had few scruples when it came to business practices and sought to make
their profits by hoodwinking their native trading partners or stealing from their European
rivals. The near-absence o f state authority at trading posts meant that the victims' only
avenue of redress was to take violent revenge for their injuries. The earliest permanent
English resident o f Richmond Island, Walter Bagnall, was killed by Wabanakis for
trading abuses in 1631, making him the first in a long line o f frontier traders whose shady
dealings were punished by death.25 The intense competition o f the fur trade, combined
with the weakness o f state authority and absence o f strong social ties, meant that frontier
traders had little reason to trust each other. To gain a measure o f security in the region,
traders had to develop alliances with Wabanakis and other Europeans, or intimidate rivals
through displays o f force. The second option was chosen as often as the first, leaving the
early years o f the fur trade in New England punctuated by violence.
Some o f the best known incidents occurred at the Plymouth colony’s northern
trading posts, which had been established in the late 1620s. Burdened with debts and
sorely in need o f exportable commodities, the colony had sent a ship to the Kennebec
River in 1625 which returned laden with seven hundred pounds o f furs. The Pilgrims
returned to the Kennebec over the next several years, and by 1629 they had established a
permanent trading post at Cushnoc and obtained a patent to the lands adjoining the river.
They began another post at the Penobscot River the same year, and in 1631 they started a
trade at Machias. The easternmost stations fell within the jurisdiction o f French trader
Charles de la Tour, whose father had been in Acadia since 1610. In 1632, the Treaty o f
St. Germain had returned Acadia to the French crown and La Tour received a commission

25 William Willis, "History of Portland," Maine Historical Society, Collections, ser.l, 1 (1831): 21.
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from the French king for the governorship o f Acadia. In 1633, he sent a group o f men to
Machias, who killed two o f the Plymouth traders, seized all their goods, and sent the
remaining captives back to France. The same year, a party o f French landed at
Penobscot, forcing the Plymouth traders to hand over some £400 or £500 in furs and
other merchandise. Two years later, another party o f French, this time led by La Tour's
rival, Charles Menou d'Aulnay, removed the Plymouth traders for good, forcing them to
hand over their trade goods and abandon their post.26
The Plymouth colony was troubled by English competitors as well. In 1634 a
Piscataqua trader named John Hocking sailed up the Kennebec River, intending to go
beyond Cushnoc to fetch furs. The captain o f Cushnoc, John Howland, refused him
passage, but Hocking ignored the order and anchored his pinnace upriver. When
Howland sent his men in canoes to cut the ship's cables, Hocking fired upon them, killing
Moses Talbot. A friend o f Talbot shot back and Hocking fell to his death. One of
Hocking's kinsmen sought justice for the murder, writing to the proprietors o f the
Piscataqua colony in England and applying to Governor John Winthrop o f Massachusetts
Bay for a trial. Winthrop set a date for a hearing at Boston, but the representatives from
Piscataqua failed to appear and the governor let the matter drop.27
Although Plymouth's governor, William Bradford, lauded Winthrop's handling o f
the case, the decision not to prosecute anyone for the murders owed as much to the

26 William Bradford, O f Plymouth Plantation. 1620-1647. ed. Samuel Morison (New York: Knopf, 1953),
244-46,275-77; Leon E. Cranmer, Cushnoc: History and Archaeology o f Plymouth Colony Traders on the
Kennebec. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology No. 7 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic
Preservation Commission, 1990); Moloney, Fur Trade. 25-31. La Tour had also received a baronetcy in
Nova Scotia from William Alexander in 1630.
27 Bradford, Plymouth. 262-68; Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and Laetitia Yeandle, eds., The Journal of
John Winthrop. 1630-1649 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1996), 114-15,122-23, 131; Shurtleff,
Records o f Massachusetts. 1 :119. The English backers o f the Piscataqua colony were Puritans, led by
Lords Saye and Brooke, who corresponded with Winthrop.
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weakness o f colonial government as it did to Winthrop's wise jurisprudence. Fur traders
tended to be independent-minded men who did not brook political interference in their
affairs unless it worked in their favor. Unable to muster much in the way o f military
force, colonial authorities could not cudgel them into submission and had little muscle in
the more distant parts o f their jurisdiction. Traders aligned themselves with particular
colonies, investors, companies, and even crowns as it suited their purposes, not out o f a
reflexive sense o f allegiance. It is anachronistic in this sense to treat them as
representatives o f nation states, since their primary attachments were local: to family, to
partners, to patrons. Not only are there many examples o f peaceful cooperation between
members o f different national groups in the region during the seventeenth century, there
were also some notable instances in which traders who were ostensibly subjects o f the
same crown fought for control o f the same territories. In Acadia, the La Tour family and
Charles d'Aulnay feuded for nearly twenty years over the control o f the Acadian fur trade,
with each party claiming to be the rightful governor o f the province.28

Two Kinds o f Colony
Yet the national origins o f traders mattered to the extent that French and English
leaders pursued different strategies o f colonization. The early rulers o f Acadia were
nearly all noblemen who had received offices and grants o f land from the king as a
reward for military service. The rules o f derogeance, which prevented nobles from
pursuing occupations that were not suitable to their rank, kept them from engaging in

28 On examples o f intercultural cooperation, see John G. Reid, "An International Region o f the Northeast:
Rise and Decline, 1635-1762," in Stephen J. Hornsby, Victor A. Konrad, and James J. Herlan, The
Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries o f Interaction (Fredericton. N. B.: University o f Maine and
Acadiensis Press, 1989), 10-25. On the contest between La Tour and Aulnay, see M. A. McDonald,
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manufactures or other "demeaning" commercial activities. But the fur trade, with its
attendant risks and promise o f adventure, was an occupation open to them, and they
sought to make it second only to the fisheries in order o f economic importance.29
Acadia's proprietors did sponsor the migration o f a few hundred French men and
women, the majority o f them settling along the tidal flats o f the Bay o f Fundy. The lands
in these areas were nominally held under a seigneurial system o f tenure, but tenants' fees
were negligible in comparison to the great profits to be reaped from the fur trade and
fisheries, and lords often did not bother to collect them. With the energies o f leaders such
as La Tour and Aulnay devoted primarily to the fur trade, the Acadian settlements
developed as relatively autonomous and self-regulating communities. Settlement was
concentrated in the coastal areas o f the Acadian peninsula -- there were never more than a
hundred French people living west o f the St. John River valley —and the seigneuries that
were granted in southwestern Acadia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
were essentially monopolies that gave their holders exclusive rights to trade along
rivers.30
The trading outposts La Tour and Aulnay established in southwestern Acadia
between the St. John and Penobscot rivers were bastonaded forts made o f stone, and were
clearly intended to be permanent establishments. At Pentagoet, Aulnay erected a mill and

Fortune and La Tour The Civil War in Acadia (Toronto: Methuen. 1983).
29 Two o f the founders of Acadia had served as governors of frontier provinces in France before they made
their way across the Atlantic: Monts was governor o f Pons in Saintonge, and Poutrincourt governor of
Mery-sur-Seine in Champagne. See "Biencourt de Poutrincourt et de Saint-Just, Jean de," and "Du Gua de
Monts, Pierre," in DCB 1 :96,291.
30 Andrew Hill Clark, Acadia: The Geoaranhv o f Earlv Nova Scoria to 1760 (Madison, Wis.: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1968), esp. 90-95,113-15. According to a French census o f 1687-88, there were only 58
French senlers and 3 soldiers west of the S t John River valley, with only 22 acres in the region under
cultivation. With an estimated population o f445, Indians far outnumbered the French at these settlements.
See "General Census o f the Country o f Acadia, 1687-1688," in William Inglis Morse, ed., Acadiensia Nova
U 598-17791. 2 vols (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1935), 1:144-60.
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a farmstead and built several ships using lumber from nearby areas. In order to develop a
bond o f trust with their trading partners, leading fur traders also made alliances with their
Wabanaki neighbors: the younger La Tour even married a Wabanaki woman. The
importance of these alliances to the fur trade, combined with the nobles' highly cultivated
sense o f honor, made French traders unlikely to cheat the Wabanakis in their commercial
dealings.31
The English trading posts, by contrast, were sparsely furnished wooden buildings
manned by agents o f trading firms from England and southern New England. The
stations' ramshackle architecture was a consequence o f their impermanence, since most
English merchants treated the fur trade as a temporary measure that would raise the
capital necessary to pay off debts, purchase land, and launch other business enterprises.
Southern New England's Puritan and Separatist leaders tended to regard fur traders with a
degree o f suspicion - on various occasions, William Bradford referred to traders as
"profane", "base fellows", and "loose and drunken fellows" -- and countenanced their
libertine way of life only because the colonies needed the quick profits that came from
the trade. The transitory character o f the trading posts left English colonists with
relatively little interest in diplomacy with their native neighbors. Marriage between

31 Alaric Faulkner, "Gentility on the Frontiers o f Acadia, 1635-1674: An Archaeological Perspective,"
Dublin Seminar for New England Folklife. Annual Proceedings 14 (1989): 82-100; Alaric Faulkner and
Gretchen Faulkner, The French at Pentagoet. 1635-1674: An Archaeological Portrait o f the Acadian
Frontier. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, No. 5 (Saint John, N. B. and Augusta, Me.: New
Brunswick Museum and Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1987), esp. 1-20; Naomi Griffiths,
"1600-1650: Fish, Fur, and Folk," in Philip A. Buckner and John G. Reid, eds., The Atlantic Region to
Confederation: A History (Fredericton, N. B. and Toronto: Acadiensis Press and University of Toronto
Press, 1994), 59. The ideology of nobility, both in the Old World and the New, was in tension with the
emergent commercialism of French life. Nobles paid lip service to the feudal belief that commerce was
dishonorable, yet they actively sought out new sources o f wealth to support their genteel way of life. The
noble background of the early colonizers did not make them reluctant to engage in commercial enterprise;
to the contrary, they aggressively searched for economic opportunities. Aulnay, for example, built several
ships at Pentagouet on the Penobscot River and owned farmland near the fort. But these activities were a
supplement to the fur trade, and Aulnay would never have styled himself a merchant, a farmer, or a
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Wabanakis and English settlers was unheard of, and when Plymouth's authorities
discovered that a trader named Edward Ashley had engaged in sexual relations with
native women, they sharply reprimanded him for his "uncleanness."32
The social and religious background o f Plymouth's authorities helps to explain
their ambivalence toward the fur trade. The leaders o f southern New England tended to
be members o f the gentry with little military experience and a distrust o f courtly life.
Although they recognized the importance o f fisheries and the fur trade to the prosperity o f
their region, men such as Bradford and Winthrop hoped to establish colonies that were
"plantations," or settlements with agriculture as the dominant economic activity. Devout
Calvinists, they believed that people should slowly accumulate their wealth through
discipline and hard work, rather than seizing it by plunder and profiteering. They
expected that husbandry and industry, pursuits that required diligent labor, would become
the basis of their colonies. The fur trade in New England was expected to be a prop to
settlement and not an end in itself.33
The permanent settlers who arrived in northern New England in the 1630s and
1640s did not necessarily share the religious beliefs o f their neighbors to the south, but
they did have the same economic aspirations. Brought over as servants o f fishing
companies or as tenants o f the Council's patent holders, English people purchased and
settled parcels o f land along the coasts and rivers, with the largest communities

shipbuilder.
32 Cranmer, Cushnoc. esp. 51, 89; Bradford, History. 219,232-33,244-45; Emerson W. Baker, The Clarke
and Lake Company: The Historical Archaeology o f a Seventeenth-Centurv Maine Settlement. Occasional
Publications in Maine Archaeology No. 4 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission,
1985),10-12,62. According to a French report o f 1715, the Wabanakis o f Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and
the St. John River never married English settlers, war captives included. See letter o f Begon to the
Ministre de la Marine, September 25,1715, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 35, fol. 116.
33 Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture o f Puritan New England (New
York: Norton, 1995), esp. 64-106.
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developing at Strawberry Bank (Portsmouth) and Kittery along the Piscataqua River.
While the inhabitants o f coastal fishing stations and interior trading posts were
predominantly unattached young men, settlers usually arrived as nuclear families headed
by middle-aged fathers.34 Like other English people o f their time, these families hoped to
acquire the economic independence that came from land ownership. Agricultural land in
seventeenth-century England was the primary source o f productive wealth, providing
families with food and other products for home consumption and commodities for
exchange. It was also a patrimony that could be passed from one generation to the next,
allowing children to enjoy the fruits o f their parents' labor. Without land, a family would
be dependent on others for its economic well-being; with a small allotment o f acres its
members could become comfortably self-reliant.35
While land was scarce in the Old World, it was abundant in New England, making
it possible for a wide section o f the colonial population to acquire real property. Vast
areas of land in the region were opened to settlers as crowns and colonies established
their jurisdictions in the New World. Because the possession o f land depended on the
political control o f these authorities, land owners were forced to pay taxes or other fees to
their government, essentially as a form o f tribute. Maine's earliest settlers did not have
absolute rights to their lands but held them under socage tenure, whereby a tenant's rights
to the land were derived from his lord. Sir Ferdinando Gorges envisioned a colony with a
seigneurial system o f land tenure, in which settlers would receive the protection o f their

34 In the 1640s, the government of Maine passed an act forbidding women from living on the Isles of
Shoals, the main site for fishing stations at the mouth o f the Piscataqua River. See Charles T. Libby, Neal
W. Allen, and Robert E. Moody, eds., Province and Court Records o f Maine. 6 vols. (Portland, Me.: Maine
Historical Society, 1928-75), 1: 119. (Future references to this series appear as PCRM.l
35 Daniel Vickers, "Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” William and
Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 48 (1990): 3-29.
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lords in exchange for quit rents and work duties. In the early land grants, tracts o f land
were leased to patent holders for annual fees, with the expectation that the patentees
would in turn receive rents from the settlers they transported to the colony.36

"We Shall Understand a Little Geogrijy"
One o f the earliest patentees to settle in the colony was Edward Godfrey, a
merchant from London who had been associated with the Council for New England since
the early 1620s. Around 1630, he had migrated to Maine, establishing residence along
the Agamenticus (York) River. In 1636, Godfrey returned to England and obtained a
patent from the Council for the lands lying to the south o f Gorges's possessions along the
river. Several years later, Godfrey and his associates divided the 12,000 acres o f the
patent amongst themselves, with Godfrey and his partners receiving a substantial portion
of the tract. The settlers who lived on his lands asked him to confirm their title, and he
complied, granting deeds and running the bounds o f their estates. By 1655, at least
seventeen inhabitants owning over six hundred acres o f land traced their title to deeds
issued by Godfrey.37
Although Godfrey hoped to receive a return on his investment by collecting rents
and other dues from his tenants, he discovered that many settlers were reluctant to
comply. In a 1654 petition to the General Court o f Massachusetts Bay, he complained
that the inhabitants o f York had divided and shared a large portion o f patent's unallocated

36 John G. Reid, Acadia. Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 104-6; Edwin A. Churchill, 'Too Great the Challenge: The
Birth and Death of Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1979), 122-24.
37 Charles E. Banks, History of York. Maine. 2 vols. (Boston, 1931-35; reprint ed., Baltimore: Regional
Publishing Co., 1967), 1:46-50,81, 133: DHSM 4:121,127; William M. Sargent, "The Division of the
12,000 Acres Among the Patentees at Agamenticus," Maine Historical Society Collections. 2nd ser., vol. 2
(1891): 319-27.
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lands amongst themselves. Remarking that settlers had taken control o f most o f the
marshland in the patent -- marshes being prized as pasture for livestock ~ he claimed that
his "Rentes and acknowledgments" had "been detayned," leaving him without enough
marsh to feed even five head o f cattle.38
The tension between Godfrey and the inhabitants of York had been exacerbated
by Massachusetts Bay's 1651 annexation o f most o f Maine's settlements. In the 1640s the
outbreak o f civil war in England had forced Gorges to neglect the administration his
colony, leaving the Bay colony with the opportunity to assume control o f his lands.
Massachusetts leaders managed to do so with relative ease, partly because their
landholding system was more appealing to settlers than the seigneurial regime o f Maine.
Lands in Massachusetts were held under "free" socage tenure, which allowed people to
purchase and possess tracts without paying entry fees, quit rents, or other manorial
exactions. Landowners held their titles in perpetuity and received their grants directly
from the towns or the colony. As Joseph Wood has put it, towns in colonial
Massachusetts were "effectively manors without lords."39 To many o f Maine's settlers,
rule by Massachusetts Bay offered an opportunity to gain a clearer title to their land,
unencumbered by quit rents and work duties. Godfrey, on the other hand, actively
opposed annexation, knowing that it would wrest power from local magistrates and place
it in the hands o f the Massachusetts General Court. By 1652, it was clear that the battle

38 DHSM 4: 121-22; Reid, Maine. Acadia, and New Scotland. 133-35. Godfrey was not the only
proprietor whose lands were divided by inhabitants. After the deaths o f Sir Ferdinando Gorges and
Captain John Mason, thirty settlers at Kittery and Agamenticus (York) divided the lands o f their patents
amongst themselves and seized the mills built by Mason. See DHSM 4:94-95.
39 Joseph S. Wood. The New England Village (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 38.
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had been lost and Godfrey petitioned the Massachusetts General Court for confirmation
o f his land titles.40
Though Godfrey had denigrated the Court, accusing them only six months earlier
o f attempting to "ingraspe" Maine's lands, the magistrates o f Massachusetts grudgingly
accorded Godfrey's request. Throughout the controversy over annexation, they had
promised not to interfere with existing property rights, and in setting up an inquest into
Godfrey's titles, they were merely keeping their w ord41 The refusal to punish Godfrey or
any others for their opposition signaled the determination o f Massachusetts leaders to
remain impartial in the adjudication o f disputes over real property. Custom and legal
title, untarnished by political favoritism or personal vindictiveness, would continue to be
the basis o f land ownership.
This approach placed objective criteria, such as the placement o f fences and the
content o f written deeds, above social considerations in the adjudication o f property
disputes. While the seigneurial system was defined by human relationships, particularly
the ties that bound tenants to their lord, the laws o f Massachusetts emphasized the
owner's exclusive right to enjoy his property. The defense o f this right was grounded not
in self-interested individualism but in the knowledge that disputes over property were a
threat to social harmony. By making property rights explicit and exactly defined, the
leaders o f Massachusetts allowed judges and juries to adjudicate disputes on the basis o f
criteria that were in theory impartial and impervious to political influence. As early as
1647, the General Court passed a law requiring selectmen to run the boundaries o f their

40 DHSM 4: 36-7. By the second half of the seventeenth century, most o f the seigneurial provisions of
land deeds - time limits on leases, work duties, quit rents —had disappeared, making freeholds virtually
the only form o f tenure in Maine. See Churchill, 'Too Great the Challenge," 269-70.
41 DHSM 4: 17; Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts. 3:333-34,363.
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towns every three years, taking care to record and maintain the ditches and stones that
marked the limits o f their jurisdiction. The preamble o f the law explained that the
"deficiency and decay o f markes" caused "great jealousies o f persons, troubles in townes,
and incumbrances in Corts."42 Soon after their annexation, the towns o f southern Maine
were ordered to perform similar perambulations, with explicit orders not to interfere with
existing property rights. Wrangling over competing claims left local officials unable to
carry out the surveys themselves, and they were forced to turn to commissioners from
Boston, who laid out the dividing lines between the towns. By the end o f the century,
virtually all the boundaries o f the southwestern towns o f York County had been surveyed
and agreed upon.43
The annexation o f Maine was itself justified by surveys commissioned by the Bay
colony. According to the terms o f its 1628 charter, the northern limit o f Massachusetts
Bay was set three miles to the north o f the Merrimack River. At the time, the members o f
the Council for New England believed that the river ran eastward from the interior to the
coast. But explorers soon discovered that the river changes course some twenty miles
from the coast, winding northward as far as Lake Winnipesaukee. In August 1652, the
General Court hired two surveyors to find the northernmost point o f the river, which they
fixed at a latitude o f 43° 40' 12" north. In November o f the same year, the Court declared
this latitude to be the northern limit o f colony, running east-west from sea to sea, and
renamed the part o f Maine that fell within this line York County [see Fig. 2.6]. Two

42 Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts. 2:210. Property disputes in Maine tended to be more rancorous
than in the Bay colony, and in many cases were marked by violent incidents. For examples, see PCRM.
vol. 1:44, 51-52, 53,58-62, 106-107; vol. 2:24; DHSM. 4:8-9.
43 DHSM 4: 35-36, 64; ShurtlefF, Records o f Massachusetts. 3:402; 4/1: 128-31 ,340,373,375,380,399;
Kittery Town Records, fols. 93-94; Biddeford Town Records, fols. 25-26, 131; Scarborough Town
Records, fols. 21-22.
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years later, the Court sent another pair o f surveyors to Casco Bay to find the same latitude
along the coast. Using nautical instruments and mathematical calculations, they placed
the limits o f the colony across the bay from Clapboard Island, marking several trees with
the letters "MB," for Massachusetts Bay.44
Many inhabitants o f Maine saw Massachusetts' actions as a transparent ploy
designed to justify the Bay colony's aggressive expansion into their jurisdiction.
Godfrey, who had become governor o f the colony following Gorges' death in 1649, wrote
that he "marvell[ed]" that Massachusetts extended its government from sea to sea, adding
that "we shall understand a little Geogrify or Cosmogrifie."45 Yet in basing the
boundaries o f the colony on the wording o f their charter and the scientific measurement
of space, the leaders o f Massachusetts simply extended the logic o f property rights to
include the land possessed by the colony itself. If the annexation o f Maine was a matter
of applying the letter o f the law, then the General Court's actions were impartial and
above politics. Working with the pen rather than the sword, the leaders o f the Bay colony
legitimized their claims by grounding them in documentary title.
The General Court's understanding o f its jurisdiction, like its approach to real
property rights, was based in a belief in the sanctity o f written contract. The Puritans'
understanding o f themselves as a covenanted community, combined with their opposition
to the absolutist tendencies o f the early Stuart kings, made them committed to the need to
draw up and to obey written agreements.46 Once the colony's charter, or any other
transaction, had been framed as a legally binding document, the Puritans believed that the

44 DHSM 4: 18; DHSM 7:273-76; Shurtleff, Records o f Massachusetts. 3:361-62.
45 DHSM 4: 18.
46 Innes, Creatine the Commonwealth. 194-97. The contractualism of Puritan society was also a result of
their widespread involvement in a commercial economy; the colony itself was originally a joint-stock
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signatories were bound to its terms. When parties interpreted the contract in divergent
ways, as did Massachusetts Bay and the Council for New England, they could resolve
their differences by appealing to the provisions o f the contract, which were theoretically
objective and unbiased, since both parties had agreed to them.
The belief that property rights could be defined objectively was a fiction, since
there was always a subjective element in the resolution o f property disputes. The
enforcement o f contracts depended on an elaborate social edifice o f laws, courts,
magistrates, clerks, and governments. These agencies oversaw the drafting o f written
agreements and punished those who failed to conform to their terms. The validity of land
deeds and other legal titles was inseparable from the authority o f such agencies, since
property owners depended on the protection o f courts and governments. When
governments failed to exert their authority over lands that lay within their jurisdiction, the
rights o f landowners were placed in danger.
No one knew this better than the patentees who held their lands under Gorges's
charter. Other than two brief periods, 1636-37 and 1640-45, in which a proprietary
government held courts and received petitions, the settlers in his colony were left to fend
for themselves.47 Matters were often confused by vague or overlapping titles which
assigned portions o f land to two or more owners. Lacking an exact knowledge o f the
region's geography, the Council allocated its lands in a haphazard fashion that made
disputes between title holders inevitable. One o f the most notable conflicts took place
between George Cleeve, an entrepreneur and early settler o f Maine, and John Winter, a
representative o f English merchants Robert Trelawney and Moses Goodyear. As an

company.
47 Gorges's descendants also tried, unsuccessfully, to reestablish proprietary government on two occasions
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incentive to settlement, Sir Ferdinando Gorges had promised Cleeve 2,000 acres o f
unoccupied land in New England, and around 1630 Cleeve had established himself at the
mouth o f the Spurwink River in Casco Bay. He soon formed a partnership with Richard
Tucker, who had purchased an adjoining tract. But two years later, the Council issued a
patent for Richmond Island and the adjoining mainland - a tract that included the land
possessed by Cleeve -- to Trelawney and Goodyear. Winter arrived in New England to
manage their operations the next year and drove Cleeve and Tucker from their original
settlement, forcing them to relocate on a neck o f land adjoining the Casco River. Cleeve
returned to England in late 1636 and obtained a patent for the new settlement from
Gorges, but soon after his return Winter attempted to seize the lands occupied by Cleeve
and Tucker, again claiming them on behalf o f Trelawney and Goodyear. The dispute was
left to fester until Sir Ferdinando Gorges sent his nephew Thomas Gorges to Maine late
in 1639 to establish regular government in the province. The following year, Cleeve
brought two trespass suits against Winter at a Saco court and both juries found in his
favor, rewarding him with damages and a confirmation o f his title to the lands on the
neck.48
The weakness o f property rights and the persistence o f disputes over land owed
much to the relative absence o f a strong provincial government. Because large portions
o f Maine had been distributed in the form o f extensive patents in the 1620s and 1630s,
much o f the authority over land holdings remained in the hand o f individual patentees,

in the 1660s.
48 PCRM. 1: 58-64; Willis, "History o f Portland," 21-62; Thomas Gorges to John Winter, [October 1740];
Thomas Gorges to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, July 7,1641; Thomas Gorges to Robert Trelawney, [Sept?
1641], in Robert E. Moody, ed., The Letters of Thomas Gorges. Deputy Governor o f the Province of
Maine. 1640-1643 (Portland. Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1978), 20-22,31-33,73-75; Reid, Maine.
Acadia, and New Scotland. 106-109,111-14,134. Settlers who held their titles from Winter and Cleeve
continued to have disputes into the 1660s.
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who were only sporadically checked by provincial authorities. Listing twenty distinct
land grants within the territory o f Maine, one anonymous writer in the mid-1630s
remarked that disputes between settlers o f different patents were "seldome, or never
ended because there is none in the countrie that hath authority to decide them; every mans
power beinge limitted, with his owne Patent." Like many other colonists, the observer
pleaded for the establishment o f a central authority that would adjudicate disputes
between the patentees, explaining that "[tjhere wants uniformytie in the Lawes and
Customes o f severall Patents and alsoe a generall unitie, in thinges that conceme the
publique good o f the Countrie."49
The proprietors' inability to provide adequate protection to landholders in the
province made many settlers receptive to the entreaties o f the Massachusetts Bay, which
promised regular courts and an orderly system o f town government. In a 1656 petition to
Oliver Cromwell, the supporters o f the Bay colony in Maine complained o f the
proprietors' silence over several years, "both in their tongues and penns," which had let
the colony "sinke into great distractions," and had forced them to look to Massachusetts
Bay for effective government.50 Over the next several decades, York's inhabitants began
to clarify their titles through the county courts, settling land disputes through a series of
suits and counter-suits. While judges and juries tended to base their decisions on
customary possession, plaintiffs and defendants in civil suits presented written deeds and
depositions from knowledgeable neighbors.51

49 Charles E. Banks, ed., "Relation Concerning the Estate of New England, about 1634," New England
Historical and Genealogical Register 40 (1886): 73.
50 DHSM 4: 139.
51 PCRM. vols. 2-4, passim. Town governments were also had a vested interest in recording o f real
property rights; the town of Wells ordered in 1651 and 1658 ordered a survey o f its marshes to make it
easier to rate taxes. See PCRM 1:171,2:37
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In the early years o f the colony, the allocation o f land had taken place informally,
often without any written documentation or official recording o f property titles.
Typically, proprietors or towns issued grants o f a specified number o f acres to settlers,
who searched for parcels o f land that could be immediately turned to cultivation.
Because land was abundant and the settler population largely illiterate, few smallholders
recorded the exact limits o f their estates. Many did not delineate their property
boundaries until disputes with neighbors over salt marshes and other scarce resources
forced them into court. But once they became embroiled in land disputes, settlers began
to appreciate the value o f clearly defined property boundaries. John Treworgy, an early
settler of Kittery who quarreled with his neighbor John Heard over a marsh near Sturgeon
Creek, proposed that the dispute be settled by informally dividing the marsh according to
natural markers such as trees and bushes. "Come, what should wee have difference about
marsh," he told four o f his fellow townspeople, "wee will devid it and live like
neighbors." Unfortunately, this informal division did not settle the matter; Heard
successfully sued Treworgy in 1645 for trespassing on his marsh and Treworgy lost a
counter-suit in 1647. A year before, Treworgy had tried to reclaim the marsh by force but
had been violently beaten back by Heard's wife. It was perhaps the threat o f such
unneighborly behavior that caused the town meeting o f Cape Porpoise in 1663 to lay out
the property boundaries o f six o f its inhabitants ”[f]or the preventing o f striffe, that peace
and quietnesse may bee mantayned amongst us."52

52 PCRM. 1:93-95, 106-107, cit. 94-95; York Deeds, vol. 1, fol. 145. On the parallel development of
property boundaries in nearby Essex County, see David T. Konig, "Community Custom and the Common
Law: Social Change and the Development o f Land Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Journal of
American Legal History 18 (1974): 137-77.
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Gradually, towns and courts began to accumulate a large store o f knowledge
about property boundaries, transfers o f title, customary uses, and land grants. Although
the county government did not compile a full-fledged registry o f its lands, its role as an
arbiter o f land disputes and a repository o f deeds and wills forced it to develop an
extensive understanding o f real property rights in its jurisdiction.53 By the 1670s, the
measurement and description o f land grants issued by both towns and the province
became increasingly precise. Towns in the last quarter o f the seventeenth century began
to hire or appoint surveyors to lay out the grants and append their signatures to the deeds;
by the early eighteenth century, virtually every chartered town in York county had
appointed at least one person to the office o f land surveyor.54 Earlier town grants had
often been vague; a 1653 deed to Robert Beth and Walter Pemwell from the town o f Saco
(Biddeford) allowed them a tract o f land "60 poles in bredth or ther abouts be it more or
less."55 By the last quarter o f the seventeenth century, towns such as Kittery sometimes
included small diagrams o f the grants in their records and typically described the parcels
as being "measured and laid out" instead o f "granted and laid out," the less precise phrase
used in grants made before the 1670s [see Fig. 2.7].56
The earliest existing property maps o f Maine date to the 1670s, and in the next
two decades provincial and town officials stepped up their efforts to place land titles on a

53 Gorges had already established a kind o f informal land registry in his colony; when he first received a
charter for the province, he issued an order that required all land transactions to be reported to the Council
for approval. See James P. Baxter, ed., Sir Ferdinando Gorges and His Province o f Maine. 3 vols. (Boston:
The Prince Society, 1890), 3:67.
54 See, for example, Biddeford Town Records, vol. 1, fol. 143; Brunswick Town Records, vol. 1,
Appointments for 1720; Kittery Town Records, vol.l, fols. 34ff; vol. 2.
55 Grant to Robert Beth and Walter Pemwell, July 12, 1653, Biddeford Town Records, vol. I, fol. 4.
56 Kittery Town Records, Maine State Archives, Augusta, Maine, vol. I, esp. fols. 34ff; Richard M.
Candee, "Land Surveys o f William and John Godsoe of Kittery, Maine, 1689-1769," in Peter Benes, ed.,
New England Prospect: Mans. Place Names, and the Historical Landscape. Dublin Seminar for New
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more solid footing. The government o f Massachusetts played an important role in these
efforts, strengthening its own hand in the process. Merchants and speculators from
southern New England had been acquiring land titles in Maine since the 1630s, and the
integration o f the province into the political fold o f Massachusetts offered them an
opportunity to purchase new holdings or to protect the legal basis o f their existing deeds.
In 1680, two years after the Gorges family had ceded its outstanding claims to Maine to
Massachusetts in exchange for £1,250, the General Court reorganized the government o f
the province. The General Court appointed Thomas Danforth, a magistrate from
Cambridge, to the office of president o f Maine. Danforth was given the powers o f a
colonial proprietor, having the right to grant new townships to existing towns or
companies, confirm land titles granted in the past, or grant lands o f his own accord.
Among the earliest actions o f this government was an order requesting a survey o f lands
in Maine.57
Virtually the same powers were assumed by Edmund Andros, who was appointed
governor-general o f the Dominion o f New England in 1686. A fierce defender o f the
royal prerogative, Andros sought to make the crown rather than the provincial
government the ultimate source o f land titles in the colonies. He ordered that New
England's inhabitants would have to validate all future land purchases with new deeds
and would be forced to pay quitrents on the same. Although many New Englanders were
outraged by the reforms, several prominent landowners in Maine with connections to
Andros's regime eagerly seized the opportunity to place their holdings on a more solid

England Folklife Annual Proceedings (Boston: Boston University Press, 1980), 9-46. The first map
included in the Kittery town records was dated March 2,1696: see vol. I, fol. 71.
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footing. They convinced many neighbors with more modest estates to do likewise: the
result was a flood o f petitions that requested confirmation o f new or existing tracts o f
land to the eastward; well over a hundred settlers applied to Andros for deeds to their
land.58 Surveyor Richard Clements measured out twenty-three such grants in Falmouth
to local allies o f the Andros administration [see Fig. 2.8].59 Because the region's settlers
welcomed this opportunity to gain more secure title to their lands, many had no qualms
about paying hefty fees to the Andros government in return for a survey o f their lands and
a confirmation of their deeds. Several landholders from Massachusetts who had gained
title to large patents under the presidency o f Thomas Danforth were outraged by Andros's
rejection o f their titles but it was Andros's dismissal o f existing land rights, not the
involvement o f the provincial government, that stoked their ire.60
Some settlers in Maine were also angered by what seemed to be a form o f
extortion by Andros and his allies. The settlements east o f the Piscataqua River had been
riven by faction for generations, largely because there had been so many competing
sources o f authority: first the various holders o f patents under Gorges, then the competing
governments o f Massachusetts and Maine, and finally the supporters o f Andros and the
backers o f the Danforth administration.61 But all land holders wanted more secure title to

57 Theodore B. Lewis, "Land Speculation and the Dudley Council of 1686," William and Mary Quarterly.
3rd ser., 31 (1974): 255-72; Order for survey o f lands in Maine, May 26, 1680, Massachusetts Archives,
vol. 3, fol. 342a.
58 For petitions to Andros for confirmation of land titles see DHSM. 6: 219-468, passim.
59 See Land Office Maps, Maine State Archives, Augusta, Me., Map Case 4, Drawer 5, Items 9-18,21,2330,53-58,60; Massachusetts Archives, Boston, Maps and Plans, 3rd Series, vol. 1, p.135-36; vol. 32, p. 9;
vol. 33, p. 7; vol. 37, pp. 2 ,4 ,8 , 16,19,24.
60 John Frederick Martin, Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding o f New England
Towns in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 17-18,
20-21, 105-110,260-66.
61 On opposition to Andros's land reforms in Falmouth, see Willis, "History o f Portland," 188-92; on
factionalism in Kittery, see Jonathan A. Chu, "The Social and Political Contexts o f Heterodoxy: Quakerism
in Seventeenth-Century Kittery," New England Quarterly 54 (1981): 365-384.
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their holdings; the dilemma was to determine which government held ultimate authority
over the region's lands. By the last decade o f the seventeenth century, it was becoming
increasingly clear that the province o f Massachusetts was the only sovereign authority
that could reliably grant, record, and protect real estate holdings in Maine. By the early
eighteenth century, land grants by the General Court were increasingly becoming a matter
o f routine: although most grants were issued by towns, the province also confirmed and
granted numerous tracts o f land in York County every year, frequently including
diagrams o f the real estate next to the orders that confirmed them. The increasingly
active involvement o f the provincial government in the authorization, measurement, and
protection o f land titles served to tighten the connection between Maine's settlers and the
General Court.
Occasionally, towns and the province stumbled in their effort to accurately
measure the private holdings o f their citizens. In 1710, for example, the town o f Kittery
was forced to redraw the property boundaries o f several inhabitants who had discovered
that the placement o f their fences did not accord with the descriptions o f their deeds to the
land.62 On another occasion, the Massachusetts General Court granted land along the
Newichawanock (Salmon Falls) River that already belonged to a settler named Thomas
Broughton.63 But both towns and the province owned up to their mistakes and redoubled
their efforts to measure their land holdings more accurately. Treating the land as durable
and consistently measurable object served a valuable political purpose: if governments
demonstrated an ability to impartially record and protect property rights, they gained
legitimacy in the eyes o f the region's settlers.

62 York Deeds, vol. 7, fol. 175
63 DHSM. 4: 13.
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There was, in other words, a thread o f authority that attached the titles o f land
owners to the jurisdiction o f governments. Lands could not belong to private individuals
unless the title holders received the backing o f courts and political authorities. If these
authorities were weak, or if their jurisdiction overlapped with another government, the
owner's exclusive right to use his or her tract was jeopardized. But if the government had
established an uncontested claim to sovereignty over the land, the owner’s rights were
secure. Conversely, the government's own authority depended on its ability to make itself
legitimate in the eyes o f the people it ruled. Governments that threatened existing
property rights - such as the administration o f Edmund Andros, which called into
question the very basis o f land titles in the Bay Colony -- were unpopular and liable to be
overthrown.64 In New England, where property ownership was widely diffused, the
strength o f political authorities depended to a large extent on their ability to defend
private property. Towns, counties, and colonies were consequently defined as clearly
defined territories with well-marked boundaries, all having the right to grant lands within
their respective jurisdictions.65

Two Kinds o f Frontier
This type o f arrangement could only work in areas with substantial English
settlement. In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts Bay had its strongest hold on the
small towns o f southwestern Maine -- Kittery, Wells, York, Scarborough, and Falmouth -

54 On Andros's assault on land titles in Massachusetts, and the consequent rebellion of New Englanders
against his administration, see Martin, Profits in the Wilderness. 260-80.
65 The thread of authority arguably extended as far heads o f household, nearly all o f them male, who
theoretically had exclusive control over the disposal o f their families' real property.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130
- where nearly all the English population was concentrated.66 The colony did little to
extend its authority beyond these towns, failing to hold courts east o f Wells or to build
any large forts in Maine before the 1675-78 Anglo-Wabanaki war. On coastal islands and
at inland trading posts, political authority effectively remained in the hands o f traders and
fishermen. The traders were nominally subjects o f the French or English crown, but they
were notoriously flexible in their loyalties. In 1674 a party o f English and Dutch
privateers sacked French outposts at Pentagoet, Machias, and St. John, claiming them on
behalf of the Prince o f Orange and using them as bases for the plunder o f English ships.
When they were brought to trial in an English court, they pled innocence to charges o f
piracy, insisting that they had received letters o f marque from the Prince o f Orange and
were defending his territory against English interlopers. The privateers were sentenced to
death, but the episode laid bare the weakness o f state authority in the region east o f Casco
Bay.67
Because the leaders o f Massachusetts Bay had neither the means nor the will to
enforce its authority in these distant regions, which in any event were not included in the
colony's original charter, they involved themselves very little in the regulation o f such
disputes. Before the 1675-78 war, most frontier traders were independent operators with
little interest in attaching themselves to one government or another. Political authority
near the frontier outposts consequently had a different character than in settled areas.
Although the territorial boundaries o f traders' monopolies were described precisely in
patents and other land grants, in practice they were ambiguous. The aim o f most traders

66 In 1675, there were roughly 3,500 English people living in the towns between Piscataqua and
Sagadahock, and another 775 or so living between Sagadahoc and S t Georges River. See Robert E.
Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 259-60.
67 DHSM 6:49-88; 7:328-34.
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was to secure important thoroughfares o f communication such as harbors and rivers and
thereby monopolize all the commerce that passed through them. They defended their
monopolies by forming alliances with trading partners and by using force to keep out
their competitors. No traders ever bothered to survey the boundaries o f their grants, since
their interest was in controlling strategic points o f trade, not in the protection o f large
swaths o f agricultural land.
There were, in short, two kinds o f frontier in seventeenth-century Maine: one
consisting o f outposts and the other o f settled farmland. In cartographic terms, the first
was best expressed by the pattern o f nodes and links. The nodes were the outposts that
enforced political control in peripheral regions, such as towns and forts, while the links
were the maritime and riverine transportation routes that allowed colonies to provision
and supply the outposts. Nearly all the large scale maps o f New England in the
seventeenth century took this form [see Fig. 2.9]. Political boundaries in such maps were
either absent or ambiguously defined, since no colony had exclusive political control o f
frontier regions. Possession o f Penobscot Bay was claimed by the English, French,
Wabanakis, and even the Dutch, and any political boundaries that might have been drawn
around it in the seventeenth century would have been artificial. In practical terms,
possession o f the Bay had to be negotiated, either by placating rivals with presents and
favors or intimidating them with displays o f force.
If power at frontier outposts came from the barrel o f a gun, in settled areas it
flowed from the nib o f a pen. Although county courts and town meetings had some
coercive power, their authority ultimately came from their ability to protect property and
to regulate social rifts in a peaceable manner. Knowledge, not force, was the foundation
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o f their power. Property owners depended on the documentary authority o f the
government to such an extent that when the county recorder in 1686 announced that he
was intending to move Maine's records from York to Black Point -- a journey o f only
twenty-five miles -- over a hundred men petitioned the government to forbid the move,
claiming that the previous recorder had dropped deeds and other documents into rivers in
his travels, "to the great Damage o f many o f the Inhabitants."68
Because o f their importance in granting land and settling property disputes, towns
and counties were defined territorially, as bounded and well-defined jurisdictions. Their
limits were clearly marked and measured, since land owners depended on a government
that had exclusive control and exact knowledge o f its lands. A pattern that had since
ancient times been associated primarily with maps o f land ownership -- a landscape
divided into a patchwork o f regular shapes —began to be applied to political cartography.
The similarity was no coincidence, since the clear definition o f political boundaries in
early New England was a consequence o f the division o f the land into private property.
The first jurisdictions to clarify their boundaries were settled areas such as towns and
counties, where land values were highest and where disputes over real property rights
were most likely to take place. These boundaries tended to stick because property owners
had a vested interest in supporting a government with exclusive authority over their
lands: the boundary lines between the towns o f Kittery, Wells, and York in the late
seventeenth century were roughly the same as they are today. These borders did not
generally appear in large-scale maps, since they were only o f interest to people who had a
stake in the land. But in a few instances, such as John Seller's 1675 map o f New England

68 DHSM 6:213-15. The occasion o f the move was the replacement o f Edward Rishworth by Thomas
Scottow as clerk o f the court.
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[see Fig. 2.10], the boundary lines o f colonies and counties were clearly if awkwardly
drawn. Although this pattern was only vaguely discernible in the last quarter o f the
seventeenth century, over the next hundred years it would begin to appear in maps o f
New England with increasing regularity.

Imperial boundaries
If the delineation o f boundaries in regional maps was caused by property disputes,
the development o f border lines on a continental scale was the result o f imperial wars.
During the last third o f the seventeenth century, the crowns o f France and England
tightened their control over their colonial possessions, taking a more direct role in their
administration and becoming more vigilant in the collection o f customs duties and the
regulation o f trade. As royal power expanded, the crowns assumed many o f the roles that
had previously been played by the proprietors o f colonial companies. Perhaps the most
important change was that the monarchs now became responsible for the military
protection o f their subjects in the colonies. Regular troops replaced militiamen and
proprietors' private armies at frontier outposts, and navy ships protected ocean shipping
lanes against pirates and privateers. The involvement o f the crowns in military affairs
brought the colonies greater prosperity through the expansion o f trans-Atlantic trade, but
it also involved them in imperial conflicts o f an increasingly large scale.
Like colonial proprietors, royal officials found maps to be an effective instrument
o f political control, serving both as propaganda and as sources o f information. As early
as 1675, English officials had complained o f a "want o f maps," and the next year they
sent a circular letter to the governors o f New England requesting them to send accurate
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maps o f their colonies. By the end o f the century, the Board o f Trade, a committee o f the
Privy Council charged with oversight o f colonial affairs, had compiled several dozen
maps o f the colonies, most o f them in the private collections o f Board members such as
William Blathwayt. The French government, meanwhile, had also launched an ambitious
cartographic program under the guidance o f Louis XIV's Comptroller General, JeanBaptiste Colbert. In 1663, he ordered provincial officials to gather local maps and to
send them to the royal cartographer for correction. The government also requested maps
o f French exploration in North America, usually drawn by Jesuit missionaries, whose
academic curriculum placed a heavy emphasis on cartography and geographical
knowledge.69
Both crowns sponsored the publication o f maps, providing royal cartographers
with manuscript maps and other materials necessary for their preparation. Where
sixteenth-century printed maps were cautiously neutral, their eighteenth-century
equivalents were overtly political, with the typical sheet spelling out the cartographer's
royal commission at a comer o f the page. To please their patrons, mapmakers presented
the most generous possible interpretations o f their respective crown's territorial claims in
the Americas. The map o f New France engraved by royal cartographer Nicolas Sanson in
1656, for example, placed the limits o f the colony at the Kennebec River, even though
two years before English privateers had seized control o f Acadia and had removed all
French officials from the region [Fig. 2.11]. Like other maps o f the time, Sanson's sheet

69 CSP. vol. 9 (1675-76), fols. 672,810; William Blathwayt, The Blathwavt Atlas: A Collection o f 48
Manuscripts and Printed Maps of the Seventeenth Century.... ed. Jeanette D. Black, 2 vols. (Providence:
Brown University Press, 1970); David Buisseret, "Monarchs, Ministers and Maps in France before the
Accession o f Louis XIV," in idem, ed., Monarchs. Ministers and Maps: The Emergence o f Cartography as
a Tool of Government in Earlv Modem Europe (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), 99-100;
Brown, Story o f Maps. 241-45.
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was a mixture o f propaganda and practical information, illustrating the course o f rivers
and the location o f Indian tribes while simultaneously backing the French crown's
vaunted notions o f its North American empire.70
The delineation o f boundaries in Sanson's map was exceptional, since most maps
of his time represented the colonies as free-floating names. But over the course o f the
next century, boundary lines became commonplace in the maps o f royal cartographers,
largely as a result o f the series o f imperial wars that took place between France and
Britain between 1689 and 1763. Extensions o f dynastic conflicts in Europe, the wars
accentuated national differences in the colonies, forcing colonists to identify themselves
as subjects o f one crown or the other. Territories that lay between the French and British
colonies became flashpoints o f imperial rivalry as both sides claimed them as their own.
The positions o f both crowns were graphically supported in royally-commissioned maps
that traced boundary lines around the possessions o f each crown. Each map invited a
response from the opposite crown, leading to a prolonged cartographic struggle in which
the exaggerated claims o f one side were met by the extravagant counter-claims o f the
other. The opening volleys were fired in early eighteenth-century maps prepared by
cartographers such as Guillaume de 1'Isle and John Senex, but the battle reached a fever
pitch in the "map wars" o f the 1750s, as the printing presses o f London and Paris rolled
off dozens o f maps supporting the claims o f their respective crowns in North America
[see Figs. 2 .1 2 ,2.13].71

70 On the practical and symbolic uses o f maps in seventeenth-century England, see Peter Barber,
"Necessary and Ornamental: Map Use in England under the Later Stuarts, 1660-1714," Eighteenth-Centurv
Life 14 (Nov. 1990): 1-28.
71 On the map wars o f the 1750s, see William P. Cummings, British Maps o f Colonial America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 59-60.
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Unlike the straight lines that separated towns and counties in New England, the
borders that divided New France from the English colonies never became fixed. While
an exact knowledge o f town limits was necessary to preserve social peace, imperial
boundaries were essentially military fronts that guarded the possessions o f one crown
from the armies o f the other. The colonies o f New France and New England were girdled
by a chain o f forts, garrisons, and missionary outposts that acted as a line o f first defense
against enemy attacks. The boundary lines o f continental maps approximated the pattern
o f this chain, but the extent o f political control was a matter o f interpretation and could
change as the military fortunes o f either colony rose or fell. The diplomatic
representatives o f the two crowns never agreed upon an official border line between their
respective colonies -- indeed, none o f Louis XTV's treaties ever made mention o f political
boundaries, either in Europe or the Americas. When the French crown handed possession
o f Acadia over to the British in 1713, the territorial extent o f the colony was left
ambiguous, with its boundaries to be decided by a joint commission at an unspecified
date in the future. The French dragged their feet on the issue, making political control o f
the region a matter o f unresolved dispute over the next fifty years.72
Though imperial maps o f the mid-eighteenth century implied that the French and
British crowns had exclusive sovereignty over their North American dominions, their
control in border areas was tenuous at best. The most distant outposts o f empire in the
eighteenth century were manned by military officers and other royal agents who upheld

72 Foucher, L'invention des frontieres. 60. Boundaries were frequently mentioned during the negotiation
of treaties in the first half o f the eighteenth century, but were never incorporated into the written texts.
During negotiations for the Peace of Utrecht, French and English officials shuttled maps o f Acadia back
and forth, with each side illustrating the extent o f their respective claims with dotted lines. See "Precis de
ce qui c'est passe pendant la Negotiation de la paix d'Utrecht au Sujet de L'Accadie...", July 1711-May
1713, PAC, AN, Serie C l ID, vol. 8, fol. 3-25.
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their jurisdiction through a combination o f military force and political suasion, much like
the frontier traders o f the previous century. If colonial officials failed to win the
obedience o f people living in frontier areas, the boundaries o f imperial maps remained
more theoretical than real.
This point was not lost on the British officials charged with assuming control o f
Acadia after the Treaty o f Utrecht in 1713. Two years after the treaty's signing, the
government o f Nova Scotia sent two representatives in a sloop to proclaim the authority
o f the British king in newly conquered areas. They met a cool reception throughout
Acadia. At the mouth o f the Penobscot River they were greeted by several hundred
Indians from Panawapskik, who listened stoically as they read their proclamation. After
holding council, a spokesman for the village told the officials that "I will not make an
Oath of loyalty to anyone; I do not want a Foreign King; I have my natural Kings and
governors who are my chiefs and elders." To add insult to injury, the Indians prevented
the officials from seizing a trading vessel from Casco Bay that was plying the waters o f
the Penobscot. The shipmaster was trading illegally, since he did not have a license from
the Nova Scotia government, which claimed jurisdiction o f the lands east o f the St.
George River. But the Penobscots, who were his trading partners, told the Nova Scotians
that the Indians would consider the seizure o f the ship's cargo as theft o f their own
property. Not wanting to provoke a party o f several dozen well-armed men, the officials
returned to Annapolis Royal without making an arrest.73

73 Lt. Gov. Caulfield to Council ofTrade, Annapolis Royal, Jan. 3,1715/6, CSP. vol. 28 (1714-15), fol.
142, p. 63; Begon au ministre, Quebec, Sept. 25,1715, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 35, fol. 109-114, c it
113. (My translation; the original reads: " Je ne veux point prester Serment de fidelite a personne, Je ne
veux point de Rois Etranger, jay mes Rois naturels et mes gouvemeurs qui sont mes chefs et mes anciens.")
Indian speakers used the first person singular when referring to their village or tribe collectively.
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As Nova Scotia's government learned, agreements made in the drawing rooms o f
Europe were not always easy to enforce in the forests o f North America. No matter
where boundary lines were drawn on maps, governments could not control territories
unless they forced or enticed people within their borders to bend to their rule. The
inhabitants o f borderland regions, who were distant from political centers and often
courted by more than one colony, tended to be particularly difficult to govern. The
Wabanakis who lived in the lands south o f the St. Lawrence River valley and north o f the
Piscataqua were adept at playing British against the French and extracting concessions
from both. The Wabanakis' trump card was the strategic location o f their villages, which
lay in a buffer zone between the colonies o f New France and New England. The travel
corridor formed by the Kennebec and Chaudiere rivers represented a potential invasion
route between Quebec and New England, and officials from both colonies vied for its
control. Since Wabanakis were virtually the sole inhabitants o f the region, no
government could control the border region unless it had the support o f the Indians.
French and British officials, o f necessity and by design, undertook different
strategies to win the allegiance o f the Wabanakis. Faced with the problem o f
administering a thinly-populated continental empire, the governors o f New France
adopted policies that played to the strengths o f French colonial enterprise. Although New
France had not matched the commercial success o f the British colonies, the French by the
end o f the seventeenth century had succeeded in gaining possession o f the two most
extensive river drainages o f the continent: the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system and the
Mississippi River. These river systems acted as vital links in a network o f entrepots that
facilitated the distribution o f trade merchandise and military supplies. In the imagination
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o f French officials, New France was a vast hinterland controlled by the government at
Quebec through a network o f military garrisons, trading posts, and mission villages.
Since the French population o f the furthest outposts was tiny, control o f surrounding
areas usually depended on the support o f Indian allies.74
Acadia was a peripheral concern to the governors at Quebec, who devoted most of
their attention to the settlements o f the St. Lawrence River and the outposts o f the Great
Lakes. During the latter half o f the seventeenth century, French officials had established
military garrisons at the forts o f Pentagoet near the Penobscot River, and Nashwaak and
Jemseg on the St. John. The rulers o f New France had also considered building a string
of outposts along the Chaudiere and Penobscot rivers to facilitate communication
between Quebec and Pentagoet. But the cost o f such projects was too high, and by the
end o f the seventeenth century Acadian officials increasingly looked to defend their
southern frontiers with Wabanaki warriors fighting under the command o f French
officers. Following the Treaty o f Utrecht, the French withdrew the officers, leaving
Jesuit missionaries and French traders as their only representatives in the region.75
French maps o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries consistently recognized
the importance o f the Franco-Wabanaki alliance. The Wabanakis always appeared in
maps o f the northeast, which placed their names in large letters across their homelands.
A 1713 map o f Canada and Acadia drawn by the Jesuit missionary Father Joseph Aubry,
for example, assigned the Atlantic coast between Casco Bay and the St. John River to the

74 VV. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier. 1534-1760. rev. ed. (Albuquerque, N. M.: University of New
Mexico Press, 1984), esp. 1-11. The leaders of New France even thought this way about the British
colonies, describing them not as bounded territories but as hinterlands controlled by political centers. They
referred to Massachusetts as Baston (Boston), New York as Orange (Albany), and New Hampshire as
Pescadoue (Piscataqua).
75 On communications between Quebec and Pentagoet, see CDRH. 1:207,209,211,212-14,243,325-25;
Jean Talon, "Memoires sur le Canada, 1673," PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 4, fol. 43.
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Wabanakis, and identified the isthmus o f Chignecto with the Mi'kmaq. The only major
settlements in the interior, the map seemed to suggest, were the Wabanaki villages o f
Norridgewock, Narakamigou, Panawapskik, and Medoctec. Yet Aubry still claimed the
entire region on behalf o f "Canada ou Nouvelle France," drawing the line between the
British and French colonies at the Kennebec or St. George rivers [see Fig. 2.14; see also
Fig. 2.15].
Aubry's map is puzzling to the modem eye, for it recognizes the Wabanakis1
territorial possessions while simultaneously claiming them on behalf o f the French
crown. Since the Wabanakis were independent political actors and French officials
understood them as such, it seems a contradiction that their lands could belong to both
themselves and the French colony. Yet it is a contradiction only if one accepts the
modem assumption that territories cannot belong to two polities at once. Present-day
political maps, with their clearly drawn boundaries, are based on the premise that states
have exclusive jurisdiction o f their territories. Government may be divided into different
levels of an administrative hierarchy, with municipalities, counties, and provinces neatly
fitting into each other like a set o f nested Russian dolls. But every inch o f land must
belong to only a single city, a single county, and a single nation; it is impossible for two
jurisdictions o f the same kind to overlap. In the eighteenth century, by contrast, polities
did not necessarily define their sovereignty territorially, making it possible for lands to
belong to two or more groups at once. If an empire is treated as a web o f human
relationships, in which a king is connected to his subjects through ties o f fealty and
deference, the territorial extent o f the empire becomes a matter o f secondary importance.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
What matters instead is the personal bonds that make the ruler and the ruled loyal to one
another.
Aubry's map presents a view o f sovereignty in which territorial possession flows
from human relationships, a view that had long been held by French officials. Since the
earliest years o f colonization, the French had based their territorial claims in North
America on ceremonies that registered the willing subjugation o f native peoples to the
French crown.76 The legitimacy o f French rule, both in theory and in practice, depended
on the consent o f Indian nations. The territorial extent o f New France was determined
not so much by the boundaries recorded in colonial charters as it was by the alliances that
the French government developed with native groups such as the Wabanakis. While the
Wabanakis did not consider themselves to be subjects o f the king, they called the
governor o f New France their "father," and expected to receive presents from him in
return for their loyalty and military service. French claims to the region to the south of
the St. Lawrence depended almost entirely on these reciprocal bonds, which were
renewed every year by the distribution o f gifts and strengthened by the presence o f Jesuit
missionaries in Indian villages. Practically the French had little control over the
Wabanakis' territory, yet the Franco-Wabanaki alliance allowed officials in Quebec to
claim the Indians' lands as their own in the imperial struggle against the British.77
New England's leaders were also aware o f the strategic importance o f Indian
alliances, yet the Wabanakis did not figure prominently in their cartographic imagination.
Few British maps o f the sixteenth and seventeenth century ever depicted the Wabanakis,

76 Seed, Ceremonies of Possession. 41-68.
n W. J. Eccles, "Sovereignty-Association,1500-1783," in idem.. Essavs on New France (Toronto: Oxford
University Press), 1987, 156-81; Cornelius J. Jaenen. "French Sovereignty and Native Nationhood During
the French Regime," in J. R. Miller, Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada
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and those that did were usually military plans or copies o f French originals.78 The
absence o f Indians in maps was a consequence o f New England's diplomatic policy
toward the Wabanakis, which aimed at pacification rather than alliance.79 Since the last
quarter o f the sixteenth century, the settlements o f northern New England had been
devastated by Indian raids, losing hundreds o f lives and untold amounts o f property
during the 1675-78 war and the imperial wars o f 1688-1713. In the hope o f preventing
future attacks, Massachusetts leaders launched a number o f policies designed to appease
the Wabanakis. In the 1690s, the province assumed control o f the fur trade, establishing
truck houses that sold Indians English merchandise at low cost. At conferences and truck
houses, Massachusetts officials treated Wabanaki leaders with gifts and favors and even
issued military commissions to pro-English sagamores. New England's leaders also
attempted, with little success, to establish Protestant missionaries among the Wabanakis.
Yet these policies were based on a denial rather than a recognition o f Wabanaki
sovereignty. Since the 1690s, Massachusetts' governors had demanded that Wabanaki
leaders take oaths o f submission to the British crown as a condition o f their treaties. If
they were treated as British subjects, their lands fell within the dominion o f the crown,

(Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1991), 19-42.
78 The only colonial map that represented Wabanaki lands as a bounded territory was drawn by a
Frenchman. In October 1738, the owner of the fief o f Lussaudiere, Jutras des Rosiers, wrote the Minister
of the Marine to complain about Indians from Odanak who had used some fifty acres o f his land with the
tacit approval of Father Aubry and Governor Vaudreuil. He appended a map representing his fief, along
with the "Village des Sauvages" (Odanak), and two large rectangular areas on either side o f the St. Francois
River marked "Terrain dont JouTssent les Sauvages" (land enjoyed by the Indians). See Rosiers to the
Comte de Maurepas, October 1738, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 70, fols. 230-34, map on 234.
79 The Iroquois were the only Indian group that appeared regularly and prominently in English maps,
largely because o f their roles as military allies o f the British and middlemen in land deals between colonial
speculators and western tribes. See, for example, Lewis Evans’s famous 1755 map o f the middle colonies,
in which Iroquois territories stretch from the Ohio Valley to Lake Champlain.
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and their attacks on English settlements became acts o f rebellion that invited swift and
unmerciful reprisal on the part o f Massachusetts' authorities.80
The ultimate goal o f this policy was to neutralize the Indians as a military force
and open their lands to English settlement: it was the Wabanakis1lands, not the
Wabanakis themselves, that interested the leaders o f Massachusetts. By the last quarter
o f the seventeenth century, merchants and political officials on both sides o f the Atlantic
had taken a growing interest in the lands east o f the Piscataqua River, seeing them as a
potential source o f timber, naval stores, and agricultural land. But economic
development o f the region could not proceed if French-supported Wabanakis resisted
English incursions into their territories. With the backing o f royal officials and
mercantile interests, Massachusetts' governors sought to bring the Indians to heel through
a combination of diplomacy and intimidation. Gifts and truck houses were one side o f
this strategy, scalp bounties and garrison forts were the other.
The forts and truck houses represented the effective limits o f British control in
northern New England, yet they were not depicted with any regularity in maps o f the
region. The boundaries o f Massachusetts, in the minds o f its leaders, were defined not
through alliances with the Indians but by the terms o f its charter. From its beginnings,
the colony's jurisdiction had been defined territorially, as an expanse o f land that could be
parcelled out to settlers and towns. The outer limits o f the colony were not entirely clear
during the seventeenth century, since Massachusetts' claims were challenged by rival
colonies and the crown. But the advance o f settlement in the eighteenth century led to an

80 Ronald Oliver MacFarlane, "The Massachusetts Bay Truck-Houses in Diplomacy with the Indians,"
New England Quarterly 11 (1938): 48-65; Axtell, Invasion. 247-54; Myron O. Stachiw, comp, and ed.,
Massachusetts Officers and Soldiers. 1723-1743: Dummer*s War to the War o f Jenkins' Ear (Boston: The
Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and The New England Historical and
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increasingly precise definition o f boundaries, as the distribution o f lands forced the
colonies o f New England to clarify their respective jurisdictions.

Maine Takes Shape
In the years that followed the Treaty o f Utrecht, the population o f northern New
England grew rapidly, as settlers migrated to frontier regions in search o f cheap land and
real estate companies sought to develop their holdings in New Hampshire and
Massachusetts. In 1690, there were fewer than 6,000 English inhabitants residing in
twelve towns in northern New England. By 1760, the region's population had swelled to
almost 60,000, with the number o f incorporated towns rising to sixty-five.81 The growth
of settlement entailed the transformation o f thousands o f acres o f forest and vale into
parcels of real estate. As in the previous century, the occupation o f these lands took place
within a political framework that attached property owners to town meetings and county
courts. Since the security o f land titles depended on the strength o f civil authorities, the
spread of settlement brought with it an expansion and a reordering o f political
jurisdictions. Dozens o f new townships, all with the power to grant lands, were chartered
where none had existed before.
It was imperative under these circumstances to eliminate overlapping
jurisdictions, which inevitably gave rise to disputes between settlers over conflicting land
titles. This problem was particularly sticky along the border between New Hampshire
and Massachusetts. Although New Hampshire had been independent o f Massachusetts

Genealogical Society, 1979), passim.
81 Clark, Eastern Frontier. 336. The number o f towns was artificially large in New Hampshire, since the
provincial government had granted several "paper townships" to obviate a British law that prevented
logging outside town boundaries.
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since the late seventeenth century, the Bay colony still held claims to the lands north o f
the Merrimack River according to the terms o f its original and second charters. In the
1720s, the expansion o f settlement led both provinces to grant overlapping townships in
the region between the Merrimack and Connecticut rivers, with the leaders of
Massachusetts hoping an influx o f settlers from the Bay colony would strengthen their
territorial claims. Since neither province had clear or exclusive jurisdiction over the new
townships, the inhabitants' property rights were left in the air. Numerous violent
skirmishes took place between settlers living in the disputed territory, with many being
jailed for their refusal to pay taxes to both provinces. Unable to resolve these disputes
themselves, the government o f New Hampshire in 1733 asked the Board o f Trade to
establish a boundary commission that would arbitrate between the two sides.82
After several years o f lobbying and appeals, King George II finally issued an
order in 1740 settling the boundary line between New Hampshire and Massachusetts. His
decision favored New Hampshire, setting its southern limit three miles north o f the
Merrimack River until it reached Pawtucket Falls, at which point it continued in a straight
line due west. The ruling placed nearly thirty Massachusetts townships under the control
of the government o f New Hampshire. The decision also drew a boundary between New
Hampshire and Maine, represented by an imaginary line that began at the mouth o f the
Piscataqua River, ran up the Newichawanock (Salmon Falls) River as far as Lovell's
Pond (Great East Lake), and followed a straight course 2 degrees northwest for another
120 miles [see Fig. 2.16]. This northerly line was not run until a dispute over timber

82 The boundary dispute between New Hampshire and Massachusetts was one o f many in the British
colonies during the mid-eighteenth century. The Board o f Trade was also forced to settle the boundaries
between New York and New Jersey, Virginia and North Carolina, South Carolina and North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania and Maryland (the latter survey carried out by Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, hence the
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rights led the Massachusetts General Court to order a survey o f the Maine-New
Hampshire border in 1763.83
In the twenty-year period that preceded the 1740 ruling, both colonies had
experimented with new methods o f town planning designed to promote the rapid and
orderly settlement o f their frontiers. Although there were many other models, the typical
plan by the 1740s was a township six miles square, divided into a checkerboard o f
hundred-acre farms. The rectangular shape o f townships and lots was adopted because it
made surveying a simple matter o f running straight lines with compass and chain.
Individual farms were allotted as shares to proprietors, with each receiving a number
commensurate with the value o f their investment. The lots were then sold or leased to
tenants or occupied by the proprietors themselves. These "range" townships, as they
came to be known, rationalized the process o f settlement, making it possible for town
planners to rapidly divide and distribute their lands as numbered lots. For this kind o f
township to be successful, proprietors had to survey their holdings in advance o f
settlement, measuring and marking the boundaries o f lots on the basis o f a predetermined
plan.84
It was this pattern that became the prototype for settlement in Maine during the
second half o f the eighteenth century. The English population o f the region had grown

"Mason-DLxon line.")
^.Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. Public and Private, o f the Province o f the Massachusetts Bav. 21
vols. (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1869-1922), 17:361-62,429.
84 James L. Garvin, "The Range Township in Eighteenth-Century New Hampshire," in Benes, New
Eneland Prospect. 47-68; Roy H. Akagi, The Town Proprietors o f the New England Colonies
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1923; reprint ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963),
230-81. Surveyors kept notebooks in which they recorded points o f reference such as marked trees and
heaps o f stones, the direction o f the lines run (according to degrees and minutes o f the compass), and rods
travelled. They later translated the information into plats o f property boundaries, using a ruler and
protractor. For an early example of a surveyor’s notebook, see John Brown, "Field Book o f Bakerstown
&c., 1767-68 (Now Minot)," Pejepscot Proprietors Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me.,
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steadily since the Treaty o f Utrecht, but the advance o f settlement had been slowed by the
renewal o f warfare against the French and Wabanakis after 1745. With the conquest o f
Quebec in 1759, this barrier to English settlement was removed and the result was an
explosive growth in population east o f the Piscataqua. Between 1763 and the American
Revolution, the number o f English inhabitants in Maine doubled from 23,000 to over
47,000. Almost a hundred townships were founded during the same period, most o f them
range townships. Many were established east o f the Kennebec River, a region that had
been sparsely settled before the end o f the imperial wars.85
The town o f Gorham offers an example o f how these settlements were created.
Originally known as Narragansett No. 7, Gorham was one o f seven townships awarded
by the provincial government in 1733 to veterans o f King Philip’s War and their heirs.
Although most veterans o f the Narragansett campaign had since passed away, 840 people
in Massachusetts still claimed land under the grants and all were eager to gain a share o f
the buoyant real estate market o f the 1730s. The grantees divided themselves into seven
corporations o f 120 partners each, and every corporation was awarded a township. The
seventh o f these proprietary bodies, which was later renamed after its leading light, John
Gorham, was given the rights to form a township to the west o f Falmouth.86 Although

Collection 61, Box 2, Folder 17.
85 Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, comps., American Population before the Federal Census
of 1790 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932; reprint ed., Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966),
36-40; Stanley B. Attwood, The Leneth and Breadth o f Maine (Augusta. Me.: Kennebec Journal, 1946;
reprint ed., Orono: University of Maine Press, 1974), 21-22. In the two years that preceded the conclusion
of a peace with France, the leaders o f Massachusetts, forseeing the rapid growth o f settlement, undertook a
series of policies that strengthened the province’s territorial claims to the lands east o f the Piscataqua River.
In 1761, the House of Representatives sponsored a survey o f the lands south o f the St. Lawrence River and
ordered a perambulation o f the boundary line between New Hampshire and Maine. The government also
backed a survey of its boundary with Nova Scotia at the S t Croix River in 1762, and granted ten townships
in the lands between the Penobscot and the St. Croix between 1762 and 1763. See Massachusetts, Acts and
Resolves, vols. 16:691; 17:47,163-76,191,211,246,256,289,361,429,474-79.
86 Clark, Eastern Frontier. 180-82; Proprietors’ Records, Gorham, Maine, Maine State Archives, Augusta,
Maine, fols. 1-31,33,77.
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the settlement o f the township proceeded slowly, the proprietors were quick to order
several surveys o f their holdings. In the surveys, the lands o f the township were divided
into rectangular lots, which were assigned to individual proprietors. The township
became the physical embodiment o f the corporation, the lots within the town representing
shares o f each individual proprietor [see Fig. 2.17].
Other land companies emerged from the embers o f long-lapsed patents,
transforming seventeenth-century frontier outposts into agricultural settlements. The
holdings o f the Plymouth Company, one o f Maine's most prominent o f the land firms in
the eighteenth century, were possessed under the Plymouth colony's original patent to
lands along the Kennebec River, which was sold to four Boston merchants in 1661. The
Plymouth Company had also acquired two adjoining tracts along the river that had
originally been held by two fur traders from Boston, Major Thomas Clarke and Captain
Thomas Lake. The fur traders had abandoned their posts during the 1675-78 war and had
never returned. But their land deeds were kept by their descendants, who divided them
into shares, which circulated among investors in Boston during the early part o f the
eighteenth century. Following the conclusion o f a peace on the Maine frontier in 1749,
the shareholders decided to begin the division and settlement o f their tract [see Fig.
2.18].87
The intent of the original patent holders had been to trade for furs, and the
boundaries o f their patent, which encompassed some 1,500 square miles, were meant to
represent the limits o f their trade monopoly. But in the hands o f the Plymouth
proprietors, the patent became a title to a vast agricultural estate, which could be

87 Cranmer, Cushnoc: Baker, Clarke and Lake: Gordon E. Kershaw, "Gentlemen o f Large Property &
Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors. 1749-1775 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1975),
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parcelled out into individual farms and sold to settlers. By the 1750s the proprietors had
begun measuring and dividing their tract into townships in preparation for settlement.
They also sought to defend their title against rival claimants, launching an ambitious
public relations campaign and bringing ejectment suits against settlers who obtained their
lands from other companies. Although their plan did not unfold as smoothly as they had
hoped, the proprietors by the end o f the century had succeeded in establishing a ribbon o f
townships along both banks o f the Kennebec River.88
As the Kennebec valley was divided into townships and the townships sectioned
into farms, the region began to assume the shape o f a property map writ large, a
landscape overlaid with a rectangular grid [see Fig. 2.19]. By the late eighteenth century,
forts and trading posts had disappeared from maps o f the region, and the river itself had
become a property boundary that broke up the regular rectangular pattern o f the
townships. The Kennebec Valley was not exceptional in this respect, for in other parts o f
Maine the nodes-and-links pattern o f the outpost frontier was also being transformed into
a grid o f orderly settlement. In the decades that followed the end o f the American
Revolution, lands seized or purchased from the Wabanakis were quickly occupied by
migrants from southern New England, and the rapid growth o f settlement led to the
creation o f dozens o f townships and several new counties. As the white population
pushed eastward along the coast and northward into the interior, disputes over logging
and land rights between Downeasters and New Brunswickers also made it necessary to
demarcate the border lines between Maine and its neighboring governments. Although
Maine did not assume its present-day shape until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty o f 1842

3-20.
88 Kershaw, The Kennebec Proprietors.
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settled its northern boundaries, by the late eighteenth century it was increasingly clear
that the district would be a bounded territory, with its borders defined by its ability to
grant and protect real property.89
The straight lines o f the state's boundaries were a visible trace o f the distinctive
path o f state formation in Maine and North America generally. While the interior and
exterior boundaries o f countries in Europe and much o f Asia have an irregular pattern that
typically corresponds to natural features such as rivers and mountain ranges, much o f
North America is divided by straight lines that separate states, provinces, counties,
townships, and farms. The immediate cause o f this difference was the Northwest
Ordinance, the Homestead Act, the Dominion Lands Act, and other legislation that
authorized the distribution o f public lands in an orderly manner.
But the deeper cause o f the differing patterns was a divergence in the evolution of
political authority in North America and Eurasia. An alliance between property owners
and the state had also fostered the creation o f clearly delineated boundaries in Europe but
the political dynamics o f the continent left a different impression on the political map.
Because traditional landowners such as nobles, peasants, and burghers formed powerful
political blocs within their respective countries, states were inclined to respect existing
property boundaries. Borders both between and within European countries tended to
reflect idiosyncratic patterns o f land ownership that had developed over centuries as well
as "natural" frontiers such as rivers and mountains that impeded the progress o f

89 The eastern boundary was surveyed by the St. Croix boundary commission o f 1798, and the northern
boundary was settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. The boundaries o f Maine's territorial waters (an
oxymoron if there ever was one) were not defined until the Gulf o f Maine Treaty o f 1984. On the
boundary disputes of the 1790s and 1840s, see David Demeritt, "Representing the True St. Croix:
Knowledge and Power in the Partition o f the Northeast,” William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 54 (1997):
515-48; Howard Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations (Chapel
Hill, N. C.: Unversity of North Carolina Press, 1977).
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conquering armies. In North America, on the other hand, customary property boundaries
were virtually erased as states pushed Indians into reservations and parceled their lands
out to white settlers. Once the Indians were removed as a barrier to expansion, vast
sections o f territory were opened for occupation. Straight lines, because o f the ease with
which they could be surveyed, facilitated the process o f settlement, making it possible for
the spoils o f conquest to be allocated according to a rational plan. The rapid and peaceful
manner in which lands were distributed —as distinct from the violent way in which they
were taken from the Indians -- owed much to an alliance between states and property
owners, in which each gave backing to the exclusive territorial claims o f the other. It
would not be an exaggeration to say that the creation o f an egalitarian republic o f
property holders, in Maine as elsewhere in North America, was made possible by the
virtual eradication o f the Indians' rights to the land.90

90 On property ownership and the rise of the territorial state in Europe, see Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign
State and Its Competitors: An Analysis o f Systems Chanee (Princeton. N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1994). A pattern o f irregular boundaries developed in most o f South and Central America, even though
many Latin American countries were settler societies like the U. S. and Canada. The difference is partly
attributable the region's geography, which is divided between coastal lowlands and interior highlands,
which made the gradual westward movement o f population that characterized North America an
impossibility. But just as importantly, the primary instrument o f colonization in Spanish America,
particularly in peripheral areas, was the encomienda, which gave encomenderos authority over people but
not their lands. Territorial boundaries were consequently more likely to reflect customary patterns of land
ownership that had been established before the arrival of Europeans. See David J. Weber and Jane M.
Rausch, eds., Where Cultures Meet: Frontiers in Latin American History (Wilmington. Del.: SR Books,
1994).
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FIGURE 2.1. TWO KINDS OF MAP.

(a)

Fort
Town

O Town

Two kinds of map: (a) is a boundary map, while (b) forms a nodes-and-links pattern. The extent of territorial control is
clearly demarcated in the first map, but in the second it is ambiguous and depends on a host of contingencies, such as
the trade contacts between the two towns, the strength of the fort, the nature of the terrain, and so on.
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FIGURE 2.2 "OCEAN ATLANTIQUE" (DETAIL), PIERRE LEVASSEUR, 1601.

A later portoian chart of the French Dieppe school, drawn on parchment Some place names may appear upside down
or sideways because portoian charts were meant to be rotated by their users. The lines radiating from the compass rose
helped pilots to set their course; Levasseur's chan, like many other ponolans of his time, also includes lines of latitude.
By the end of the sixteenth century the French knew of fishing banks as far south as Cape Sable, illustrated by clusters
of dots, and were well acquainted with the course of the St. Lawrence River. The Bay of Fundy is missing, suggesting
that French mariners did not venture beyond Cape Sable at this time. Photocopied from Joan Dawson, The
Macmaker*s Eve. Map 1:3.
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FIGURE 2.3. "NOVA ET AUCTA ORBIS TERRAE DESCRIPTIO AD USUM
NAVIGANTIUM EMENDATE ACCOMMODATA" (DETAIL), GERARD
MERCATOR, 1569.
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The first example of Mercator’s projection, this map was intended for seafarers —"ad usum navigantium" —although
there is little evidence that it was ever used as such. The coast of North America as far as the Gulf of Mexico is
colored with a brown wash, while Newfoundland, called by its Iberian/Latin name "Terra de Bacalaos" (land of cod),
is tinted yellow. Photocopied from Marcel Trudel, Atlas de la Nouvelle France. Figure 23.
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FIGURE 2.4. "FIGURE DE LA TERRE NEUVE, GRANDE RIVIERE DE CANADA,
ET COTES DE L’OCEAN EN LA NOUVELLE FRANCE," MARC LESCARBOT,
1609.

Since Lescarbot never travelled west of the S t Croix River, it is almost certain that he obtained his geographical
knowledge second hand, probably from Champlain, who drew a detailed map of the colony’s coastline on vellum in
1607. Champlain's earliest printed map, included in an account ofhis voyages, was issued in 1613. Lescarbot lacked
Champlain's skills as a draughtsman, and his map appears rather crude by comparison. Photopied from Seymour 1.
Schwartz and Ralph E. Ehrenberg, The Mapping of America.
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FIGURE 2.5. "A MAPP OF NEW ENGLANDE" (PORTION), SIR WILLIAM
ALEXANDER, 1624.

The names of the patentees stretch from Cape Cod to Penobscot Bay. This map was printed in support of Alexander's
own claims in Nova Scotia, although it also includes an illustration of the New England Company's holdings. While
Alexander probably consulted maps drawn by Champlain, he eliminates nearly all traces of French possession south of
the St. Lawrence River, turning Acadia into New Scotlande, la Baie Franfaise (Bay of Fundy) into Argals Bay, the St
Croix River into the River Tweede, the S t John into the River Clyde. Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of
Congress.
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FIGURE 2.6. [BOUNDARIES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY COLONY],
WILLIAM STOUGHTON AND PETER BULKELEY, CIRCA 1677.
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Following the annexation of Maine, the Massachusetts General Court prepared a map for the English Parliament
delineating the boundaries of the colony. It was lost in transit to England in I6SS, but a second map was produced ten
years later. The above is a later copy, presented to the Lords of Trade by agents of Massachusetts Bay in 1678. Note
the latitude scale in the center of page, and the line cutting through Lake Winnipesaukee and Casco Bay at a latitude of
43° 40' 12". Photocopied from photostat at the Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.7. NINETEEN ACRES "MEASURED AND LAID OUT" FOR WILLIAM
PEPPERELL BY WITHERS BERRY (SURVEYOR), 1720

A confirmation of tract in fCittery originally granted in 1699 to Pepperrell, one of the leading merchants and land
holders in the town. Photocopied from fCittery Town Records, vol. 2, January 13,1719/20.
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FIGURE 2.8. "THE DRAFT OF NONSUCH POYNT...," RICHARD CLEMENTS,
1687.
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One of twenty-three surveys carried out in Falmouth by Richard Clements, deputy surveyor under the Andros
administration. The map represents a grant to Sylvanus Davis, who along with Edward Tyng, supported Andros's
demand that land titles in the town be reconfirmed upon payment of a fee to the provincial government Photocopied
from Massachusetts Archives, Maps and Plans, 3rd series, vol. 33, fol. 7.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

160
FIGURE 2.9. "A MAP OF NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK" (PORTION), JOHN
SPEED, 1676.
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Speed's plate is one of the later examples of the Jansson-Vischer series, a group of maps of New Netherlands and New
England based on originals printed in Holland in the 1630s. This version erroneously has the Merrimack River
running into Lake Champlain (Lake of the Iroquois). The edition of this map in the possession of the Lords of Trade
has boundary lines drawn in watercolor around the New England colonies. The southern boundary of Maine is set at
the Piscataqua River, its northern boundary near the Penobscot New Hampshire appears on the map, bordering
Massachusetts just north of Salem. Photocopied from reproduction at Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.10. "A MAPP OF NEW ENGLAND BY JOHN SELLER
HYDROGRAPHER TO THE KING" (PORTION), 1676.
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Published in Seller's Atlas Maritimus. The printed map is based on manuscript maps sent from Boston to London.
The boundaries of Essex, Middlesex, and Suffolk counties in Seller’s map are roughly the same as they are today. The
land to the north of Norfolk (the name of New Hampshire while under the control of Massachusetts) is called, "Lacona
or the Province of Maine." Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162
FIGURE 2.11. "LE CANADA, OURNOUVELLE FRANCE, &C.” (PORTION),
NICOLAS SANSON, 1656.
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The limits of the colony are represented by a dotted line, which is filled in around New England. The name
"Etechemins", another term for Wabanakis west of the Acadian peninsula, is written across the river. Sanson leaves
the unknown regions of the interior blank, and his map is sparse in comparison to the ornate plates of his predecessors.
Photocopied from Marcel Trudel, Atlas de la Nouvelle France. Fig. 36.
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FIGURE 2.12. "AMERIQUE SEPTENTRIONALE, DRESSE, SUR LES RELATIONS
LES PLUS MODERNES DES VOYAGEURS ET NAVIGATEURS..." (DETAIL),
DIDIER ROBERT DE VAUGONDY, 1750.
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From his Atlas Universe!, a compilation o f 108 maps. Vaugondy was the royal cartographer o f Louis XV, and
prepared this map following the end o f the W ar o f Austrian Succession. All o f the territory north o f the Kennebec
River is claimed on behalf o f the Estechemins, o r Wabanakis. Photocopied from the Smith Collection at the Osher
Map Library, University o f Southern Maine, Reel 21:10204.
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FIGURE 2.13. "A MAP OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SETTLEMENTS IN
NORTH AMERICA" (DETAIL), J. RIDGE (ENGRAVER), [1755?].
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One of many maps that illustrated the causes of the conflict between the French and British colonies in the 1750s. The
shaded area, as the cartographer explains, represents "French Incroachments" on British territory. The map does
include the Wabanaki village of Norridgewock, but it is placed far in the interior, just to the south of the St. Lawrence
River. The map also illustrates two British forts built along the Kennebec River in the 1750s, Fort Halifax and Fort
Western. Photocopied from the Smith Collection at the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine, Reel 21:
9896.
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FIGURE 2.14. "CARTE DU CANADA AVEC PARTIE DES COTES DE LA
NOUVELLE ANGLETERRE ET DE L'ACADIE," FATHER JOSEPH AUBRY, S. J.,
[1713?].

Aubry was a m issionary who lived at Odanak for many years, and prepared this m ap for French authorities at Quebec.
Crosses represent W abanaki mission villages, squares stand for European settlements. The waterways o f the interior,
o f great interest to French authorities, are represented in detail. Source: PAC, H3/900. Photocopied from W. J. Eccles,
The Canadian Frontier. 1534-1760. 138.
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FIGURE 2.15. "CARTE DE L'ACADIE," ANONYMOUS, 1702.

A map published in France representing French possessions in Acadia. The name o f Acadia stretches from the
Penobscot River to the Acadian peninsula, but portions o f the sam e area are assigned to Wabanaki ethnic groups such
as the Ethechemins, Canibas, Abenaquis, and Socoquis. Photocopied from photostat at the Library o f Congress.
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FIGURE 2.16. "ACCURATE MAP OF HIS MAJESTYS PROVINCE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE IN NEW ENGLAND" (DETAIL), SAMUEL LANGDON, 1756.
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A manuscript version o f a m ap that Langdon later published for the governm ent o f N ew Hampshire in collaboration
with Joseph Blanchard. T he 1740 boundary lines between M assachusetts and N ew Hampshire are clearly drawn. The
curving line o f the townships in the western part o f New Hampshire are the result o f the claims o f the Masonian
Proprietors, a group o f investors who revived Captain John Mason's patent to a sem i-circular tract o f land radiating
sixty miles from the m outh o f the Piscataqua River. Photocopied from a photostat a t the Library o f Congress.
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FIGURE 2.17. SURVEY OF LOTS ADJOINING ROAD, GORHAMTOWN, JOHN
SMALL (SURVEYOR), 1754.

A survey o f lots ordered by the town proprietors and recorded in their records. Photocopied from Gothamtown
Proprietors’ Records. Maine State Archives, vol. I, p. 77.
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FIGURE 2.18. "A TRUE COPPY FROM AN ANCIENT PLAN...," THOMAS
JOHNSTON (ENGRAVER), 1753.
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This map was included in a pamphlet published by the Brunswick Proprietors, who were rivals of the Plymouth
Company. The map places the Plymouth claim far into the interior, on the reasoning that the Kennebec River to the
south of Merrymeeting Bay was called the Sagadahock and therefore did not belong to the Plymouth patent. The
Plymouth Company responded with a map of their own a year later, also published by Thomas Johnston, in which
their lands extended all the way to the coast. The two Indians in the cartouche at the lower right hand comer, one
carrying a war club and the other a rifle, are made to speak the words, "GOD hath planted us here," and "GOD decreed
the land to us," sentiments that presumably support the validity of Indian deeds. Photocopied from reproduction at
Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 2.19. "A MAP OF THE DISTRICT OF MAINE...," OSGOODE CARLETON,
1795.
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One of the leading American cartographers of his time, Carleton based this map on proprietary plats and surveys
carried out under a 1794 Massachusetts town mapping law. Much of the land in the eastern counties of Lincoln,
Washington, and Hancock has been laid out in a grid pattern, and the lands on either side of the Kennebec Rivers are
divided into townships. A corridor ofland along the upper Penobscot River is marked, "Land reserved for the
Indians." Photopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.
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CHAPTER in
LEVIATHAN’S TONGUES

The effective government o f large areas depends to a very important
degree on the efficiency o f communication.
--Harold Innis, Empire and Communication

In October 1756 northern New England's first newspaper was launched by Daniel
Fowle, a Boston printer who had recently arrived in Portsmouth. Named the NewHampshire Gazette, the weekly was printed on a single large sheet folded into four pages
and distributed through the mail to subscribers in New Hampshire and Maine. Like other
provincial newspapers o f the time, the Gazette published little in the way o f original
material, relying on stories reprinted from periodicals in Britain and Boston for most o f
its copy. To the news stories were added local advertisements, lists o f ships arriving and
departing from the port o f Piscataqua, printed letters, and bits o f gossip spread by word of
mouth. The Gazette's contents were meant to suit the tastes o f the local gentry, and
Fowle wrote a brief editorial in the newspaper's first edition in praise o f their good sense.
He noted that the many "Friends to Learning, Religion and Liberty" in the province had
encouraged him in his efforts and that their appetites for timely news had been whetted
by the recent outbreak o f war in America and Europe. Newspapers such as the Gazette,
he continued, allowed "every Lover o f Mankind" in New Hampshire "to be acquainted
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with the Affairs o f his own Nation and Country."1 Fowle's editorial was somewhat
disingenuous -- the truth o f the matter was that he had run afoul o f authorities in Boston
and fled to New Hampshire -- but in his second edition he pressed the point further,
publishing an essay in celebration o f printing.
Claiming that the printing press was "one o f the most useful Inventions the World
has ever seen," he recited the great advances in civil and religious liberties since the
advent o f the printed book. In Turkey, where printed materials were outlawed, there was
"neither Liberty, Property, true Religion, Arts, Sciences, Learning, or Knowledge." But
in countries with a lively press, these things flourished. The printed word, he reasoned,
broadened the mind because it diffused knowledge throughout the world, imbuing all
readers with a sense o f fellowship. The spread o f information through newspapers and
books united the inhabitants o f the world, giving them the ability to see beyond their local
surroundings and to understand their commonalties with the rest o f humanity. Periodicals
such as the Gazette facilitated the "speedy Communication o f the State o f Affairs from
one part o f the World to another" and the "Intercourse maintain'd between the different
Parts o f a Kingdom." The transmission o f information through the printed word united
the subjects o f the British crown, allowing them to leam o f events in other parts o f the
empire and to determine "what Measures connected with the general Good are to be
pursued." The diffusion o f printed news, Fowle concluded, was "like a good Circulation
in the natural Body," for it "keeps the Body Politic (if not alive, at least) in sound
Health."2

1 New-Hampshire Gazette. October 4.1756.
2 New-Hampshire Gazette. October 11,1756.
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Fowle's comparison between bodies physical and political was no more original
than his second-hand copy or his characteristically British prejudices. The image o f a
body politic had its roots the writings o f classical authors such as Plato and had been
become a stock phrase by the Middle Ages. Only a century before, the metaphor had
been brilliantly extended by Thomas Hobbes, who compared a commonwealth to a
leviathan or "Artificiall Man," whose anatomy could be dissected and analyzed in the
same manner as a human body. If there was anything new in Fowle's editorial, it was his
observation that the health o f the body politic depended on a steady circulation o f
information. Hobbes himself had noted that speech was necessary for the creation o f a
civil society but his discussion o f language was only tangentially related to his treatment
of politics. Fowle, on the other hand, placed language at the center o f his argument,
holding that communication was the lifeblood o f the political world, creating affinities
between strangers and facilitating the dissemination o f information. The boundaries o f
the human community and the British commonwealth, he seemed to suggest, were
defined not by borders but by the limits o f human interaction.
This point o f view came easily to someone living in northern New England,
where it was difficult to indulge in the illusion that colonies were self-contained worlds.
Maine was twice a colony, a satellite o f Massachusetts that also felt the tug o f the mother
country's political gravity. Since its beginnings, the colony's lands had been controlled to
varying degrees by outsiders from Boston or London, who lived at distance from the
settlements yet claimed them as their own. The ability o f merchants and administrators
make good on their claims o f ownership depended on the co-operation o f agents and
allies living in the colony, which they won through a continual exchange o f favors,
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rewards, and payments. This flow o f transactions between Maine and its two metropoles
was the means by which outsiders gained access to the region's resources and the method
o f Maine's connection to the wider world.
The land, from this perspective, was a collection o f resources whose exploitation
depended on the co-operation thousands if not millions o f people living on both sides o f
the Atlantic. The holdings o f individual landholders in Maine were confirmed by towns
and protected by the county courts, and towns themselves received their charters from the
provincial government. The provincial government, in turn, held its charter under the
crown and was answerable to the Privy Council. The development o f these holdings was
a joint endeavor that required an even higher level o f social cooperation. Maine's
families worked together to provide themselves with food, shelter, and clothing, and also
produced large quantities o f goods to be sold at market. For the marketing o f these
commodities, they looked to merchants and wealthy landowners, who provided them with
wages, credit, and milling services. The merchants also handled the distribution of
exportable goods to foreign markets, shipping them to overseas ports with the aid o f ship
captains, mariners, stevedores, and shipwrights. Shipping lanes, meanwhile, were
protected against pirates and privateers by the merchant marine and royal navy, who were
paid with revenues collected from British taxpayers. This web o f interdependency could
be extended almost infinitely, since New Englanders participated in an international
economy with a highly complex division o f labor.
It may be fruitful, in this context, to imagine the region's polities in Fowle's terms:
not as bounded territories but as social networks woven by communications. These
networks were not contained within territorial boundaries; to the contrary, it was the

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175
existence o f far-flung social ties that allowed people to control and exploit the land.
Northern New England's relationship with the mother country was defined not by a static
constitutional framework but by the exchange o f words and goods across the ocean.
Merchants and administrators in London sought to tap the riches o f the region by sending
agents and officials across the Atlantic to promote their authority and to lay claim to a
portion o f the products o f the land. New Englanders, on the other hand, defended their
interests at home by establishing agents and patrons in London. This pattern o f give-andtake between metropolis and colonies had its beginnings in the late seventeenth century
and had become a central fact o f political life in the New England by the 1750s.
It is impossible to understand the development o f this relationship without taking
into account the modes and methods o f communication that linked the two sides. The
degree o f control that Londoners and Bostonians exercised over the lands o f Maine rested
on their ability to establish lines o f contact with the region. Letters and parcels carried by
sailing vessels and post riders were the means by which merchants and officials from
distant capitals gained authority over northern New England, and also the tools that the
region's inhabitants used to tap into the imperial economy. To trace the lineaments o f the
leviathan in northern New England one must begin with what Fowle called the
"Circulation" o f the body politic: patterns o f communication.

Arteries o f Communication
To people accustomed to the bustling cosmopolitanism o f London or the
burgeoning commercial life o f Boston, the lands east o f the Merrimack River, or "Eastern
Parts" as they were known in the eighteenth century, must have seemed a backwater, a
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region far removed from the center o f things. But the people living on this remote
frontier were not without attachments to a wider world. Merchants in Kittery and
Portsmouth knew that crop failures in Madeira and sugar gluts in the Leeward Islands
would cause fluctuations in the prices o f commodities at their own ports. Settlers in
Brunswick and Dover understood that when war was declared in Europe, it would only be
a matter o f time before their farms were threatened by French-backed Indian raids. While
the forests and meadows o f the interior invited settlers to push further into the continent,
the attraction o f markets in Europe and the West Indies pulled them back toward the
arteries o f water-borne transport. Like the other colonies o f the North America, Maine
and New Hampshire were the product o f commerce and empire and looked to the ocean
for their contacts with the wider world.3
In the earliest years o f the colony, Maine's trade was oriented primarily toward
England, particularly the West Country. Fishermen relied on the metropolis for supplies
o f fishing gear and provisions and found a ready market for their catch in England, where
it was re-exported to southern Europe or consumed domestically. But by the mid
seventeenth century, the relative importance o f English trade declined as Boston's traders
exerted increasing control over the colony's economy. Faced with an unfavorable balance
o f trade with the mother country, the merchants o f Massachusetts Bay actively sought
supplies o f exportable commodities in neighboring areas: furs from Maine and the

3 In 1796, real estate agent Alexander Baring remarked that settlers in Maine were "in general nearly equal
in information, manners and comforts o f life to those o f the old New England states." He saw newspapers
in nearly every farmhouse and was impressed by the settlers' grasp o f European and American politics.
The prosperity and sophistication o f the settlements, he explained, were "an advantage resulting from the
easy water communications with all parts, which in fact brings them nearer the old countries than any back
lands at not one third the real distance." See Alexander Baring to Hope and Company, Philadelphia,
December 3,1796, in Frederick S. Allis, Jr., ed., William Bingham’s Maine Lands. 1790-1820.2 vols.,
Publications of the Colonial Society o f Massachusetts, 36-37 (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts,
1954), 2: 768.
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Connecticut River Valley, fish from the Gulf o f Maine, and lumber from the Piscataqua.
They also looked for commercial opportunities in distant parts o f the Atlantic basin,
finding outlets for the fish and lumber in southern Europe, the Caribbean, and the islands
of Madeira, the Azores, and the Canaries. As the volume o f this trade grew, New
England's merchants assumed an increasingly important role in the emerging Atlantic
economy.4
By the last quarter o f the seventeenth century, this economy had developed a
discernible pattern. The bulk o f New England's maritime trade was carried on with the
sugar plantations o f the West Indies and the vineyards o f the Atlantic Islands. The
economies of both groups o f islands were oriented toward staple production and their
inhabitants were in constant need o f food and other provisions. Extensive cultivation on
the islands had led to deforestation, making them dependent on foreign supplies o f wood
for housing, cooperage, and firewood. Vessels from New England brought cargoes o f
fish and lumber to the islands, returning to their home ports laden with sugar, molasses,
rum, fruit, wine, and other tropical commodities.5 The importance o f this trade is readily
apparent in the port records o f Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Records for the last decade
o f the seventeenth century indicate that nearly half the ships entered and cleared by the
naval officer at Portsmouth were trading with the West Indies. Most o f the West Indian

4 Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 1955), esp. 112-42.
5 These commodities were not the only things that were exchanged; trade was more than a simple barter of
goods. New England's merchants faced a chronic trade deficit with the mother country and were
constantly in search of "returns" such as commodities, specie, and bills o f exchange that would get them
out of the red. Ships that sailed to the West Indies returned not only with sugar, rum, and molasses, but
also with trade credits that enabled New Englanders to purchase manufactured goods from Great Britain.
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traffic was with Barbados, the most important sugar-producing island o f the time.6 The
Wine Islands, meanwhile, accounted for a little less than a fifth o f the port's traffic; more
vessels arrived in Portsmouth from the Azores and the Canaries than from England.7
The West Indian trade retained its central place in the maritime trade o f northern
New England during the eighteenth century, but the region's merchants also found new
commercial opportunities in the Carolinas, the Chesapeake, Nova Scotia, and southern
Europe [see Figs. 3.1,3.2]. Vessels to and from the West Indies continued to account for
nearly half o f Piscataqua's traffic in 1724, with an increasing portion o f the vessels sailing
to the Leeward Islands, which were overtaking Barbados as the center o f sugar
production in the British Caribbean. Merchants in Kittery and Portsmouth also developed
contacts in North Carolina, exchanging lumber, rum, and English manufactured goods for
naval stores and provisions. Another outlet for trade was to the northeast: northern New
England supplied Newfoundland, and later Nova Scotia, with provisions, timber, and
livestock. New Hampshire's merchants also traded on a more modest scale with
Philadelphia, New York, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Bermuda, and West Africa.
Nearly all this commerce was carried by smaller vessels -- sloops, schooners, brigantines,

6 Some o f Che clearances for Barbados may have in fact ended up trading with other colonies. Since
Barbados was the most windward o f the islands, shipmasters usually arrived there first, and if they found a
poor market for their goods, followed the winds to the Leeward Islands and Jamaica.
7 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fols. 1-5. These figures are based on a partially incomplete series of
naval office lists for Portsmouth kept between August 1694 and September 1695. Earlier, less complete
records exist for a twelve-month period in 1680-81 and a three-month period in 1692. Fifty-one vessels
were reported to have entered at Portsmouth between April 14,1680 and April 12,1681, but the customs
officer noted that many o f the ships were "driven in by contrary winds and made but little stay." See CSP.
vol. 11 (1681-85), fol. 98, p. 46. For the quarter in 1692, clearances included four vessels bound for
London, one for Newfoundland, one for the Canaries, and one for Virginia, twelve coasters for Boston and
one for Nantucket. Entries included five vessels for Barbados, three for London, eight coasters from
Boston, and one coaster from Hampton. See Nathaniel Bouton, ed., Provincial Papers o f New Hampshire.
7 vols. (Concord, N. H., 1868-72), 2:77-83.
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and the occasional snow —with crews o f fewer than a dozen men and burdens o f less than
a hundred tons.8
Only a small portion o f Piscataqua's trade was directly with Great Britain, and the
bulk o f this commerce was carried by mast ships, vessels o f several hundred tons with
hulls specially designed for transporting masts. The ships arrived as a fleet during the
summer, after the spring thaw had flushed cut timber downriver to the harbors o f
Piscataqua and Casco Bay. Their outward cargoes consisted mainly o f manufactured
goods, which were purchased by Piscataqua's merchants with the profits o f the West
Indian trade. The return cargoes were consignments o f masts, spars, bowsprits, timber,
and naval stores, which were transported to the naval shipyards o f England. Many o f
Piscataqua's leading families had West Country connections and also acquired
manufactured goods from the ports o f Devon, Cornwall, Hampshire, and Somerset.
Merchants also traded periodically with ships from other parts o f the British Isles,
obtaining coal from Swansea, linen from Cork, and sundry manufactured goods from
Liverpool and Glasgow.9
The naval office shipping lists generally did not include the coastwise trade
between Piscataqua and southern New England, since the sloops that carried the trade
were not large enough to require customs inspection. But the existing evidence indicates
that considerably more coasting vessels than ocean-going ships called at the ports o f
northern New England. In the twelve-month period between August 1694 and July 1695,
92 coasters were cleared for Boston in the port o f Piscataqua, while only 28 vessels left
for other ports. By 1713, the number o f coasters sailing from Piscataqua to Boston had

8 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-68. Piscataqua in this context referred not only to the river but to the
entire drainage, which included the Salmon Falls, Cocheco, Lamprey, Oyster, and Exeter rivers.
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risen to 129, and by 1724, even as northern New England was embroiled in a war with
the Wabanakis, the figure had reached 197. Coasting vessels from other ports in southern
New England, such as Salem and Newport, also visited Portsmouth in smaller numbers.
Because Piscataqua was the center o f the timber industry in the early part o f the
eighteenth century, it received most o f northern New England's coastal traffic. But as
settlement and the lumber trade moved eastward, a growing number o f coasters plied the
route between Boston and Casco Bay. In 1773, Hugh Finlay, the surveyor o f the post
roads for North America, remarked that there were two or three packet boats "in constant
employment" between Boston and Falmouth, each o f them making some twenty trips
yearly.10
The importance o f the coastal trade was a consequence o f Maine's economic
dependence on southern New England. The region's quasi-colonial relationship with
Massachusetts Bay had developed in the middle o f the seventeenth century, as
entrepreneurs from Boston sought to tap the rich natural resources o f northern New
England and the Gulf o f Maine. The merchants had established trade contacts with West
Indian and Iberian planters and had built the vessels necessary to transport fish and timber
to other Atlantic ports. But they also needed the labor o f fishermen and lumbermen,
without which there would have been no commodities to export. Since most producers in
northern New England lacked the means to purchase fishing vessels or saw mills and had
few ready outlets for their commodities, they looked to Boston's merchants for credit and

9 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-69.
10 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fol. 6-8; Boston News-Letter. 1713-24, cited in Byron Fairchild,
Messrs. William Peoperrell: Merchants at Piscataqua /Ithaca. N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), 84n;
Hugh Finlay, The Hugh Finlav Journal: Colonial Postal History. 1773-74 ([n. p.]: U. S. Philatelic Classics
Society, 1974), 17. According to Massachusetts law, coasting vessels carrying less than I 1/2 tons o f
enumerated goods did not need to clear customs when travelling within the boundaries o f province. See
Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1:21.
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merchandising opportunities. The Bostonians advanced them physical capital —ketches
and gear for fishermen, oxen and saw mills for lumbermen —and provided them with
provisions and alcohol to tide them over during the fishing and lumbering seasons. In
return, the merchants received a share o f their produce, which they sold overseas at a high
markup. This proved to be a very profitable relationship for the Bostonians, who held a
virtual monopoly on the supply o f fish and lumber while also cornering the market on
finished goods in northern New England. As the English visitor John Josselyn remarked
in 1674, merchants from Massachusetts "set excessive prices" on manufactured goods,
and "if they do not gain Cent per Cent, they cry out that they are losers." Josselyn added
that many fishermen in Maine were indebted to the point that they became "the
Merchants slaves," and were forced to forfeit their land and livestock to their creditors.11
Boston's grip on northern New England weakened slightly during the last quarter
of the seventeenth century as mercantile communities developed in Portsmouth and
Kittery. The leading families o f Piscataqua by the beginning o f the eighteenth century
owned several dozen vessels and were actively involved in the carrying trade o f the
Atlantic.12 Yet the colonists o f northern New England, particularly those who lived east
of Kittery and York, remained economically dependent on Massachusetts’s merchants.
Most inhabitants marketed their timber and fish through Boston on coasting vessels.
When warfare discouraged coasters from making trips to the eastern settlements,
colonists were often unable to dispose o f their produce. In a letter to Boston in 1746, the

11 Paul J. Lindholdt, ed., John Josselvn. Colonial Traveler: A Critical Edition o f Two Voyages to NewEneland [1674] (Hanover University Press ofNew England, 1988), 143,145.
12 In 1697, the governor ofNew York and New England, Lord Bellomont, reported that the merchants of
Piscataqua owned eleven ships and thirteen smaller vessels. The shipyards o f Maine were nearly as active
as those ofNew Hampshire, building twenty-three ships and twenty-seven smaller vessels between 1674
and 1714, although most were owned by merchants in Boston and Britain. See William G. Saltonstall,

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182
leading inhabitants o f Falmouth complained that warfare had left the families to the east
of Casco Bay in "the most dispirited, distressed Condition," not only because Wabanaki
attacks threatened their homes but because the dearth o f coasters had turned their winter’s
work "to no account," leaving thousands o f cords o f wood rotting on the ground.13
In peacetime, the coasters arrived more regularly, with most vessels shuttling back
and forth between Boston and Maine several times a season. The rhythms o f maritime
life at Piscataqua were tied closely to the demands o f coastal trade. The heaviest period
o f traffic at the port was during the spring and early summer, as vessels arrived from
Boston to take on wood and timber that had been cut during the winter. Because o f their
small size, the coasting sloops did not spend long periods in port loading and unloading
their cargoes, and during the summer most made round trips between Boston and
Piscataqua every fortnight. Between March and October in 1695, twenty coasters made
trips between New Hampshire and Boston, with some o f them making as many as ten
voyages [see Fig. 3.3]. Winter was the slack time for the coastal trade, as many
shipmasters laid their vessels up for the season, but some coasters continued to make
voyages in December and January, carrying timber for re-export to the West Indies or for
domestic consumption in Boston.14
Ocean-going traffic, meanwhile, tended to follow the schedules o f the West
Indian trade. Although there were entries and clearances for the West Indies in every
month o f the year, certain months were more active than others. The produce o f sugar
plantations came gradually on the market between February and June, and shipmasters

Ports of Piscataqua (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), 18; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 7,
Commercial, 1685-1714.
13 Boston Gazette. April 29, 1746.
14 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fol. 9.
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from New England tried to time their arrival accordingly. The trick was to arrive before
the market for fish and lumber was glutted but after the planters had brought their
produce to harbor. If vessels landed too early, they would have to spend idle time in port
or be forced to sail to another island; if they landed too late, they would be forced to sell
their cargoes at a low price. Since the voyage from Piscataqua to the West Indies
generally took about six weeks or seven weeks, the peak period for clearances to the West
Indies was in January, with ships leaving in time for the beginnings o f the sugar market.
Mid-summer represented a second, if lesser, jump in the number o f clearances at
Piscataqua. While many vessels engaged in the West Indian trade made a third leg
between the Caribbean and Great Britain, others completed two six-month round-trips
every year, departing for the second voyage in June or July. The busiest period o f entries
at the port came somewhat earlier, during the spring and early summer, as vessels arrived
from Europe and the West Indies to load cargoes o f timber [see Fig. 3.4].15
The arrival and departure o f ships at Piscataqua was a matter o f interest to many
people in nearby areas, since they relied on maritime traffic for the circulation o f goods
and information with the rest o f the world. Merchants and political officials had the
greatest investment in these contacts, but others also looked forward to the arrival of
ships. The vessels came loaded not only with West Indian sugar and English goods but
with letters from friends and family and newspapers from other ports. During the
seventeenth and most o f the eighteenth centuries, these communication networks were
sustained by an informal method o f letter carrying. Shipmasters made public
announcements o f their dates o f departure and left mail bags hanging in a tavern or coffee
house to be filled with letters, each costing the sender a penny. The shipmasters then

15 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-69; New-Hamnshire Gazette. 1756-65.
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carried the bag to their designated port, and made a second public announcement asking
the recipients to come fetch their letters. In 1699, the deputy postmaster for the North
American colonies, Alexander Hamilton, proposed that all letters to and from America be
required to pass through the post office, but his suggestion was not followed and most
letters continued to be carried by private shipmasters in the eighteenth century.16
But Hamilton, with the cooperation o f colonial legislatures, succeeded in
establishing an intercolonial postal system in the last decade o f the seventeenth century.
In 1691, a Whig courtier named Thomas Neale had been awarded a monopoly for the
colonial posts, and Neale appointed Hamilton, then governor o f East and West Jersey, as
his deputy. With Hamilton's encouragement, several northern legislatures passed acts
establishing an official post office in their colonies. Under the terms o f Massachusetts's
law, passed by the House o f Representatives in 1693, the postmaster at Boston was to
receive two pence for single letters sent to Europe and the West Indies, and four pence for
packets o f letters sent overseas. Letters sent to Piscataqua cost six pence - about a half
day's pay for a typical laborer -- and were carried by a post rider who made weekly trips
to the north. The postal service did not extend past the Piscataqua River, so letters to
people living in Maine were deposited at the Portsmouth post office to be picked up by
their recipients, or, if a sufficient number o f letters were collected, to be delivered by a
post rider. As Maine's population grew, post riders made their trips with increasing
regularity, and by 1757 a weekly mail was established between Piscataqua and Falmouth.
During the summer this postal route carried relatively little mail, since most letters were

16 Memorial o f Andrew Hamilton, April 26, 1699, General Post Office, Treasury Letter Books, vol. 169199, fols. 253-58. Hamilton remarked that the informal system o f letter-carrying was susceptible to abuse
by merchants who rifled through mail bags to find their competitors' letters, and shipmasters who tossed
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transported by coasters from Boston, but during the winter the overland post became the
primary means o f communicating with southern New England.17
Because travellers had to cross dozens o f rivers, streams, and rivulets as they
moved along the coastline, their progress was often slow and arduous. The towns o f
northern New England cleared fording places, made by placing stones across a river so
that travellers could step or wade across the water when its level was low. When the
water level was higher, people were carried across the river by a ferryman, who was
typically also an innkeeper. During the winter, the ferry was not needed because most
rivers became frozen highways, easily traversed on foot. A number o f towns also built
bridges, although the cost was steep and some towns by the middle o f the eighteenth
century began to raise the funds through lotteries or by petitioning the province's General
Court for aid.18
Townspeople were also responsible for building and maintaining the road network
o f the region, a task they performed with mixed results. Since the seventeenth century,
inhabitants o f towns had been required to devote several days o f work a year to the repair
and laying out o f roads, a practice rooted in the manorial custom o f corvee. But towns
often neglected the duty, and their roads, many o f them little more than trails, were often
impassable during the summer. The county court tried to correct this problem by issuing

the bags overboard as soon as they left port. Hamilton's observations were, of course, colored by a degree
of self-interest.
17 Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic. 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 121-23; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1:115-17; Hugh
Finlav Journal. 17-19; Clark, Eastern Frontier. 264,339-40; New-Hampshire Gazette. July 1, 1757 and
March 31, 1758.
18 Herbert G. Jones, The King's Highway from Portland to Kitterv: Stagecoach and Tavern Davs on the
Old Post Road (Portland, Me.: Longfellow Press, 1953), 12; PCRM 1:90,111,126,146, 186,307-08, 2:
68, 80,94, 118, 123,134,155,157, 168, 170,283,318,416,479,487,3:106,205,243-45,260,4:94,
275-78; New-Hamnshire Gazette. February 24,1758, September 8, 1758, November 10,1758, October 26,
1759; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves 1:183; 4:46,285.
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orders that forced the towns to build and maintain an adequate system o f roads. The
court had initiated plans for the cutting o f roads as early as the 1640s and its orders
became more systematic after the region was annexed by Massachusetts. In 1653 the
court demanded that York and Kittery make "Convenient ways" and bridges between the
towns that were "fitt for horse and man," and in the ensuing years the court issued orders
for further roads from Portsmouth as far as the Saco River.19 Towns often ignored the
court's decisions, preferring to pay fines than to bear the expense o f building roads and
bridges. A 1673 plan to build a highway (country road) between Wells and Casco Bay
was dashed because the cost was too great. But over time a small road network
developed in York County and was most elaborate in the settled parts o f Kittery,
Berwick, York, and Wells. Further east, roads were fewer in number and in greater need
o f repair. The upper portion o f the King's Highway -- the name o f the less-than-majestic
road that connected Maine's settlements from Portsmouth to Casco Bay ~ was not
completed until around 1740.20
Because most people in Maine relied on water-bome transport for their travel,
existing roads sometimes received little use. During the War o f Spanish Succession
(Queen Anne's War in the colonies), the ferrymen licensed by the towns o f Kittery and
York petitioned the General Court for aid, complaining that the war had cost them their
business. By law, soldiers and officers were ferried for free, forcing both men to
constantly attend to their posts. Meanwhile paying passengers, as the ferryman at York

19 PCRM. 2: 14-5.
20 PCRM 1:255, 3: 107,261,277; Jones, The King’s Highway. 15. According to a guidebook published
in 1731, roads linked forts and settlements along the coast as far as Fort Richmond and Brunswick in Casco
Bay, although the quality of the easternmost roads was probably very poor. See Thomas Prince, The Vade
Medum for America (Boston: Kneeland and Green for Henchman and Hancock, 1731), 195-97.
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put it, were "few... indeed almost none at all."21 Even in peacetime, road traffic was light;
in denying a petition from Falmouth requesting funds to repair a bridge over the Fore
River, the General Court noted that "not one in five hundred" o f the inhabitants o f York
County ever passed over the bridge.22
Roads were most frequently used for travel over short distances, acting as links
between neighboring farms and settlements. The earliest court orders required highways
to be large enough to accommodate a horse and a man, but by the last quarter o f the
seventeenth century most orders and statutes stipulated that highways should be sixty-six
feet wide when running straight and slightly wider along curves and at fording places.
This breadth made it easier for farmers to drive their livestock to market, since wide
spaces allowed the animals to graze or sleep on the road and enabled the drovers to keep
watch for wild predators. Smaller roads and trails connected neighboring farms and were
used by settlers to visit kinfolk and friends, to attend church and town meetings, and to
exchange cloth, eggs, butter, cider, and other produce with their neighbors. Another set
o f roads in the backwoods allowed lumbermen to haul their timber to water with chains,
carts, sleds, and oxen.23
Although governments and settlers saw a need for better roads, ambitious plans
for improving inland communications were rarely realized. Maritime transport was
essentially a private matter: merchants built, maintained, and insured their own vessels

21 Petition of William Brier, November 9,1704, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 121 (Travelling, 16441774), fol. 121; petition o f Arthur Beal, May 30,1705, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 121, fol. 122.
22 Answer to petition, 22 November, 1744, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 121, fol. 266.
23 PCRM 2:345,3: 124,4:283,317-18,365,5: 174; Michael Williams, Americans and Their Forests: A
Historical Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 96-98. On local exchange
networks, see Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives o f Women in Northern
New England. 1650-1750 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), esp. 26-27,43-48; Jere R. Daniel, Colonial
New Hampshire: A History (Millwood, N. Y.: KTO Press, 1981), 153-54. Beyond the pale o f English
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and whatever benefits they received from their use were undeniably their own. Roads
and bridges, on the other hand, were usually public property and building them was a
politically contentious matter. Because the routes established by roads were fixed, land
owners inevitably lobbied for roads that connected their holdings to ports and market
towns —thereby raising their value, since roads made it easier and less expensive to
market their produce - and against roads that cut through their farms, stripping them of
valuable land.24
Disputes also arose over the expenses o f inland transportation because road and
bridge projects required a pooling o f capital and labor. In 1693, Massachusetts passed a
law that required every town to appoint two selectmen as surveyors o f the highways as a
way o f ensuring that roads and bridges would be built and maintained within their
jurisdiction. In 1713 the act was amended, allowing justices o f the peace to require towns
to lay out public roads and private ways. But the role o f the provincial and county
governments under these acts was punitive rather than enabling: the courts fined towns
for failing to maintain their roads, but did little to fund their construction or repair.
Although some town proprietors by mid-century scored minor victories in winning funds
for bridge and road building, there was little public support for such projects because the
benefits o f the roads accrued mainly to the proprietors while their expenses were borne by
all the taxpayers o f the province. Reporting on the Plymouth Company's efforts to
receive provincial funding for roads within their patent, surveyor o f the posts Hugh

settlement, colonists were forced to use Wabanaki trails and portage routes, often with the aid o f an Indian
guide.
24 Inland transportation projects o f a large scale did not begin anywhere in North America until early in the
nineteenth century. These undertakings depended on a growing concentration of capital and an increasing
willingness of state governments to support and partially finance inland transportation projects. In both the
North and the South, states gave charters to private companies responsible for the building o f turnpikes and
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Finlay explained that "[t]he Public says, let the Plymouth Company improve their
property by opening high-ways, why shou'd the people contribute to make their estate
valuable."25
Lacking public funding and frequently in a state o f disrepair, Maine’s muddy back
roads supported a commercial world that was tiny compared to the far-flung trade
networks o f the Atlantic. While oceanic shipping lanes carried thousands o f tons o f
commodities, the paths o f Maine facilitated bartering and borrowing on a small scale,
often so small that it was never recorded in account books. Ocean-going vessels and
inland roads supported two distinct if interrelated economies, one based on profitable
long-distance exchange and the other oriented toward local self-sufficiency.26 There were
many points o f articulation between the two economies and it would be misleading to
refer to the region's settlers as subsistence farmers. According to a 1751 petition from the
town o f Kittery, fewer than a half o f its inhabitants were able to make their own clothing,
grow their own wheat, or raise their own livestock.27 Although towns with more fertile
and abundant lands were more self-sufficient, none was divorced from the commercial
economy. The inhabitants o f Falmouth and Berwick spent their winters cutting and

canals and often helped to pay for their construction and maintenance. See George R. Taylor, The
Transportation Revolution. 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951), esp. 18-55.
^.Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1: 136-37,721-22; Hugh Finlav Journal. 15. The Plymouth
Company had made some efforts in road building; in 1757, the proprietors' committee, "being
apprehensive that the laying out good Roads in Towns for plantation will be o f very great advantage to the
Inhabitants round about," proposed construction o f two roads running from Fort Shirley on the Kennebec
River to Wiscasset on the Sheepscott River and Newcastle on the Damariscotta. See Committee to Samuel
Goodwin, Boston, October 5, 1757, Kennebec Purchase Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine,
Box I, Folder 18.
26 By an insidious logic, poor transportation networks acted as a lag on economic development and
economic underdevelopment impeded the improvement of communications. The rude state of roads made
it difficult and expensive to bring produce to market and nearly impossible to transport merchandise in
large quantities. High transaction costs discouraged trade, limiting the amount o f investment in the region.
Without the funds that came from trade, towns were unable to afford the taxes and loans necessary to
improve their roads.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190
sawing wood and many were dependent on wages for their subsistence. Farmers who
owned salt marsh and meadows in Scarborough, Biddeford, and the Kennebec River
Valley raised livestock for sale in overseas markets, curing and barrelling their meat or
shipping live cattle and horses to purchasers in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the West
Indies. Merchants in port towns who made their fortunes through the wholesaling trade
of the Atlantic also played an important role in the local economy. Families such as the
Pepperrells, the Frosts, and the Hammonds sold English manufactured goods to their
neighbors, extended credit to producers, and provided milling services to farmers and
loggers.

Pine Tree Politics
While the loggers and hardscrabble farmers o f Maine's back settlements had little
in common with the periwigged merchants and tar-smeared seamen o f the port towns,
channels o f communication extended even to the most isolated farmsteads, linking them
with other parts o f the British empire. People living in New England and London viewed
these connections differently, as if they were looking through the opposite ends o f a
telescope. In the unlikely event that merchants and royal officials in London ever thought
about Maine at all, they considered it a marginal part o f the empire whose worth was
commensurate with its ability to supply the metropolis with scarce commodities. But
New Englanders placed themselves at the center o f their world and cherished their
connection to the mother country, not for its own sake but because it provided political
favors, military protection, and commercial opportunities.

27 Petition of town o f Kittery. March 20,1751, Collections o f the Maine Historical Society. 2nd ser., vol. 4
(1898), 197-205.
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In general, this difference in perspective did not matter since both sides benefited
from their relationship. But there was one issue over which colony and metropolis were
sharply divided and would remain so throughout the century: the disposal o f Maine's
woods. The crown's interest in the forests o f New England had been inspired by the
expansion o f the English navy, which had grown steadily since the civil war and by the
middle o f the eighteenth century had become the backbone o f the nation's military might.
At the end o f the seventeenth century, the navy had built a fleet o f nearly a hundred ships
and was competing with Holland and France for naval supremacy in Europe. The
construction o f men-of-war demanded a large and skilled workforce, as well as a
continual supply o f building materials, particularly timber. Approximately 50,000 cubic
feet o f timber were needed in the construction o f a third-rate ship o f 1,000 tons. Ships
also required timber for at least 23 masts, cross yards, and a bowsprit. Larger men-of-war
were fitted with a main mast that could be as large as 40 inches in diameter and up to 120
feet in length.28
Navy shipwrights built hulls with domestic supplies o f oak, but they needed to
search abroad for the pines used to make masts, yards, spars, and bowsprits. The navy
had traditionally purchased its masts from Scandinavia and the Baltic but by the second
half of the seventeenth century, these supplies were becoming inadequate. The hulls o f
men-of-war tended to be more durable than their masts, which were easily broken during
battle or worn through use. Ships in wartime were frequently refitted with new masts,
making it necessary to find ample supplies o f tall pine trees suitable for large ships.
During the first Dutch War in the 1650s, the navy had procured shipments o f masts from

28 Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power The Timber Problem of the Roval N aw . 1652-1862
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), 92-93; Williams, Americans and Their Forests. 90-91.
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northern New England, where white pines grew in abundance. New England's pines, it
turned out, were superior in quality to those o f Scandinavia; because they retained their
moisture under hot and dry conditions, pine masts from Maine and New Hampshire lived
four times as long as sticks from Norway. The demand for New England masts grew in
the second Dutch War o f 1664-67, as Dutch blockades and a Swedish ban on the felling
of pine trees had forced the English navy to outfit their ships with American masts.29
Colonial imports seemed to be an ideal solution to the problem o f acquiring pine
trees since shipments from New England kept trade within the empire and made the
crown less dependent on foreign powers. But the colonial trade had problems o f its own.
Not only was it expensive and risky to transport pines across the ocean, the supply o f
masts was threatened by the rapid deforestation o f coastal New England. The timber
trade had played an important part in the region's economy since the beginnings o f
permanent settlement. Nearly every town in northern New England built a sawmill
within a few years o f their establishment, and by 1682 there were some twenty-four mills
operating in Maine, each capable o f producing between 500 and 1,000 feet o f pine boards
per day. Northern New England's timber trade by the last quarter o f the seventeenth
century had eclipsed the fisheries in importance, and the export o f sawn lumber to
Boston, Iberia, and the West Indies had become an indispensable source o f income for
Maine's settlers.30

29 Albion, Forests and Sea Power. 200-230.
30 Charles F. Carroll, The Timber Economy o f Puritan New England (Providence: Brown University Press,
1973), 104-11; Willis, "History o f Portland," 179-80. By 1709, there were about seventy sawmills in
operation along the Piscataqua and its tribuaries. See CSP. vol. 24 (1708-1709), fol. 428. Maine's
fishermen by the 1670s were finding it increasingly difficult to compete with their counterparts in Essex
County, who received better financial backing and were better equipped to exploit the cod-filled waters of
the Grand Banks ofFNewfoundland.
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Colonists made use o f all species o f trees, fashioning fence rails with ash, staves
with oak, boards with hemlock, pegs and clothespins with birch. But for commercial
purposes, white pines were preferred because they were more easily floatable and less
likely to be rotten than old-growth hardwoods such as maple, birch, and hemlock.
Loggers often bypassed hardwoods near settled areas as they searched for the tall conifers
that flourished at higher elevations. While the work o f cutting and hauling the trees was
performed by poorer settlers, who went logging in winter to earn credit and cash for their
farms and families, the processing and marketing o f timber was the responsibility o f
wealthy and well-connected merchants. Making pines into masts or boards was a
profitable but laborious process that involved dozens o f workers and large outlays of
capital. Lumberjacks first "bedded" a pine by felling trees that were in the path o f their
fall, then sawed until the tree was toppled. After stripping it o f its bark, they "baulked”
the tree to the river by wrapping it with chains attached to teams o f oxen and dragging it
through the snow or along a cleared path. Once they reached the riverside, they flipped,
or "twitched," the tree into the river. The pines made their way downstream until they
reached the mast ponds o f the ports, where they were finished by mastwrights or cut by
sawmills, and loaded into ships. The merchants who backed this enterprise needed deep
pockets because they had to pay crews o f lumberjacks their daily wages, supply several
dozen teams o f oxen, and purchase shares in the large ships that transported the masts.31
Like other merchants, timber traders sought to limit competition while opening
markets for themselves. The British system o f military contracting offered just such an
opportunity for a select group o f merchants, since the navy granted exclusive contracts to
mast suppliers in England, who hired agents to cut the pines and ship them from America.

31 Saltonstall, Ports o f Piscataqua. 56.
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Merchants who failed to win such contracts were naturally hostile toward the system,
dependent as they were on the sale o f pine to overseas markets. Most were inclined to
ignore royal directives, devoting themselves to the production o f boards, planks, staves,
and other sawn lumber while sending many potential masts to the sawmills. Other pine
trees were sold as masts in Portugal and Spain, or as ship timber at the dockyards of
Piscataqua, which by the last quarter o f the seventeenth century specialized in the
construction o f large ships.32 The settlers' activities were a cause for concern among
royal officials, since the deforestation o f Maine and New Hampshire threatened the
navy's future supply o f masts. Edward Randolph, a former timber agent for the navy and
a commissioner o f the Lords o f Trade in New England, sent home a report in 1676 that
brought the problem to their attention. Randolph excoriated Massachusetts for its open
defiance o f the Navigation Acts, and claimed that New England's timber trade violated
trade laws and depleted the stock o f pine trees in Maine and New Hampshire. The Lords
o f Trade quickly responded to his criticisms, revoking the colony's charter and appointing
Randolph surveyor o f pines and timber in Maine and New Hampshire, a post that came
with a £50 annual salary. Randolph became mired in the controversies o f the Andros
administration and did little to serve his office, but his reports brought the mast problem
to the attention o f the Lords o f Trade.33
Randolph and Governor Andros were jailed during New England's version o f the
1688-89 Glorious Revolution and returned to England upon their release. Randolph
remained an influential figure at the Colonial Office and helped to insert a clause in

32 Joseph A. Goldenbere. Shipbuilding in Colonial America (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press,
1976), 36ff.
33 Joseph Malone, Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England.
1691-1775 (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1965), 1-9.
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Massachusetts's second charter that reserved to the crown all white pine trees greater than
two feet in diameter growing on the province's public lands. Because Randolph had burnt
his political bridges in New England, he could not enforce the provision himself. But by
early 1690s, as the depredations o f French privateers limited the supply o f masts and
naval stores from the Baltic, the Lords o f Trade and the Navy Board took a growing
interest in New England's supply o f pines. This interest was cultivated by merchants and
political leaders on both sides o f the Atlantic, who saw the development o f forest policy
in New England as a potential source o f enrichment and political advancement.34
New Englanders hoped to obtain contracts for the supply o f masts and bounties
for encouraging the production o f naval stores such as tar and pitch. A month before the
granting o f the second charter in 1691, governor William Phips, a native o f Maine and a
former ship carpenter, had written a letter to the Lords o f Trade informing them that there
were ample quantities o f timber in Piscataqua and Nova Scotia fit for naval purposes. In
addition to oak and ash, there were "such abundance o f pines that were they well
improved they would supply the whole Navy with pitch and tar, better and cheaper than
in Europe."35 A group led by Joseph Dudley repeated Phips's overtures in 1693-94,
lobbying the crown with the aid o f Sir Henry Ashurst, a merchant and member o f
Parliament with close connections to New England. Ashurst and Dudley looked to obtain
a charter for the production o f naval stores and arranged a trial shipment o f masts to
England in the hope o f winning the favor o f the Lords o f Trade. Encouragement also

34 Malone, Pine Trees. 10-27; Michael G. Hall, Edward Randolph and the American Colonies. 1676-1703
(Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, I960), 96-97.
35 CSP. vol. 13 (1689-92), fol. 1725.
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came from England, both from merchants lobbying for masting contracts and political
officials eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the crown.36
Although New England and the Naval Office had a shared interest in the
promotion o f the mast trade, they understood its benefits differently. Both knew that the
navy's demand for masts and naval stores was matched by the abundant timber supplies
o f Maine and New Hampshire, but each side sought to tip the scales o f the market in its
own favor. As timber producers, New Englanders supported royal forest policy only to
the extent that it opened up commercial opportunities for the region's lumbermen and
merchants. In their eyes, masting contracts were valuable because they limited
competition and gave lumbermen a reliable market for their timber. Without subsidies
and protective legislation, New England was unable to compete with Scandinavia in the
sale o f timber and naval stores. High labor costs and the long Atlantic voyage made the
transportation o f masts and tar expensive and risky in America. John Taylor, a New
Hampshire merchant with many years in the masting trade, made this point clear in a
memorial presented to the Lords o f the Admiralty in 1694. "I would gladly see this
Kingdom independent o f Sweden and Denmark," he assured them, "but 1 must speak as a
merchant who judges his trade only by the measure o f profit; and then arises the difficulty
o f how we shall bring bulky goods from a very remote part as cheaply as from countries
near us." Taylor explained that it was impossible for Americans to sell masts and naval
stores at as low a price as the Scandinavians and suggested that the crown should treat
New England as a supplier o f last resort for timber products, "with more regard to getting
it than the price." The surest way o f guaranteeing a supply o f naval stores, he concluded,

36 Malone, Pine Trees and Politics. 11-17.
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was by encouraging the manufacture o f pitch and tar in New Hampshire, presumably with
bounties and other subsidies.37
British authorities were willing to support Taylor’s program, but they also sought
to protect naval timber against indiscriminate felling by New England’s lumbermen. As
purchasers o f timber and naval stores, the navy commissioners wanted a continual supply
o f pines and oak for as low a price as possible. The rapid depletion o f the forests o f New
Hampshire and Maine threatened to limit this supply and drive prices upward. In a 1700
report to the Privy Council, the Board o f Trade speculated that "in two or three years time
there will not be a good tree left for the use o f His Majesty's Navy, but what will be so far
up in the country that the carriage to Piscataway will cost more than it will be worth."
Pine trees suitable as masts on naval vessels were being cut into deals and staves or were
sent as masts and spars to Portugal and Spain, countries that, the Board reminded its
readers, "upon a turn o f affairs, may prove our enemies." The only way to protect white
pines against the depredations o f lumbermen was to introduce punitive measures,
preferably through an act o f Parliament, that would force the inhabitants o f New England
to reserve a portion o f the forest to the crown.38
On the basis o f these recommendations, Parliament passed a law in 1705 that
extended the provisions o f the Massachusetts charter to include all o f the northern
colonies, placed bounties on the production o f naval stores, and prohibited the felling o f
pitch and tar pines for non-naval purposes. This act became the basis o f the crown's
"broad arrow" policy in North America, so called because surveyors o f the woods marked

37 CSP. vol. 14 (1693-96), fol. 967.
38 CSP. vol. 18 (1700), fol. 841, pp. 563-67. The Board's report was based primarily on information
provided by the Earl o f Bellomont, governor o f New England and New York, who was looking to win
points with his superiors by taking the lead in the development o f royal forest policy.
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potential mast trees with three hatchet strokes that resembled an arrow or a crow's foot.
Soon after the passage o f the act, Jonathan Bridger, a former shipwright and naval purser
who had played a leading role in formulating the broad arrow policy, was appointed
surveyor-general o f the king's woods in America. Unlike his predecessor, Jahleel
Brenton, a customs collector who had done little to earn his salary as surveyor, Bridger
was firmly determined to uphold royal authority in New England’s forests.

Surveying the Woods
The broad arrow policy made all tall white pines on public land in New
Hampshire and Maine the property o f the crown, prohibiting lumbermen from felling
them without a royal license. But the crown's property rights did not have teeth unless it
defended them in the courts or protected them with the sword. Like colonial proprietors
o f the previous century, royal officials were presented with the problem o f making good
on land claims that had more legitimacy in Europe than in America. Separated by an
ocean from Maine and New Hampshire, royal officials in Whitehall could not control
crown lands directly and depended instead on agents in the colonies. The agents' task
was to defend the crown's property through a combination o f enticements - in the form
o f bounties on pitch, tar, turpentine, and hemp —and the enforcement o f prohibitive
timber laws.
Like Gorges and Mason, the crown was hamstrung in this task by a lack o f funds
and weak lines o f communication. Jonathan Bridger in 1705 was paid a salary o f £200,
which was rather modest given that a substantial portion o f it was used to pay his
deputies and to cover travelling expenses. With the aid o f two or three deputies, Bridger
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was expected to mark all the tall white pines found near the Piscataqua and its tributaries
-- a vast area that extended some fifty miles into the interior ~ and to protect them from
illegal cutting. Because the territory was so large and his deputies so few, Bridger had
little hope o f catching violators red-handed and depended on paid informants who
fingered wrongdoers, receiving a portion o f the seized logs in return. Even when
lumbermen were caught and prosecuted, they were unlikely to be convicted because their
cases were tried by the county judiciary, which was dominated by local timber interests.
In 1708 Bridger brought charges against John Plaisted, a prominent New Hampshire
merchant and council member, for cutting mast trees without a license. Claiming that he
had a license through Francis Collins, an English merchant with a contract from the navy,
Plaisted had sent lumbermen into the woods during the winter, telling them to cut as
many mast trees as they could. Bridger estimated that only one in four o f the trees that
they felled were deemed worthy to be masts, while the rest were sent to the sawmills.
Bridger took the case to York County court, but after a summary trial the jury found
Plaisted innocent o f all charges, leading Bridger to grumble that the jurymen were "all as
guilty" as the defendant.39
Although Badger's superiors in London were sympathetic to his cause, there was
little they could do to help him. In the age o f sail, distance presented a formidable barrier
to administrative centralization and left the American colonies with a remarkable degree
o f political independence. Merchantmen sailing between Britain and New England in the
eighteenth century had to complete a voyage o f some 2800 miles, which most sailed in
seven or eight weeks. Although vessels became more complex in their sails and rigging
during the eighteenth century, the duration o f this journey did not decline much before

39 CSP. vol. 24 (1708-1709), fol. 428, p. 259.
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the introduction o f the clipper and the ocean steamer in the 1830s.40 Trans-Atlantic
correspondents had to contend with a two-month lag in the transmission o f their letters, a
problem that was compounded by the seasonality o f commerce between Britain and New
England. The only time o f the year in which vessels from the mother country were
certain to be calling at New England's ports was in the summer, when the mast fleet made
its arrival. During the rest o f the year, correspondents were often forced to find more
circuitous methods o f communicating across the ocean.
The uncertainty o f communication was particularly burdensome for royal
officials, who were expected to report regularly to the Board o f Trade. Joseph Dudley,
governor o f Massachusetts during the War o f Spanish Succession, often lamented in his
letters that the irregular traffic between Boston and London prevented him from reporting
to the Board o f Trade as regularly as he would have liked. Between October 1705 and
July 1706, he received no letters from the Board, while sending four o f his own, one in
April by a vessel that he considered to be an "uncertain conveyance" and another in July
sent via Barbados to be transferred to a packet boat travelling to England. In this last
letter, which did not arrive at the Board's offices until November, Dudley remarked that

40 Steele, English Atlantic. 17,57-77,249-50, Table 4.4; Gary M. Walton, "A Quantitative Study of
American Colonial Shipping: A Summary," Journal o f Economic History 26 (1966): 597. Improvements
in maritime transport before the American Revolution were the result of a growth in the frequency, rather
than the speed, o f voyages. The expansion o f Atlantic trade, particularly after the Treaty o f Utrecht,
created a steady increase in the volume o f oceanic traffic at all ports in the British empire. More vessels
built to accommodate this traffic, and the existing mercantile fleet became more efficient. The growth of
markets made it easier for ships to acquire and dispose o f cargoes, so that vessels did not need to spend
long periods in port waiting for the arrival o f goods. Fewer days in port meant more days in transit, and
vessels by the mid-1700s were making more voyages during their lifetimes than they had a century earlier.
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he had so little confidence in the trans-Atlantic mails that he did not intend to send a full
report until the departure o f the mast fleet in September.41
Maritime communications became somewhat more dependable after the Peace o f
Utrecht, and Massachusetts's officials by mid-century were less likely to encounter
difficulties in exchanging letters with the Board o f Trade. But the long oceanic voyage
remained a source o f frustration. The length o f the journey made it impossible for the
metropolitan government to respond immediately to crises in North America or to
involve itself to any significant extent in the day-to-day business o f governing the
colonies. The Privy Council intervened only periodically in the administration o f the
colonies, issuing broad directives to governors, adjudicating disputes, and appointing and
dismissing colonial officials. Even in these cases, the Council's authority was limited
because the enforcement of orders depended on the compliance o f local authorities and its
personnel decisions were invariably influenced by lobbying on the part o f colonial agents.
The govemors-general, who acted as the crown's representatives in the colonies, were
more directly involved in provincial politics, but they, too, were constrained by distance.
A journey o f at least a day by sail and as much as a week by horse separated Boston from
Casco Bay, making it difficult for royal officials in the capital to react promptly to events
on the eastern frontier.
The barriers o f land and sea made government primarily a local responsibility.
The town meeting in Maine and New Hampshire was the focus o f most political activity:
assessing and collecting taxes, distributing lands, cutting roads, building churches and
schools, maintaining garrison houses, settling minor disputes, caring for the poor, and

41 CSP. vol. 23 (1706-1708), fols. 288,443, pp. 213, 178-79. Dudley had improvised in similar fashion in
the past, having sent a letter to the Board by way o f Lisbon in April 1704. See CSP. vol. 22 (1704-1705),
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supporting ministers. Because selectmen met their fellow townspeople nearly everyday,
it was easy for them to respond promptly to local concerns. Officials working in London
and Boston, on the other hand, were distant from the places they governed, and
encountered more difficulties in gathering information and enacting policies. The
crown's authority in the New World depended on the existence o f trans-Atlantic political
networks sustained by maritime transportation and the written word.
Every year the Board o f Trade, the advisory body charged with oversight o f the
American colonies, received hundreds o f letters from correspondents in North America
and the West Indies and dozens more from colonial agents in London. Although the
Board was staffed by an assortment o f clerks and copyists, it was not in any real sense a
bureaucracy; its commissioners were political appointees rather than career civil servants
and its procedures were relatively informal. More importantly, the Board did not have an
agency devoted exclusively to the disinterested gathering o f information and depended on
reports from outsiders for its knowledge o f the colonies. The bulk o f these reports came
from governors and other royal officials, who owed their posts and salaries to the crown
and were consequently loyal to the royal prerogative. Official memoranda were
supplemented by letters from colonial agents, representatives o f proprietary companies,
and private individuals, who weighed in on issues in which their interests were at stake.42
This communication was often personal in character; many letters were addressed
to individual commissioners rather than the Board itself and were couched in deferential

fol. 455, p. 213.
42 Mary P. Clarice, "The Board ofTrade at Work," American Historical Review 17 (1911), 17-43; Charles
M. Andrews. The Colonial Period o f American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), vol. 4,
272-317; Richard M. Brown, "The Anglo-American Political System, 1675-1775: A Behavioral Analysis,"
in Alison G. Olson and Richard M. Brown, eds., Anglo-American Political Relations. 1675-1775 (New
Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 14-28.
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language that explicitly recognized the social superiority o f the person being addressed.
Letters and petitions —the typical method by which corporations, informal associations,
or private individuals brought their grievances to the authorities —were customarily
directed to an "honored Sir" and signed by a "humble and obedient Servant."43 This
deferential language reflected not the slavish subservience o f the correspondents but the
continuing importance o f patronage and personal ties in the political world o f the early
eighteenth century. Although many impersonal, "modem" forms o f political association,
such as lobbying organizations and national parties, had their tentative beginnings in
eighteenth-century Britain, family ties, friendships, and patronage remained central to
political life. The Board ofTrade, as Ian Steele has pointed out, "should be viewed as a
changing group o f individuals rather than a bureaucratic institution," because "in the early
eighteenth century [personal] connections were bureaucracy." At both the Colonial
Office and other departments o f the government, the exercise o f power depended on a
pyramid o f patron-client relationships that connected the political centers o f Westminster
and Whitehall with the localities.44
These relationships acted as conduits for both patronage and information.
Possessing only the bare bones o f bureaucratic organization, agencies such as the Board
ofTrade drew their knowledge o f the colonies mainly from petitions and reports, which
were inevitably colored by the interests o f their senders. The typical petition began by

43 A petition in the eighteenth century could be brought by a single individual and did not need to be
accompanied by a long list o f signatures. Much o f the legislation of Massachusetts General Court during
peacetime was initiated by petitions; Alison Olson has estimated that about half the taws passed in the
American colonies before the Revolution were based on petitions. See Alison G. Olson, "EighteenthCentury Colonial Legislatures and Their Constituents," Journal o f American History 79 (1992): 543-67.
44 Ian K.. Steele, Politics o f Colonial Policy: The Board ofTrade in Colonial Administration. 1696-1720
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), xiii. On the importance of connections between Parliament and
the localities in Britain, see Jeremy Black, The Politics o f Britain. 1688-1800 (Manchester Manchester
University Press, 1993), 55-93.
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outlining the problem at hand, skewing the information to make the writer's demands
seem reasonable. The petitioner then outlined a plan o f action for the government,
emphasizing its importance to the interests o f king and country, even though its most
immediate beneficiary was nearly always the petitioner himself. Because such petitions
and letters formed the basis o f the Board's knowledge o f the colonies, they strongly
influenced the formulation o f colonial policy. The commissioners knew that letters from
America served as a useful guide to public opinion and as an indication o f the extent to
which royal initiatives would be palatable in the colonies.45
Political favor, as a consequence, tended to flow along the channels cut by
communication; unless people had the ear o f the government, they could not expect it to
work on their behalf. Personal ties mattered a great deal under these circumstances, since
government officials were inclined to see the justice in their friends' grievances and the
faults in those o f their enemies. Patronage flowed freely to those who won the favor of
the government and ran dry for its opponents. Not surprisingly, political life in Georgian
England was characterized by intrigue and underhanded dealings as ambitious merchants
and politicians courted the favor o f the powerful while simultaneously attempting to
undermine their rivals. Because political figures represented and drew support from their
followers, competition for place and patronage was not merely a matter o f personal
striving but a contest between rival interest groups.46

45 As Richard Bushman has pointed out, deferential language of petitions allowed people to express their
grievances against the authorities without calling into doubt their sense o f allegiance. See Richard L.
Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North Carolina
Press, 1985), 46-54.
46 The classic work on patronage networks in eighteenth-century Britain is Sir Lewis Namier, The
Structure o f Politics at the Accession o f George m (London: Macmillan. 1957). Namier has been justly
criticized for underestimating the importance o f ideology and o f popular politics. John Brewer’s Party
Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976) offers a sharp rebuttal to Namier's rather cynical view o f political life.
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Personal attacks against public figures in this context were also assaults against
the policies they represented. If laws and directives were based on petitions and pleas
from the localities, the crown could count on local cooperation in their enforcement since
the inspiration for the policies lay among the very people they were intended to affect.
But initiatives devised by outsiders needed to be enforced by outsiders, and colonial
resentment against unpopular laws was usually directed against the officials sent to
uphold them.47 The provisions o f the 1705 forest law that rewarded the lobbying efforts
o f New Englanders, particularly the bounties on naval stores, were well received in
America and did not face popular resistance. But the punitive aspects o f the law, which
placed a ban on the felling o f pines, were drawn up in Britain by men such as Edward
Randolph and Jonathan Bridger, who were indifferent if not hostile to the interests of
New England. These provisions had little support in New England, and local opposition
focused on the man who was appointed to enforce them, Jonathan Bridger.
Soon after Bridger began to prosecute lumbermen such as John Plaisted for
violations o f forest laws, the notables o f New Hampshire and Maine launched a
counterattack against him, assailing his reputation in England and America. Through
their contacts in England, Plaisted and his allies sent messages to the Board ofTrade
accusing him o f corruption and suggesting that he had allowed local mill owners to saw
mast trees into lumber in return for bribes. When Bridger was informed o f the rumors, he
dispatched a letter to the Board in March 1709, denying all wrongdoing and asking that
his accusers come forward to be publicly interrogated on their charges. Aware that his
connections in the mother country were in need o f repair, he apologized for past

47 Patricia Bonomi, The Lord Comburv Scandal and the Politics o f Reputation (Chapel Hill, N. C.:
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
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"mistakes," particularly his persistence in asking for a higher salary. He then made a
journey through the settlements o f New Hampshire, posting notices on meetinghouse
doors in which he refuted the charges and promised a reward o f £100 to any person who
could prove his guilt. He also listed the regulations for cutting trees and promised a
reward to people who brought information that led to a successful conviction.48
Bridger understood that attacks against his reputation threatened his political
career. Like all royal officials in America, his political survival depended on his ability
to remain in the good graces o f the Board ofTrade, which was responsible for his
appointment and his salary. Its members needed to be assured that he was carrying out
his office honestly and not using it as a platform for jobbery and extortion. Since the
Board did not have any impartial agents who could monitor Bridgets actions, its
evaluation o f his performance was based on information obtained from letters written in
the colonies or from conversations with colonial agents. This information was inevitably
colored by the interests o f those who delivered it because few people would bother to
write unless they had a political axe to grind. If Bridgets opponents managed to cast
doubts on good faith, he would lose the Board's confidence and would be recalled to
England. And if they undermined his reputation, they would call into question the
credibility o f his reports from the colonies. Bridger knew the danger o f malicious
rumors, and his regular correspondence with the mother country was meant to ensure that
the Board would see his side o f the story.49

48 DHSM 9: 270-71.
49 When Bridger prosecuted three men in 1720 for cutting mast trees, he told the Board ofTrade that they
"may expect a cloud of witness's affadavits against me," because he had attempted to uphold the
prerogative. See CSP, vol. 32 (1720-21), fol. 118, p. 55.
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Because his office led him to trample on local interests, the surveyor o f the woods
inevitably became a magnet for personal attacks. The most sustained assaults came in the
second decade o f the century, as timber merchants in New Hampshire and the "populist"
party in Massachusetts -- a group o f assemblymen hostile toward the expansion o f royal
prerogative -- united in their opposition to Bridger. The earliest accusations came from
merchants who were directly affected by Bridger’s prosecutions. In February 1710,
Bridger complained in a letter to the Board ofTrade that he was being made the object of
a personal vendetta by John Mico, the agent o f Francis Collins, a London merchant who
held a masting contract with the navy. Mico's "mallice is as great as ever," he told them,
"and reports all over the countrey he will turn me out, if it cost him £10,000." Bridger
was not mistaken: a few months later, a number o f merchants allied with Mico and
Collins brought a report to the Board ofTrade accusing Bridger o f being "guilty o f
bribery and corruption, and making devastation o f the woods he was sent to preserve."
They claimed that Bridger had allowed the "common people to cut what trees they
please" in exchange for bribes and had recently received £50 for an illegal shipment o f
masts.50
The circle o f Bridger's enemies widened after the Peace o f Utrecht as growing
numbers o f investors in Massachusetts became interested in the lands o f Maine and New

50 CSP. vol. 25 ( 1710-11), fols. 86,329. Bridger's reputation also came under attack by fellow officials.
His first voyage to New England in 1698 had been described to the Board ofTrade in an unflattering light
by the Earl o f Bellomont, then governor o f New York and New England. Bellomont reported that Bridger
and two other surveyors sent by the commissioners of the navy had been blown off course and forced to
land in Barbados, where Bridger and a colleague fell sick o f a fever "contracted by a debauch." Bridger’s
colleague, considered "the better o f the two" by Bellomont, died in Barbados, but Bridger recovered and
went on to New Hampshire. The governor scolded Bridger for his "foolish and unhappy parsimony,"
which had brought "[m]uch disappointment and loss of time" in the task o f furnishing the navy with naval
stores from New England. Though Bellomont was a loyal defender o f royal forest policy, he saw Bridger
as an officious meddler and potential rival, and his remarks about the surveyor's syphilitic episode in
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Hampshire. In 1713 the provincial government revived the Committee o f Eastern Claims
and Settlements, which had been established for two brief periods in 1700 and 1702. The
committee began preparing the Book o f Eastern Claims, a registry o f land titles for the
region east o f Wells that allowed former inhabitants o f Maine to reclaim holdings they
had abandoned during wartime. The list o f people who presented deeds to the committee
included former inhabitants o f Maine as well as speculative land companies from Boston
that had purchased seventeenth-century patents and other titles in the hope o f profiting
from the settlement o f Maine's lands.51
One o f these groups o f investors was the Lincolnshire Company, or Muscongus
Proprietors, who had acquired title to approximately one million acres between the St.
George and Penobscot rivers on the basis o f a 1630 patent to John Beauchamp and
Thomas Leverett and a 1694 deed between Madockawando and Sir William Phips. The
original deeds belonged to the descendants o f Leverett and Phips, who in 1719 sold
shares to thirty investors expected to provide the financial backing for the settlement o f
their lands. Several o f the shareholders were also members o f the populist party,
including Dr. Elisha Cooke, Jr., one o f the most vocal critics o f royal prerogative in the
House o f Representatives. To men such as Cooke, Bridger became both a symbol o f
arbitrary royal power and a practical impediment to the development o f their holdings in
York County.52 Early in 1718, Cooke and his allies launched a campaign to discredit
Bridger, using Massachusetts's agent in London, Jeremiah Dummer, to lobby for his

Barbados were meant to undermine his credibility in the eyes o f the Board. See CSP. 16 (1697-98), fol.
502, pp. 240-41.
51 Clark, The Eastern Frontier. 111-43; Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607-1763” (Ph.D. diss.,
Yale University, 1933), 319-45.
52 Cooke and others had substantial holdings in Maine even before the acquisition o f the Muscongus
Patent.
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dismissal. Cooke also took direct aim at the broad arrow policy, arguing that it did not
apply to Maine's lands. Since the region had been purchased from the Gorges family, he
reasoned, it was private property, and according to the terms o f the 1705 act white pines
were protected only in territory that was not divided into private holdings.53
In February 1718, Cooke took his case to the House o f Representatives, accusing
Bridger o f corruption. Loggers, he claimed, had been forced to pay bribes to the surveyor
before entering the woods to cut white pines. In the ensuing months, Cooke collected
depositions from more than a dozen lumbermen, most alleging that they had been made
to pay six shillings for every team o f oxen sent into the woods. In a later speech to the
House, Cooke reported that John Mico had paid the surveyor £50 for the right to send a
shipload o f masts to England. Many o f those who backed Cooke's charges were
respected figures in northern New England; among the deponents were members o f New
Hampshire's leading families, including Archibald Macpheadris, Timothy Wentworth,
and Elisha Plaisted. Bridger had already been threatened with dismissal in the winter o f
1715-16 and had been forced to return to England to restore his reputation. Cooke's
campaign, combined with Jeremiah Dummer's lobbying efforts in London, put the final
nails in the surveyor's coffin. By October 1718 a letter arrived in Boston reporting that
Bridger had been relieved o f his post and replaced by Charles Bumiston, a London
merchant. In a letter written the same month, Bridger openly criticized the Board's
decision but also admitted that his unpopularity in Maine and New Hampshire had made
it nearly impossible for him to carry out his office. Claiming that "my life is threatened if

53 On the political background o f Cooke's campaign, see William Pencak, War. Politics, and Revolution in
Provincial Massachusetts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 62-67. Bridger received support
from governor Samuel Shute, who opposed Cooke's plan for the establishment of a private bank to increase
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found on my duty in the woods," he reported that backwoodsmen had "begun to cut [and]
destroy all before them" since news o f his dismissal had spread to northern New
England.54
Although he almost certainly did not reach the heights o f venality described by
Cooke, Bridger had probably engaged in activities that left him open to charges of
corruption. Like other royal officials o f the time, Bridger was remunerated not only with
a salary but with various perquisites o f office that allowed him to increase his income.
The crown in this respect behaved much like a merchant o f the time, both o f them faced
with the problem o f directing large organizations with an insufficient supply o f funds.
Wholesalers in port towns advanced credit to producers such as farmers and fishermen
with the knowledge that both creditor and debtor would receive a share o f their crops or
their catch. Debtors would divide their time between producing for the market and
working for their own subsistence. This arrangement allowed merchants to limit their
expenses because they did not have to provide for their workers year-round. It also
passed some o f the merchant's risk on to the producer, since debtors were legally
obligated to make good on their loans. In similar fashion, the crown advanced a post and
a modest salary to its officeholders with the understanding that civil servants would make
additional income through the performance o f their office. This practice cut the expenses
of governments and allowed them to shift some o f the burden o f risk —say, o f failures to
collect revenues or o f botched privateering expeditions —on to their office holders. But

the money supply in the province. Cooke and other members o f the populist party knew that the removal
of Bridger from office would be a blow to Shute and his supporters.
54 CSP, vol. 29 (1716-17), fol. 33, p. 10; vol. 30, fol. 735, pp. 368-69; vol. 31, fol. 578, pp. 365-68.
Cooke's charges were later confirmed by Bridger’s successor, Robert Armstrong, who reported that Bridger
had accepted bribes from timber merchants and had looked the other way as they illegally cut mast trees.
Yet Armstrong’s charges were self-serving, since he had a vested interest in appearing more vigilant than
Bridger. See CSP, vol. 32 (1720-21), fols. 669,694.
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the crown, like a wholesaling merchant, could not directly supervise its employees and
was dependent on their good faith, hence the constant ruminating at the Board ofTrade as
to whether the reports o f royal officials "had credit" or were credible.55
In Bridger's case, the salary that came with the post o f surveyor was inadequate to
maintain a genteel lifestyle, and it was understood that Bridger would also receive a share
o f all the fines exacted under the forest laws. But Bridger was unable to collect this
revenue because o f his inability to successfully prosecute violations o f the laws. Even
when he finally managed to secure a conviction in 1713 against three men for cutting a
mast tree, none o f their neighbors would purchase their estate at public auction, making it
impossible to collect their fines.56 Without the fines, Bridger’s deputies and informers
could not be paid their rewards and consequently had little reason to be vigilant in the
enforcement o f the forest laws. In a December 1717 letter to the Board ofTrade, Bridger
reported that he had appointed seven deputies "well knowing in the woods and people o f
good repute," but admitted that he "cannot give them any reward so what may be
expected from them I humbly submitt to their Lordshipps."57 To make matters worse, the
surveyor did not receive any salary at all in the last two years o f his tenure and was
dependent on loans for his subsistence. In all likelihood, the frustrations o f his office led
Bridger to charge all lumbermen a fee before entering the woods, thus guaranteeing
himself a steady income and a modicum o f control over the timber trade.

55 On the connection between merchant credit and the management of risk, see Rosemary E. Ommer, ed.,
Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton, N.B.: Acadiensis Press,
1990); on credit and the economy o f early modem England, see Craig Muldrew, The Economy o f
Obligation: The Culture o f Credit and Social Relations in Earlv Modem England (New York: S t Martin's
Press, 1998).
56 CSP, vol. 27 (1712-14), fol. 518, p. 257; fol. 249, p. 126.
57 CSP, vol. 30 (1717-18), fol. 283, pp. 139-40.
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In accepting this compromise, Bridger effectively admitted defeat in his battle
against New England's timber merchants over the enforcement o f forest laws. Far from
accepting the notion that white pines were the property o f the crown, the inhabitants o f
Maine and New Hampshire treated the trees that grew on public lands as a common
resource to be divided amongst themselves. This point o f view was upheld by the judges
and juries o f the Court o f Common Pleas, who consistently thwarted any attempts to
enforce the broad arrow policy. Acting as agents o f community sentiment, the courts
refused to indict offenders o f the forest laws and tacitly defended the notion that forest
products were owned by New Englanders themselves, to be sold to the highest bidder on
an open market. Because the county courts were the only legitimate arbiter o f property
rights in the region, Bridger's attempts to prosecute the laws were doomed to failure. He
admitted as much in several letters to the Board ofTrade, telling them that "all the people
on the frontiers depend on the woods for their livelyhood and say the King has no woods
here, and they will cut what and where they please as long as the Charters good."58
Bridger's only recourse was to turn to his superiors at Whitehall for support, but
they failed to provide him with the funds and personnel necessary to enforce the forest
laws. Worse still, New Englanders proved effective at using trans-Atlantic lines o f
communication to their own advantage. By flooding the Board ofTrade with rumors o f
Bridger’s wrongdoings, Elisha Cooke and his allies undercut the surveyor's authority in
New England by calling into question his reputation in the mother country. This strategy
eroded Bridger’s power and allowed New Englanders to evade punitive forest laws. Not
only did Yankee merchants continue to export masts and other timber to Iberia and the

58 Ibid.
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West Indies, they also transshipped naval stores from North Carolina to England,
collecting the bounties on tar and pitch made by the Carolinians.59
Bridger’s ordeal was an instructive example o f the limitations o f imperial power in
the First British Empire. As Jack Greene has argued, the coercive model o f late
nineteenth-century imperialism fits poorly with the political facts o f the previous era o f
colonization. The effective operation o f early modem empires century depended on the
consent o f colonists living at the peripheries, who accepted royal authority only because it
protected their customary liberties.60 The circuitous methods by which imperial
authorities controlled and gained knowledge o f distant territories tended to reinforce this
relationship. In the heyday o f nineteenth-century imperialism, European powers ruled
vast territories through colonial bureaucracies whose knowledge o f their subjects
depended little on the cooperation o f native inhabitants. The authoritarian structure o f
power in these colonies was reflected and reinforced by centralized techniques o f
information-gathering: British knowledge o f India, for example, owed little to native
map-making and much to large-scale land surveys carried out by highly trained engineers
using geodetic triangulation.61 In the eighteenth-century, by contrast, knowledge and
control o f the land depended on the cooperation o f colonists, who were steadfast in their
defense o f customary rights and liberties. The flow o f information determined the
balance o f power; because the Board ofTrade received much o f its information about

59 Malone, Pine Trees and Politics. 28-46.
60Jack P. Greene, "Negotiated Authorities: The Problem o f Governance in the Extended Polities o f the
Early Modem Atlantic World," in Negotiated Authorities: Essavs in Colonial Political and Constitutional
History (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24.
61 C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India. 17801870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive:
Knowledge and the Fantasy o f Empire (London: Verso, 1993); Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire:
The Geographical Construction of British Tndia. 1765-1843 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1997).
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Maine from merchants and agents from New England, its centralizing policies were
doomed to fail.

Samuel Waldo and the Muscongus Patent
The short trip between Boston and Maine posed a less o f an obstacle to political
authority than the Atlantic, and the leading figures o f the Bay Colony wielded greater
influence to the eastward than did their metropolitan counterparts. The resettlement o f
Maine following the Peace o f Utrecht brought the region's towns deeper into the political
fold o f Massachusetts, as the provincial government took an active role in sorting out the
land claims o f returning colonists. After they had resolved disputes between rival groups
of proprietors over the distribution o f common lands, towns from Casco Bay westward
became increasingly integrated into the world o f provincial politics, sending
representatives to the assembly, winning a handful o f appointments to the council, and
shaping legislation through petitions and informal influence. To the east o f Casco Bay,
on the other hand, lay a large expanse o f territory that had been weakly held or never
occupied by the English. With the cession o f Acadia by the French, the time seemed ripe
for its settlement, and the lead was taken by a number o f land companies from Boston
and environs who derived their title to vast proprietary holdings from seventeenth-century
patents, grants, and Indian deeds.62
To the merchants and gentlemen who invested in these companies, the lands of
Maine were a form o f capital stock whose value was expected to accrue overtime. With
a rapidly expanding population and a growing demand for natural resources, it was
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generally understood that the value o f land would steadily rise throughout New England.
The safest investments were in holdings within chartered townships but the most
spectacular profits were made in frontier areas, where land could be purchased cheaply
and sold later at a much higher price. As in any speculative venture, investments in land
companies were made with the expectation that the value o f stocks would rise in the
future. The stockholders o f the companies believed that population growth would fuel a
demand for lands in marginal areas such as Maine, and that as more colonists settled in
York County, the clearing o f roads and construction o f mills would drive up land prices
further still. But the problem was to establish ownership o f the land in advance o f
settlement and to hold the land in reserve until prices had risen sufficiently.63
Success in this regard required a defensive strategy o f protecting the land against
rival claimants and an offensive strategy o f promoting the settlement o f proprietary
holdings. The effective use o f communication was essential to both aims. In the
eighteenth century, merchants made their profits not so much by increasing the volume of
production as by merchandising and speculation. Traders flourished when they cornered
the market on various commodities and controlled their distribution. Because their
success depended on their ability to link producers with consumers, merchants were
constantly in need o f reliable and timely information about prices, markets, and sources
of goods. They were also continually courting political favor, since the ability to secure
exclusive rights to a commodity often depended on the influence o f public authorities.
The land was a good like any other in this respect, and the successful promotion of

62 Roy H. Akagi, The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies (Philadelphia: University o f
Pennsylvania Press, 1923; reprint ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), 188fT; Moody, "Maine
Frontier," 319-424.
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company holdings depended on the creation o f human networks that enabled proprietors
in Boston to develop and protect their lands from afar.
The case o f Samuel Waldo, one o f the leading promoters o f proprietary holdings
before the Seven Years War, provides an illuminating example o f how such networks
were created. Waldo's great-grandfather, Cornelius, had been one o f the founders o f
Chelmsford and Dunstable, and his father and uncle were two o f the original investors in
the Lincolnshire Company. By the time he was in his twenties, Samuel was trading
merchandise from his house on Queen Street in Boston on capital advanced by his father,
Jonathan. In 1728, Jonathan also gave Samuel his share in the Muscongus Patent as a
deed o f gift, encouraging his son's emerging career as a speculator in Maine's lands.64 A
year earlier, Samuel had begun to purchase portions o f the estate o f Sylvanus Davis, a
seventeenth-century trader who had built two sawmills and acquired extensive land
holdings in Falmouth. His interest in Maine real estate climbed dramatically after he
negotiated the confirmation o f the Muscongus Patent by the Privy Council in 1732 and
was rewarded half the Patent for his services. He added to his holdings after his return to
New England, investing over £14,000 in Maine lands between 1732 and 1736 and
receiving an additional share from the Lincolnshire Company65 By the time o f his death
in 1759, Waldo had acquired approximately 13,000 acres in Falmouth, 350 acres in
Scarborough, 200 acres in Biddeford, some 1,000 acres in North Yarmouth, two mills
with four saws at Presumpscott and Stroudwater streams near Casco Bay, as well as the

63 On land speculation in colonial British North America, see Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling o f British
North America: An Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1986), 65-85.
64 York Deeds, vol. 12, fol. 355; "Waldo, Samuel," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds.. Dictionary
o f American Biography. 10 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), vol. 10:333.
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400,000-acre share he held in Muscongus Patent: the executors o f his estate valued his
holdings in York County at £41,387.66
Although Waldo made frequent visits to his eastern holdings, his business was
carried out for the most part by a number o f agents acting on his behalf. In the 1730s, he
formed a partnership with Thomas Westbrook, a masting agent and landowner who had
moved to Falmouth after serving as commander o f Maine's forces during Dummer’s War.
Not long after the war, Waldo won an appointment as the agent o f Ralph Gulston, an
English merchant who held a masting contract with the royal navy. Waldo retained the
services o f Westbrook as his own agent, who hired teams o f lumbermen to cut and haul
the trees specified in the contract and brought additional timber to Waldo's sawmills.
Westbrook had acted in the past as a representative o f the Pejepscot and Lincolnshire land
companies and Waldo came to rely on him as his eyes and ears in real estate dealings in
York County. The two men jointly purchased numerous tracts in Maine, and Westbrook
kept Waldo abreast o f potential buyers and sellers, estates made available by the deaths o f
landowners, and threats to Waldo's interests.67 A similar role was later played by Waldo's
sons, Francis and Samuel, Jr., and his son-in-law, Isaac Winslow. A variety o f other
agents served Waldo in Maine by collecting rents and debts, paying bribes, organizing
shipments of lumber, and retailing provisions and other goods. Still others carried out

65 York Deeds, vol. 15: fols. 119,234-39,251-53; vol. 16: fols., 22-29,32,97, 159-75,214-220; vol. 17,
fols. 11, 61-68, 103, 117-18,209-11,229,235-36,271,284-85,288-89,296-98; vol. 18: fols. 31-32,5759, 73, 81, 129-33,214-17,223-25,227.
66 Inventory of Waldo estate, Boston, August 18,1760, Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland,
Me., box 1, folder 8, fols. 4-5.
67 York Deeds, vol. 13, fols. 151-53; vol. 15:118; vol. 16:97; vol. 17: 103,236,271; vol. 18:57-68;
deposition of Joseph Connant, August IS, 1759, Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society, box I, folder 8;
petition o f Richard Fry, Collections o f the Maine Historical Society. 1st. ser, vol. 3 (1853): 335-37; DHSM.
11: 1-4,41-43.
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land surveys and facilitated the settlement o f the Lincolnshire Company's townships [see
Fig. 3.5].68
The regular communication o f Waldo with his agents was made possible by the
frequent sailings o f coasting sloops between Boston and Maine. As the center o f timber
trade moved from Piscataqua to Casco Bay, a steadily increasing number o f vessels called
at Falmouth and points eastward, carrying cargoes on the accounts o f Waldo and other
merchants. Waldo was not himself a ship owner but the steady stream o f coasting vessels
trading to the east allowed him to keep a constant communication with his agents in
Maine. In May and June 1744, he received over two dozen letters from correspondents in
York County, with some correspondents writing several times a week.69 The high
volume o f mail was largely due to preparations for war -- Waldo was commander o f York
County's eastern regiment - but it also reflected the rapidity and reliability o f
communication between Boston and Maine. Waldo made ample use o f coasting vessels,
corresponding and visiting his eastern settlements regularly. The success o f his business
in Maine depended on this active involvement; when Waldo went to England for several
years after 1749, his son remarked that his "Eastern affairs" suffered from neglect.70
But it was in his effective use o f overseas networks o f communication that Waldo
made his mark. Located in a region where land claims conflicted and political authority

68 For purchases of land, see indenture with Thomas Smith, October 27,1732; for the collection of rents
and debts, see letter of Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 6,1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical
Society, Boston, Mass.; indenture with Enoch Freeman, December 29, 1758; for shipments o f timber, see
letters of Thomas Carver, May 18,1744, Enoch Freeman, June 6 ,7 ,8 , 1744, Samuel Waldo Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society; for payments ofbribes, see letter o f Enoch Freeman, June 8,1744,
Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; for retailing, see letter o f Captain Phillips, Boston, June
29, 1753, Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass., vol. 50, fol. 119;
certificate from Thomas Fuller, Knox Papers, vol. 50 fol. 133; receipt, Knox Papers, vol. 54, fol. 2; for
surveys, see depositions o f George Drinkwater, January 14,1734/5, Jonas Willson and Henry Macintire,
March 27, 1734, Stephen Jones, May 19,1738, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fols. 8,9,32.
69 See 26 letters dated May and June, Samuel Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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was precarious, the Lincolnshire Company's holdings were secure only if the owners
managed to get the backing o f several levels o f government. Waldo was intensely aware
o f the connection between commerce and politics and spared no effort in his attempts to
influence provincial and imperial leaders. The first challenge he faced was from David
Dunbar, an Irish-born military officer who was appointed surveyor-general o f the woods
in 1728.71 Having learned from Bridgets failures that surveyors could not count on local
cooperation in the enforcement o f the broad arrow policy, Dunbar introduced a proposal
that would allow the crown to gain tighter control o f New England's forests without
having to defer to the region's authorities. His solution was to establish a royallyadministered settlement in Sagadahock, the name traditionally given to the territory
between the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers. Soon after his arrival in New England in
1729, the surveyor-general recruited some three hundred Scotch-Irish migrants to move
to the lands east o f the St. George River and proposed that a separate province be
established east o f the Kennebec, to be called Georgia.72 Knowing that Dunbar

70 Letter of Francis Waldo to Samuel Waldo, May 18, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 110.
71 Dunbar's strongest backer at the Board o f Trade was Colonel Martin Bladen, one o f the leaders o f the
West Indian party in Parliament. Like other West Indian planters, he resented New England's extensive
involvement in illegal trade with the French Caribbean, which flooded the British market with French
tropical produce and drove down the price of sugar from the English islands. Beginning in 1727, Bladen
took the lead in pushing for a reform of the colonial administrative system, demanding tighter control of
the colonies and a more rigid enforcement o f the Navigation Acts. As the colony responsible for the most
flagrant violations o f trading laws, Massachusetts became a focal point o f Bladen’s campaign. In an effort
to bring the New Englanders to heel, Bladen and his allies introduced legislation designed to clamp down
on smuggling in the West Indies and also attempted to enforce existing imperial regulations, including the
forest laws. See "Bladen, Martin," in Romney Sedgwick, ed., The House o f Commons. 1715-1754. 2 vols.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 1:465-66; James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect": Colonial
Administration Under the Duke o f Newcastle (Princeton. N. J.r Princeton University Press, 1972), 60-106.
72 DHSM. 10:451-69. The lands east of the Kennebec nominally belonged to Massachusetts on the basis
o f its 1691 charter but they had been virtually unoccupied by the English since French and Wabanaki
forces razed their fort at Pemaquid in 1696. After the Peace of Utrecht, various companies had floated
schemes to settle the region, including a group led by the merchant-philanthropist Thomas Coram, who had
begun his career as a shipwright in New England and had since become one o f London's most successful
merchants. Coram’s plan to settle discharged soldiers in the region was scuttled after the bursting of the
South Sea Bubble in 1720. But the merchant brought his scheme to the attention o f the Board o f Trade
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threatened the validity o f the Muscongus Patent and promised to interfere with his
masting operations, Waldo departed to England to plead the case o f the Lincolnshire
proprietors. Conscious o f the value o f metropolitan connections -- he even went so far as
to name his youngest son after his English patron, Ralph Gulston -- Waldo exerted his
influence at the Privy Council for over a year, winning a revocation o f Dunbar’s colony in

1732.73
The Privy Council's decision did not spell the end o f Dunbar’s stay in New
England; in 1731 the Board o f Trade had appointed him lieutenant-governor o f New
Hampshire in order to strengthen his position as surveyor-general. In the years that
followed, Dunbar was drawn into a peculiar alliance with Waldo, the two o f them united
in opposition to the governor o f Massachusetts, Jonathan Belcher. In 1734, an employee
of Waldo's, William Leighton, organized a logging party to cut pine trees in Berwick in a
forested area whose title was held by John Frost, a member o f Piscataqua’s oligarchy of
merchant families. Dunbar assisted in the operations, marking the trees that were suitable
for shipment as masts. Frost took Leighton to court on trespass charges, as much to make
a political point as to collect damages. The county court found in Frost's favor, and over
the next several years the case became tied up in a series o f appeals and counter-appeals,
eventually reaching the Privy Council in London. Much to Waldo's dismay, Belcher
failed to lend support to his case and tacitly worked to advance the cause o f Frost and his
allies.74

once again in 1728 and it was quickly adopted by Dunbar. See CSP. vol. 27 (1712-14), fols. 357,364,366,
385; vol. 29 (1716-17), fol. 577; vol. 36 (1728-29), fol. 628; DHSM. 10:436-444.
73 DHSM 11: 134; Samuel Waldo, A Defence o f the Title o f the late John Leverett. E s q .: to a Tract of
Land in the Eastern Parts o f the Province o f the Massachusetts Bav. commonly called Muscongus Lands,
lying unon St. George's. Muscongus. and Penobscott Rivers (Boston: Kneeland and Greenf?], 1736), Early
American Imprints, 1st sen, no. 4098, 7-9.
74 Andrew M. Davis, "The Case o f Frost vs. Leighton," American Historical Review 2 (1897): 229-40.
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Two years later, the governor again provoked Waldo's ire by failing to support
him in a dispute with the Wabanakis over the settlement o f the upper St. George River.
Knowing that Belcher’s reputation was vulnerable on both sides o f the Atlantic, Waldo
launched a public relations campaign at home —which included two lengthy pamphlets
that delineated the history o f the Muscongus claim and insinuated that the governor
surreptitiously encouraged the Indians —and an intense lobbying effort in London to
remove Belcher from office. By 1741, Waldo's efforts bore fruit with the replacement o f
Belcher by William Shirley, who had acted as Waldo's first lawyer in the Leighton case
and was given a share o f the Muscongus Patent as a reward.75
In his many voyages to England -- he made fifteen in his lifetime —Waldo did
more than protect his political interests; he also did much to promote the development o f
the Muscongus Patent. The recruitment o f settlers was crucial to this effort, since the
worth o f real estate grew as its population increased; in 1729, Waldo told a colleague that
the Muscongus Patent would in a few years be "very valuable, more especially as Lands
adjacent thereto will soon be settled."76 But because Maine's soils were relatively
infertile and its settlements vulnerable to Indian attack, land companies were hard pressed

75 Samuel Waldo. Whereas since mv Return from St. George's River.... (Boston: n. p.. May 22, 1735),
Early American Imprints,1st ser., no. 40087; idem., Defence o f the Title: indenture of land from Samuel
Waldo to William Shirley, July 3, 1738, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fols. 34-35. Waldo belonged to one o f
several groups in New England who called for Belcher's removal. Elisha Cooke and his radical allies
opposed the governor on constitutional grounds, criticizing on principle the representative of the
prerogative in Massachusetts. The Wentworth family o f Portsmouth was irritated by Belcher’s close
friendship with Richard Waldron and William Vaughan, who were the factional opponents o f the
Wentworths in the New Hampshire assembly. Belcher’s attempts to control appointments to the provincial
council and his desire to annex New Hampshire to Massachusetts bothered them even more. Both Waldo
and the Wentworths had powerful metropolitan connections: William Shirley was the brother-in-law o f the
Duke of Newcastle, while Mark Hunking Wentworth was the masting agent o f John Thomlinson, an
influential figure in the Walpole administration. It was these connections that made Belcher’s removal
possible. See John A. Schultz, "Succession Politics in Massachusetts, 1730-1741," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 15 (1958): 508-20; £SP, vol. 41 (1734-35), fol. 166, p. 103; Malone, Pine Trees. 11823.
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to attract families from southern New England. Waldo printed numerous handbills and
inserted several advertisements in Boston newspapers announcing the availability o f
tracts in Maine, but because farmers preferred to purchase lands within their own
townships or nearby areas, few people from Massachusetts proper took his offer.77
Like the proprietors o f other companies, Waldo was forced to look across the
ocean for settlers, recruiting migrants from Ireland, Scotland, and Germany. As early as
1720, the Lincolnshire Company had contracted with an agent in Ireland to send fifty
families to settle two townships on the St. George River. But the deal fell through, as did
several later attempts to recruit Irish settlers, and it was not until the 1730s that large
numbers o f foreign immigrants began arriving in the lands o f the Muscongus Patent.78
The first group were the fifty families brought over by David Dunbar, many o f whom
later purchased deeds from Samuel Waldo for holdings between the Muscongus and St.
George rivers. In 1735, Waldo contracted with another group o f Scotch-Irish families to
settle at St. George River and in 1740 he made a similar agreement with some forty
German families from Saxony. Although many o f the settlers abandoned their holdings
during the War o f Austrian Succession (King George's War), others returned after the war
and were joined by several more shipments o f migrants in the 1750s. By 1760, it was

76 Samuel Waldo to Thomas Paine, December 22, 1729, Miscellaneous Mss., Massachusetts Historical
Society, Boston.
77 For an example of a handbill, see Samuel Waldo, Samuel Waldo o f Boston, merchant... hereby notifies
all Persons... (Boston: n.p., March 3, 1734), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40088; for an example
of a newspaper advertisement, see Boston Gazette. August 22,1737.
78 Akagi, Town Proprietors. 262-63. On Scotch-Irish and German migration to America, see Graeme
Kirkham, "Ulster Emigration to North America, 1680-1720," in H. Tyler Blethen and Curtis W. Wood, Jr..
eds., Ulster and North America: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Scotch-Irish (Tuscaloosa, Ala.:
University o f Alabama Press, 1997), 76-117; Jane Bramwell, "Irish Migration to New England, 1714-1722:
An Early Example o f the Emigrant Trade" (M. A. thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1995); Marianne
Wokeck, "Harnessing the Lure o f the 'Best Poor Man's Country1: The Dynamics o f German-Speaking
Immigration to British North America, 1683-1783," in Ida Altman and James Horn, eds., 'T o Make
America": European Emigration in the Earlv Modem Period (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
1991), 204-243.
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estimated that there were 145 households established on Waldo's holdings at St. George,
Medumcook, and Broad Bay, most o f them with Scottish, Irish, or German surnames.79
The transportation o f these immigrants across the Atlantic was an audacious
undertaking that involved the coordination o f several networks o f communication.
Recruiters in Europe sought out information about sources o f prospective settlers and the
costs o f transporting them, sent out printed and spoken calls for migrants, and made
arrangements for the settlers in America. The immigrants themselves shared information
about transportation costs, economic opportunities in America, and prospects in different
colonies. Agents in America, meanwhile, organized the transport o f migrants from major
ports to frontier areas, located and divided unsettled lands, and supplied the migrants with
provisions.80 Waldo's role was to bring these networks together, encouraging and
facilitating the movement o f families from Europe to his holdings near the St. George
River. He proved remarkably adept at synthesizing information drawn from various
sources, contacting immigration agents in Frankfurt, recording the freight rates charged
by shipmasters in Rotterdam, and learning how a settler family could support itself in its
first year in Maine.81
Yet he faced major obstacles in his efforts to recruit migrants. As a location for
settlement, Maine paled in comparison to Pennsylvania or the Carolinas, which offered
migrants richer soils and readier access to markets. German and Scotch-Irish settlers
were more likely to follow their kin and neighbors to the Middle Colonies and the South

79 List o f the settlers in St. Georges River, Medumcook and Broad Bay, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 166.
80 On the workings o f trans-Atlantic migration, see Bernard Bailyn, Vovagers to the West: A Passage in
the Peopling o f America on the Eve o f the Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1986), 3-352.
81 See, for example, letter of Waldo to Jean Palairet, Sept 20,1757, Fursdich Wiedisches Archiv Neuwied,
Schrank 30, Gefach 3, Fascil 1 (photostat at Library o f Congress), fols. 69-77, in which Waldo lists freight
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than to take their chances in cold and war-tom northern New England. Even when Waldo
located a willing group o f migrants, he was unable to bear the full cost o f transporting
them across the Atlantic and needed assistance from immigration agents or the
immigrants themselves.82 Waldo countered the first problem by launching an ambitious
propaganda campaign, issuing printed circulars in Ireland and Germany that advertised
the availability o f land in Maine. Generously describing the region’s climate as "healthy"
and its soils "exceedingly fruitful," the handbills offered attractive terms o f settlement,
typically allowing migrants one hundred acres gratis or for a nominal quitrent."83 The
circulars specifically asked for migrants who could pay their own freight, and Isaac
Winslow informed Waldo in 1752 that the Germans who migrated to Broad Bay were
families who were "little in debt."84
Constantly short o f funds, Waldo also attempted between 1757 and 1759 to entice
a Rhineland count to provide financial backing for the migration o f a thousand German
families, offering him a 200,000-acre share o f the Muscongus Patent in return.85 Waldo
once again painted a deceptively rosy picture o f his holdings, reporting to the count's
agent that Maine's lands were more fertile than those o f Pennsylvania, that he had already
settled three hundred German families along the Medomack River, that the value o f some

rates and explains in detail how the ownership o f a breeding sow could help a family to survive its first
winter in New England.
82 According to a petition from the immigrants, most owned land and houses in Germany, which they sold
to pay their way to New England. See petition on behalf o f Palatines, May 25,1748, Massachusetts
Archives, vol. 15A, fol. 33.
83 "General Waldo’s Circular," in Samuel L. Miller, History o f the Town of Waldoboroueh. Maine
(Wiscasset, Me.: Emerson, 1910), 33; "Advertisement," in Ruth Aiken, ed., Records o f Lower St. Georges
and Cushing. 1605-1897 (Cushing, Me.,: Driftwood Farm, 1987), xv
84 Isaac Winslow to Samuel Waldo, May 12, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 109.
88 Waldo made this rationale clear in a letter to one o f his agents in 1749, when he wrote that "the most
effectual way to increase [the value o f his holdings] will be to sell a Large share o f the Lands to some
Gentleman of Distinction, Fortune or Interest." Samuel Waldo to Captain Bradford, Boston, October 20,
1749, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 427.
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o f Waldo's holdings had increased between thirty and seventy times since he first
purchased them, and that the provincial government was considering plans to build a fort
on the Penobscot River large enough to house a thousand soldiers. Waldo also floated a
scheme in which the count would send a regiment o f soldiers to fight in North America
and have them settle in Maine after the end o f the war. The deal foundered because
English law prohibited the ownership o f so large an estate by a foreigner, but Waldo's
creative efforts underscored his inability to finance migration on his own.86
Once the migrants had arrived in Maine, they continued to rely on Waldo's
assistance. Most settlers were indebted to Waldo, either for his payment o f their passage
or for shipments o f provisions and tools from Boston. They were obliged to make good
on their debts, typically by sending him shipments o f timber or by performing services on
his behalf. Waldo himself was chronically indebted, so much so that he was forced to
foreclose on the properties o f his partner Thomas Westbrook in 1743. Financial
difficulties also led him to return to England in 1749 to collect fees for military services - after he had successfully defended a suit by his former ally William Shirley, who
charged him, among other things, with failure to make good on debt payments.87 A
scarcity o f money, combined a need to share the risks o f settlement and the timber trade,
created a web o f interdependence structured by patterns o f debt and credit. Because
people at all stages o f the social hierarchy had an interest in Waldo's enterprises, no one
was exempt from their risks: Waldo, his settlers, agents, and patrons were all linked

86 Letter o f Jean de Palairet to Count o f Neuwied, March 25,1757, London, Furstlich Wiedisches Archiv
Neuwied, Schrank 30, Gefach 3, Fascil 1 (photostat at Library o f Congress), fol. 4; letter o f Palairet to
Count o f Neuwied, 19 July 1757, ibid., fol. 16; letter o f Waldo to Jean Palairet, Sept 20,1757, ibid., fols.
69-77; "His Excellency the Count o f Neuwied's Covenants with Samuel Waldo," August 3 1, 1757,
Furstlich Wiedisches Archiv Neuwied, Schrank 6, Gefach 5, Fascil 2.
87 Account of trial between Shirley and Waldo, Boston, February 1749, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 96.
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together in a chain o f credit fashioned out o f the promises each group made to one
another.
Thus in October 1752, Waldo's agent, Isaac Winslow recorded the sums owed by
27 German settlers for shipments o f provisions and tools, for amounts running from a
little over five shillings to nearly £84. Meanwhile, Winslow and other agents were
running their own debts with Waldo's Boston business partner and future son-in-law
Thomas Flucker, who had loaned Waldo £280 in 1747 and continued to ship goods to his
eastern settlements. Waldo himself was indebted to his English patrons; the letters he
received from England consistently reminded him o f his financial obligations. In
England in 1757, he borrowed £8,000 from William Sitwell o f London, a weighty sum
even for a prosperous merchant such as Waldo. Because such loans were granted on the
basis o f trust -- prosecutions against debtors, as Waldo well knew, were costly in
financial and personal terms and were to be avoided except as a last resort -- Waldo and
his settlers became enmeshed in a network o f debt and credit that increased their reliance
on one other. Settlers came to depend on Waldo for the land and goods he advanced
them, while Waldo drew much o f his income from the rents and commodities supplied by
his tenants in Maine.88
Waldo and his settlers were also bound together by a shared interest in the land.
One o f the greatest demons Maine's inhabitants faced was the precariousness o f their hold

88 List of debts due to Isaac Winslow by settlers at Broad Bay, October 17, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol.
112; list of supplies sent by Thomas Flucker, 1753-54, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 128; indenture between
Samuel Waldo and Thomas Flucker, September 15,1749, Samuel Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society,
box 1, folder 8; indenture between Samuel Waldo and William Sitwell, August 10, 1757, Knox Papers, vol.
50, fol. 138. For examples o f Waldo's indebtedness to his English patrons, see: John Thomlinson to
Samuel Waldo, London, April 7, 1742, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 118; Beaves and Stanton to
Samuel Waldo, London, June 8, 1742, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 125; Joseph Gulston to Samuel
Waldo, July 13, 1742, London, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 129; Robert Sedgwick to Samuel
Waldo, London, July 27,1742, Massachusetts Arhives, vol. 53, fol. 133.
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on their farms; persistently faced with Indian attack and disputes with rival claimants,
frontier families were grateful to anyone who strengthened the security o f their title.
Waldo gladly played this role, defending his settlements against competing companies
and using his influence to bolster English defenses on the eastern frontier. Following the
declaration o f war against the French in 1744, Waldo received dozens o f letters and
petitions from his settlers, asking for reinforcements to garrisons, shipments o f provisions
financial aid to outlying towns, and commissions for officers. The merchant complied
with many o f the requests, taking a leading role in recruiting soldiers in 1744 and acting
as one o f the leaders o f the Louisbourg expedition. He also battled more familiar
enemies, preventing a rival proprietor from chartering a township on land belonging to
his settlers.89
Although he was not elected to office, Waldo served as a political representative
of his settlers, receiving petitions from aggrieved parties and exerting his influence in the
provincial government. His son, Francis, also played a more official role, as a
representative in the provincial assembly and customs inspector for Falmouth. Far from
resenting the political connections o f their landlord, settlers recognized that their interests
were tied to his own and advanced by his influence on public officials. "I thank the
Lord," wrote a clergyman from Georgetown o f Waldo's friendship with William Shirley
on the eve o f war in 1744, "who hath put a Gentleman into the Chair o f Government to

89 Letters of Joshua Bang, May 4,1744; Alexander Nichols, May 5,1744; letter from townspeople of
Walpole, May 8, 1744; William Bums, May 20,1744; Benjamin Larabee, May 20,1744; William
McCleland and George Ferguson, May 24,1744; Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 25,1744; Sebastian
Zuberbuhler, May 31, 1744; Joshua Moody, June 1744; Arthur Savage, June 16,1744; Robert Carver, June
16, 1744; Samuel Wheelwright, June 25,1744; Henry Alexander, June 28, 1744; Joseph Woods, July 2,
1744; William Bums, July 2,1744; Boyce Cooper, July 5,1744; William Bums, August 25,1744, Waldo
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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whom you have ready access, with whom you have a Good understanding, and whose
Impartial administrations give us great consolations in this day o f trouble."90
As in the case o f earlier land companies, settlers and proprietors were tied
together by a shared claim to ownership o f the land. By weaving a web o f
communication that tied the interests o f both London merchants and frontier farmers to
the protection o f his property rights, Waldo managed to gain a large measure o f control
over his holdings. Where imperial agents had failed to gain the support o f the local
population, he deliberately fostered an identification between the public interest and his
private emolument.91 O f course, the only people entitled to Waldo's protection were
those who accepted his authority; those who claimed holdings under rival proprietors had
interests directly opposite to those o f the Lincolnshire Company. Because Waldo's claim
was backed by an order o f the Privy Council, few were willing to contest it and the rights
o f his settlers were generally secure. But further to the west, in the region adjacent to the
Kennebec River, several large and powerful land companies made overlapping claims to
large portions o f the same territory. The Kennebec (Plymouth), Pejepscot, Clarke and
Lake, Brunswick, and Sheepscot companies all held claims along or near the lower
Kennebec River, which they defended with greater energy following the declaration o f
peace in 1749.92
Settlers who held title to their lands under rival companies ran the risk o f being
ejected from their farms for no other reason than being on the wrong side o f a proprietary

90 M. Clenachan to Samuel Waldo, May 23,1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
91 Waldo's success in prosecuting cases in the York County Court o f Common Pleas is a measure of his
influence in the region: the court found in his favor in every one of the nearly two dozen cases he contested
at the county level: see York County Court o f Common Pleas Records, Maine State Archives, Augusta,
Me., vol. 9: 245-46; vol. 10:158-61,187-88,361; vol. 11:184-85; vol. 13:15; vol. 14:293-94,372,452,
456-58,472,477-79,503,534-37; vol. 15:52-53.
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dispute over legal title. Deeds issued by the Kennebec Proprietors in the 1750s required
settlers to hinder others from lumbering or planting on the proprietors' lands. Squatters
and settlers who held title from rival land companies were to be brought to the attention
o f the proprietors and charged with trespass.93 In general, the proprietors sought
ejectment rather than damages in trespass suits, calling into question the defendants'
rights to the land and forcing them to quit their claims if they lost the case. The
proprietors were also more likely to bring their suits to the Supreme Court, since the
justices who sat on the provincial bench tended to be members o f Boston's elite with
family or political connections to the proprietors. Although York was one o f the least
populous counties in Massachusetts, it consistently provided a large proportion o f the
trespass suits heard by the Supreme Court. With less than one-tenth o f the province’s
population, York accounted for twenty-two o f the sixty-seven, or nearly a third, o f the
cases tried by the Court in 1750.94
The actions o f proprietary companies sometimes made innocent victims o f
Maine's settlers, who worked the land with their own hands and depended on it for their
subsistence. Summary ejectments cost families tracts that they had themselves improved
and the high cost o f company lands left many with so little land that they could not make
a living. By the 1760s, frontiersmen in Maine began engaging in acts o f sabotage and
intimidation against representatives o f the proprietary companies, and after the American

92 Gordon E. Kershaw, "Gentlemen o f Large Property & Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors.
1749-1775 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1975).
93 Kennebec Purchase Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me., box 1, folders 4-18.
94 Peter E. Russell, Provincial Society and the Superior Court in Massachusetts. 1692-1774 (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1990), 27-35; Appendix 1, Table 2. These figures are based on a generous estimate of
York County's population in 1750. According to the census o f 1765, Maine's population stood at a little
under 23,000, while Massachusetts's total population was estimated at about 240,000: Maine accounted for
about one-tenth of the population. But the rate o f population growth between 1750 and 1765 was much
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Revolution many became involved in what amounted to an open revolt against the
proprietors.95
But in the 1730s, before there was much English settlement east o f Casco Bay,
Waldo and his colleagues faced a more immediate threat from a different quarter. In
August 1735, a band o f Wabanakis set fire to several bales o f hay that Scotch-Irish
settlers had cut on the east side o f the Wiscasset River and told an ensign at the St.
George blockhouse that they would to the same to the home o f another settler who lived
above the falls o f St. George’s River. Two years later, the Indians threatened to kill the
sheep and cow o f a settler named Thomas Gregg, one o f them leaving a gun flint at the
house of his wife as a reminder that a war would ensue if he did not leave. Like later
white settlers, the Wabanakis held their land by custom and depended on it for their
subsistence. They would not, as Waldo learned, abandon them without a struggle.96

higher in the Eastern parts than it was in the rest o f Massachusetts; the proportion was almost certainly
lower in 1750.
95 Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier.
1760-1820 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North Carolina Press, 1990), 11-87. Others opposed the
proprietary companies because their relunctance to sell their holdings before prices rose acted as a brake on
the advance of settlement. A critic o f the Pejepscot Proprietors wrote in 1715 that absentee landowners,
like "the Dog in the Fable will neither serve themselves, nor let others be serv'd." Forty years later, a
Boston merchant living in London sharply criticized absentee proprietors in a 1755 memorandum,
branding them "Monopolisers o f Lands" who were "Imaginary Rich in Waste lands," and called fora tax
that would force them to dispose o f their holdings. See CSP. vol. 28 (1714-15), fol. 521, p. 234; John
Barrell, "An Account o f the Northern Colonies," London, March 6,1755, in Stanley M. Pargellis, Military
Affairs in North America. 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle
(New York: Archon Books, 1969), 75-76. There were provincial regulations that required recipients of
land grants to settle a minimum number o f families on their lands within an allotted period o f yean, but
they were usually winked at by provincial officials.
96 Deposition o f Nicholas Byram, Jan 17, 1736, in Waldo, Defence o f the Title. 37; depositions of Thomas
Gregg, May 13, 1738, Robert Rutherford, April 10, 1738, William Woodside, May 10, 1738, Jean and
Anna Woodside, May 1738, letter o f Ammi Ruhamah Cutter to Jonathan Belcher, December 3, 1737,
Knox Papen, vol. 50, fols. 11,16, 19,30,31.
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FIGURE 3.1. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES FROM THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA,
1694-95.
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Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/968.
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FIGURE 3.2. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES FROM THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA,
1723-25.
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Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/967. In Figures 3.1, and 3.2, entries to and from other ports in New England have
been excluded. The discrepancy between the number of entries and clearances is due in part tot he sale of ships: many
vessels cleared from Piscataqua's shipyards were sold at foreign ports and never returned. The decline in the
proportion of entries and clearances to the West Indies also took place in Boston, where vessels from the Caribbean
accounted for more than half the entries in 1687-88 but only a quarter by 1718-19. The trend was reversed at
Piscataqua later in the century; by the 1750s, vessels to and from the West Indies accounted for over half the port's
traffic once again. This change reflected a shift in the center of the timber trade from Boston to New Hampshire and
Maine; Boston assumed the role of a regional entrepot that organized the shipment of commodities to and from other
parts of greater New England. See Ian Steele, The English Atlantic. 61-62.
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FIGURE 3.3. CLEARANCES OF COASTING VESSELS FROM PISCATAQUA FOR
BOSTON, AUG. 1694-SEPT. 1695.
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FIGURE 3.4. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES AT THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA,
JAN.-DEC. 1755.
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FIGURE 3.5. DESCRIPTION OF LOT NO. 61 IN A TOWNSHIP BELONGING TO
THE LINCOLNSHIRE COMPANY, 1738.
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The surveying of townships before settlement made it possible for proprietors to allocate their holdings as shares. The
lot described above was recorded in the proprietors’ record book in 1738. Photocopied from the Henry Knox Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 50, fols. 23-27.
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CHAPTER IV
A SWEET MOUTH BUT A BITTER HEART

As I said before, so I now say, that the Lands we own let us enjoy, and no
Body take them from us. We said the same to those o f our own Religion
the French; altho we are a Black People yet God hath planted us here:
God gave us this Land, and we will keep it, God Decreed all things, he
Decreed this Land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English
Possess it but we will.
--Colonel Louis, Penobscot sagamore, 1752

Formal conferences between Wabanaki and English leaders never failed to attract
an audience, for they offered one o f the few great spectacles to be seen on the Maine
frontier in the eighteenth century. Sagamores arrived in ruffled shirts and cocked hats,
with strings o f wampum wrapped around their necks. They were accompanied by as
many as six hundred followers, many o f them warriors with painted faces. Colonial
commissioners, resplendent in fine clothing and powdered wigs, also arrived with pomp
and ceremony and made a show o f treating the sagamores with presents and refreshments.
A cannon blast in the morning announced the beginning o f the meeting and sagamores
arrived in a flotilla o f canoes with a Union Jack at the helm. The meetings, which usually
lasted for a week or more, were conducted with a high degree o f solemnity and concluded
by an exchange o f toasts and a dance performed by the young men o f the Wabanaki
delegation. Following two conferences with the Norridgewocks and Penobscots in June
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and July 1754, the Reverend Thomas Smith o f Falmouth remarked that the "summer's
scene" was "of as much bluster as a Cambridge Commencement."1
The conferences were remarkable not only for their spectacle but in the degree to
which their protocol was a compromise between European and Indian styles o f
diplomacy. The procedure for formal conferences was gradually established in the last
quarter o f the seventeenth century and had become regularized during the long period o f
imperial wars, as the conclusion and ratification o f peace treaties required colonial
governments to meet with the Wabanakis more frequently. Although the meetings took
place in English towns or forts, New England's officials made many concessions to
Wabanaki custom. The commissioners conformed to the Indian practice o f tum-taking,
with each delegation alternately talking while the other sat quietly. They also adopted the
vocabulary o f Eastern Woodlands diplomacy, speaking o f the Wabanakis as their
brothers, their alliance as a path, and peacemaking as a matter o f burying the hatchet.2
The Wabanakis, for their part, opened the conference by toasting the British monarch and
closed their treaties by signing or ratifying a written document. Wabanaki speakers gave
weight to their words by laying beaver pelts or wampum belts on the ground after their
speeches, but they also requested written minutes o f the meetings from the English
delegation.
The compromises made by both sides were a testament to the delegates' sincere
desire to find common ground and to establish a lasting peace. The English hoped to

'William Willis, ed., Journals o f the Rev. Thomas Smith and the Rev. Samuel Deane. Pastors o f the First
Church in Portland (Portland. Me.: Joseph S. Bailey, 1849), 156.
2Some English officials incongruously used Iroquois diplomatic imagery, referring to the Anglo-Wabanaki
alliance as a "covenant chain" that was "shined" by their words. In a 1714 meeting at Portsmouth, the
governor of Massachusetts proposed that a peace agreement be commemorated by covering a hatchet with
a kettle in the Iroquois manner. Querrebuit, the Wabanaki speaker, told him "I never saw how they put the
Hatchet under the Kettle," but gave assurances that "I have put my Hatchet away." See DHSM. 23:71.
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persuade the Wabanakis to renounce their alliance with the French and cease their attacks
against northern New England. Wabanakis tried to convince the English that their
encroachments on Indian lands threatened the peace. But their collective efforts failed to
create a lasting alliance, and the English could not prevent Wabanakis from joining arms
with the French in every imperial war. Worse still, the conferences themselves bred
hostility between the two groups, with each side feeling that the other had not spoken
honestly. At a July 1713 meeting in Portsmouth, Governor Joseph Dudley flashed copies
of seven treaties before the Wabanaki delegates, accusing them o f breaking the terms o f
every single one. Later governors repeated these charges and blamed the Wabanakis for
their alleged treason and bad faith. Many Wabanakis, for their part, distrusted the
English and often suspected that beneath a veneer o f friendliness the English were filled
with greed and ill will. In 1721, several sagamores from Norridgewock, complaining that
colonial leaders had twisted their words, declared that the English were "thieves and
usurpers who wanted to unjustly invade their lands."3
Recent historians have placed most o f the blame for these conflicts on the
shoulders o f English officials. According to the prevailing view, colonial leaders
willfully broke treaties and produced sham deeds in a thinly-veiled attempt to legitimize
the seizure o f Wabanaki territory. In a recent article, historian David Ghere has argued
that the government o f Massachusetts "conducted a policy o f deception" with respect to
land ownership, leading the Indians to be "deceived by misleading rhetoric." Reproving
English governors and interpreters for their incompetence and bad faith, he concludes that

3DHSM 23:40-43; Vaudreuil and Begon to Minister, October 8,1721, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 43, fol.
374; Vaudreuil and Begon to the King, June 8,1722, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 44, fol. 303v. (My
translation; original reads: "des voleurs et des usurpateurs qui vouloient Envahir injustement Leurs
Terres.1')
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Massachusetts officials engaged in the "deliberate and systematic use o f mistranslations
and misinformation" to mislead the Indians. At the root o f the English failure to establish
peaceful relations with the Wabanakis, Ghere argues, was their unwillingness to
communicate truthfully. Colonial officials obfuscated or glossed over contentious treaty
provisions and stubbornly refused to listen to Wabanaki objections to English policy. If
the Indians failed to adhere to the terms o f written treaties, it was because English leaders
deliberately mistranslated or misrepresented their contents. In short, Ghere shares
Francis Jennings's belief that English officials shrouded their aggressively expansionist
policies in a "cant o f conquest" that legitimated unscrupulous land grabs by framing them
in falsely contractual terms.4
Like the work o f Jennings, Ghere's article forces us to view the self-serving
rhetoric of colonial officials with a skeptical eye and has left the validity o f colonial
treaties open to question. But in dwelling on hidden motives and tampered documents,
these historians have tended to caricature the English as venal charlatans and the Indians
as hapless victims. That a complex history should be reduced to such simplistic terms is
unfortunate, for the transcripts o f frontier conferences provide rich documentation o f a
century-long debate between Indians and colonists over questions o f land ownership,
social obligations, and the just exercise o f political power. Since conferences were
focused on the specifics o f peace making, many historians have seen their transcripts as
nothing more than a tedious record o f endless squabbles over the price o f beaver pelts and
the redemption o f war captives. But if they scraped beneath the surface o f these disputes,

4David L. Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation: Diplomacy on the Maine Frontier, 1725 to 1755,"
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 8 (1984): 3-24; Francis Jennings, The Invasion o f America:
Indians. Colonialism, and the Cant o f Conquest (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North Carolina Press,
1975).
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they would uncover a struggle between two opposing moralities, each rooted in the daily
interaction o f people with their natural and social environments.
The immediate context o f this struggle was the migration o f English colonists into
lands that had traditionally belonged to Wabanakis. But New England's eastward
expansion was only one chapter in a larger story o f Europe's encounter with a wider
world. Since the fifteenth century, Europeans had migrated to the Americas in search of
wealth, whether for the riches o f Potosi or the hardscrabble independence o f a fifty-acre
farm. The movement o f people across the Atlantic was both a consequence and a cause
of the economic growth o f the West from the fifteenth century onward. While many
economic historians blithely refer to this period o f growth as Europe's "take-off' to
industrialization, it entailed many wrenching social changes, particularly in the Englishspeaking world, where commercial expansion occurred earlier and more rapidly than
anywhere else. Economic change produced fortunes for some and a steady rise in income
for many, but others were stripped o f their land and thrown into lives o f destitution.
One o f the most important consequences o f economic "development" in England
was the transformation o f communally owned resources into privately owned land,
through the enclosure o f common fields and the introduction o f stringent game laws that
abridged customary rights to forests and rivers. The beneficiaries o f these changes found
advocates in political economists such as Adam Smith and Bernard Mandeville, who
argued that the untrammelled pursuit o f economic self-interest created greater aggregate
wealth, paradoxically serving to benefit the general good. The victims o f economic
expansion, meanwhile, expressed themselves in the language o f the "moral economy," a
term that gained currency in the late eighteenth century. Placing the demands o f
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communal obligation above those o f economic self-interest, many English cottagers and
wage laborers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mounted a sustained defense of
manorial custom, common rights o f ownership, and the just price. Less educated and not
as well-connected as political economists, the defenders o f the moral economy articulated
a vision o f society in which the wealthy had a moral obligation to provide for their less
fortunate neighbors in times o f dearth and hunger.5
The debate between English and Wabanaki leaders at treaty conferences was a
distant echo o f the struggle between the moral and political economies in Britain. As in
England, a group o f people claiming customary rights to the land stood in the way o f
those who wished to convert it into private property. And as in England, conflicts
between these two interests sometimes erupted into violent confrontation. But the
similarities ended there, for the terms o f the debate were framed by the particular
circumstances o f the Maine frontier. Unlike those who enclosed common fields in
England, colonists in New England had few social or cultural ties with the people whose
lands they sought to possess. They were also members o f a settler society in which a
relatively high proportion o f the population owned land. The Indians whose lands they
encroached upon, furthermore, bore little resemblance to the cottagers o f Great Britain.
While farmers in England worked their fields with plow and oxen, Wabanakis subsisted
on fishing, gathering, hunting, and swidden agriculture. They based their defense o f
customary right not on manorial traditions but on the moral imperatives o f a society o f
hunter-gatherers. While the Old World's moral economy was rooted in the realities o f
social class, the Wabanakis belonged to a society in which all social relationships were

5E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy o f the Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past and Present 50
(1971): 76-136; idem. Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: New
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described in the terms o f kinship. Seeing their close neighbors as members o f an
extended family, they were both strongly egalitarian and unbendingly individualistic,
objecting to actions that threatened social harmony or compromised the autonomy o f
individuals. This point o f view —typical o f foraging societies -- was eloquently
expressed by sagamores who discussed matters o f land ownership, trade, treaties, and
sovereignty with the English.

The Language o f Land
At eighteenth-century conferences, English and Wabanaki delegates ritually
danced a verbal minuet whenever the discussion turned to questions o f land ownership.
Wabanakis usually took the lead, informing the governor that they were uneasy with the
rapid advance o f English settlement. The Indians then proposed a boundary line that
would mark the limits o f English towns. Colonial representatives praised the Wabanakis
for their openness but also reminded them that British subjects were entitled to settle all
the lands they had legitimately purchased. A clerk would present parchment copies o f
seventeenth-century deeds, showing the Wabanaki delegates the totems o f long-dead
sagamores who had ceded their lands to English buyers. The Wabanakis responded that
they knew nothing o f the purchases, that the sagamores had been drunk when they signed
the documents, or that Indians had been insufficiently compensated for their lands.
Invariably, the governor dismissed these objections out o f hand and reminded the
Wabanakis o f their treaty obligations.
No matter how many times they went through these paces, the two sides never
found any basis for agreement. Several articles o f a 1678 treaty were devoted to

Press, 1993).
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questions o f land ownership, and all the written treaties signed in the ensuing century
included some mention o f the issue. From the 1713 Treaty o f Portsmouth to the 1749
Treaty o f Falmouth, the documents used roughly the same wording: the English were
permitted to settle all the territories they owned before the outbreak o f war, while the
Wabanakis retained their inland hunting grounds as well as fishing, hunting, and fowling
rights on English lands. Yet when English and Wabanaki leaders spoke about these
matter at conferences, it was clear that they were talking at cross-purposes. These
misunderstandings hinged on differing beliefs o f what it meant to own the land.
The colonial view of land ownership was colored by the changes that had taken
place in English society since the sixteenth century. In the Middle Ages, European estate
surveys had been carried out by manorial officials, who made a perambulation - a walk
around the perimeters - o f the manor, making note o f the boundary markers o f the
tenants' holdings. The bailiff then summoned the tenants and asked them to testify as to
the size o f their fields, as well as the rents, fines, and services they owed the lord.
Tenants renewed pledges o f homage and fealty to their lords at these occasions. These
surveys were undertaken not so much to determine property rights as to reaffirm the
bonds of loyalty and deference that characterized the social world o f the manor.
Although the lord o f the manor recorded the location o f his tenants' holdings, the
boundaries o f their lands were generally determined through customary use and common
agreement. Knowledge o f these boundaries ultimately rested with the tenants, who
learned them through daily activities and confirmed them at regular intervals by "beating
the bounds" -- making a collective perambulation o f the limits o f their parish or manor.6

6A. W. Richeson, English Land Measuring to 1800: Instruments and Practices (Cambridge, Mass.: The
Society for the History of Technology and the M. I. T. Press, 1966), 30-1.
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The estate survey was transformed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as it
increasingly became the province o f paid professionals commissioned by the lord o f the
manor. This change first occurred in the more commercialized countries o f Europe,
particularly England and the Netherlands, where landowners showed an active interest in
the efficient management o f their estates. In England, the professionalization o f
surveying began in the sixteenth century as inflation and rising population caused land
values to soar. Because tenants under customary forms o f tenure typically held their
lands at fixed rents for their entire lifetimes, inflation ate into the income of landlords,
causing the real value o f their rents to drop. Faced with the threat o f falling income,
landlords, yeomen, and ambitious tenants sought to acquire tighter control o f their lands
and thereby gain a freer hand in their disposal. Clearer title to the land made it possible
for owners to raise rents, evict tenants, engage in land speculation, or experiment with
new agricultural methods. Professional surveyors were important allies o f landowners,
for a lord could scarcely hope to sell or improve a tract o f land without knowing its size,
boundaries, and soil quality. By rendering an entire estate on paper, a surveyor undercut
the authority o f tenants’ customary knowledge and freed landlords from the need to
consult with their rentiers about the location and value o f holdings. As lords and tenants
gained a clearer knowledge of their property rights, Andrew McRae has written, a
worldview "dominated by moral standards and interpersonal relations gave way to a
discourse which facilitated economic individualism and competition."7
This modem view of property rights was reinforced by the colonial experience o f
New Englanders. The majority o f families who arrived in New England in the

7Ibid., 89, 144-5; Andrew McRae, 'T o Know One's Own: Estate Surveying and the Representation of the
Land in Early Modem England," Huntington Library Quarterly 56 (1993): 333-57, quote on 352; E. P.
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seventeenth century were wealthy enough to purchase real estate, as well as the draught
animals and tools necessary to start a farm. Because land was abundant in the New
World, many families were able to acquire a few hundred acres for their own use and
depended very little on the town commons. Once they had acquired a parcel o f real
estate, colonists invested heavily in its improvement. A successful farm depended on the
unstinting labor of an entire family working together year-round. The early years o f a
farmstead were the most difficult, as colonists devoted years o f hard effort into cutting
trees and plowing the soil, converting forested areas into arable land.8
These investments brought abundant returns, particularly as the development o f
regional and trans-Atlantic transportation networks opened up markets for agricultural
surpluses. A successful family could subsist on its own farm produce and acquire
manufactured goods with the money earned from selling grains and livestock at market.
The strenuous work of agricultural life, and its attendant returns, gave English settlers a
strong proprietary interest in their lands. Settlers wanted the benefits o f their labor to
accrue both to themselves and their children, since they knew it took a lifetime to
establish a farm. They fully expected that their deeds o f purchase would be confirmed
and protected by the county courts and that the ownership o f land could be passed from
one generation to the next. Merchants and gentlemen who purchased land titles with
commercial profits also assumed that their hereditary rights o f ownership would be
protected by provincial authorities. Both merchants and settlers in the eighteenth century
depended on the primacy o f written contracts as a basis for land ownership, and feared

Thompson, "Custom, Law and Common Right," in Customs in Common. 97-184.
8Howard S. Russell, A Long. Deep Furrow: Three Centuries of Farming in New England (Hanover, N. H.:
University Press of New England, 1976), 18-207; Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries
of Work in Essex Countv. Massachusetts. 1630-1830 (Chapel HiU, N. C.: University o f North Carolina

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

246
anything that undermined the validity o f their legal title to the land. "Taking away Men's
Estates," Governor Jonathan Belcher reminded the Wabanakis at a 1732 conference, "is
like taking away their Lives."9
Because they were answerable to an electorate o f property holders, colonial
representatives at frontier conferences always upheld the validity o f registered deeds to
Maine's lands. In the negotiations o f the 1725 treaty with the Penobscots, Lieutenant
Governor William Dummer balked at a Wabanaki proposal to limit settlement near St.
George River since such a promise would have abridged the rights o f English
landholders. "Those Lands are the Property o f particular Persons who have the Indian
Right by fair Purchase," he said after presenting the deeds o f sale, "you cannot reasonably
expect that the said Proprietors should be hindred o f making Improvement o f what is
their own." In 1726, Dummer again rejected a proposal to limit English settlement to the
area west o f Pemaquid and south o f Arrowsick Island in Casco Bay. Claiming that titles
to the disputed lands had been purchased from Wabanaki sagamores and confirmed by
later treaties, he reminded the Wabanakis that since the lands were "for a long Time since
purchased by His Majesty's Subjects, and the Property vested in them, the Government
cannot Disclaim them." Dummer reasoned that the government was being impartial in
recognizing the titles, since as British subjects the Wabanakis were also given the benefit
of the law.10

Press, 1994), 13-83.
9Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Conference o f His Excellency Jonathan Belcher. Esq... with Wewankenk.
chief sachem o f the Penobscut Tribe: Loron. one o f the chief captains of the same tribe: Lorus. chief
sachem of the Norridgewock tribe: Adiawando. chief sachem o f the Pigwacket tribe: and Medaeanesset.
chief sachem o f the Amerescoggin tribe... at Falmouth in Casco-Bav. July 1732 (Boston: B. Green, 1732),
Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 3554,15. Belcher's statement was made in reference to an incident
in which Wabanakis killed several cows from a Casco Bay farm.
*°DHSM 23: 201; Massachusetts Bay (Colony), The Conference with the Eastern Indians... at Falmouth...
in Julv-Aueust. 1726 (Boston: reprinted by S. Kneeland, 1754), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no.
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English opinion on this question was not unanimous. Some critics o f provincial
Indian policy argued that clear boundaries were necessary to preserve the peace. In
September 1721, Council member Samuel Sewall issued a printed broadside in which he
explained his disapproval o f a proposed military expedition against the Norridgewocks.
He noted that at a 1717 meeting with Governor Samuel Shute at Arrowsick Island, the
Indians had objected to the construction o f forts on the Kennebec River and, fearing a
rapid influx o f new settlers, suggested that a line be run between the English settlements
and the Indians. The governor rejected the proposal, but Sewall, who had himself
dabbled in surveying, felt that their suggestion was eminently reasonable. "Without
doubt," he declared, "Boundaries are necessary for the preservation o f Honesty and Peace
among those that border one upon another." The wisdom o f this policy, Sewall
continued, was evident from the Massachusetts law that required townships to run their
boundaries once every three years.11
Sewall's case for a boundary line was grounded in the belief that clearly
understood property rights were a cornerstone o f civil society. If Wabanakis and English
people had an exact knowledge o f the boundaries o f their lands, he contended, they would
have no reason to fight. Although Wabanakis shared Sewall's desire for boundary
markers, their position was rooted in a rejection rather than an embrace o f formal
property rights. Because they lived in a small-scale society in which disputes could be
resolved through face-to-face mediation, Wabanakis had little need or understanding o f
formal land titles. They also had less proprietary interest in the land than the English.
While families in New England drew their living from farms as small as a hundred acres,

7216, 8-9.
"Samuel Sewall. A Memorial Relating to the Kennebeck Indians (Boston. 1721), Early American
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Indians used the land more extensively, subsisting on the ecosystems o f entire rivers,
lakes, and estuaries. Although they raised crops and managed forest resources by setting
fires and limiting hunts, Wabanakis did not alter the natural environment to the same
extent that European colonists did. The tendency among Indians was to base their
seasonal movements on the patterns o f natural abundance rather than to rearrange the land
to suit their needs. Because they expended less effort in working the land, Indians had a
weaker sense o f land ownership than the English. Though their emotional attachment to
the land may have been stronger, they suffered less o f an injury if someone trespassed on
their territories.12
This distinction held for the products o f the land as well as the land itself. While
settlers assumed that farm produce belonged exclusively to the owners o f the land,
Wabanakis always shared their food with neighbors. As in other foraging cultures,
sharing was a social imperative among the Wabanakis, a custom that could not be broken.
Early European visitors such as Father Biard were often struck by the extent o f their
generosity. "No one would dare refuse the request o f another," he remarked, "nor to eat
without giving him a part o f what he has." Wabanakis were often contemptuous o f
Europeans' unwillingness to reciprocate this liberality; one Indian told Biard that "you are
thieves and deceivers; you are covetous, and are neither generous nor kind; as for us, if
we have a morsel of bread we share it with our neighbor."13

Imprints, 1st ser., no. 2292, I.
12 Anthropologist James Woodbum has argued that "delayed-retum" foragers who make significant
investments o f time and labor in procuring their food tend to have more defined notions of property and
territoriality than "immediate-retum" groups who do not use storage or traps. The difference is even more
pronounced when comparing foragers with agricultural societies, whose return on their investments o f
labor, time, and capital is often delayed over a course o f years. See James Woodbum, "Egalitarian
Societies," Man. n. s., 17 (1982): 431-51; idem, "Hunters and Gatherers Today and the Reconstruction of
the Past," in Ernest Gellner, ed., Soviet and Western Anthropology (London: Duckworth, 1980): 95-117.
i 3JR 3:95, 1: 173. See also, JR 2:79. The practice ofsharing has even been confirmed archaeologically;
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The imperative o f sharing and a weak sense o f proprietary interest were two sides
o f the same coin. When English families claimed ownership o f the land, they announced
their refusal to share its resources without some form o f material compensation. Lacking
the same sense o f ownership, Wabanakis were more willing to give their wealth to others.
This is not to say that their generosity was reducible to a lack o f proprietary interest;
sharing served a valuable social purpose. The practice o f enjoying food and other
necessities in common fostered a sense o f mutuality in families and villages and created a
web of interdependency that sustained individuals in times o f hardship. Kin and friends
provided each other with material and political support, ensuring that no one would go
hungry or suffer injuries without revenge or compensation. To Wabanakis, social
investments in kinship and alliances mattered a great deal more than material investments
in the land. Because they depended on others for their survival, people lived well when
they cultivated harmonious relationships with their neighbors. The pursuit o f private
property threatened this ethic o f mutual support because it limited sharing and tore apart
the bonds o f interdependency among extended kin groups.14

at one Ceramic period site on the St. Croix River, the bones o f large animals such as bears and moose were
spread throughout different hearths and were almost certainly shared among the settlement's various
households. Archaeologists have discovered some possible evidence of social inequality in the distribution
of "status" items such as jewellery, copper, and exotic lithics in late Ceramic and early contact burial sites
in Maine. But there is no evidence, either archaeological or ethnographic, that this inequality extended to
the distribution of food or other necessities o f life. See David Sanger, The Carson Site and the Late
Ceramic Period in Passamaquoddv Bav. New Brunswick. Archaeological Survey o f Canada, Paper No. 135
(Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1987), 65-67; Arthur E. Spiess, Bruce J. Bourque, and Stephen
L. Cox, "Cultural Complexity in Maritime Cultures: Evidence from Penobscot Bay, Maine," in Ronald J.
Nash, ed., The Evolution o f Maritime Cultures on the Northeast and the Northwest Coasts o f America.
Publication No. 11, Department o f Archaeology (Vancouver Simon Fraser University, 1983), 91-108;
Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh
and Jonathan E. Ericson, eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in North America (New York: Plenum Press,
1994), 23-46; Robert G. Doyle, "Analysis o f Lithic Artifacts: The Identification, Petrologic Description,
and Statistical Analysis o f the Lithic Artifacts Recovered from the Turner Farm Site," in Bruce J. Bourque,
Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A Gulf o f Maine Perspective (New York:
Plenum Press. 1995), Appendix 6,297-316.
I4The ethic o f sharing did not come naturally, and many Wabanakis probably had moments when they did
not want to share their possessions with others. Biard reported an incident in which a group o f hungry
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The intransigence o f English leaders on questions o f land ownership seemed to be
a violation o f the Wabanaki ethic o f sharing. Norridgewocks and Penobscots saw many
advantages to peaceful co-existence with the English and frequently invited the colonists
to establish trading posts near their villages. But Wabanakis were only willing to support
an arrangement that was mutually beneficial to both sides; all too often the English built
mills or set nets that disrupted Indian fishing, went trapping without permission on
Wabanaki hunting grounds, or erected fences that interfered with the migratory patterns
of game animals. Although they officially retained fishing and hunting rights on
unfenced English lands, the establishment o f English towns in Maine inevitably ate into
Wabanaki territories and made it increasingly difficult to for the Indians to provide
themselves with the necessities o f life.
Wabanaki delegates frequently made this point at treaties, reminding the English
that an aggressive policy o f colonial expansion would undermine their friendship. At a
1753 conference, the Norridgewock orator Quenois pleaded for a limit to English
settlement along the Kennebec River, arguing that the growing influx o f colonists
threatened to bring the Norridgewocks to the point o f starvation. The Plymouth
Company had recently erected a fort on the east side o f the Kennebec River above Swan
Island and had plans to build two more further upriver. It had also sponsored the
settlement o f two tracts near the mouth o f the river that would receive town charters a
year later. Quenois began his plea by offering a boundary for English settlement. "Here

women hid in the woods to avoid sharing a kettle of fish with a party o f people passing nearby. (See JR 3:
95-97.) Selfish tendencies were curbed by powerful social sanctions that rewarded the generous and
punished the stingy. Those who shared were regarded with affection by others, but selfish or miserly
individuals inevitably became the subject o f gossip and, if their behavior was persisted, witchcraft
accusations and social avoidance. Similar social sanctions existed in neighboring societies: see, for
example, Bruce G. Trigger, "Maintaining Economic Equality in Opposition to Complexity: An Iroquoian
Case Study," in Steadman Upham, ed., The Evolution o f Political Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale
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is a River belonging to us," he said, "[y]ou have lately built a new Garrison here; we wish
you would be content to go no further up the River than that Fort." He then remarked that
governors Dudley and Dummer had promised many years before that English settlement
would not go beyond Fort Richmond, a garrison on the west side o f the river. "We live
wholly by this Land," he told the English, "and live but poorly; the Penobscotts hunt on
one Side o f us, and the Canada Indians on the other Side; therefore do not turn us off this
Land."15
Later in the conference, Quenois returned to the subject o f lands and rehearsed the
promises English governors had made at the treaties o f 1713,1717, and 1726. At the
1713 treaty, the English promised to settle no further than Brunswick, North Yarmouth,
and Casco Bay; the Norridgewocks were told that if the governor would forcibly remove
any settlers who went further than these townships. For the sake o f peace Norridgewocks
gave ground in 1717, allowing the English to settle as far as Fort Richmond. Quenois
offered another compromise, whereby English settlement would be limited to the area
downriver o f the new fort. The orator appealed to English consciences, telling them that
the advance o f settlement beyond the fort would threaten the Norridgewocks' livelihood
and jeopardize the peace. Allowing that the English "should settle all the Lands below
the New-Fort... with Courage and a good Spirit," he told them that "You have Land
enough below the New-Fort, without going any further up." In making this demand, the
orator continued, "We have told you our Hearts; we hope you will not settle any further

Sedentary Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 119-45.
^Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Conference held at St. Georges in the Countv of York on the twentieth
dav of September... 1753 (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1753), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 7025,15.
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up the River; the Indians hunt on both Sides o f us; we have but a little Space; we desire to
live as Brothers."16
No doubt Quenois intended to shame the English into softening their rigid stand
on questions o f land ownership. Using more land than was necessary was a violation o f
the ethic o f sharing, particularly when allies depended on the same territory for their
survival. Wealthy as they were, the English did not need the lands further up the
Kennebec, and their insistence on taking them seemed particularly reprehensible given
the Norridgewocks' dependence on the river for their survival. In Wabanaki society
selfish behavior o f this kind would have been unimaginable among kin and allies, and it
is no coincidence that Quenois stressed the fictive bonds o f kinship that bound the
English to the Norridgewocks. The Wabanaki orator hoped -- vainly, as it turned out —
that the English would relent if they were made aware o f the deleterious effects o f their
expansion on their Indian allies. "It would hurt us," he reminded them, "for you to settle
higher up the River than the New-Fort."17
The Penobscot orator Loron Sauguaaram had made a similar point during the
1726 conference with Lieutenant Governor Dummer. Disputing Dummer's insistence
that seventeenth-century land purchases were still valid, Loron remarked that "we have a
Number o f young People growing up who never were acquainted o f the Lands being
Sold." Massachusetts was "a Great and Rich Government," and could easily purchase the

16Ibid., 20-21. The Norridgewocks had made the same plea in a letter to the governor written seven
months earlier. See DHSM. 23:445.
^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference held at St. Georges... September 1753. 21. Western Abenakis also
criticized the English for the same reasons; in March 1753/54, a number o f sagamores told a fort
commander that they objected to English settlement at Cowass on the Upper Connecticut River Valley,
informing him that "the English had no need o f that land, but had enough without it... the English had a
mind for war, if they should go there.” See letter o f Spencer Phips to Benning Wentworth, March 19,
1753. Jeremy Belknap Collection, 1685-1790, Peter Force Collection, Library o f Congress, Series 7E, Item

8.
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lands on the Penobscots' behalf, since they were sold for a small sum and cost very little.
The importance o f hereditary title paled in comparison to the immediate needs o f the
present, and the English insistence on recognizing the validity o f land deeds seemed
contrary to the spirit o f peaceful friendship. Like Quenois, Loron tried to prick English
consciences by reminding the settlers o f their moral obligations as allies.18
But Dummer refused Loron's request, just as the commissioners o f Massachusetts
dismissed Quenois's plea out o f hand. Since English officials placed greater stock in the
protection o f private property than in the renewal o f Indian alliances, the sagamores'
words did not have their intended sting. Land ownership in English society was based on
objective considerations o f customary use and written title rather than subjective notions
o f need. Because they invested heavily into their lands, property owners needed
assurances that their estates would be protected against trespass or arbitrary seizure. The
court system accommodated this demand by basing its rulings on an ostensibly impartial
consideration of documentary title and customary right. Whether other families needed
the land was immaterial to judges and juries: what mattered was the strength o f their legal
case for ownership.
The Wabanaki conception o f land ownership, by contrast, gave greater weight to
subjective considerations o f social obligation. Wabanaki orators consistently rejected
seventeenth-century deeds as a legitimate basis for the ownership o f land. Quenois
claimed that the deeds were no longer valid, offering several reasons: elders at
Norridgewock had never heard o f the purchases, the Indians who signed the deeds were
drunk, the agreements were made before the Norridgewocks became Christians, the
sellers had not been paid enough for their lands. Quenois and his fellow orators did not

^Massachusetts Bay, Conference at Falmouth. Julv-Auyust 1726.8.
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claim that the deeds were forgeries —they recognized the names o f the sagamores who
signed them - but they argued that agreements made in the distant past had no relevance
to the circumstances o f the present.19 Far more important was the need to maintain a
peace between English and Wabanakis by removing the threat o f English expansion. If
settlers continued to migrate to the Kennebec River Valley, the Norridgewocks would be
forced to take up arms against them. Norridgewock leaders had made this point many
times in the past: in 1717, the noted sagamore Wowuma told the English that the
Norridgewocks wanted "no further Settlements" because ”[w]e shan't be able to hold
them all in our Bosoms, and take care to Shelter them, if it be like to be bad Weather, and
Mischief be Threatned." Foul weather, as the English undoubtedly knew, was a metaphor
for conflict.20
Even if the Norridgewocks' livelihood had not been threatened by colonial
expansion, they would not have seen the deeds in the same light as the English. On
several occasions, Wabanakis seemed to suggest that all Maine's lands —including those
that had been cleared and fenced by English colonists - belonged to the region's native
inhabitants and that English settlers held their lands at their sufferance. As Wowuma put
it in 1717, "We can't understand how our Lands have been purchased, what has been
Alienated was by our Gift." Wowuma's comments rankled the governor, who told the
Indians that they "must not call it their Land, for the English have bought it o f them and
their Ancestors."21 The governor’s understanding o f the matter was rooted in the belief
that land was an economic good that could be bought and sold like any other. English

^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference held at St. Georges... September 1753. 22.
20"Conference between Governor Shute and the Eastern Indians at Georgetown on Arrowsick Island,
August 9,1717,” Collections o f the Maine Historical Society, ser. I, vol. 3,367.
21 Ibid., 369,367.
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deeds spelled out the exact location and dimensions o f parcels o f land, assigning them to
individuals or companies in perpetuity. This practice objectified the land, removing it
from the domain o f social relations and treating it as an alienable commodity. Once a
tract o f land was sold, it became the exclusive possession o f a single person, to be used or
disposed of as he or she saw fit.
Wabanakis were more likely to see the land as a host o f natural actors who were
part o f the social world o f human beings. The natural environment was an extension of
the human community, an active part o f people's lives. Wabanakis treated animals as
their kin and believed that spirits dwelling in rocks and rivers could bring them good or
bad fortune. Without a rigid boundary between the human and natural words, they
extended the circle o f sharing to include animals and spirits, offering prayers and
sacrifices in return for prey and harvests.22 The attachment between people and their
environment was so strong that orators could only express their relationship to the land in
spiritual terms. At a 1752 conference at Fort St. George, Penobscot orator Colonel Louis
argued that Wabanakis possessed the land by divine sanction: "God hath planted us here:
God gave us this Land, and we will keep it. God Decreed all things, he Decreed this
Land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English Possess it but we will."23
Because the stewardship o f the land was based on social relationships between
people, animals, and spirits, it was no more possible to exchange territories than it was to
buy and sell friendships. As the Penobscot orator Captain Job informed Samuel Waldo in

220 n sharing between foragers and their natural environment, see Nurit Bird-David, "Beyond The Original
Affluent Society': A Culturalist Reformulation," Current Anthropologist 33 (1992): 25-48.
^Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal o f the Proceedings o f the Commissioners from New England to
Treat with the Eastern Indians. October 1752 (Boston: Draper, 1752), Early American Imprints, 1st ser.,
no. 6861, 7. See also the letter o f Abenakis and their allies to the English, July 28, 1721, in James P.
Baxter, The Pioneers o f New France in New England (Albany, N.Y.: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1894), 112-15.
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1735, the Indians "could not dispose o f the Land, which God had given to them." Groups
could share their lands with others, which is what Wowuma probably meant when he said
that the Norridgewocks gave their lands as a "gift" to the English. Sharing the land in
this fashion was a kind o f material exchange that helped cement the friendship between
the English and the Norridgewocks. O f course, English people did not see things the
same way; as Waldo told Captain Job, "the English Constitution was different from the
Indians, and... English Men had a Right to Settle their own Lands as they pleas'd."24
Treated as a gift, the land was part o f a web o f reciprocal obligations that tied people to
God and one another; seen as property, the land was a factor o f production that could be
possessed as a matter o f right. Implicit in these points o f view was a different
understanding o f the social consequences o f land ownership. For English people, the
acquisition o f legal title allowed landowners to dispose o f their holdings as they wished,
and freed them from the need to consult with their neighbors before using their lands.
But among Wabanakis, the possession o f the land had the opposite effect: it entered
people into a world o f social obligations and forced them to treat neighboring people and
animals with respect.

The Language o f Trade
If disputes over land ownership drove English and Wabanakis apart, a shared
interest in the fur trade brought them together. Since the earliest years o f contact, English
people had traded with Indians for furs, hides, and feathers, obtaining the fruits o f the

24Samuel Waldo. Whereas since mv Return from St. George's River.... (Boston. 1735), Early American
Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40087, 1-2; Samuel Waldo, A Defence o f the Title o f the late John Leverett. Esq.: to
a Tract o f Land in the Eastern Parts o f the Province o f the Massachusetts Bav. commonly called
Musconeus Lands. Ivine unon St. Georye’s. Muscongus. and Penobscott Rivers (Boston. 1736), 36.
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land through peaceful exchange instead o f violent conflict. Although the value o f the
trade declined over the course o f the seventeenth century, it remained the primary point o f
contact between colonists and Indians. By the eighteenth century, Wabanakis were
dependent on the fur trade for many o f their material needs. Men needed rifles,
gunpowder, and shot for their hunting expeditions and had grown accustomed to metal
knives, axes, and other manufactured implements. Women had come to prefer European
textiles over animal skins, since cloth was lighter and easier to sew. Families had also
grown accustomed to pork, peas, biscuits, and other dried goods that tided them over
during the starving time o f late winter and early spring. While some o f the demand for
European merchandise was satisfied by presents and trade goods from Canada,
Wabanakis living in present-day Maine preferred to trade with the colonists o f New
England, who sold their wares at lower prices in forts and ships much closer to the
Indians' villages. French officials in the late seventeenth century often fretted over the
possibility that New England's advantageous terms o f trade would draw the Wabanakis
into an alliance with the English. This prospect caused them far less worry as Wabanakis
repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty in imperial wars, but trade remained the chief
advantage o f the English in negotiating an alliance with the Wabanakis.
In the early seventeenth century, Wabanakis living near the Atlantic coast found
several outlets for their furs. Private traders and companies from Acadia and New
England established trading posts at places such as Cushnoc, Arrowsic Island, and
Machias, which were close to Wabanaki settlements and offered the most reliable market
for pelts. Indians could also find purchasers at garrisoned forts such as Pentagoet and
Pemaquid, which also served as trading posts. Wabanakis found a third outlet o f trade in
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shipmasters from southern New England who plied the Maine coast, selling alcohol and
manufactured goods to fishermen and Indians in exchange for fish and furs. Although
companies and colonies held nominal trade monopolies for large portions o f Maine and
Acadia, their exclusive rights were often contested and the trade was largely unregulated.
Any colonist with a boat and a small stock o f goods could sail along the coast and trade
with Wabanakis for pelts and hides. Because many traders viewed these exchanges as
short-term ventures, they were inclined to cheat the Indians as much as possible, even to
the point o f robbing them o f their furs. On several occasions in the early seventeenth
century, unscrupulous traders brought Wabanakis and English colonists to the brink o f
war. When warfare finally did break out in 1675, disputes over trade were sorest point o f
contention, particularly the kidnapping o f several Indians at Machias by a Massachusetts
trader and the refusal o f English authorities to provide powder to starving Wabanaki
hunters.25
After the war, New York's government at Pemaquid introduced stringent trade
regulations that prohibited the sale o f liquor to Indians and limited trading to daytime
hours. Massachusetts followed suit in 1694, placing the fur trade under government
control. Following the signing o f a peace treaty between Governor William Phips and
several Wabanaki sagamores in 1693, the General Court passed an act designed to
continue the Indians' "dependance upon the English for supplies o f clothing and other
necessaries," while ensuring that "the Christian religion be not scandalized, nor any

250 n threats of war in the 1640s, see letter o f Thomas Gorges to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, September 19,
1642, in Robert E. Moody, ed., The Letters o f Thomas Gorges. Deputy Governor of the Province of Maine.
1640-1643 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1978), 120; Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and
Laetitia Yeandle, eds., The Journal o f John Winthrop. 1630-1649 (Boston: Harvard University Press,
1996), 313-14,395. On trade conflicts and the outbreak of the 1675-78 war, see Frank T. Siebert,
"Incident at Machias," in William Cowan, ed- Actes du auatorzieme congres des Algonouinistes (Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1983), 137-56.
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injustice done to the Indians, in the taking o f unreasonable and excessive prices for the
goods and supplies sold unto them." The 1694 act laid the foundation for Massachusetts's
"truck house" system, which banned private trade with Indians and established
provincially run trading posts at Fort Richmond and Fort St. George. A more
comprehensive law was passed in 1699, making it clear that the purpose o f the truck
houses was to "undersell the French" and supply Wabanakis "at such easy rates and prices
as may oblige them to adhere firmly to the English interest."26
Although they continued a modest clandestine trade with private shipowners,
Wabanakis in the eighteenth century seem to have conducted most o f their trade with the
truck houses, and total annual receipts at the posts climbed as high as £20,000 by the
early 1750s.27 Yet Wabanaki leaders frequently criticized the English conduct o f the
trade at conferences, complaining that the English were poor trading partners. Some of
their criticisms -- particularly their pleas for higher quality goods at lower prices —were
not really criticisms at all but part o f a bargaining strategy that couched demands for
favorable terms o f trade in the language o f diplomacy. Like other North American
Indians, Wabanakis tried to obtain preferential rates o f exchange from their allies by
combining pleas for pity with threats to go elsewhere with their furs.28 But on other

26Edmund Andros, "Orders and Directions fo[r the] Commander att Pemaquid," September 22,1677, in
Peter R. Christoph and Florence Christoph, eds., Books of General Entries o f the Colony of New York.
1674-1688 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1982), 176-77; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. I:
172, 384-85; Proposal o f the Committee o f the Board, March 19,1699, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119
(Trade), fol. 167; Ronald Oliver Macfarlane, "The Massachusetts Bay Truck-Houses in Diplomacy with the
Indians," New England Quarterly 11 (1938), 48-51; Neill DePaoli, "Anglo-Native Trade at Pemaquid," in
Robert L. Bradley, ed., The Forts o f Pemaauid. Mainer An Archaeological and Historical Studv.
Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, no. 10 (Augusta, Me.; Maine Historic Preservation
Commission, 1994), Appendix D, 254-57.
27Macfarlane, "Massachusetts Bay Truck-House Trade,” 58n; Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier,
1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 353.
280 n Indian harangues as a bargaining strategy, see Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, "Give Us Good
Measure": An Economic Analysis o f Relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before
1763 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 66-69.
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occasions, Wabanaki orators were clearly exasperated by the failure o f English officials
to conform to Indian trading practices. Although their complaints usually concerned
narrowly economic matters o f price and inventory, they related to broader social
questions o f mutual obligation and proper conduct. Above all, Wabanaki grievances
were rooted in a dissatisfaction with the impersonal manner in which the English carried
on the trade.
At eighteenth-century conferences, Wabanaki delegates generally began
discussions of trade by complaining that the English had not lived up their promise to
give the Indians preferential rates at truck houses. Itemizing the rates o f exchange for
various trade articles, they suggested that cost o f European goods continually rose while
the price o f furs always fell. "We have not above half so much for our beaver as
formerly," the Wabanaki delegation told Governor Dudley at a 1702 meeting at Casco
Bay. When the Governor explained that the price o f beaver had plummeted in Europe,
they responded, "We are always promised beaver will rise but we think never."
Wabanakis made similar complaints at the 1713 Treaty o f Portsmouth and later
conferences. Even after the conquest o f Canada, Passamaquoddy Indians arrived at the
Council chambers in Boston with a long list o f grievances, ranging from the dearth o f
cloth and provisions at the St. George's truck house to the use o f new weights and
measures by the fort's truckmaster.29
Governor Dudley, like other English representatives, expressed a willingness to
extend favorable terms o f trade to the Wabanakis, but stopped short o f promising them
goods at lower prices than the market would bear. His exchange with the orator

29Govemor Dudley to Board of Trade, Boston, August 5,1702, CSP. vol. 20 (1702), fol. 810, p. 504;
DHSM. 24, 116-20.
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Franxwaxer (Francois Xavier) was typical o f discussions o f trade at Anglo-Wabanaki
conferences. "I am no merchant, and get nothing by it," he told the orator, "but am
Governor o f the merchants, and will see they use you kindly." F ran cis Xavier replied,
"You can govern the matter better than it used to be," and asked for the same rates o f
exchange as were current when the peace was first made. Dudley answered that he would
allow the Wabanakis to "have goods as cheap as may be," but at prices that would let "the
merchants live."30
The governor's point o f view was shared by later colonial representatives: they
would tell their truckmasters to sell goods to Wabanakis at retail prices that were current
in Boston, but would not go so far as to divorce truck house prices from the workings of
the market. While colonial leaders promised to protect Wabanakis against extortion and
price-gouging in trade, they refused to fix the prices o f trade articles at permanent levels.
Instead, they assumed that prices would fluctuate according to the laws o f supply and
demand. In response to Wabanaki complaints concerning trade, Lieutenant Governor
Dummer told them in 1727 that changes in exchange rates "proceed[ed] only on the
Account o f the Price o f Beavers falling at the Market and not from any Rise on the Cost
of our Goods." Assuring them that "the English Government scom to raise one farthing
on the true Cost o f the Goods," he repeated the explanation, made a year earlier, "that the
Prizes of all Goods would be sometimes higher and sometimes lower at the Markets, and
that no Body could help it."31

30Dudley to Board of Trade, August 5, 1702, CSP, vol. 20 (1702), fol. 810, p. 504.
31Massachusetts Bay (Colony), The Conference with the Eastern Indians at the Further Ratification of the
Peace. Held at Falmouth in Casco-Bav. in July 1727 (B. Green and S. Kneeland, 1727), Early American
Imprints, 1st ser., no. 2885,20. See also, Massachusetts Bay, The Conference with the Eastern Indians...
Julv-August. 1726. 11-12.
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When Dummer spoke o f "the Market", he was referring not to a physical place but
to an abstract commercial sphere. Like other educated English people o f his time, he
believed that this market operated according to natural laws that were beyond the control
of any single individual. And like other colonial leaders, Dummer assumed that
government interference in the market was necessary only in cases where merchants
gouged or cheated their customers.32 This point o f view puzzled many Wabanakis, who
suspected that the English varied their prices to hoodwink their Indian customers. In
1732, Loron speculated that Dummer’s promise was not made in good faith: "the
Govemour told us that Goods would be govern'd by the foreign Markets, sometimes
cheaper and sometimes dearer; but the Goods have always risen in their Price."33 The
existence o f a provincial monopoly in the fur trade fed these suspicions; Wabanakis often
complained that truck house prices compared poorly with the rates offered by Boston and
Albany retailers, or with the prices o f goods sold on ships trading illegally along the
coast. The Wabanakis probably also knew that the holders o f the beaver monopoly in
Canada kept prices constant at their trading posts regardless o f whether the value o f
beaver rose or fell in Europe.34
The notion o f an abstract market governed by fluctuations in supply and demand
was an alien concept to Wabanakis, who had a difficult time understanding how events in
Europe might affect the price o f cloth and gunpowder in Maine. While English officials
assumed that prices were set by the self-regulating mechanism o f the market, Wabanakis

320 n early American attitudes toward the market, see Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The
Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New York: Norton, 1995), 160-91; Daniel Vickers,
"Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America," William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd
series, 48(1990): 15-17.
^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference o f His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 11.
34Matthew R. Laird. "The Price o f Empire: Anglo-French Rivalry for the Great Lakes Fur Trades, 1700-
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were more inclined to view changes in the terms o f trade as an index o f the degree o f
friendship between trading partners. This is not to say that they were oblivious to
questions o f profit and advantage; they always told the English that "the Custom is where
persons sell the Cheapest there we go to trade."35 But Indian leaders repeatedly asserted
that a firm alliance went hand in hand with an amicable trading relationship. "[T]hey that
are loving to each other will trade together," the Penobscots reminded the governor in
1755. Five years earlier, a Penobscot named Sebaooset remarked that "Cheapness o f
goods increase[s] love and friendship." Wabanakis presumed that trade was embedded in
social relationships and that the terms o f trade were set by people rather than impersonal
market forces.36
The English were well aware o f the connection between trade and diplomacy,
having established the truck house system as a way o f luring the Wabanakis away from
the French. In their conference speeches, English officials often reminded the Indians
that the attractive prices offered at the truck houses were a compelling reason to join them
in an alliance against the French. English speakers usually made this point as an appeal
to the Wabanaki "interest," as when Governor Belcher told the Penobscots, "It is greatly
for your Interest to keep with Us, because We are nearer than the French, and can supply

1760" (Ph.D. diss., College o f William and Mary, 1995), 149.
^Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal o f the Proceedings of Jacob Wendall. Samuel Watts. Thomas
Hubbard, and Chambers Russel. Esqrs.: Commissioners Appointed by the Honorable Spencer Phips. Esq.
to Treat with the Several Tribes o f Eastern Indians, in Order to Renew and Confirm a General Peace
(Boston: J. Draper, 1752), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 6881,8. See also, DHSM. 23:322.
36DHSM. 24: 56, 23:374. Among historians of the fur trade, there has been a long-standing debate over
whether Indians engaged in trade for its material advantages or as a means o f cementing alliances. The
current consensus is that the two motives were not mutually exclusive; Indians used diplomacy to
strengthen their bargaining position in trade and attracted allies by offering favorable terms of exchange.
For a succinct recapitulation o f this debate, see Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's
"Heroic Age" Reconsidered fMontreal: McGill-Oueen's University Press. 1985), 183-94.
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you cheaper."37 Like other educated men o f his time, Belcher subscribed to the oftquoted maxim "interest governs all": every person was motivated by a desire for personal
betterment, particularly through the acquisition o f riches. Eighteenth-century thinkers
believed that the pursuit o f pecuniary interest was a means o f restraining the passions,
particularly the thirst for glory through military conquest. Belcher and other colonial
leaders hoped to harness the military threat posed by the Wabanakis by offering them
incentives to trade peacefully with the English.38
Wabanakis did indeed appreciate the favorable prices offered at truck houses,
knowing that better exchange rates would make it easier for them to provide themselves
with their necessities. But their eyes were not fixed solely on the bottom line and they
expected the trade to be conducted in a spirit o f friendship, with each party treating the
other as kinfolk. Commerce was one o f the paths that fostered alliances, creating ties
mutual dependence between trading partners. As Loron said in 1740, it was important to
take "great care" in regulating the trade, for "it is the great means o f keeping the Peace."39
The self-seeking behavior o f profitable trade needed to be counterbalanced by the
generosity o f gift-giving, which reassured trading partners that they could trust one
another and had a genuine concern for each other’s welfare.
Wabanaki trading parties at frontier forts expected to be treated with the same
lavish hospitality as diplomatic delegations at treaty conferences. Captain John Gyles
remarked in 1726 that Indians were "disgusted" unless they were allowed to trade in
"great Numbers," and had an "abhorrence o f Restraint in Coming to a Trading House."

37DHSM. 23,269. See also, Massachusetts Bay, A Conference Held at St. Georges... September 1753.8.
38Albert 0 . Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its
Triumph (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 7-66.
39DHSM. 23: 269.
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Before and after they traded their furs with truckmasters, Wabanakis also exchanged
small gifts such as paddles and game birds to soldiers for pork, peas, and other
provisions. They also expected truck masters to treat them with rum and tobacco, and
saw the refusal to provide such refreshments as a sign o f unfriendliness. "When we have
been absent two or three Months and visit the Truck House we shou'd be glad that the
Truck Master wou'd give us a pipe and a little Tobacco and a Dram especially when we
have no Truck to purchase withal," Loron told Governor Belcher in 1740, complaining
that many truckmasters "have exacted every Pennyworth." Such stinginess was contrary
to the spirit o f alliance: "If we were used as Friends and Neighbours, as we are at other
Trading Places, when we are on a Visit, it wou'd be a Means to preserve Peace and
Friendship." Friendliness was also a spur to trade, for as the Penobscots told the
government in 1763, "If we had a good humor'd man to trade with We should bring more
Beaver into the Fort."40
Wabanakis repeatedly informed the English that they preferred to trade with men
who were familiar to them and were particularly fond o f those who spoke their own
language. Captain Gyles, who was taken captive by Wabanakis as a child and spent six
years with a Maliseet family, was frequently praised at treaty conferences for his service
as interpreter at St. George's truck house. Soon after his return to English society in
1698, Gyles interpreted several conferences between Massachusetts officials and
Wabanakis and became a fixture at Anglo-Wabanaki conferences until his death in 1755.

40Petition of John Gyles and Edmund Mountfort to General Court, Boston, October 12, 1726,
Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119 (Trade), fol. 280; DHSM. 23:228,264-65,24: 120. In 1725, Wabanaki
elders complained that a former truck master was "a Rogue" who mismeasured cloth sold to the Indians,
giving "many of them a Disgust against the Government." See letter o f John Minot to William Dummer,
Portsmouth, April 20,1725, in William Blake Trask, ed., "Letters o f Col. Thomas Westbrook and Others
Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 46 (1892): 36263.
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"I respect him as my own Child," the Penobscot sagamore Wenemouet told the English in
1713, approving o f his service as interpreter. Another Indian representative in 1727
remarked that "[w]e look upon Captain Gyles as a Captain o f the Tribes in our Parts."
When Gyles took sick in 1738, Loron told Governor Belcher that "we know not what we
should do if he should die, we like him very well and believe it would be an hard matter
to find such another man."41
The lavish praise extended to Gyles was in stark contrast to the sharp criticism of
truck masters who dealt with Wabanakis in a brusque or penny-pinching manner.
Conference speakers often complained o f poor treatment at the truck houses and on
several occasions they demanded the removal o f truck masters from their posts. In
December 1727, a number o f sagamores presented complaints to Lieutenant Governor
Dummer against Captain Thomas Smith, truck master o f St. George's at the time, asking
for his dismissal. Smith had underpaid Indians for their furs and overcharged them for
cloth, and his unorthodox trading practices -- particularly his habit o f paying the same
price for spring and fall beaver -- led many Wabanakis to believe that he was deliberately
cheating them. Worse still, Smith abandoned his post for long periods, which "much
offended" the Indians who needed goods from the truck house. "It is very strange to us,"
Loron told the Lieutenant Governor, "that now the Truck Master is come away, the Door
is fast, the Key is turned on the Lock, and we cannot get any thing now, nor can our
Wives and Children get the Necessaries o f Life." The provincial Council, mindful o f the
need to avoid a rift with the Wabanakis, removed Smith from St. Georges and offered the
Indians £77 in reparations.42

41DHSM- 23: 61,228,242.
42DHSM. 23:220-29; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119 (Trade), fols. 297,302-07; Massachusetts Bay,
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The House o f Representatives later cleared Smith o f all charges and he was
transferred to Saco Fort, where Wabanakis once again complained o f his suspicious
conduct. In 1731-32, Smith had abandoned his post for several months, leaving his slave
to conduct the trade with the Wabanakis. Speaking on behalf o f a Pigwacket sagamore,
Wahway o f Androscoggin informed Governor Belcher that "Adiowando and his People
are dissatisfied that a Negro has the Ordering o f the Trade at Saco-River. We did not
know that King George was served by Negroes." Belcher responded that the slave was "a
very honest Man," and chastised Wahway for his racial prejudice: "God made us o f
different Colours, the Negros black, the Indians not so black, and the English white; and I
don't despise the Indians because they are not so white as the English, for they are as God
made them." But Wabanaki delegates were bothered by Smith's shady business practices
rather than the color o f the slave's skin: Smith and his slave overcharged and doublecharged Indians for goods, sometimes forcing hunters to pay both master and servant for
a single item. Wabanakis were also uncomfortable with strangers who did not understand
their way o f trading; in 1736, Penobscot representatives expressed a preference for
English over Irish settlers, explaining that Wabanakis and the English "fell out as boys do
at play, yet afterwards we were reconciled and got friends again, but as to foreign men we
were not acquainted with their manners and did not know their customs."43
The most persistent criticism o f truck masters such as Smith was that they seemed
to be indifferent to the Wabanakis' welfare. Not only did they charge high prices for their
goods, they also failed to show sympathy for the Indians when they were in need. Loron

The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bav. in July 1727.23. Loron's complaint was made in
the summer o f 1727 against Smith's predecessor, Edmund Mountfort
■^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference o f His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth. 12.20; DHSM. 23:
240.
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complained in 1738 that Smith's successor at St. George's "do's not treat the poorer Sort
o f Indians kindly if they come with a few feathers and to truck he will throw them away
and bid them go trade with the French." Four years later, Loron told Governor Shirley
that the Penobscots "now are kept much in the dark as to our trade," since the truck
master was a Protestant minister and "understands verry little as to our Language or
trade... we a little wonder at his comming to trade here." He added that, contrary to treaty
agreements, there was not a full stock o f goods at the truck house and Penobscots lacked
"Provissions and many other nesessarys and have a long time bin without them and in the
middle o f Winter the most nessesary time we would want them in." Were the English
sincere in their desire to live as brothers, sagamores repeatedly told colonial officials,
they would offer them a steady supply o f goods at prices they could afford. If prices rose
too high, Indians would be unable to acquire the necessities o f life and would go hungry
or suffer from want. Toxus, a sagamore from Norridgewock, made this connection
directly when he complained that high prices and a scarcity o f beaver made it nearly
impossible for hunters to provide for their families: "what one Man can get till Winter" he was speaking in July —"will hardly procure a Pair o f Stockings."44
Unwilling to interfere with the workings o f the market, New England’s governors
turned a deaf ear to these complaints and insisted that the Indians would be better off if
they weathered fluctuations in the price o f beaver. Quite accurately, they argued that
Wabanakis would profit more in the long run if they allowed prices to rise and fall
according to the vagaries o f supply and demand. What they failed to realize was that the
long run matters very little to people faced with pressing short-term needs. The

^ DHSM. 23: 244,285-86; Massachusetts Bay, A Conference o f His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at
Falmouth. 18.
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Wabanakis' way o f life made them susceptible to occasional periods o f hunger and dearth,
and during these times they looked to their friends and neighbors for aid. It was assumed
that trading partners would treat their opposites generously when they were hungry and
that this generosity would be reciprocated in the future. Favorable terms o f exchange in
such instances were a sign o f respect, an indication that trading partners were close
enough to provide for each other in times o f hardship. When English leaders claimed that
they were unable to alter the terms o f exchange - telling the Indians that the market, not
the government, set the price o f beaver —Wabanakis tended to think that governors were
ineffectual or, worse yet, that they were insincere in their offers o f friendship.

The Language o f Treaties
The exchange o f views over questions o f land ownership and trade was not an idle
exercise but was meant to clear the air o f lingering resentments between the English and
Wabanakis. The purpose o f treaties, as both delegations understood them, was to put an
end to wars and build a lasting peace between their respective peoples. But even in this
respect, Indians and colonists did not see eye to eye. Both parties hoped to dispel
hostilities through diplomacy, but neither side could find the words necessary to placate
the other. This failure was a consequence o f substantive disagreements over issues of
sovereignty and land ownership, but also o f differences in conference etiquette. Though
they adopted many o f the customs o f their counterparts, Wabanaki and English
representatives continued to use two different styles o f formal speaking at their
conferences and were irritated when their counterparts failed to follow their respective
rules of verbal etiquette. Although this difference hinged on seemingly minor questions
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o f politeness and frankness, it was neither trivial nor superficial. The linguistic rules
followed by conference speakers were also social rules: when to be voluble and when to
be quiet, how to address social superiors and subordinates, how to broach delicate
subjects without hurting the feelings o f others. Violations o f these tacit rules were often
interpreted in moral terms, as personal flaws in the speaker.
Such differences were painfully apparent at a 1732 parley between Governor
Jonathan Belcher and several Wabanaki sagamores at Fort St. George's. Belcher began
the meeting by reprimanding the Indians for their abuse o f rum and demanding to know
what measures they would take to prevent it. Loron, the Penobscot speaker, avoided the
question and remarked that since it was peacetime there was little to be discussed.
Belcher ignored Loron's remark and returned to his original subject, treating the
Penobscots to a temperance lecture and asking them to stop purchasing rum from private
traders. Loron once again gave a noncommittal answer, saying ”[w]e will think o f what
your Excellency mentions to us." Belcher then asked that the Wabanakis accept
Protestant ministers and send their children to English schools. The Penobscots again
promised to consider the matter. The next day, Loron disclaimed responsibility for the
abuse of rum and refused to address the other two subjects, reminding Belcher that
Dummer's treaty promised no interference in religion. The governor denied that he was
trying to bully the Wabanakis, but then suddenly declared his intention to build a
settlement near Cushnoc along the Kennebec River. He told Loron he expected an
immediate answer from the Wabanakis: "When I propose any thing, and you don't object,
I suppose you consent. If there should be a Town, you shall have Lands there, and live
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with the English." Taken aback by the governor's abrupt ultimatum, Loron responded, "It
is not our Way to give a sudden Answer to what is proposed."45
Belcher learned his lesson and a year later he wrote that the Wabanakis "are a
humersome [i.e., temperamental] people, and must be tenderly treated."46 Although the
Governor's prickly personality may have exacerbated differences between the two groups,
his standoff with Loron was not atypical. Similar exchanges took place whenever
English delegates pressed Wabanakis to fulfill contentious treaty obligations, such as the
return of war captives or the abandonment o f their alliance with the French. Colonial
officials usually stated their demands directly and bluntly, with the Wabanakis making an
evasive or noncommittal answer. Rather than dropping the subject, English speakers
continued to badger the sagamores until they obtained a satisfactory answer. Wabanaki
delegates usually tried to sidestep the issue or offer a face-saving compromise. Both
sides inevitably became exasperated by the poor manners o f their counterparts and left the
conference irritated and resentful.
For English officials, a sense o f frustration arose from the inability or
unwillingness o f Wabanakis to make good on their treaty promises. To colonial leaders,
a treaty was synonymous with its end result: a binding written document signed by the
participants. Treaties, in other words, were a class o f contracts that related to diplomatic
affairs. Like civil contracts, they required some means o f enforcement and needed to be
spelled out in clear and objective language. Because they were put down in writing, their
terms were fixed and could be consulted and examined long after their signatories had
passed away. To be effective they required a degree o f trust between delegates, based on

■^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 6-11
46Belcher to David Dunbar, Boston, July 17, 1733, in Massachusetts Historical Society. Collections. 6th
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a shared belief that both parties were acting in good faith and would uphold their end o f
the bargain. English officials repeatedly made this point at conferences, underlining their
determination to adhere to treaty articles while chastising Wabanakis for their failure to
do the same. "When the English Promise," commissioner William Pepperrell remarked at
a 1753 conference, "they religiously comply with it."47
If a party failed to comply with the terms o f a contract, English people usually
tried to enforce them through the courts. Colonial officials assumed that if Wabanakis
were brought under the sovereign authority o f the British crown, they would be legally
obligated to make good on their treaty promises. In 1693 and at every succeeding treaty,
English officials inserted a provision that declared the subjection o f the Wabanakis to the
crown o f Britain. This article allowed colonial representatives to act as the judicial
representatives o f the crown, ensuring that the Wabanakis' contractual agreements would
be enforced. English delegates often adopted the tone o f judges at a conferences,
speaking to the Indians in a manner that was by turns inquisitorial, solemn,
magnanimous, and authoritarian. This way o f speaking was acceptable in colonial
courtrooms because settlers had invested the state with the ability to examine and punish
people who broke contracts or threatened the civil order.
But to Wabanakis, who frequently denied their subjection to the crown, the
officials' tone o f voice was bullying and unfriendly. The purpose o f treaties from the
Wabanaki point o f view was not to draw up contracts but to form and continue alliances
and friendships. Treaties took place when groups wanted to "cover the blood" (forgive
and forget wartime deaths and injuries), recruit military allies, or "clear a path" o f alliance

ser., vols. 6-7 (Boston, 1893-94), Belcher Papers. 1,330.
•^Massachusetts Bay, A Conference o f His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 16.
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through an exchange o f views. A treaty, in other words, was a declaration o f amity rather
than a binding contract. The many cordial greetings and compliments exchanged at the
beginning o f conferences, as well as the lavish banquets and frequent toasts, were more
than empty formalities and constituted an important part o f the process o f treaty-making.
The actual contents o f the written agreements, on the other hand, were less important the
sense of love and unity that was created through exchanges o f words and gifts. While the
English considered treaty articles to be an end in themselves, Wabanakis saw the points
discussed at conferences as a means to an end: "obstacles" to be "cleared" in order to
open the "path" o f alliance.48
Once again, a matter that English delegates saw in objective terms, as a written
document, Wabanakis treated as a subjective question o f human relationships. Treaties
were a way o f quelling hostilities and fostering a sense o f unity between groups.
Confrontation or direct contradiction were to be avoided at conferences because they
threatened the very harmony that the meetings were supposed to achieve. Participants
handled grievances delicately to avoid giving offense to the opposite party. Where
English speakers tried to make their meanings as clear as possible, Wabanaki orators
often spoke in elaborate metaphors, stating their points o f view indirectly or obliquely49
In some cases, they merely responded with silence. Their style o f speech, which linguists
call "negative" or "deference" politeness, showed a high degree o f respect for the feelings
and autonomy o f listeners. Sagamores did not force their opinions on others but tried to
convince them o f their good sense through persuasive speaking. This approach was

48For Wabanaki explanations of the concepts o f "clearing a path" and "covering the blood", see DHSM.
23: 32,365-66.
49The most admired Wabanaki orators were called neba'ulinowak, or "riddle men", because o f their ability
to devise impenetrably recondite metaphors. See Frank G. Speck, Penobscot Man: The Life History o f a
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typical o f the Wabanaki style o f leadership, which was based on a form o f authority that
was, in the words o f Father Biard, "most precarious, if, indeed, that may be called
authority to which obedience is in no wise obligatory."50
Lacking the ability to command or interrogate others, Wabanaki leaders expected
that treaty participants would make good on their promises out o f a sense o f personal
good will rather than a fear o f punishment. It was necessary to cultivate a sense o f trust
between speakers so that each would feel a personal sense o f obligation to the other.
Wabanaki speakers built this trust by making constant protestations o f love and fidelity.
Orators frequently claimed to speak from their hearts, a turn o f phrase that expressed
openness ("Our hearts ar open if they wear to be seen they ar all truth and Sincerity"),
good will ("our Hearts are good," "we Salute you with a Friendly Heart"), honesty ("What
we now say and do proceeds from our hearts"), affection ("I am glad from my Heart to
see your Excellency in good health"), loyalty ("this Belt we Present to you as a Plegg o f
our fidelity and faithfulness to your Self, Pray [ac]cept it the same, we now Lay open our
hearts to you"), and commitment to memory ("what we have heard we will keep it in our
hearts to spread it abroad among our People"). Those who spoke from their hearts could
be counted on to keep their word. When Governor William Shirley asked

Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 269.
50JR 2: 73; Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals o f Language Usage
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 129-211; Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon,
Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach (Oxford: Blackwell. 1995), 36-42. Powerful
sagamores generally remained silent at conferences, allowing their juniors to act as orators in their place.
When David Dunbar first encountered the Penobscots in 1729, he noted that their leading sagamore,
Wenemouett, seemed "grave and reserved," and he asked him why he was not more voluble. Wenemouett
answered that "it was in great respect to [Dunbar] that he was so, and when he was better acquainted, he
would be as merry as I pleased." Col. Dunbar to the Duke of Newcastle, Boston, December 10,1729, CSP.
vol. 36 (1728-29), fol., 1019, p. 553.
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Norridgewock's delegates to a 1749 meeting in Boston whether they had "any
credentials," they replied that "[w]e have brought no other than our hearts."51
This manner o f talking reflected a worldview in which the import o f words was
inseparable from the spirit in which they were said. Because the fulfillment o f promises
depended on mutual trust, words were believable only when they were spoken between
people who had formed a personal bond o f allegiance: truth was inextricably tied to troth.
While English leaders sought adherence to the letter o f the law, Wabanakis were more
concerned with preserving the spirit o f friendship. Having a "good heart" - being filled
with honesty, sincerity, and good will —was as important as the formal observance o f
treaties. When New England's conference speakers dourly demanded the fulfillment o f
treaty articles, Wabanakis wondered if the English were filled with a "secret hatred" for
the Indians. The bullying manner o f colonial representatives belied their professed desire
to live harmoniously with their Wabanaki neighbors, leading many Indians to believe that
English offers of friendship were not sincere. "It is in vain that you accuse us having a
bad heart," the orator Artiwaneto told Captain Phineas Stephens in 1752, denying his
charge that Wabanakis had broken the peace by attacking English farms. "It has always
been you, our brothers, who have attacked us; you have a sweet mouth, but a bitter
heart."52
In 1695, two Wabanakis from Androscoggin, Ouranmikoues and Eskambamet,
responded in similar fashion to an offer o f amnesty from Massachusetts Governor

5IDHSM. 23: 32,45,62, 88, 254, 308; Massachusetts Bay, A Conference Held at St. Georyes... September
1753. 14; Massachusetts Bav. The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bav. July 1727. 1.
52Letter of "l'abnaquis” to Louis XIV, [1715?], PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 1, fol. 267v (my translation;
original reads "secrette haine"); Speech o f St. Francois Abenakis to Captain Stevens, 5 July, 1752, in
CDRH- vol. 3, 509 (my translation; original reads: "C'est en vain qu’on nous taxe d'avoir le coeur mal fait,
c'est toujours vous nos freres qui nous ont attaque; vous avez une bouche de sucre, mais un coeur de fiel.")
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William Stoughton. The governor had accused the Androscoggins and other Wabanakis
o f treason and rebellion for their raids against English settlements, but had offered to send
presents to those sagamores who opposed the assaults to show the government’s good
faith in the face o f Wabanaki treason. Ouranmikoues and Eskambamet remarked that the
governor would recognize the tone o f their letter, for he had provided it in "writing with
too much haughtiness." They retorted "in the same manner," saying that the "heart" of
the English "has always been inclined toward malice and treachery," and pointed to two
recent instances o f betrayal at English forts in Saco and Pemaquid as proof.53 Stoughton
had in fact merely acted his role as magistrate, excoriating the Wabanakis for their failure
to live up to their treaty promises and granting them amnesty if they promised to pledge
fidelity to the crown. While such judiciousness won praise in courtrooms or the
chambers o f the provincial Council, it ran contrary to the Wabanaki spirit o f treatymaking, which was based on personal ties o f affection rather than the impersonal
enforcement o f the law. In Wabanaki eyes, Stoughton's entreaties were undercut by his
apparent hardness o f heart, revealed in the authoritarian tone o f his letter and the
misdeeds o f his soldiers.
Because treaties were built on the subjective notion o f "heart," the written
contents o f treaties were o f secondary importance to Wabanakis. Like other Indian
groups o f eastern North America, Wabanakis remembered treaties not in terms o f a
written document but as the entire verbal exchange between conference participants.54

53Report o f Frontenac to Minister, 1695, CDRH. 2:196 (my translation: original reads: "Tu reconnoistras
aysement mes parolles, et comment ne les reconnoistras tu pas? Cest toy, pour ainsy parler, qui me les
foumis, m'escrivant avec trop de hauteur, tu m'obliges a te repondre du mesme style
II faut bien que ton
coeur ayt este porte de tous terns a la mechancete e ta la fourberie.")
54For similar American Indian perspectives on treaties, see Michael K. Foster, "On Who Spoke First at
Iroquois-White Councils: An Exercise in the Method o f Upstreaming," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi,
eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroauoian Studies (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY
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Conferences were treated not as a single text but as a conversation in which speakers
exchanged different points o f view. Treaties were binding in the sense that speakers were
honor-bound to keep their word, but there was no authoritative version o f a treaty that all
participants were expected to follow. Father Biard observed early in the seventeenth
century that Wabanakis often failed to conclude any agreements at their councils, with
sagamores departing "more confused and disunited than when they came." As in other
small-scale societies, political talk in Wabanaki communities did not usually result in
decisive action. Without the apparatus o f a state -- courts, legislatures, police —leaders
could not force their views on others and had to live with a degree o f factionalism in their
communities. For the sake o f social harmony it was important to have an appearance o f
consensus, but respect for their fellows' personal autonomy prevented sagamores from
demanding adherence to the letter o f their agreements. Council speakers generally agreed
to disagree, knowing that they could not coerce others into sharing their beliefs.55
But conferences were not an empty exercise, nor were council speakers as
confused as Biard presumed. When leaders talked at treaties, they put their points o f
view on record and staked their personal honor on their promises and opinions. Their
words could convince others o f their wisdom and good intentions and might be held
against them in the future. As New Hampshire councilman Samuel Penhallow noted in
%

the 1720s, Wabanakis kept oral accounts o f their meetings and customarily had "the
whole o f their tribes present" at treaties, "having no other record o f conveying to

Press, 1984), 183-207; idem, "Another Look at the Function o f Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils," in
Francis Jennings, ed., History and Culture o f Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the
Treaties of the Six Nations and their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 99-114; Treaty 7
Elders and Tribal Council, with Walter Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, and Sarah Carter, The True Spirit
and Original Intent o f Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
55JR 3:91; Karen J. Brison, Just Talk: Gossip. Meetings, and Power in a Panua New Guinea Village
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Donald Brenneis and Fred R. Myers, eds., Dangerous
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posterity, but what they communicate from father to son, and so to the son's son."56
Orators were self-consciously aware that their words would be committed to memory. At
a 1720 conference on Arrowsic Island, Kennebec speaker Mogg held a belt o f wampum
above his head and declared that "we are all upon a Hill in Vew o f all the Indians, who
see and know that we are here to act for them, and this Belt is a Token o f it."57
Speakers were also aware that contending versions o f the truth would circulate
after the meetings. Following the ratification o f Dummer's treaty in 1727, the
Arresaguntacook representative, Auyaumowett, warned the governor that their agreement
might be undone by gossip: "As I have shaken Hands with my Brother there is no doubt
but that many Stories will arise on it, that your Honour as well as our Selves will be told
Stories." Assuring the governor that such rumors would "have no ill Effect on either side
for we are all as one," Auyaumowett declared that the true meaning o f the treaty consisted
o f the words spoken on the record between the participants. "As we are here now in this
Place where the Peace has been Concluded," he told his audience, "we desire that nothing
which may be spoken out o f Doors or transiently be taken notice of." He asked them to
remember only "what has been said here to one another in this Place," adding that "this is
what is to be observed... it is the Conclusion o f the Peace."58
Although he addressed it to the governor, Auyaumowett's pronouncement was
clearly intended for his fellow Wabanakis. By the eighteenth century, "Arresaguntacook"
was an ambiguous term that referred to Wabanakis living along the travel corridor formed

Words: Language and Politics in the Pacific (Prospect Heights, 111.: Waveland Press, 1984).
56Samuel Penhallow, The History o f the Wars o f New-Enyland with the Eastern Indians... (Boston: T.
Fleet, 1726; reprint, Cincinnati: Dodge and Harpel, 1859), 82.
57DHSM- 23:98.
^Massachusetts Bay, Conference with the Eastern Indians... July 1727. 18.
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by the Androscoggin and St. Francois rivers, and often included the village o f Odanak.59
Like other Wabanaki communities o f the time, the Arresaguntacooks were riven by
factionalism, with some leaders remaining resolutely loyal to the French, others more
inclined toward the English, and still others favoring neutrality. At Odanak and other
settlements close to Canada, the pro-French faction was more numerous. Grey Lock, a
Missisquoi sagamore who had since 1723 led a campaign against English settlements
along the Connecticut River, wanted to continue the war and refused to meet with
colonial authorities from New England. Sagamores from Odanak had turned down
several requests to ratify the 1725 peace between Massachusetts and the Penobscots, and
many people still wanted to take revenge for the deaths o f their relatives at the hands o f
the English. Auyaumowett, who lived along the Androscoggin, risked his reputation in
meeting with English authorities, for in making concessions to the Wabanakis' longtime
enemies he opened himself to charges o f betrayal and cowardice. Knowing that the proFrench party would inevitably spread malicious gossip about his meeting with Dummer,
Auyaumowett preemptively put his own version o f the treaty on record.60
The significance o f the words spoken at treaties, as Auyaumowett knew, was
inextricably tied to judgments o f the person who spoke them. Loron remarked at the
same conference that Wabanaki sagamores who signed the treaty staked their reputations
on the benefits o f a peace with the English. If the English failed to uphold their part of

59 Gordon M. Day, "Arosagunticook and Androscoggin,” in William Cowan, ed., Papers o f the Tenth
Algonauian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University Press. 1979), 10-15.
60Colin Calloway, The Western Abenakis of Vermont. 1600-1800: War. Migration, and the Survival o f an
Indian People fNorman. Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. 1990), 113-31. On factionalism in
Wabanaki communities, see Kenneth M. Morrison. The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive [deal o f Alliance
in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations fBerkelev: University of California Press. 1984), 173-74, 186-87; David
L. Ghere, "Abenaki Factionalism, Emigration and Social Continuity: Indian Society in Northern New
England, 1725 to 1765” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1988); Fannie H. Eckstorm, "The Attack on
Norridgewock, 1724." New England Quarterly 7 (19341:541-78.
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the bargain, sagamores such as Auyaumowett and Loron would lose face in their
communities. Observing that the terms o f trade at truckhouses had recently become
unfavorable to the Indians, Loron remarked that "this turns out to our shame, when we
told the Tribes how the Trade was to be carried on, and it proves otherwise, it makes us
Lyars." He added that the "there are a great many that talk to us in another Language" an allusion to the French -- "and tell us this Trade is but for a little while, it is to draw us
in for a small time, and then it will fall, and we shall be laughed at." A few months
earlier, Loron had sent Dummer a letter asking to be paid an annual gratuity and "some
tokens o f special respect" at English forts in return for his efforts on behalf o f the peace.
Because he had risked his personal honor in supporting peace with the English, Loron
wanted assurances that colonial authorities would reward him for his service.61
While the English recognized the importance o f cultivating ties with Wabanaki
leaders such as Loron, they demanded more o f them than loyalty. English delegates
wanted treaty agreements to be binding for all the Wabanakis represented at the
conferences and always began treaties by asking Indian delegates if they represented their
whole tribes. The English in this respect wanted to treat tribes as mirror images o f
European polities: as clearly-defined territorial jurisdictions whose leaders had executive
authority over their subjects. Imagined in this way, Wabanaki sagamores would be able
to enforce contracts with the decisiveness o f governors or courts. But the reality was that
Wabanaki leaders were unable to force their opinions on others, and their authority
extended only as far as their persuasive powers. All the promises they made at

61Massachusetts Bay, The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bav. in July 1727.19; Benjamin
Colman, "Some Memories for the Continuation of the History o f the Troubles o f the New-English
Colonies, from the Barbarous and Perfidious Indians..." in Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections.
1st ser., vol. 6, (1797), 116. During treaty negotiations, Loron had criticized the English for
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conferences were consequently personal in character and rested on the honor o f the
speaker and his influence over others. When colonial officials pressed Wabanaki leaders
to do more than they were able -- insisting that they prevent all Wabanakis from siding
with the French or that they retrieve war captives who had been adopted by Indian
families -- sagamores inevitably felt that their fidelity to the English was insufficiently
rewarded and that English leaders had little regard for their personal honor. In 1751,
Loron angrily responded to charges that the Penobscots had not done enough to prevent
other tribes from attacking the English. "I have been the Man that has been the first in all
Treatys," he told the English representatives, "but you think I am not capable to manage
for the other Tribes. - - 1 have been the Man that has quell’d all the rest."62
Underlying such misunderstandings were differences in the way power was
exercised among the Wabanakis and the English. New England's governments were
invested with the ability to act on behalf o f society as a whole and to coerce others into
accepting their rulings. Orders issued by political leaders carried great weight because
they had the backing o f the state, and those who disobeyed them could expect to be
punished. Wabanakis, on the other hand, rejected the notion that any person was owed
obedience as a matter o f right. Political relationships were formed through continual
negotiation, with each person showing respect for the personal autonomy o f others.
Wabanaki criticisms o f the English way o f speaking were at their heart a denial o f the
legitimacy o f state power, and were rooted in the belief that social harmony was more
important than adherence to the letter o f the law.63

misinterpreting his statements. See Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation," 8-11.
62D H S M . 2 3 :4 2 0 .

630 n the differences between between speech in state and stateless societies, see Pierre Clastres, Society
Against the State: Essavs in Political Anthropology. Robert Hurley, trans., in collaboration with Abe Stein
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The Language o f Status and Obligations
Although Wabanakis and colonists had differing understandings o f power, they
established a political relationship that began in the seventeenth century and has persisted
to the present day. But the two sides had different understandings o f the nature o f the
relationship and the obligations each party owed the other. From 1693 to the American
Revolution, English leaders insisted that the Wabanakis were subjects o f the British
crown and that their territories lay within the jurisdiction o f the British empire. This
point of view was bolstered by the cession o f Acadia to Great Britain under the terms of
the Peace o f Utrecht, which weakened New France's claims to suzerainty over Wabanaki
lands. As subjects o f the British crown, rather than citizens o f Massachusetts, Wabanakis
were not obligated to pay taxes to the province, nor were they expected to perform militia
duty, or even try their internal disputes in provincial courts. But colonial leaders
demanded that Wabanakis demonstrate their allegiance to the crown by renouncing their
alliance with the French, forswearing future attacks against the English, and promising to
settle disputes with colonists by applying to the governor for redress.
This policy was aimed at giving English colonies the upper hand in the imperial
struggle with the French. Knowing that Wabanakis played an important role in the
Canadian system o f military defense, English officials sought to bring them to heel by
claiming exclusive jurisdiction over their lands. Although most Wabanakis saw no
contradiction in forming alliances with both the English and the French, colonial
authorities at Boston and Quebec insisted that the Indians choose sides. English leaders
were determined to establish exclusive military authority within their own boundaries,

(New York: Zone, 1987), esp. 152-55.
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and to reach this goal they needed to cut the Wabanakis’ ties with the French. In a 1722
letter to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor Samuel Shute o f Massachusetts insisted that
the Norridgewocks, who were on the verge o f war with Massachusetts, had subjected
themselves to the British crown and that their lands belonged to the English under terms
of the Peace o f Utrecht. "If they chuse the Allyance and Protection o f the French," he
wrote, "In Gods Name, let them move into the Confines o f the Government o f Canada; I
am very sure the place o f their residence at present Vizt Norridgewock is within the
Territory o f Great Britain." By virtue o f the crown's sovereignty over their lands, royal
representatives claimed absolute military control over the Wabanakis. When
Norridgewocks objected to the construction o f a fort on the Kennebec River in 1754,
Governor William Shirley answered, "I did not ask your Consent... King George, nor any
other Prince, ever asks the Consent o f any Person to build Forts within their own
Territories." As subjects o f the king, Wabanakis owed complete obedience to the crown
in all military matters.64
Wabanakis saw things differently, as they made clear at several treaty
conferences. The notion o f monarchical government was alien to them; the Wabanaki
word for "king", kinjames, had its origins in the early seventeenth century, when
Wabanakis first began to meet subjects o f King James I. Governor Francis Bernard
speculated in 1763 that the word referred to James II and was a Jesuit-inspired "system o f
verbal Jacobitism," but Wabanakis even addressed Louis XIV as nekintsemesem, "my
King James," a twist of historical irony that apparently eluded the missionaries

^Sam uel Shute to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Boston, April 23,1722, in Baxter, Pioneers o f New France.
307; Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal o f the Proceedings at Two Conferences Begun to Be Held at
Falmouth in Casco Bav... on the Twenty-Eighth Dav of June 1754—and on the Fifth Dav o f July
Following (Boston: J. Draper, 1754), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 7222,17.
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transcribing their letters.65 Wabanakis preferred to describe political relationships in
kinship terms and treated the language o f sovereignty as a foreign innovation. While
English and French governors rancorously debated whose crown had authority over the
Indians, Wabanakis described themselves as brothers o f the former and children o f the
latter. "All the French are our fathers, that is what we call them, the others are only our
brothers," a Wabanaki soldier named Colonel Louis told Pierre Duponceau, a French
interpreter at Valley Forge in 1778. The English "also wanted them also to call them
fathers," he continued, "but the Indians would not consent; the French alone were their
fathers."66
Colonel Louis's account was correct: with the exception o f a 1701 conference in
which they called King William their uncle, Wabanakis had always referred to the
English as "brothers," a term memorialized by the "Two Brothers" stone cairns at Casco
Bay. Throughout the eighteenth century, Wabanakis had spoken o f French governors as
their "fathers," also referring to them as Onontio or "great mountain," a literal Iroquois
translation o f the name o f New France's second governor, Charles Huault de Montmagny.
Such precise distinctions were o f great importance to the Wabanakis, for fraternal and
filial relationships entailed two different sets o f obligations. Among Wabanakis, a father
was a provider, a man who saw to the material needs o f his family. Children owed

65DHSM. 13: 371; letter of Tabnaquis" to Louis XIV, [1715?], PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 1, fol. 266. By
the nineteenth century, Wabanakis had devised compound words such as kinjameskua (queen, using the
feminine suffix-skua), kinjamessis (prince, using the diminutive suffix-sir), and kinjamesigamigw (palace,
with the word gamigw, or wigwam). See Joseph Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues
(Quebec: Leger Brousseau, 1884), 40,48.
66James L. Whitehead, ed., "The Autobiography o f Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, I-m," Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 63 (1939): 222.
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obedience to their father, but only so long as he generously provided them with food,
clothing, and other necessities o f life.67
French authorities had established themselves in this role by the last quarter o f the
seventeenth century, lavishing gifts upon loyal sagamores and establishing mission
villages for Indian refugees. In return, they expected Wabanakis to support them in
imperial wars and to serve under French officers in Acadia. Their relationship was not
based on treaties - Maine's Wabanakis never made any written agreements with the
French -- but was created through a continuous flow o f gifts and favors.68 After the
Treaty of Utrecht, the French continued to provide for their allies in a more roundabout
manner, giving gifts to Wabanakis visiting Quebec or distributing them through Jesuit
missionaries and Acadian families such as the Sieurs de St. Castin. In 1716, the
government o f New France established an annual fund o f 4000 livres for their Wabanaki
allies, to be paid out in the form o f presents at Quebec and Isle Royale (Cape Breton).
French authorities also helped to fund the construction o f churches at Norridgewock and
Medoctec. The generosity o f the French won them the allegiance o f most Wabanakis; as
the Penobscot orator Meskouadoue said in 1700, "I have no other hatchets but that of
Onnontio... I have no other will but your own, I will do exactly as you wish."69
Although the Wabanakis filled the subordinate role in this relationship, the burden
o f obligation lay on the shoulders o f their French fathers. The obedience o f the Indians

67 Gregory Evans Dowd, "The French King Wakes Up in Detroit: 'Pontiac's War1in Rumor and History,"
Ethnohistorv 37 (1990): 254-78.
68A Penobscot delegate signed the Great Peace o f Montreal in 1701, but was essentially a witness to an
agreement between the Iroquois, the French, the Ottawas, and the Hurons.
69Catherine M. Desbarats, "The Cost o f Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric,”
William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 52 (1995): 609-30; Vaudreuil and Begon to Ministre, Quebec,
October 14,1716, PAC, AN, Serie C llA , vol. 37, fols. 27-29; "Parolles des Iroquois... le 3e septembre
1700," PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A, vol. 18, fol. 87. (My translation; original reads: "je n’avoit point dautres
Haches que celle d’onnontio... je n’ay point d’autre volonte que la sienne, je suiveray exactement tout
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was limited to military affairs and during peacetime they owed nothing to the French.
But when Wabanakis brought grievances or demands to the French governor during
peace or war, he was morally obliged to provide for them. Indians usually made their
requests to French authorities as pleas for pity. "It is true that I am altogether poor," a
delegation from Panawapskik told Governor Frontenac in 1691, in a request for trade
articles. "I am without a hood, without blankets, without shirts, without leggings, without
a cap, without shot, without powder, without peas and without tobacco, so that if I want
to smoke a bit to ease my sorrow, I have to use tree leaves and wood chippings."
Admitting they were "denuded o f everything," they assured the governor that they "think
at present about nothing but making war," and if they were not sent powder and shot they
"would use kettles and the bones o f game animals to make arrows." In exaggerating both
their destitution and their devotion, the Penobscots appealed to the governor’s moral duty
as a father to provide for his children, making it impossible for him to deny their request.
Frontenac gladly played the role demanded o f him and ordered a shipment o f powder and
shot as well as a canoe o f trade articles to be sent from Quebec.70
Frontenac and other French officials won the loyalty o f Wabanakis because they
were consistently able to take care o f the Indians' needs. In Wabanaki society, leaders
attained a dominant social position only if they were able to provide for others, and their
authority was precariously tied to their liberality. When French officials showed
stinginess or tried to compel obedience, Wabanakis acted angrily and refused to do their

Cequel Souhaitera.1')
70CDRH- 2: 34-38. (My translation; original reads: "II est vray que je suis tout a faict pauvre. Je suis par
exetnple sans capotte, sans couverte, sans chemises, sans bas, sans bonnet, sans plomb, sans poudre, sans
feves et sans tabac, en telle sorte que sy je veux fumer quelques fois pour dissiper mon chagrin, je suis
oblige de me servir de feuilles d'arbres, de bois et de tondre." "n'importe que je soys ainsi denue de tout” ”
j ’employeray mes chaudieres et les os des bestes que je tueray a faire des fleches.")
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officials' bidding.71 In August 1751, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, governor o f New
France, learned that French authority over the Wabanakis had its limits. In his annual
meeting in Quebec, a representative from Panawapskik expressed concern over recent
attacks Odanaks had made against the English in retaliation for a murder o f one o f their
kinsmen. Observing that the French had failed to provide for his village in recent years,
the sagamore explained that the Penobscots were dependent on trade with the English and
would be cut off from supplies if war broke out between the two groups. The governor
was rumored to have supported the attacks and the sagamore chided him in a roundabout
way for his complicity. Jonquiere sharply reprimanded the delegate, telling him that the
Penobscots were "poor subjects, corruptible by a dram o f drink." Accusing them o f
taking orders from the English, he reminded them that though they were a "blazing fire"
he would "reduce them to ashes" if they disobeyed his orders. Only if they were to "beg
and Repent" for their infidelity could he forgive them. The Penobscot sharply retorted,
"We dont like any that go to fright us. The Penopscots are not to be frightn'd. We [djont
beg o f any. We live on our own Rights what God has given us and where we live wele
die." Even in the face o f the governor's threats, members o f the pro-English party
continued to work toward peace with their neighbors from New England. A father could
not command obedience, but had to earn it: officials like Jonquiere who tried to stretch
their authority too far tended to lose the allegiance o f their followers.72

7’Denys Delage, "Les Iroquois chretiens des ’reductions', 1677-1770:1 - Migration et rapports avec les
Francais." Recherches amerindiennes au Quebec 21 (1991): 64-65.
72"Abenakis de Panna8anske, Parolles d'un chef qui s’est noye," August 27,1751, PAC, AN, Serie C l 1A,
vol. 97, fols. 62-63; DHSM. 23:425-26. (My translation; original reads: "vous etes des mauvais sujets,
qu'un coup de boisson en capable de corrompre”; "je vous reduiray en cendres.") Pro-French factions at
Panawapskik later expressed assurances o f their loyalty to the governor and their willingness to prosecute
war against the English: see "Parolles des Abenakis fidels au Village de Panna8amske," September 19,
1751, PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 97, fol. 78.
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If French officials occasionally stumbled in their efforts to win the obedience o f
the Wabanakis, the English failed altogether. Like their French counterparts, New
England's leaders were relentless in their diplomatic pursuit o f the Wabanakis’ favor. In
the language o f European diplomacy, they sought to establish the sovereignty o f the
British crown over the Indians and their lands. This translated into a desire to become the
Wabanakis' "fathers," since English officials wanted to command absolute obedience
from the Indians in military affairs. But Wabanakis consistently rejected the paternalist
claims o f the English, and treated them as mere "brothers": equal allies whose
relationship was structured through trade rather than gifts. The relationship o f father and
son involved a set o f reciprocal duties, and if one party failed to fulfill its obligations the
relationship was dissolved. While the English demanded obedience from Wabanakis,
they failed to show the generosity necessary to command their loyalty. English leaders
rarely responded to Wabanaki requests with the alacrity o f the French; instead, they
questioned the sagamores' wisdom and pushed their own ultimatums back at the Indians.
To the Wabanakis, it seemed that English governors lacked the magnanimity necessary to
be fathers. "Govemour Dummer was a good man," Penobscot sagamore Wenemouett
said in 1729, "but he had not power like the Govemour o f Canada to performe what he
promised."73 Wabanakis preferred to see their relationship with the English as one o f
equals: brothers who were bound together by trade and friendship but did not owe each
other allegiance in war.

73Col. Dunbar to Mr. Popple, Boston, December 10,1729, CSP. vol. 36 (1728-29), fol. 1018, p. 553. In
English political culture, petitioners were expected not only to state their grievances, but to make their case
convincing to the authorities. The government then decided whether the petition had sufficient merit to be
granted. But among Wabanakis, followers merely had to state their needs to their leaders: the onus was on
the father to provide for his children. This difference has been a persistent source o f misunderstandings
between Indians and whites, even to the present day. For an illuminating contemporary example, see Ron
Scollon and Suzanne B. K. Scollon, Narrative. Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication (Norwood,
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Although English treaty speakers called Wabanakis their brothers, they had little
understanding o f what such kinship terms involved. New England's officials were more
inclined to think according to the principles o f sovereignty, and in these terms they owed
Wabanakis little. The crown had gained jurisdiction over the Indians under the terms o f
Phips's Treaty o f 1693 and had taken control over their lands by the Peace o f Utrecht.
From the English point o f view, these documents gave English governors authority over
the Wabanakis whether this pleased the Indians or not. As in their defense o f private
property, English people clung to the belief that the possession o f land was a right that
entailed no social obligations.
Wabanaki leaders gave voice an alternative perspective, one that emphasized the
need to maintain harmonious relations among people, and between human beings and
their natural environment. The Wabanaki moral economy emphasized the obligation o f
kinfolk to provide for each other and to ensure that the land would sustain their
descendants in the future. Rejecting formal notions o f justice, property, and trade,
Wabanakis were intensely concerned with the personal and immediate effects o f social
interaction, and saw that the recognition o f English land claims —whatever their legal
merits —would threaten their traditional way o f life.
Although representatives from both sides sought to slacken the tension between
these two points of view, they often failed and the inevitable result was violence. The
threat of warfare hung over the heads o f conference delegates, particularly as AngloWabanaki conflicts became entangled with a larger imperial struggle between the French

N. J.: Ablex, 1981), esp. 17-23.
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and the British. If words failed, weapons would ultimately decide who possessed the
lands of Maine.
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CHAPTER V
THE WAGES OF WAR

"You've lived in England; are they as crazy there as in France?"
"It's a different kind o f madness," said Martin. "You realize that
these two countries are fighting a war over a fe w acres ofsnow near
Canada, and they have spent more on this fin e war than all o f
Canada is worth."
-Voltaire, Candide
Without supplies no army is brave.
—Frederick II o f Prussia, 1747

In February 1764, Samuel Holland, a Dutch-bom military engineer and veteran of
the sieges o f Louisbourg and Quebec, received a royal commission to launch a large-scale
survey o f the northern half o f British North America. At Holland's suggestion, the Board
of Trade divided the mainland colonies into northern and southern districts, assigning the
region north o f the Potomac River to Holland and leaving the southern portion to William
De Brahm, surveyor-general o f Georgia and South Carolina. Soon after receiving his
commission, Holland appointed a deputy to assume his duties as surveyor-general of
Quebec, and organized a number o f surveying parties to prepare maps o f uncharted areas
of the northern colonies.1

1 Order of King George III, Court at St. James, February 10,1764, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fols.
10-11; Captain Samuel Holland to the Lords Commissioners forTrade and Plantations, March 12, 1764,
Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fols. 38-41; F. J. Thorpe, "Holland, Samuel Johannes." in Dictionary of
Canadian Biography, vol. 5 (1801-1820), 425-29; J. B. Harley, "The Contemporary Mapping of the
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One o f the leaders o f the parties was an officer o f Holland's regiment named
Joseph F. W. Des Barres, who undertook hydrographic surveys o f Cape Breton Island,
Nova Scotia, and the coast o f Maine. Des Barres and Holland hired several assistants and
some twenty or thirty laborers each and, with the aid o f theodolites, telescopes, and other
surveying instruments, took soundings o f harbor depths, measured degrees o f latitude and
longitude, and made exact calculations o f area and distance. By 1775, the surveyors had
produced several dozen plans, nine o f which illustrated the coastline between the Saint
John and Piscataqua rivers. Artistically polished and remarkable in their technical
sophistication, the maps were compiled into a single atlas the same year, published under
Des Barres's name as the Atlantic Neptune [Fig. 5.1].2
The Holland-Des Barres surveys were the latest o f a series o f reconnaissance
expeditions that rode the wake o f British victories in the Seven Years War. In May 1759,
Massachusetts governor Thomas Pownall had ordered military engineers to survey
Penobscot Bay and the lower part o f Penobscot River, with a view to building a fort at its
headwaters. Captain John North and Lieutenant Joseph Small presented the governor
with a map o f the region, with water depths, portages, and levels o f elevation marked at
strategic locations [Fig. 5.2].3 Seven months later, Lieutenant John Montresor embarked
on the first o f two voyages between Maine and Quebec following the conquest o f the

American Revolutionary War," in J. B. Harley, Barbara Bartz Petchenik, and Lawrence W. Towner,
Mapping the American Revolutionary War (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1978), 25-29.
2 List o f Plans sent to Government, from the General Survey o f the Northern District o f North America,
February 14, 1776, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fols. 60-61; R. J. Morgan, "DesBarres, Joseph
Frederick Wallet," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 6 (1821-1835), 192-97; Joseph F. W. Des
Banes, The Atlantic Neptune: Published for the Use of the Roval N a w o f Great Britain.... 4 vols.,
(London, 1780; reprinted, Barre, Mass.: Barre Pub. Co., 1966-69).
- "Journal of the voyage of his Excell'y Thos. Pownall, Esq— to Penobscot, and o f his Proceedings in
establishing possession o f his Majesty’s Rights there in behalf o f said Province," Maine Historical Society
Collections, ser. 1, vol. 5,365-85; William Otis Sawtelle, "Thomas Pownall, Governor,” Massachusetts
Historical Society Proceedings, vol. 63 (1929-30), 254-81.
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French capital. Leaving in the dead o f winter with a party o f thirteen men, Montresor
travelled by canoe down the Chaudiere River to Lake Megantic, then made his way to the
head o f the Androscoggin River by a series o f portages. Lacking provisions and
debilitated by frostbite, MontresoPs rangers were forced to eat their moccasins and
leather pouches to survive. The next year Montresor embarked on a second journey from
Quebec to Maine, this time wisely choosing to leave in mid-June. Once again he canoed
down the Chaudiere, but portaged to Moosehead Lake and then travelled on the
Penobscot River until it wound close to the Kennebec, which he followed until he
reached Fort Halifax. On both occasions, Montresor recorded his findings in pen-and-ink
maps o f the travel corridor [Fig. 5.3].4
The surveys carried out in Maine between 1759 and 1775 were one element o f an
imperial inventory o f conquered lands following the Seven Years War, which included
James Rennell's surveys o f Bengal and James Cook's charts o f Newfoundland and the St.
Lawrence River.5 The purpose o f such surveys went beyond mere stock-taking; maps
were intended to be a blueprint for territorial expansion. At the Penobscot River,
Governor Pownall informed the Indians he met that he would "make the land English,"
truculently reminding them that "I am able to do it - and I will do it." The immediate
end o f Pownall's expedition was to build a fort, but in the long run, "making the land
English" meant parcelling it out to British subjects protected by English-speaking courts.
This point o f view was shared by the commissioners o f the Board o f Trade, who told

4 G. D. Scull, ed., "Lt. John Montresor’s Journal o f an Expedition in 1760 across Maine from Quebec,"
New England Historical and Genealogical Register 36 (1882), 29-36; "Montresor’s Journal," Maine
Historical Society Collections, ser. 1, vol. 1 (1831), 342-57.
5 On Captain Cook’s charts, see R. A. Skelton and R. V. Tooley, The Marine Surveys o f James Cook in
North America. 1758-1768: Particularly the Survey ofNewfoundland: A Bibliography o f Printed Charts
and Sailing Directions fLondon: Map Collectors' Circle, 1967); on Rennell, see Matthew H. Edney,
Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India. 1765-1843 (Chicago: University of
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King George that Holland's maps were necessary to devise measures for "the dividing,
laying out and settling such parts o f your Majesty's American Dominions," adding that it
was advisable to grant the lands "as soon as possible" because o f the "advantages which
such Settlement will produce to the Trade, Navigation and Manufactures o f this
Kingdom."6
The people o f New England did not need encouragement from the crown, for they
had already set out to make the land English. Provincial speculators leapt at the
opportunity to survey and map the newly acquired territories after 1759, and in the 1760s
and 1770s, land companies from Massachusetts dispatched dozens o f surveyors to Maine
to prepare plats for proprietors and lay out holdings for settlers. Their efforts barely kept
pace with the flood o f land-hungry settlers who migrated eastward in the 1760s and
1770s. In the two decades after the fall o f Quebec, English settlement expanded rapidly
along the coast as far as Machias and pushed inward toward the interior along the valleys
of the Penobscot and Kennebec.7
Just as the surveys opened a new chapter o f Maine's history, they closed another.
More than in any other part o f North America, the inhabitants o f the region had suffered
the depredations o f nearly a century o f imperial warfare, losing lives and property on an
alarming scale, given their small numbers. Northern New England had been the site o f a
bloody Anglo-Wabanaki war between 1675 and 1678 and was one o f the focal points o f a
long period o f intermittent imperial warfare between 1688 and 1713. An Anglo-

Chicago Press, 1997), 1-36.
6 "Journal o f Pownall," 376; Lords Commissioners o f Trade and Plantations to King George HI, December
21, 1763, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fol. 27.
7 I have located over fifty maps prepared by surveyors from the Kennebec and Pejepscot proprietors
between 1759 and 1776 at the Maine Historical Society in Portland. The plats represent only a small
proportion o f the total number of surveys undertaken in Maine during this period.
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Wabanaki conflict flared up again between 1722 and 1725, and was followed after 1745
by two wars between the French and British crowns for control o f the continent, in which
the region's inhabitants once again suffered greatly. If the terms o f the peace were to
shape Maine's future, the realities o f war had defined its past.
With few exceptions, historical treatments o f colonial warfare in Maine have
consisted o f accounts o f battles and dissections o f strategy.8 The interest o f historians in
these subjects is understandable, for the rise and fall o f military fortunes makes for
gripping narratives.9 But military studies that focus solely on events on the battlefield
tend to remove war from its social and political context, making it seem as if conflicts are
decided solely by the valor o f soldiers. As Michael Mann has put it, military power is
"promiscuous," in the sense that war-making depends on economic and political supports
from the civilian world while at the same time serving to advance the aims o f civilian
leaders. Military force was the means by which the British gained control over Maine,
but the army's power rested in turn on the pillars o f civilian society: wealth generated

8 An important exception is Stephen C. Eames, "Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the Provincial Soldier on the
Northern Frontier. 1689-1748," Ph.D. diss., University o f New Hampshire, 1989.
9 The volume o f materials that have been written on colonial warfare is dauntingly large. In addition to
contemporary histories by Benjamin Church, Cotton Mather, and Samuel Penhallow, there were several
lengthy treatments of Anglo-Wabanaki warfare in the nineteenth century. Francis Parkman's multi-volume
France and England in North America is the best-known, although Parkman wore his whiggish prejudices
on his sleeve and his Victorian brand o f racism is offensive to modem readers. Herbert M. Sylvester’s
Indian Wars of New England. 3 vols. (Boston: W. B. Clarke, 1910) is written in the spirit o f Parkman and
provides a detailed account of battles from the early seventeenth century to the fall of New France; equally
useful is Samuel A. Drake’s The Border Wars o f New England. Commonly Called King William's War and
Queen Anne's War (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1897) and A Particular History o f the Five Years
French and Indian War in New England and Parts Adjacent (reprint. Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries
Press, 1970). More recently, the work of Douglas E. Leach has become an invaluable point o f reference,
particularly his Arms for Empire: A Military History o f the British Colonies in North America. 1607-1763
(New York: Macmillan, 1973) and Northern Colonial Frontier. 1607-1763 fNew York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1966). Recent treatments o f colonial warfare with an ethnohistorical slant include Armstrong
Starkey, European and Native American Warfare. 1675-1815 (Norman, Okla.: University o f Oklahoma
Press, 1998); Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions o f North America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1994); Francis Jennings, Empire o f Fortune: Crowns. Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in
America fNew York: Norton, 1988).
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from labor and trade, revenues drawn from taxes, technology devised by industry, and a
burgeoning population that filled the ranks o f armies with a steady flow o f recruits.10
The surveys carried out following the Seven Years War offer a telling illustration
o f this intermingling o f military and civilian power. Carried out by military men under
the employ o f the imperial and provincial governments, the projects were intended to
prepare newly conquered lands for settlement by colonists. But the conquest o f these
lands had depended in turn on the cooperation o f these same colonists, working in concert
with the metropolitan and colonial governments and serving as soldiers, taxpayers, and
sutlers. Military victories had secured civilian aims —the protection and acquisition o f
lands for farmers, loggers, and land speculators —yet military successes had depended on
the human and material wealth o f New England and its metropolitan backers.
The contours o f the political map o f Maine, both before and after the Seven Years
War, were shaped by this intersection o f the military and civilian worlds. Military might
was a source o f power for the English, French, and Wabanakis who had strategic and
material interests in the region. The extent o f this power was not merely a matter o f brute
force but depended on the array o f supports that each society lent to its fighting men.
Armed conflict in Maine was more than a matter o f rival soldiers meeting in the
battlefield; it was also a contest between neighboring societies, each having a different
vision o f how the land was to be used.

10 Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power A History o f Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17-22.
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The Geography o f War
Voltaire had the Ohio Valley in mind when he quipped that the Seven Years War
was fought over "a few acres o f snow near Canada," but his observation would have
applied with equal force to Maine. By comparison to much o f North America, Maine
was a barren place, with a cold climate, dense forests, and acidic soils unsuited to wheat
cultivation. Yet both sides in the imperial struggle sacrificed hundreds o f lives and spent
untold sums for its possession. Meanwhile, places that were far more fertile and
prosperous, such as Boston or Rhode Island, emerged largely unscathed from the wars,
without suffering even a single attack. This paradox forces us to consider what might be
called the geography o f war. Why was conflict concentrated in some places, but not
others? Why was Maine a cockpit while nearby regions - o f far greater economic and
political value -- enjoyed peace?
Modem geographers have traditionally paid scant attention to military history, and
a search through the index o f any textbook on human geography would be lucky to yield
more than one or two references to the subject. With their sights trained on the
interaction between people and their environment, students o f human geography have
traditionally been interested in patterns o f subsistence, trade, and residence, rather than
the ephemeral, event-driven world o f war. But like any other human activity, war has a
spatial dimension and is shaped by contingencies o f climate, terrain, vegetation, and
transportation.
Throughout most o f human history, distance has imposed rigid limits on the
extent o f military power. In the ancient world, armies could march only for three or four
days - one scholar estimates an equivalent distance o f about 90 kilometers —before
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depleting the provisions they carried with them. Even with horse-drawn transport, few
armies could travel further than this distance without requiring more supplies. To
continue their march, they would have to requisition food, fodder, and other supplies
from friendly settlements or plunder the same from their enemies. A similar dilemma
was confronted by military commanders in medieval and modem times. Until armies
developed dependable supply lines that connected political centers with troops in the
field, the need for provisions would take precedence over other military objectives:
Martin van Creveld has termed this problem the "tyranny o f plunder," arguing that its
chains were not fully broken until the twentieth century.11
As long as transportation networks were inadequate to the task o f supplying
armies over long distances, the military power o f political capitals was limited. The
dependence o f armies on plunder as a source o f supply meant that the aims o f the state
were often subordinated to material needs o f soldiers. In the ancient and medieval world,
military expeditions were undertaken as much to win booty as they were to extend the
influence o f political leaders. The difficulties o f supplying and controlling long-distance
campaigns meant that states ruled more through threat o f military force than its actual
use, presiding over networks o f tributaries who made periodic payments to avoid attack.
Even when armies conquered surrounding areas militarily, the conquest generally
entailed a degree o f political decentralization. Since most states did not have the

11 Mann, Sources o f Social Power. 138-42; Martin van Creveld, Supplying Wan Logistics from
Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), esp. 5-39. John Lynn has criticized
Creveld for underplaying advances in European logistics before the nineteenth century, pointing out that
armies did not depend on plunder and foraging as their sole source o f supplies. Soldiers in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries drew their provisions from a variety o f sources, including purchases from local
merchants, forced contributions, etapes (stores of food maintained by local merchants) and magazines
(stores o f food and arms maintained by the army). See "The History o f Logistics and Supplying War." in
John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present
(Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), 9-27.
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revenues necessary to pay wages to their armies, they compensated them instead with
rewards o f plunder, land, or political office, installing officers as the lords or governors o f
the regions they subjugated.12
This system o f rewards, o f which feudalism was one variation, continued to
characterize war in Europe in the Middle Ages. But the conduct o f war was gradually
transformed between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, as the introduction o f new
tactics and technologies, the growing power o f monarchies, and the increasing scale o f
commerce raised the stakes o f military conflict. One by one, European states replaced
feudal levies with paid mercenaries, built bastioned forts, and outfitted their armies and
navies with cannon and muskets. Collectively, these innovations dramatically increased
the expense o f war, both in expenditures and human lives. Smaller city states and
principalities that could not bear these costs were pillaged or absorbed by their larger
neighbors. Powerful monarchs, meanwhile, found themselves in an arms race with their
rivals, with constant pressure to find new sources o f revenue for their armies. The lion's
share o f royal budgets were devoted to financing wars or servicing debts incurred by war.
As the cost o f campaigns mounted, governments became more intrusive in the lives o f
their citizens, devising new methods o f extracting taxes and obtaining loans, and
demanding military service from a growing share o f the male population.13
This system o f warfare favored territorial states over other forms o f political
organization because they generated more revenues than city states and were more

12 Mann, Sources of Social Power. 130-77.
13MichaeI Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," originally delivered as a lecture at Queen’s
University, Belfast, 1955, reprinted in Essavs in Swedish History (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota
Press, 1967), 195-225; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the
West. 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Jeremy Black, European Warfare.
1660-1815 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); William H. McNeill, The Pursuit o f Power:
Technology. Armed Force, and Society since A. D. 1000 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1982);
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compact, and hence easier to defend, than dynastic empires. In the Middle Ages, the
countryside o f Europe was dotted by hundreds o f castles, which acted as the strongholds
o f local magnates. These magnates were allied with princes, Icings, and pontiffs, whose
dynastic estates were often noncontiguous and scattered throughout the continent. As the
political fortunes o f magnates waned and the strength o f monarchs waxed, the castles
became increasingly unnecessary and were replaced by a ring o f frontier fortifications
that protected the outer edges o f states. Under the direction o f Louis XIV's chief military
engineer, Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 133 strongholds at the fringes o f France were
built or rebuilt, while the fortifications o f Paris were tom down. Vauban's projects were
emulated by monarchs in other parts o f Europe and the result was a military landscape in
which violence was pushed out toward the frontiers o f the state, with its territorial core
acting as a supply center for the peripheries.14
This pattern was duplicated in Europe's colonies. In the early years o f settlement,
violent conflicts were relatively small in scale and geographically diffused: in early
seventeenth-century New England, few places were entirely free from the threat o f piracy
or Indian raids. But as colonies developed economically, they became increasingly adept
at providing military protection for the more densely settled seaboard towns. Because
cities such as Boston or Providence were also commercial centers with large populations,
it was easy to recruit and provision large armies for their defense and the protection o f
nearby areas. The more sparsely populated regions at the edges o f colonies were far less
able to defend themselves and were consequently more likely to be chosen as military
targets. Places such as Maine and southern Acadia, which had small populations and

Richard Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation State,” Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 203-21.
14 Parker, Military Revolution. 42-43.
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were claimed by rival crowns, became militarized frontiers that depended on supplies and
troops sent from colonial capitals. Because no side was able to gain a decisive advantage
over its rivals in these frontier regions, their inhabitants were constantly vulnerable to
attack.
The successful prosecution o f war in a frontier area in Maine depended on the
ability o f colonial officials to establish an umbilical cord o f supply and troops that linked
the peripheries with commercial and political centers. Logistics, more than strategy or
tactics, was the central problem faced by military commanders leading campaigns in
Maine. Unless they managed to recruit, transport, fortify, provision, and supply troops on
the frontier, political leaders could not gain control over the land. For much o f the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial leaders had mixed success in this regard.
The English oversaw a steady increase in the number o f forts, garrison houses, and
soldiers in Maine throughout the eighteenth century, but before the 1750s the numbers
were not large enough to overwhelm their enemies.
Lacking the funds or the transportation networks necessary to launch large-scale
campaigns, English, French, and Wabanaki forces all adopted military styles that
departed from European convention. By the eighteenth century, warfare in Europe was
typically conducted according to a set o f unwritten rules: by and large, war was fought by
professional armies, acting on behalf o f states, seeking decisive military victories that
resulted in territorial conquest or diplomatic concessions. These rules were put into
writing in the nineteenth century by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz,
who called war "the continuation o f policy by other means." The modem form o f warfare
described by Clausewitz was built on the assumption that armed force is monopolized by
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states, and that the soldiers hired by the states have a disinterested determination to
advance their policies.15
In Maine, as in the ancient and medieval world, these assumptions did not apply.
It may be helpful in this respect to imagine warfare in terms o f a spectrum o f organized
violence, running from small raiding bands to large-scale professional armies [see Fig.
5.4], Because modem states have substantial revenues and highly developed
transportation networks, soldiers are adequately paid and supplied by their governments
and do not have to resort to plunder. Instead, their attention is devoted exclusively to
following orders and serving the interests o f the state. Armies o f a smaller scale, on the
other hand, tend to be less well funded and more oriented toward the pursuit o f plunder
and the individual interests o f soldiers. While far less costly than professional armies,
they also are less effective at advancing state interests.
None o f the groups fighting in Maine conformed to the image o f a professional
army, although some came closer than others. Soldiers on all sides went to the battlefield
in search o f plunder and personal profit, and few were wholly dedicated to the interests o f
the state. Their tactics, as often as not, were designed to bring home captives and booty
rather than to advance the policy aims o f their leaders. The tyranny o f plunder still held
sway in colonial Maine, although the degree to which soldiers remained committed to its
pursuit depended on many things: political circumstances, the wages and supplies offered
by governments, inherited traditions o f warmaking, and cultural assumptions regarding
military honor and the legitimacy o f violence. English, French, and Wabanaki soldiers
received different kinds o f support from their respective governments, and understood the

15 John Keeean. A History o f Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1991), esp. 3-60: Martin van Creveld. The
Transformation o f War (New York: Free Press, 1991), esp. 33-94; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
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aims and conduct o f warfare in divergent ways. The result was a confluence o f different
styles of warfare, which grew from separate cultural traditions and evolved under the
press of events. How these styles differed and how they determined the balance o f power
in Maine are questions that bear further examination.

The Sociology o f Scalping
French entrepreneurs and administrators had claimed possession o f Acadia since
the first decade of the seventeenth century, but their rights to the province - particularly
its southern reaches ~ had little practical backing. English and Scottish forces claiming
the territory on behalf o f the colony o f Nova Scotia captured the capital o f Port Royal in
1629 and again in 1654. When French authorities regained possession o f the colony in
1670, they ruled the southern portion through a handful o f military garrisons, which lost
the colony’s most important trading posts to Anglo-Dutch privateers in 1675 and its
capital to English soldiers in 1690. The inconsiderable French population o f Acadia,
which numbered only a few hundred in the seventeenth century, was incapable of
mounting a sustained defense o f its settlements. The more substantial population o f the
St. Lawrence River Valley was itself vulnerable to Iroquois and English assaults and was
in any case too far removed from Acadia to lend it any assistance. Regulars from France
were expensive to transport and even costlier to maintain after they had crossed the
Atlantic. French administrators recognized very early that they could not defend their
North American footholds alone and would have to look to native allies for assistance.
Indians were a unique class o f soldiers, very different from Canadian militiamen
or French regulars. They had their own assumptions about the proper conduct and aims

trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), esp. 75-123.
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of war, and their unwillingness to conform to Old World standards o f military discipline
exasperated many colonial military commanders. But the colony's desperate need for
military assistance forced French administrators to adopt tactics, rewards, and methods o f
recruitment that were familiar to the Indians and bore little resemblance to standard
European practice. Although New France's governors acted as the warriors' commandersin-chief, the terms o f their employment were determined more by the Indians than by the
French. In this respect, Wabanakis were similar to Cossacks, Highland Scots, and other
"nomadic" groups who were induced to serve on behalf o f European states in eighteenthcentury wars. Like these other peoples, Wabanakis negotiated an alliance with a
European power which allowed them to retain a degree o f independence -- specifically, in
the Wabanaki case, the right to enjoy their lands without intrusion by Europeans -- in
return for military service.
The Franco-Wabanaki military alliance came to fruition in the last quarter o f the
seventeenth century, but its roots extended as far back as the earliest years o f
colonization. The French had established themselves at the head o f a continental system
of native alliances by insinuating themselves into diplomatic networks that had existed
before their arrival. Because the main points o f French interest in North America were
the Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system, they naturally gravitated
toward the Indian groups who controlled access to these regions. The groups first
encountered by French colonists in Acadia were known as the Souriquois (Mi'kmaq), the
Etechemins (whose villages extended from the Saint John to the Kennebec rivers), and
the Almouchiquois (whose villages lay to the south o f the Kennebec). As elsewhere in
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the Northeast, these groups were tangled in a web o f alliances and enmities that included
dozens o f villages and bands sometimes hundreds o f miles apart.
In the first decade o f the seventeenth century, there was sporadic warfare between
the Mi'kmaq and Etechemins, although it was mitigated by a constant flow o f trade and
diplomacy between factions on both sides. Mi'kmaq had also launched attacks against
the St. Lawrence Iroquoians in the sixteenth century and had contacts with Montagnais
living at Tadoussac on the north shore o f the St. Lawrence River. Etechemins were also
allied with the Montagnais and carried on trade with corn-growing villages from Saco
southward. Tensions sometimes existed between neighboring villages; Captain Robert
Davies in 1607 was informed o f a war between two groups living at the headwaters o f the
Kennebec River.16
The exotic origins o f trade goods uncovered by archaeologists in Maine gives
some indication o f the geographic extent o f this system o f trade and alliances. Objects
dated toward the end of the Ceramic period include a Norse penny, a Labrador Inuit tool,
copper and chalcedony from Nova Scotia, and quartzite from Lake Mistassini in northern
Quebec. Documentary evidence also indicates a far-flung range o f alliances: three
separate European authors in the first decade o f the seventeenth century described
contacts between the Montagnais leader Anadabijou and the coastal population o f Acadia.
In 1603, he was seen by Samuel de Champlain at his home in Tadoussac, hosting a feast
to celebrate a recent defeat o f the Iroquois with an army o f warriors that included many
Etechemins. Four years later, he gave his blessings to a raid on Saco led by the renowned

16 Laurence Johnson and Charles A. Martijn, "Les Malecites et la traite des fourrures," Recherches
amerindiennes au Quebec 24 (1994): 25-44; Philip L. Barbour, ed., The Complete Works o f Captain John
Smith (1580-16311.3 vots. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North Carolina Press, 1986), 328-29,338-41;
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Mi'kmaq sagamore Membertou. And in the first decade o f the century, Indians from
Penobscot Bay informed the English that they sometimes travelled to the St. Lawrence
Valley to trade with him because he had access to European goods through the French.17
Wabanaki armies rarely if ever numbered over a thousand men, placing them at
the low end of the military spectrum. But they still required a considerable degree o f
organization, both in the recruitment o f warriors and the planning o f battles. Native
leaders spent much o f their time cultivating alliances with neighboring groups, recruiting
warriors from nearby areas, and compensating recruits for their services. Although
persuasive speaking was a necessary part o f their efforts, sagamores were unlikely to gain
much support unless they backed their words with gifts, food, and other displays o f
largesse. In general, military organization in the Northeast was structured by four kinds
o f material exchange: tribute, feasts, trade, and competitive gift-giving. Each form of
exchange fostered the social relationships necessary to mobilize armies.
Most Wabanaki commoners at the beginning o f the seventeenth century paid
tribute to their sagamores in the form o f pelts, com, or other valuable items. In return,
sagamores acted as the leaders and representatives o f their kin and allies in peace and
war. They served as war captains, mediated disputes, and provided dogs, canoes, and
supplies to hunters. The more powerful sagamores had retinues o f unmarried young men
who presented their leaders with all their furs and served under them as warriors. The
payment o f tribute was a recognition o f sagamores' skills as military and political

"The Davies Journal of the 1607 North Virginia Voyage," in David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, eds.,
The English New England Voyages. 1602-1608 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1983), 433.
17Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh
and Jonathan E. Ericson. eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in North America (New York: Plenum Press,
1994), 34-35; H. P. Biggar, ed., The Works o f Samuel de Champlain. 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain
Society, 1922), 1:98-103 ; Marc Lescarbot, History o f New France, ed. and trans. W. L. Grant (Toronto:
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organizers: because powerful men could convince hundreds o f warriors to take up arms
against their enemies, they guaranteed a degree o f safety to their followers. Families who
gave gifts to their sagamores were sure to receive military backing if they were injured by
outsiders. Those who failed to align themselves with an influential strongman left
themselves vulnerable. In a sense, the relationship between sagamores and their
followers was a protection racket in which military security was exchanged for tribute.18
Sagamores did not usually keep tribute for their own use, but put furs and other
valuables back into circulation to recruit more military support. Early European visitors
were impressed by the size and frequency o f feasts hosted by Wabanaki sagamores. "As
long as they have anything," Pierre Biard wrote, "they are always celebrating feasts and
having songs, dances and speeches; if there is a crowd o f them you need not expect
anything else." Although some banquets were attended merely for pleasure, others had a
decidedly political tone. Sagamores did not give their wealth away piecemeal but
stockpiled it so they could make an ostentatious display at feasts.19
By the last quarter o f the seventeenth century and probably earlier, sagamores
prepared for war by hosting a dog feast for the warriors about to go into battle. Several
dogs belonging to the sagamore —typically his favorite ones —were slaughtered, boiled
in kettles, and served to the warriors. One by one, the sagamores attending the feast

The Champlain Society, 1907), 499-500; "The Description o f the Countrey of Mawooshen," in Quinn and
Quinn, English New England Voyages. 471.
18 JR, I: 75-77, 3: 87-89. On the protection racket as an organizing military principle in small-scale
societies, see Timothy Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power The Political Economy in Prehistory (Stanford,
Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 105-109. On the nature of Wabanaki leadership in the seventeenth
century, see Alvin Morrison, "Dawnland Decisions: Seventeenth-Century Wabanaki Leaders and their
Response to Differential Contact Stimuli in the Overlap Area o f New France and New England" (Ph.D.
diss., State University of New York, Buffalo, 1974).
19 JR, 3: 107. See also, Sieur de Diereville, Relation o f the Vovage to Port Roval in Acadia or New France
[1708], trans. Mrs. Clarence Webster, ed. John Clarence Webster (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933),
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would throw their hatchets onto the coals beneath the kettles and announce their intention
to join the expedition. The feast emboldened its participants to go to war and also served
as a token o f the sagamore’s esteem for his warriors and allies. This practice acted as a
ritual o f alliance in which warriors and their leaders paid respect to one another.20
Other feasts were held during peacetime to solidify alliances or cultivate
friendships. The feasts usually served as an occasion for trade or gift-giving between
sagamores o f allied groups. After they had eaten, leaders distributed large quantities of
gifts to their allies -- typically prestige goods such as furs, exotic cherts, copper,
wampum, hunting charms, or European merchandise. The gifts symbolized the
sagamores' respect for their allies while also advertising their ability to gather tribute
from their own followers. While it was conducted in a spirit o f generosity, gift-giving
often had a competitive edge: if a sagamore's gifts were not reciprocated by his partners,
it was likely that one or the other would lose face. When the Mi'kmaq sagamore
Messamoet presented Saco River leader Olmechin with a large gift o f French
merchandise in 1605, preceded by an hour-long speech proposing an alliance between
Saco and the Mi'kmaq, he became resentful when Olmechin did not return the favor. An
unreciprocated gift was equivalent to a payment o f tribute and implied the submission o f
Messamoet to Olmechin. Messamoet recoiled from such an interpretation and, according
to French observers, planned to make war on Olmechin.21

153-57; Thomas Pichon, Lettres et memoires oour servir a 1'histoire naturelle. civile et politique du Can
Breton... (La Haye: Pierre Gosse, 1760; reprinted ed., New York: S. R. Publishers, 1966), 105-113.
20 Diereville, Relation. 153-55; John Gyles, Memoirs o f Odd Adventures. Strange Deliverances. &c. in the
Captivity o f John Gvles. E s q . (Boston: S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1736), 28; "Relation par lettres de
l'Amerique septentrionalle, 1710," PAC, AN, Serie Cl 1A, vol. 122, fols. 303v-304v; JR, 67:203;
Deposition of Hezekiah Miles, May 31, 1695, in "Statements o f Grace Higiman and Others in Relation to
Being Taken Captive by the Indians," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 18 (1864), 163.
21 Biggar, Works o f Champlain. 1:395-96; Lescarbot, History o f New France. 323-25.
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Mi'kmaq sagamores such as Messamoet were placed in a position o f advantage in
the late sixteenth century because o f their privileged access to European goods. The
coastal areas o f Cape Breton, Acadia, and Gaspe that were frequented by European
fishermen in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries belonged to the Mi'kmaq, who
were able to monopolize the occasional trade that complemented fishing expeditions.
Acting as middlemen in the trade between Indians and Europeans, Mi'kmaq travelled
along the coast and into the interior, exchanging European goods for furs and food and
using the trade to cement alliances with other native groups. Some scholars have
suggested that the wars between Mi'kmaq and neighboring groups in the early
seventeenth century were occasioned in part by struggles over control o f the trade.22
Yet it is difficult to untangle the motives that led people to go to war. Certainly, it
would be a mistake to assume that Wabanakis operated under the Clausewitzian
assumption that war is a continuation o f policy by other means. Kinship, rather than the
state, was the organizing political principle o f their society, and sagamores did not
formulate or enforce "policy" directives. Violent conflict arose from personal disputes
between individuals, who drew on their kin and friends for support. Smaller
disagreements were resolved by mediation or by a form o f ritualized combat in which two
rivals stood face-to-face, wrestling and pulling at each other’s hair. More serious
offenses, such as murder or wife-stealing, were more likely to give rise to raids,
ambushes, and other violent reprisals that resulted in death. The most common cause o f
wars was a desire to revenge the murders o f kinfolk, a form o f conflict Daniel Richter,
following Marian Smith, has called the "mourning war". Relatives o f the victims took to

22 Bruce J. Bourque and Ruth Holmes Whitehead, 'Tarrantines and the Introduction of European Trade
Goods inthe Gulf of Maine," Ethnohistorv 32 (1985): 327-41; Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric
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the warpath after their death, to assuage their grief, retaliate against their enemies, and
bring home captives to replace their loved ones.23
The kin o f the deceased were naturally inclined to seek vengeance, but raids often
involved warriors who had no direct relationship to the victim. These warriors were not
simply following orders —sagamores did not have that power over their followers —but
were impelled to fight for their own interests or to please their families and friends. Since
sagamores led by consensus, the organizing o f a war party required them to recruit
followers through speeches, dog feasts, and presents. But the greatest attraction o f the
warpath was the opportunity to fight, since warfare brought men many rewards: plunder,
captives, scalps, glory, and honor. War in this sense was not simply a means to an end
but an end in itself.
Unmarried men were customarily the most bellicose element in Wabanaki society,
largely because they occupied a precarious position in their communities. Before they
were married, they could not keep their own dogs or hunting sacks and were subordinate
to their parents and sagamores. Nor could they marry until they proved to the fiancee's
parents that they were able hunters and providers and had procured enough goods to pay
her brideprice. Warfare provided young warriors with opportunities to fulfill all these
requirements. A man won respect in his community by returning home with scalps,
prisoners, and other war trophies that proved his valor and certified his ability to act as a
protector. Any plunder he could find —usually furs, wampum, and copper -- could be

Exchange," 23-46.
23JR. 3: 93; Daniel K. Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," William and Mary Quarterly.
3rd ser., 40 (1983): 528-59; Marian W. Smith, "American Indian Warfare," New York Academy of
Sciences, Transactions. 2nd ser., 13 (1951): 348-65; Thomas S. Abler, "Beavers and Muskets: Iroquois
Military Fortunes in the Face o f European Colonization," in R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead,
eds., War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare (Santa Fe, N. M.: School of
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distributed to friends and family or used toward the payment o f brideprice, although few
accounts o f Wabanaki warfare mention plunder as an important object o f war.
Another method o f finding a wife was to capture her in battle. European accounts
of Wabanaki battles suggest that warriors specifically looked to take their enemies'
women as captives. When the Penobscot River sagamore Bashabe was killed by
Mi'kmaq raiders in 1615, Ferdinando Gorges reported that the raiders took his wives,
daughters, "and such other matters as they thought o f value." Pierre Biard noted that the
theft o f wives was an occasional cause o f war among Wabanakis. And in his poetic
account o f a 1607 Mi'kmaq raid on Saco, Marc Lescarbot mused that the warriors
planned to take the village's stores o f com, "and if we want their women as plunder/We
will have them as well."24
Although wife-stealing may have involved jealousies and other romantic
entanglements, the value o f female captives lay above all in the importance o f their labor.
Much o f the daily work in Wabanaki society was performed by women, and no man
could reach a position o f status unless he was married. The most powerful sagamores of
the region generally had more than one wife and some, like Cacagous o f the Saint John
River, had as many as eight. The sagamores explained to Pierre Biard that this practice
not only multiplied the numbers o f their kin and offspring, but gave them control over the
labor of their wives. Their work was highly valued because, as Biard put it, "they have

American Research Press, 1992), 151-174. The violent death o f kin did not necessarily lead to war, since
murders could be absolved through the payment o f condolence gifts.
24 Ferdinando Gorges, A Briefe Narration of the Originall Undertakings o f the Advancement o f Plantations
in the Parts of America. Esnecialv. shewing the Beginning. Progress and Continuance o f that o f New
England [1658] (Boston: Publications o f the Prince Society, 1890), 90; JR, 3:93-95; Lescarbot, History of
New France. 502. (My translation; original reads: "Et si voulons avoir leurs femmes au pillage/Nous les
aurons aussi"). In a 1605 raid against the Etechemins, the Mi'kmaq sagamore lounescou and his followers
carried away women from the battle, although the captives were later put to death: see Biggar, Works of
Champlain. 1:435-36.
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no other servants, slaves, or mechanics but the women." Pressed by the need to organize
a continual round of feasts for their kin and allies, sagamores prized the additional work
of female captives and treated them as a valuable reward o f battle.25
While the desire for scalps, plunder, and captives has been well documented, there
is no evidence that Wabanaki leaders ever sought the conquest o f territory. European
observers remarked that sagamores had authority over particular river drainages, but this
way of talking was likely a shorthand description o f the geographical extent o f their
tributary networks. The basis o f sagamores' power lay in their influence over other
people rather than their ability to control resources -- or more precisely, the control o f
resources was embedded in social relationships, and sagamores came to power through
their capacity to mobilize kin and allies in the defense o f group interests. Human rather
than material wealth was the object o f wars: sagamores and young men went on the
warpath to take captives and scalps, to awe their allies and intimidate their enemies, or to
win tribute and honor. If wars were ever turf battles, they were struggles over personal
authority and the collection o f tribute and had nothing to do with the permanent
occupation o f villages or river basins. The tactics used by war captains were unsuited to
territorial conquest; raids and ambushes may have been effective in securing booty and
prisoners, but they did not give the attackers political control over their enemies.26

25JR, 3: 99-101.
26Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Wav o f Wan Technology and Tactics among the New England
Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison, 1991), 26-31. These remarks apply specifically to the Wabanakis: the
more sedentary groups living in the densely populated parts o f southern New England had a stronger sense
o f territoriality and may have fought over land. But even in these regions the collection o f tribute and the
taking o f vengeance seems to have weighed heavier in the minds o f war captains.
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Onontio's Children
The conquest and defense o f the land did not become an issue until the
demographic expansion o f New England and the growing strength ofN ew France forced
Wabanakis to take sides in the imperial wars o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Most Wabanakis leaned toward the French in these conflicts, having forged a tentative
military alliance with New France during the Iroquois wars o f the mid-seventeenth
century. The partnership between the French and Wabanakis was part o f a wide-ranging
defensive alliance that included Hurons, Algonquins, Montagnais, and other groups
threatened by Iroquois raids. Elements o f the alliance had been formed at least as far
back as the sixteenth century, but the growing influence o f European powers, combined
with the increasing frequency and scale o f Iroquois attacks, led these disparate groups to
form closer diplomatic contacts in the seventeenth century.27
New France's earliest trading contacts outside o f Acadia were with the
Montagnais and Algonquins north o f the St. Lawrence River and with the Hurons of
Georgian Bay, all o f whom were engaged in occasional warfare with the Iroquois. The
French alliance with these groups, and their closely related desire to control access to
trade with the Great Lakes region, drew them into conflict with the Five Nations.
Epidemic disease, which depleted native populations and gave rise to a desire for war
captives, and competition for furs led to a sharp increase in the intensity o f Iroquois raids
in the 1630s. The victims o f the attacks included Wabanaki villages along the upper
Connecticut River, who in the 1640s were drawn into war against the Iroquois and a
tentative alliance with the French. In 1650, French authorities dispatched Father Gabriel
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Druillettes and Noel Tekwerimat to Norridgewock and surrounding communities to enlist
eastern Wabanakis and English colonists in the defense o f Connecticut River villages.
Some Christian Wabanakis, already allied with Algonquin and Montagnais converts,
gladly joined. In the 1660s, hostilities worsened as Mohawks, the easternmost Iroquois
tribe, launched a prolonged campaign against native villages and European outposts as far
as the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers.28
The defensive alliance o f the Iroquois wars was translated into a Frenchdominated system o f military defense during the colonial wars o f the next century. New
France's most reliable Wabanaki allies in these conflicts came from the Canadian mission
villages o f Odanak (St. Francis) and Wolinak (Becancour), which were established in
the last quarter o f the seventeenth century to accommodate the growing number o f
Wabanakis at Sillery and the influx o f Indian refugees from King Philip's War in New
England. Devoutly Catholic and loyal to their French protectors, the domicilies, as they
were known, provided a steady supply o f auxiliary troops for French wars. Warriors
from Odanak fought in every conflict against New England from 1688 to 1763 and also
saw service in New York, the Great Lakes, and Louisiana. French officials exerted their
influence to a milder degree among the Wabanakis remaining in Acadia, largely through
Jesuit missionaries in villages such as Norridgewock, Panawapskik, and Medoctec in the
last quarter o f the seventeenth century.

27 On the creation o f a French-led defensive alliance in the west, see Richard White, The Middle Ground:
Indians. Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region. 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 1-185.
28 Jose A. Brandao, "Your Fvre Shall Bum No More": [roauois Policy toward New France and Its Native
Allies to 1701 (Lincoln, Neb.: University o f Nebraska Press, 1997); Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal o f the
Lonehouse: The Peonies of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, N. C.:
University o f North Carolina Press, 1992); Gordon M. Day, "The Ouragie War: A Case History in
Iroquois-New England Relations," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, Marianne Mithun, eds., Extending
the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroauoian Studies (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 35-50.
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Wabanakis did not merely follow the French lead in these wars but were drawn
into an alliance through shared interests. In the earliest stages o f the War o f the League
o f Augsburg, western Wabanaki antipathy toward the English and the Iroquois tended to
feed into each other, since Mohawk leaders were allied with New York and depended on
the English for supplies o f arms and ammunition. New France had begun a war against
the Iroquois in the summer o f 1687, two years before the formal declaration o f war
between the British and French crowns. Wabanakis from Odanak had assisted in a raid
against the Senecas, the westernmost Iroquois tribe, and had returned with Iroquois and
English scalps. The Senecas were allied with New York, which officially had jurisdiction
east o f the Kennebec River in the 1680s, and the Iroquois looked to their English allies
for succor. A dispute was already brewing between the English and eastern Wabanakis,
who had fought a war between 1675 and 1678 and whose relations were strained in the
decade that followed. In 1686 and 1688, English officials sponsored expeditions against
the trading house o f the Baron St.-Castin, a veteran o f the Iroquois wars who had set up
shop as a fur trader in Penobscot Bay, marrying the daughter o f Madockawando, the most
powerful sagamore o f the region. These attacks exacerbated tensions between the
Wabanakis and the English, which had already been aroused by trading abuses, the
encroachment o f settlers on Wabanaki fishing spots and planting grounds, and the failure
o f the English to pay tribute to the sagamores who claimed suzerainty over their lands.29

29 CDRH. 1:439; Kenneth M. Morrison, The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal o f Alliance in
Abenaki-Euroamerican Relations (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), 115-22; Steele,
Waroaths. 137-41; John G. Reid, Acadia. Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth
Century (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1981), 178-83; Cotton Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum,"
in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Narrarives o f the Indian Wars. 1675-1699 fNew York: Bames and Noble,
1941/New York: Scribner, 1913), 186. The French also supported Wabanakis in their 1675-78 war against
the English, albeit on a much smaller scale: see Emerson Baker, "New Evidence on the French
Involvement in King Philip's War,1' Maine Historical Society Quarterly 28 (1988): 85-91.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

316
Wabanakis entered the war for self-interested reasons, but they gravitated toward
an alliance with the French, deferentially calling governors their "fathers" and accepting
the guidance o f French officers in the battlefield. Far from being instinctive, this
deference was the result o f a calculated strategy on the part o f the French to win the
loyalty o f their Indian allies through the distribution o f presents. Like sagamores,
governors gained the allegiance o f their military followers by providing for their needs
and making ostentatious displays o f generosity. But French authorities had access to far
greater quantities o f presents than any sagamore, and the flow o f revenues from royal
coffers enabled them to mobilize and command a network o f military allies o f a
continental scale. Needless to say, the allegiance o f Wabanakis to the French crown was
not simply a matter o f pecuniary interest, and owed much to a shared devotion to
Catholicism, ties of kinship, and a common distrust o f the English. But according to
Wabanaki custom, the exchange o f gifts fostered political relationships, acting as a social
lubricant that brought allies closer together. The lavish distribution o f royal presents
offered tangible proof o f French goodwill and bolstered their claims to paternal authority
over Indian allies.30
In the first o f the imperial wars, the recruitment and payment o f Wabanaki troops
was split between Quebec and Port Royal, although the Acadian government played a

30 For a contrary view, see David L. Ghere, "The Maine Experience During the French and Indian War," in
William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Twenty-Fourth Aleonauian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1993), 188-98. Ghere argues that "the utility o f gifts was minimal on Maine frontier diplomacy,"
and that the "Abenaki-French alliance was based on factors other than gift-giving." He points out that the
exchange of gifts between 1748 and 17S5 failed to quell hostilities or to induce Indians to switch their
allegiances. But by choosing to limit his discussion to the final years o f the colonial wars, Ghere skews his
evidence to suit his conclusions. The Franco-Wabanaki alliance developed over generations and,
according to statements by both Wabanakis and the French, it had been solidified by the exchange of
presents. By the 1750s the English were offering the Wabanakis presents of equal or greater value than the
French, but the fact that these offers did not bring a reversal in their allegiances does not discount the
importance of gift-giving in Wabanaki diplomacy.
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more significant role. The leadership o f Acadia was dominated by military men —
governors Hector de Grandfontaine, Jacques de Chambly, and Joseph Robinau de
Villebon were all military officers and veterans o f the Iroquois wars —but the military
strength of the colony was negligible. William Phips's 1690 expedition against Port
Royal, followed by the depredations o f Leislerian vessels from New York, had levelled
the provincial capital and forced the colony's government to relocate to the St. John
River. In October 1699, Governor Villebon reported there were only seventy-seven
regular soldiers in Acadia, about the same number stationed there ten years earlier.
According to a 1703 report, the colony's military strength had increased to four
companies o f fifty men each, all o f them garrisoned at the recently rebuilt capital o f Port
Royal. A half dozen smaller militia companies were added to this total, although the
militiamen were used primarily in the defense o f their own communities. The military
establishment was inadequate unless bolstered by Wabanaki warriors, and Villebon and
other officials were frankly aware o f their dependence on native allies. With the
exception o f privateering expeditions, every French victory in New England during the
War of the League o f Augsburg was scored with the assistance o f Indian troops.31
The price of this service was paid in presents, distributed first by French
missionaries or military officers to sagamores and then from the sagamores to their
followers. The presents accounted for a little less than half o f Acadia's wartime budget
and generally ranged between 2,000 and 6,000 livres annually. The staple items o f giftgiving were the tools o f war: muskets, pistols, powder, shot, flints, bayonets, and

31 John Clarence Webster, ed., Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Centurv: Letters. Journals and
Memoirs of Joseph Robineau de Villebon. Commandant in Acadia. 1690-1700 and Other Contemporary
Documents (Saint John, N.B.: The New Brunswick Museum, 1934), 125; Delabat, letter to Monsieur de
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hatchets. French authorities also provided their allies with a wide array o f provisions and
other trade goods, such as bread, flour, rice, brandy, tobacco, shirts, leggings, blankets,
hats, yam, thread, and cloth. The range o f goods was similar to the merchandise
available at English trading houses, although munitions rather than provisions were the
mainstays o f French gifts. While miscellaneous items such as chocolate, buttons,
molasses, sails, seeds, and paddles were occasionally added to this list, the basic packet of
goods remained the same in later wars.32
Warriors also expected to earn further rewards through battle, over and above the
presents distributed at war feasts and by missionaries. The gifts covered the cost o f arms
and the support o f their families, but the real profits o f war came from the battles
themselves. Warriors regularly took plunder from the houses o f English settlers,
although the booty was limited to easily portable items such as coins and guns. They also
returned home with captives: some were adopted by Wabanaki families while the less
fortunate were summarily killed or tortured to death. Warriors sold most o f their
prisoners to the French, who kept them as servants until they found an opportunity to
exchange or sell them back to the English. During the War o f Spanish Succession,
governor Joseph Dudley o f Massachusetts resolved "never to Set up an Algier Trade" o f
war prisoners with the French, but most New England families went to great lengths to
redeem their loved ones from captivity, and paid the French accordingly. French
authorities also purchased scalps; according to one English captive, Wabanakis who

Villermont, Port Royal, November 20,1703, in William Inglis Morse, ed., Acadiensia Nova (1598-1779).
2 vols. (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1935), 2:1-2.
32 CDRH. 1:447,471,474; 2: 73-74, 111, 129-30, 178,201, 203,206-7,291-92. Records o f presents
dispensed to Wabanakis by the royal storehouse in Montreal during the War of Austrian Succession
indicate a similar variety of goods, including a cow given on the occasion o f a war feast. The gifts were
distributed at feasts, rewarded to warriors returning from battle, or given to their wives and children while
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visited Quebec in 1692 were paid £10 for a captive and £5 for every scalp. Joseph
Dudley reported in 1709 that the going rate for scalps in Quebec fluctuated between 20
shillings and £5. Scalps continued to fetch an attractive price in later conflicts: at the
beginning o f the Seven Years War, Wabanaki warriors were paid 40 to 50 livres (about
£3 or £4 sterling) for each English scalp brought to the French. For young Wabanaki
men, the possibility o f such spoils was the greatest material incentive for going on the
warpath, while the distribution o f presents before the battle guaranteed them a minimum
reward for their service.33
When added to the expense o f war feasts and presents, scalp bounties could
amount to considerable sums. But the costs o f recruiting and provisioning Wabanaki
troops remained far lower than the expense o f maintaining regular soldiers. According to
Villebon's 1692 budget, the total value o f Indian presents for the year amounted to 2950
livres. The presents were distributed among Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Abenaki warriors as
far south as the Kennebec River, who together could muster some 500 warriors. Under
the conservative assumption that only half o f all adult male Wabanakis fought against the
English, and that only half o f the latter received presents from Acadia, the cost o f a year’s
service for each warrior would have been about 24 livres. Regular soldiers, by contrast,
were paid a salary o f 9 livres per month, or 108 livres annually; high-ranking officers
received monthly salaries as high as 90 livres. Wabanaki troops also had several practical
advantages over their French counterparts: they did not have to be paid or garrisoned
year-round and could be recruited for particular campaigns and released immediately

they were off at war. See "Depenses a l'occasion de la Guerre, 4 demiers mois 1746," PAC, AN, Serie
Cl 1A, vol. 86, fols. 178-231. See also, vol. 87, fols. 2-21.
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afterward. The costs o f provisioning and arming them, furthermore, were subsumed
under the expenses o f presents, which always included guns, powder, shot, and food. By
any accounting measure, Wabanaki warriors were a better buy than French regulars.34
But in purchasing military protection at such a low price, French authorities
forfeited a degree o f military control. Wabanaki troops lacked the discipline o f their
European counterparts and on several occasions refused to continue fighting when they
encountered bad omens. Wabanaki leaders also proved to be fickle allies, who attacked
the English ferociously when the desire for vengeance ran hot, but made entreaties o f
peace if material deprivation or heavy losses cooled their ardor. After suffering some
painful defeats in Dummer's War (1722-25), most Wabanakis in Maine pursued a policy
of neutrality, although English intransigence usually pushed them onto the French side.
Even during Dummer's War, Indians from Maine were more inclined to take prisoners
than to kill settlers, a fact noted with disapproval by Huron warriors from Canada, who
said the Norridgewocks "were but women in the war."35 During the War o f Austrian
Succession, twenty Pigwackets took refuge with the English, some o f them even serving
as soldiers in the English army. The Penobscots, who lived further from English
settlements, attempted to remain neutral in 1755 and were forced to choose sides only
because the English demanded their exclusive allegiance.36

33 "Statements o f Grace Higiman and Others," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 18
(1864): 161-62; DHSM. 9: 259, 294. Presumably both Higiman and Dudley were speaking o f English
pounds, and not French livres.
34 Webster, Acadia. 203. Catherine M. Desbarats has made a similar calculation for the comparative costs
of French and Indian troops in the mid-eighteenth century, finding that Indian warriors cost less than half
as much as French Regulars. See "The Cost o f Early Canada’s Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's
Rhetoric," William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 52 (1995): 609-30.
35 CSP, vol. 34 (1725), foi. 741,430.
36 Boston Gazette. July 10, November 30, and December 4,1744; DHSM. 24:11-62.
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Wabanakis in Maine were inspired to fight over local issues: the protection o f
their lands, vengeance o f dead relatives, retribution for trading abuses. In many cases,
their acts o f aggression -- particularly the killing o f livestock —were simply intended as a
protest against English encroachments on their territory. Whenever it became clear that
warfare might cost them their lives or their homes, they were inclined to negotiate a peace
with the English. Warriors were willing to take risks to capture scalps and prisoners, but
they did not engage in foolhardy campaigns that endangered the lives o f their wives and
children. This reluctance did not please the French, who depended on Wabanakis to
defend their territorial claims in Maine. French officials lent their support to warriors
because they trusted the Indians to defend their lands against English armies. From a
French point o f view, warfare was meant to advance the strategic interests o f the French
state, and Wabanakis had value only insofar as they served this cause. But Wabanaki
warriors failed to fit the model o f a professional army and remained committed to their
own interests, fighting for the French only so long as the alliance was beneficial to their
communities.37
Even when they were loyal to the French, Indian auxiliaries fought in a way that
limited the military options o f French commanders. Wabanaki tactics and strategies were
designed with an eye toward taking as many captives and scalps as possible, without
suffering significant losses themselves. Conquest or permanent occupation did not figure
in their plans. Typically, non-Christian Wabanakis consulted with a shaman before

37 The villages o f Odanak and Wolinak were not threatened by English armies until 17S9, and their
warriors were generally more eager to fight than the Wabanakis o f Maine. By the 1720s, a large
proportion of the attacks on English settlements in Maine were made by Indians from Canada. Included
among these Indians were Wabanakis, but also other domicilies and allies o f the French: in addition to the
ISO warriors raised from Odanak and Wolinak during Dummer’s War, French and Wabanaki leaders
recruited about 200 Mohawk, Huron, Nipissing, and Algonquin warriors. See Rapport de Longueil et
Begon, Oct 31, 1725, PAC, AN, Serie Cl IA, vol. 47, fol. 67.
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setting out to battle, asking him if omens advised against making a raid or if any
ambushes laid in wait. Christians took confession with their priest. Then, if the signs
were good, they rendezvoused and divided themselves into companies o f thirty or forty,
each one choosing a town they would "eat," or attack. The companies approached the
towns quietly, looking for opportunities to catch their enemies by surprise, and struck
rapidly. Battles generally only lasted a few hours and rarely continued for more than a
few days. Warriors almost never tried to storm an armed fort or garrison, choosing
instead to stand outside its walls, taunting its occupants to come outside to fight.
Warriors took as much plunder and as many captives as they could and beat a hasty
retreat into the woods. They then bound their captives, loaded their canoes, and began
the voyage home. This style o f warfare suited Wabanaki military objectives and also
made use o f their skills as hunters, since the tactics o f the raid closely resembled the
stages o f the hunt: divination to determine the location o f quarry, tracking to find its
whereabouts, shooting to kill, and a return home with prey.38
Harrowing as they were to frontier settlers, Wabanaki military actions never
threatened the existence o f New England as a whole. Although Wabanakis scored
spectacular victories in raids on Salmon Falls, Fort Pemaquid, and Oyster River, their
attacks were directed only at outlying communities and never resulted in the conquest of
territory. As French officials often put it, the effect o f Wabanaki attacks was to harceler
les Anglois -- to harry the English. Indian raids put English colonists on the defensive,
forcing them to divert a considerable portion o f their military resources to frontier patrols
and garrisons. But without greater supplies o f munitions, ships, and disciplined troops,
French commanders could not hope to launch the kind o f large-scale expeditions that

38 J R , 67:203; Diereville, Relation. 156-57; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 238.
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secured English conquests at Port Royal, Louisbourg, and Quebec. A shortage o f
provisions and arms dashed French plans for assaults against Boston in 1696 and
Annapolis Royal in 1745, and officials knew that the conquest o f New England was only
possible if the French crown provided colonial forces with large quantities o f ships,
ammunition, provisions, and men. This level o f metropolitan commitment was not
forthcoming until the Seven Years War: the heavy cost o f European wars had left Louis
XIV and his successors deeply in debt and they were reluctant to empty their pockets to
defend a marginal and economically insignificant comer o f their kingdom.39
Lacking firepower and men, the French were forced to make a reciprocal
arrangement with the Wabanakis, who defended the colony's imperial frontiers and
received presents and other forms o f succor in return. French presents and diplomatic
support gave Wabanakis leverage in their disputes with the English, and helped to slow
the incursion o f New Englanders into Indian lands. Wabanakis, for their part, created a
military buffer between New France and New England and acted as the proxies o f the
French in imperial disputes. This agreement allowed both sides to make the most out o f
scarce resources, but it also underscored the precariousness o f their claims to the land.
An underfunded, undermanned army could achieve the limited goals o f capturing
plunder, prisoners, and scalps but had little ability to topple fortified strongholds or
conquer large towns. French and Wabanaki forces left New England reeling during the
1690s, but as English forces became more adept at parrying their opponents' thrusts, the
weakness o f this arrangement became apparent.

39 Steele. Warpaths. 131-74.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

324
The Economics o f Scalping
Loosely organized and small in number, French-supported Wabanaki armies were
apparently a weak match for their English opponents. New England's population was
several times the size o f New France, its provincial treasuries were filled with substantial
revenues, and its active commercial life made it possible to supply frontier outposts with
large quantities of arms and provisions. Yet in every war before 1754, Wabanakis fought
the English to a standstill, making minor concessions in peace treaties but retaining
effective control over their territories. The English failure to win a decisive victory
against the Wabanakis was a testament to both the skill o f Indian warriors and the
inadequacies o f New England's military system. Although they had more considerable
forces at their disposal, English commanders in the early eighteenth century labored
under the same conditions as the French: strapped by insufficient funds, lacking in
soldiers, suffering from inadequate supply, and confused over strategy and objectives.
These problems were acute in Maine, where the forested environment favored the
Indians' guerrilla tactics and the local English population had neither the numbers nor the
wealth to defend itself. York County’s militia was too small to defend its own towns -- as
the region's inhabitants had painfully discovered during the First Anglo-Wabanaki War —
and English settlers in Maine looked to the provincial government for soldiers, munitions,
supplies, and funds in later conflicts. Because Maine was far removed from the
population centers o f the province, the supply o f arms and men to the region was costly.
A week's march separated Maine from Boston and even troops and supplies transported
by sail took at least a full day to arrive. This distance placed a considerable burden on the
provincial government, which was responsible for building and supplying forts, recruiting
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and paying soldiers garrisoned at the posts or marching between towns, equipping and
provisioning troops, and organizing maritime patrols in the G ulf o f Maine to defend
fishing vessels against privateers.
Although Maine's militiamen and taxpayers contributed substantially to the
defense of their towns, most o f the cost was borne by the inhabitants o f southern New
England. Military and naval expenditures accounted for as much as 90% o f the
provincial government's budget in wartime -- the percentage reached its peak during the
War o f Spanish Succession -- and even in years o f peace, about half o f all public
expenditures went toward the army and navy. The revenues were raised through a variety
of methods: bills of credit, the sale o f public lands, paper money, and, after 1749,
subsidies from the British parliament. But the single largest source o f revenue was taxes,
whether in the form o f excise, customs, polls, or assessments o f property. Because New
England was hit harder by French attacks than any other English province, its inhabitants
paid higher taxes than elsewhere in British North America. Although the main
beneficiaries o f military defense lived on the frontiers, taxes ran highest in Boston and
other commercial centers, which suffered under fiscal laws that assessed agricultural
property at lower rates than commercial investments.40
Many townspeople in Boston and central Massachusetts were understandably
reluctant to loosen their purse strings for military campaigns in Maine. Few would have
hesitated to pay for the defense o f their own homes, but the protection o f the remote and

40Julian Gwyn, "Financial Revolution in Massachusetts: Public Credit and Taxation, 1692-1774," Histoire
sociale-Social History. 17 (1984): 59-77; H. Janies Henderson, "Taxation and Political Culture:
Massachusetts and Virginia, 1760-1800," William and Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 47 (1990): 90-114; Robert
A. Becker, Revolution. Reform, and the Politics o f American Taxation. 1763-1783 (Baton Rouge, La.:
Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 8-41. As Henderson points out, New England also had higher tax
rates than southern colonies in the 1760s because its provinces spent more heavily on schools and roads.
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sparsely populated towns o f York County was o f secondary importance to most. New
Englanders were far more willing to support large-scale expeditions against French
strongholds in Canada and Acadia, which entailed exorbitant costs and high risks but
promised large quantities o f plunder and clear-cut military victories. In the first decade
o f the eighteenth century, the provincial assembly repeatedly refused to fund the
construction of a new fort at Pemaquid -- the previous one having been razed in 1696 -claiming that its dubious strategic value did not warrant the expense.41 But even as it
cried poor over the defense o f the Maine frontier, the House o f Representatives gave
financial backing to naval and military expeditions against Port Royal in 1707,1709, and
1710, and Quebec in 1709 and 1711, each campaign costing considerably more than the
price of rebuilding the fort.
Frontier campaigns also failed to recruit the thousands o f soldiers who signed on
for expeditions against French capitals. The attractions o f a campaign against Quebec or
Louisbourg were too great for many young men to resist: a short term o f service, the
possibility o f plunder, a chance for military glory. Service in the backwoods o f Maine
was a dismal prospect by comparison. Soldiers spent year after year at frontier garrisons,
making occasional marches in the biting cold or through swampy marshes in a futile
search for the enemy. There was little plunder to be won, other than a few packets o f furs
seized from hunters and the occasional ornament pillaged from a church. Only two years
after they had recruited some 4,000 soldiers for the expedition against Louisbourg, New
England's leaders found themselves unable to enlist even 200 volunteers for service in

But before the defeat of the French in the Seven Years War, military spending remained the greatest
fmancial burden for New England's provincial governments.
41 On opposition to the rebuilding o f Fort Pemaquid, see DHSM. 9 :8 9 ,11 4 ,117, 125, 130-35, 138, 16972,199-201, 227-228.
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Maine. Most men, they were told, did not want to sign on for a term o f three years on the
eastern frontier. Captain David Cargill, writing from Sheepscot in 1747, told the
provincial secretary that the country was in a "Deplorable state," with its "Garrisons so
scattered with so few men In them that we are in no Condition to help one Another, and
our people Almost worn out with Duty." A year later, James McCobb reported from
Georgetown on Arrowsic Island that the town was in a "Defenceless Condition," with
only 50 soldiers in its garrisons, 42 o f them local inhabitants.42
The challenge for political leaders in Boston was to entice young men to fight in
frontier campaigns without putting undue strain on the provincial treasury. Conscription
was the cheapest and most effective way o f forcing young men into the army and many of
the soldiers who fought in Maine were impressed into the service by the government.
But the press was unpopular, and many avoided it by paying fines or offering substitutes.
Government officials were more likely to entice recruits by offering them a carrot -- in
the form o f bonuses and incentives - than by beating them with the stick o f impressment.
Although the eighteenth century militia included all able-bodied men between the ages o f
16 and 60, it was in practice a pool o f potential recruits from which "marching troops" the companies o f volunteers who participated in offensives -- could be drawn 43
The troops posted in Maine were a mixture o f militiamen from York County’s
towns, drawn into the service to defend their own homes, and volunteers from southern
New England, motivated by patriotism, a lust for adventure, a desire for profit, or a lack
o f alternative employment. Muster rolls from Dummer’s War, which occasionally

42 DHSM. 11:366-67,396-97,401-3.
43 Jack S. Radabaugh, "The Military System o f Colonial Massachusetts, 1690-1740," PhD dissertation,
University of Southern California, 1965,1-17; Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 42-52; Fred Anderson, A
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recorded the soldiers’ places o f origin, indicate that the defense o f Maine depended to a
large degree on the support o f troops from southern New England. Some companies,
such as the 38 men who served under Captain James Grant in the summer o f 1725, were
made up entirely o f volunteers from York County. But just as typical was the company
o f Captain Joseph Heath, stationed at Fort Richmond between June and November o f the
same year. Only 5 o f the 45 men in the company were from York County: 15, including
the Captain himself, were from Essex County; another 15 were from Middlesex and
Suffolk, including 10 from Boston; others were drawn from such places as Barnstable,
Nantucket, Plymouth County, Connecticut, and Philadelphia. All but 2 o f the 19 privates
in Captain John Gyles’s company, meanwhile, were Irish —presumably immigrants
living in northern New England -- while the officers were nearly all residents o f Essex
County.44
Because most captains did not record the residences o f their soldiers, it is
impossible to determine the exact percentage o f soldiers fighting in Maine who were
from York County. But the large number o f muster rolls that included such information
may be treated as a representative if unscientific sample o f the whole [see Table 5.1]. O f
the soldiers who were known to have served in companies posted in Maine and whose
places o f residence were recorded, fewer than half in Dummer’s War and King George's
War came from York County. Over two-thirds o f the soldiers in both wars were from
York, New Hampshire, and the two Massachusetts counties closest to Maine, Essex and

People’s Armv: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University
of North Carolina Press, 1984), 1-30.
44 William Blake Trask, "Letters o f Col. Thomas Westbrook and Others, Relative to Indian Affairs in
Maine,” New England Historical and Genealogical Register 48 (1894), 439-40; 49 (1895), 184-87. The
origins of two men in Heath's company are not listed. Gyles' roll listed the sons of two privates, both of
them from Ireland, not included in this tally.
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Middlesex. In all the wars, York contributed more soldiers to its defense than any other
county yet depended on troops from elsewhere for the majority o f its soldiers.
Admittedly, the data culled from these rolls underrate the extent o f York County's
participation because they do not count unpaid volunteers or the hundreds o f York's
inhabitants who served at Louisbourg and other offensive expeditions. Yet even if these
additional numbers are taken into account, there is little denying Maine's dependence on
troops sent from elsewhere in Massachusetts. The geography o f recruitment in New
England was not unlike that o f Europe, where soldiers were drawn in disproportionate
numbers from both cities and frontiers. In per capita terms, York County made a larger
human contribution to the war effort than other counties, but because o f its small
population it also needed reinforcements from urban centers in Essex, Suffolk, and
Middlesex counties.45

Table 5.1: Place of Origin. Soldiers Serving in Maine. 1722-27. 1744-55.

1722-27
1744-55

York

Essex

Middlesex

115(43.6%)
204 (22.7%)

49(18.6%)
193 (21.5%)

16(6.1%)
186(20.7%)

O ther MA
Counties
51 (19.3%)
286 (31.8%)

O ther

Total

33(12.5%)
30(3.3%)

264(100%)
899(100%)

The onus for recruiting soldiers fell on the shoulders o f captains. Although the
army in provincial Massachusetts was a public institution, it depended on officers who
acted essentially as private contractors. Every year during wartime, the governor or

45 Sources: Myron 0 . Stachiw, comp, and ed., Massachusetts Officers and Soldiers. 1723-1743: Dummer's
War to the War of Jenkins' Ear (Boston: The Society o f Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth o f
Massachusetts and The New England Historical and Genealogical Society, 1979); Robert E. MacKay,
comp, and ed., Massachusetts Soldiers in the French and Indian Wars. 1744-55 (Boston: Society of
Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts; New England Historical and Genealogical Society,
1978). Soldiers with multiple enslistments are only counted once. On European patterns o f recruitment,
see Parker, Military Revolution. 47.
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lieutenant governor would formally appoint a colonel to command the regiment stationed
in Maine, sending him a packet o f blank commissions for his junior officers. The colonel
would then appoint or re-appoint a captain, ensign, and lieutenant for each o f the
companies in the regiment. Captains and colonels were the point men o f this system,
charged with the recruitment and command o f the soldiers. In most eighteenth-century
wars, the captains were allowed a recruitment bounty for every volunteer they enlisted,
which was usually divided between the officers and their soldiers. At intervals o f six or
eight months, the captains would present muster rolls for their companies to the
provincial treasurer or commissary, who paid them the soldiers' wages in a lump sum.46
Because the wages were paid at the end o f their service, soldiers were advanced
supplies and provisions by their captains, who deducted the cost from their wages or, if
necessary, paid them out o f their own pocket. Major Thomas Church, who led an
expedition to Maine in 1690, complained that delays in the outfitting o f transport ships
caused him great financial difficulty because his troops "daily expected to be treated by
him."47 The financial risks o f military expeditions were borne as much by the companies
as they were by the government. In August 1725, the company from York County led by
Captain James Grant protested the declaration o f a cease fire by the government,
explaining that they had gone to great trouble and expense to equip and arm themselves
for their term o f service, which had begun in June. Without the wages gained from a full
six-month term, the company found itself deeply in debt, and Grant speculated that since
many o f his soldiers were "very poor men," he would have to cover their debts himself.
Grant pleaded for ~ and was ultimately given —a chance to make an expedition against

46 Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 323-38.
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the Wabanakis, which allowed his men wages for an additional three months, as well as
the possibility o f captives, scalp bounties, and plunder.48
O f these four possible rewards, wages were the most reliable, if not the most
lucrative. Nominal wage rates for soldiers did not fluctuate much over the course o f the
century: in 1703, privates serving in Maine were paid 5s. a week for garrison duty, 6s. if
they were posted elsewhere; in 1746, they were paid 25s. per month, plus 5s. for billeting;
in 1755, the monthly wage for marching troops had risen slightly to 26s. 8d. During
Dummer's War, volunteers were paid 2s. 6d. per day while on duty. These sums
compared favorably with the going rate for farm laborers, who were paid a higher daily
wage but were lucky to work more than three days a week. Soldiers, on the other hand,
were paid for six days o f work a week, and usually finished their term o f service with
enough money to pay off their debts or purchase a few acres o f land. Officers, who
ranked higher than their soldiers in both the civilian and military worlds, received higher
wages: in 1755, captains o f marching companies were paid £4 16s. per month, lieutenants
£3 4s., and sergeants £1 14s. Id.49
Wage rates for soldiers were an attraction o f military service, but in the eyes of
many they were not high enough to justify the hardships o f life in the army. Agricultural
labor was strenuous and demanding, but farm hands did not suffer the myriad discomforts
of camp life, much less the possibility o f violent death or dismemberment on the
battlefield. To many, such risks were only justified if ample plunder was promised as a

47 Benjamin Church, The History of the Eastern Expeditions o f 1689. 1690. 1692. 1696. and 1704 against
the Indians and French (Boston: J. K. Wiggin and W. Parsons Lunt, 1867), 68.
48 DHSM, 10:318-19.
49 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 8:35-36; 13:521; 15:347; DHSM. 10:283; Daniel Vickers, Farmers
and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex Countv. Massachusetts. 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill, N. C.:
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reward. The leaders o f expeditions against Port Royal and Louisbourg openly recognized
the importance o f booty to their troops, and William Phips reported in 1692 that soldiers
fighting in Maine were "much encouraged" by the distribution o f plunder and captives
among them. In his study o f the siege o f Louisbourg, George Rawlyk opined that a
desire for plunder was "probably the most important single reason" for soldiers to enlist
for the expedition. But unlike French capitals, Indian settlements did not have large
stores of moveable wealth ready to be pillaged, and service on the Maine frontier was
consequently less profitable for soldiers.50
But the provincial government found a ready substitute for plunder in the form o f
scalp bounties, which were introduced in a 1689 law and revived in every successive war.
The practice o f scalping is reprehensible to modem sensibilities, and many have pointed
to New England's scalp bounties as evidence o f genocidal intentions toward the Indians.
Even in the eighteenth century, the idea o f scalping made some people uneasy,
particularly those whose understanding o f war was conditioned by Old World experience.
Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were gradually developing a notion
of "civilized" warfare: a style o f war carried out under a set o f rules that prohibited
sadistic forms o f brutality and forced soldiers to act according to an unwritten code o f
honor. Many considered scalping and torture •• two aspects o f pre-contact Indian warfare
that continued to be practised in the seventeenth century - as the sort o f behavior
outlawed by the rules o f "civilized" war. In 1709, governor Joseph Dudley o f
Massachusetts denounced scalping as a "Barbarous" custom and excoriated the French for

University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 250-51; Anderson, People’s Artnv. 38-39. See also, Eames,"
Rustic Warriors," 271-75.
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placing bounties on English heads. But Dudley's words were betrayed by his deeds, for
he himself had approved legislation that rewarded soldiers for taking Wabanaki scalps.51
English leaders such as Dudley overlooked their moral qualms over the practice
because the grim logic o f scalp bounties was too compelling to ignore. In frontier
campaigns, the English faced two chronic problems: a lack o f funds and an inability to
deal decisive blows to the enemy. Scalp bounties addressed both problems, creating
incentives for soldiers without exhausting the treasury. The strategic logic o f scalp
bounties was the easiest to understand. Because Wabanakis withdrew from their villages
whenever they were threatened with attack, the challenge o f frontier warfare for English
soldiers lay more in finding their enemies than in fighting them. English troops might
raze a Wabanaki village one week only to see its inhabitants build their wigwams
somewhere else the next. The object o f warfare was consequently to kill and capture the
enemy rather than to seize their territory. In order to defend themselves against FrancoWabanaki raids, English forces would have to adopt guerrilla strategies themselves.52
Not surprisingly, many English commanders recruited soldiers who were familiar
with guerrilla warfare. A number o f captains drew most or all their soldiers from

50 DHSM. 10: 3; George A. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, Me.: University o f Maine Press,
1969), 46; Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 191-92. Plunder taken from Indians was divided among soldiers in
proportion to their wages: see Massachusetts Archives, vol. 71, fol. 102.
51 James Axtell and William C. Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping?" William and
Marv Quarterly. 3rd ser., 37 (1980): 451-72; James Axtell, "Scalping: The Ethnohistory of a Moral
Question," in his The European and the Indian: Essavs in the Ethnohistory o f Colonial North America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 201-41; Harold E. Selesky, "Colonial America," in Michael
Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., The Laws o f Wan Constraints on Warfare
in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 59-85; Steele, Warpaths. 136; DHSM. 9:
259.
52 Musing that New England’s Indians may have been descended from the Scythians, Cotton Mather
repeated Julius Caesar’s observation regarding Asian tribes, Difficilius invenire quam interficere: "It is
harder to find them than to foil them." See Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 203. Although Mather's
genealogical speculations were off the mark, his allusion was a p t The Roman frontier in Asia roughly
corresponded with the limits o f arable farmland, and the groups beyond the frontier were, like Wabanakis,
mobile tribes who could strike quickly and retreat rapidly.
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Protestant Indian communities in Massachusetts, where there was an abundance o f young
men with tracking skills and a dearth o f alternative occupations. Benjamin Church, who
led numerous military expeditions to Maine in the 1690s and 1700s, expressed a
preference for Indian soldiers, remarking that "I know certainly o f my own knowledge,
that they exceed most o f our English in hunting and sculking in the woods." Church
asked that at least 300 o f the 1,000 soldiers recruited for a proposed mission to Maine in
1704 be Indians. In 1725,42 o f the 98 men in Captain Richard Bourne's company in
1725 had identifiably Indian names, a testament to his active recruiting campaign in the
native communities o f southern Massachusetts.53
But the pool o f Indians available for service was limited, and the soldiers posted
in Maine were more likely to be men with scant experience in the woods and little
emotional attachment to the region's towns. War-weary companies saw their numbers
dwindled by a regular trickle o f deserters and the steady attrition o f disease. Finding
themselves virtually alone in the wilderness, soldiers were undoubtedly tempted to limit
the possibility o f engagement with the enemy either by staying in their garrisons or by
making only half-hearted attempts to discover Wabanakis. Scalp bounties gave soldiers a
compelling reason for venturing into the woods. In placing a high price placed on
Wabanaki heads -- as much as £300 for the scalp o f an adult male by the Seven Years
War —the government made it possible for English soldiers to double or treble their
earnings by finding and killing opponents in battle. The four companies o f soldiers who
attacked and razed Norridgewock in August 1724 were awarded £405 for 27 Indian
scalps, £20 for 4 prisoners, as well as £100 for the scalp o f Father Sebastien Rale. The

53 Church, History. 99-103; Trask, "Letters o f Col. Thomas Westbrook," New England Historical and
Genealogical Register 49 (1895): 183-84.
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total was roughly equal to the wages paid to an entire company for six months of
service.54
The average reward for Wabanaki scalps taken at Norridgewock was rather low
compared to the bounties paid to soldiers in other circumstances. From 1706 through
Dummer's War, the government posted a graded system o f scalp bounties that varied
according to the age and sex o f the victim as well as the enlistment status o f the soldiers.
The scalps o f adult male Indians generally earned double the price o f women or children
and slightly less than the amount paid for captives.55 The government also offered higher
bounties to the soldiers least dependent on provincial supplies and equipment. According
to the 1722 law that set scalp rates during Dummer’s War, the bounty for adult male
scalps was £15 for regular soldiers, £30 for companies defending a town or garrison, and
£100 for volunteers serving without pay. The latter reward encouraged ordinary
townspeople to outfit and provision themselves for bounty-hunting missions, which did
not cost the government a penny unless the volunteers killed or captured the enemy.
Similar acts passed in the eighteenth century gave preferential terms o f enlistment to
soldiers able to furnish their own arms and equipment.56
This system o f bounties had an economic rationale that benefited both the
government and its soldiers. If volunteers failed to find any Indians during their marches
-- as was usually the case -- the government did not lose anything beyond the soldiers'

54 Trask, "Letters of Col. Thomas Westbrook," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 48
(1894), 187-88.
55 At the beginning of Dummer’s War, the rewards paid for scalps were twice as high as the price of
captives: see Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 2:258. In the seventeenth century, many o f the Indians
taken prisoner were sold into slavery; the profits were divided among the soldiers o f the company that
captured them.
56 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 1 :292,530,547,558,594,2:258,8: 38,44-45; Samuel Penhallow,
The History o f the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians (Boston: T. Fleet, 1726; reprinted
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wages, if any wages were paid at all. But if the troops returned with scalps, the
government had palpable proof o f enemy losses: an immediate return on its investment.
Like the rewards paid to surveyors o f the woods, scalp bounties were a device that
allowed the government to pass risk on to its employees. Lacking the funds necessary to
arm, clothe, and supply a large complement o f soldiers, the province advanced soldiers a
basic packet o f provisions and reasonably high wages. If these soldiers provided their
own guns and uniforms, they were given the opportunity to make ample profits through
scalps or a decent living from their wages. For companies o f vigilantes fighting without
pay, the rewards were even higher. If companies failed to kill or capture enemy warriors,
the consequences were bome by the soldiers themselves, who failed to collect the
bounties and thus gain the most attractive financial reward o f military service.
But if provincial leaders had genocidal intentions toward the Wabanakis, scalp
bounties did not prove very effective. The deployment o f troops on the Maine frontier
served a purpose that was essentially defensive, and English armies rarely scored
impressive victories against Wabanakis. In every war from 1702 onward, the provincial
government assigned the bulk o f its troops in Maine to a string o f forts and garrison
houses that acted as a line o f first defense for the settlements o f northern New England
[see Fig. 5.5]. A portion o f the soldiers were stationed permanently in the garrisons,
ready to come to the defense o f settlers in case o f attack. Other companies were detached
as scouting parties that roamed the backs o f towns by horse, snowshoes, or on foot.
Detachments o f soldiers were also sent to protect parties o f lumbermen or farmers
harvesting their crops. The soldiers who were stationed in towns were often billeted by

Cincinnati: Harpel, 1859), 22,48,93,96; James Axtell, The European and the Indian. 142-43; Eames,
"Rustic Warriors," 170-73,229-30.
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the inhabitants, and according to a 1705 act soldiers serving in garrisons were allowed to
cultivate farmland belonging the townspeople they protected. During peacetime, soldiers
devoted much o f their time toward farming, fishing, trading, and surveying: so much so
that settlers sometimes wrote to the General Court to complain that the troops assigned to
protect them were neglecting their military duties.57
This system o f defense gradually brought results, limiting the effects o f Wabanaki
attacks while failing to disarm the warriors completely. In the War o f the League o f
Augsburg, combined French and Indian forces had scored devastating victories against
the English in Maine and New Hampshire: 30 killed in Dover in 1689,30 killed and 50
taken captive at Salmon Falls in 1690,48 killed and 78 taken prisoner at York in 1692,
100 killed or captured at Oyster River (Durham, N. H.) in 1694. In the next war, the
French and Wabanakis picked up where they left off, killing or capturing 165 people at
Casco Bay, Saco, and Wells in 1703; killing 47 and taking 109 captive at Deerfield in
western Massachusetts in 1704. But after the Deerfield raid, a more aggressive
prosecution o f the war by the governor, in which garrisons and scouting parties played a
central role, forced French and Indians to be more cautious, attacking in smaller parties
and avoiding forts and patrols. Although Wabanakis continued to inflict large numbers
o f casualties in later wars, they never again exacted the punishing defeats that the English
suffered during the first two imperial conflicts.58

57 Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 296-318;
Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 8:127; Robert L. Bradley, ed., The Forts o f Pemaquid. Maine: An
Archaeological and Historical Study. Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, no. 10 (Augusta,
Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1994), 13-15; Petition o f inhabitants ofHerrintonand
Pemaquid to Governor Phips, February 26,1757, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 117, fol. 276.
58 Penhallow, History. 1-21; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 206,252.
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The English government also took the offensive, sponsoring wartime expeditions
against Wabanaki strongholds such as Norridgewock, Pigwacket, and Panawapskik.
Benjamin Church led campaigns against Androscoggin and Pejepscot in 1689-90,
Panawapskik and Taconic in 1692, and along the coast all the way to Minas in 1696 and
1704. English troops in Dummer’s War mounted assaults against Norridgewock,
Pigwacket, and Panawapskik. One party travelled as far as the White Mountains, albeit
without discovering a single Indian. The expeditions were far more costly than garrison
patrols, since troops had to be equipped and provisioned for several days'journey, and
commanders needed to requisition whaleboats and sloops as transports for their
soldiers.59 Few o f the expeditions were unqualified successes; the 1724 attack on
Norridgewock and Robert Rogers's 1759 raid on Odanak were the only major English
victories against Wabanaki communities in the eighteenth century. More commonly, the
English only captured or killed a few people and failed to win enough plunder and
bounties to cover the expenses o f their expedition. At the end o f his term o f service in
1689, Church found himself with only 8 shillings in his pocket and was forced to borrow
money from a friend to transport himself home.60
The high cost o f supplying expeditions against Wabanakis made it difficult for
English people in Maine to gain a clear victory against their enemies. The ability o f
Wabanakis to cover vast territories in a short period allowed them to elude enemy troops
and forced the English to expend considerable sums on futile search-and-destroy
missions. The nature o f the terrain added to English frustrations. Thick forests slowed
the progress o f marching companies, prevented the transportation o f large artillery pieces,

59 On the difficulties of supplying armies, see Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 100-102,229-31.
60 Penhallow, History. 66-109; Church, History. 77.
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and provided camouflage for warriors. Large vessels, meanwhile, could not navigate the
region's rivers beyond the fall line, making it impossible to carry supplies directly to
Norridgewock and other interior settlements. The pace o f movement could be painfully
slow: in July 1754, it took five days -- "five days o f the hardest Duty that I ever saw my
troops employ'd on," according to Captain John Winslow —to transport 600 soldiers and
several pieces o f heavy artillery 18 miles between Cushnoc and Taconic Falls on the
Kennebec River.61
The costs o f offensive expeditions were certainly not justified by the results.
Although Wabanaki migration from Maine to Canada gave English people the impression
o f a steady native population loss, David Ghere has shown that the total Wabanaki
population o f Canada, Maine, and the upper Connecticut River Valley remained
remarkably stable in the first half o f the eighteenth century. By Ghere's calculation, only
26 warriors -- if that many -- were killed by English troops during Dummer’s War. The
results o f earlier conflicts were not much better: Samuel Penhallow, a chronicler o f the
New England's frontier wars, estimated that every Indian killed in the War o f Spanish
Succession cost the government o f Massachusetts £1,000. At such a high price, the
prosecution o f war against the Wabanakis hardly seemed worth the effort.62
The English in this respect were similar to other sedentary populations o f farmers
whose borders were contested by nomadic hunters or pastoralists: the agricultural
populations faced with invasions by horsemen from the Asian steppe are perhaps the

61 John Winslow to Charles Gould, Boston, December 30,1754, in Stanley M. Pargellis, Military Affairs
in North America. 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New
York: Archon Books, 1969), 54-56.
62 David L. Ghere, "Myths and Methods in Abenaki Demography: Abenaki Population Recovery, 17251750," Ethnohistorv 44 (1997): 511-34; Penhallow, History. 48. Penhallow's figures suggest a higher
death toll for Dummer’s War: he lists 58 Indians killed at Pigwacket, and 80 killed or drowned at
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most famous example. In both cases, a numerically superior group found itself at the
mercy o f small bands o f raiders whose mobility was their chief military weapon. Like the
Chinese or the Romans, the English had a relatively well-funded and well-disciplined
army, but were in no position to fund lengthy expeditions over wide territories in pursuit
o f their enemy. Instead, they were forced to accept an uneasy equilibrium between the
two sides, with English patrols giving frontier settlements a measure o f protection but
failing to extinguish the Wabanaki military threat altogether.63
The English did not manage to tip the equilibrium in their favor until the 1750s,
when Britain and its colonies stepped up their military effort in North America. In
Maine, the government o f Massachusetts, with the assistance o f land companies,
established forts up the Kennebec River (forts Shirley, Western, and Halifax, all built
between 1752 and 1754) and at Penobscot Bay (Fort Pownall, built 1759). The forts
undercut Wabanaki military strength by cutting off their most frequently used portages
and dramatically reducing the distance and cost o f expeditions against Norridgewock and
Panwapskik. Not only could the forts hold companies o f soldiers, they also housed the
provisions necessary for long marches into the interior. At the same time, combined
British and colonial forces launched a massive military and naval effort against French
bases in North America, culminating in the conquest o f Quebec in 1759 and the capture
o f Montreal in 1760. The fall o f the French capital left Wabanakis without a base of

Norridgewock. But the number for Norridgewock is inflated by comparison to all other contemporary
counts, casting doubt on Penhallow's other estimates.
63 See Owen Lattimore, [nner Asian Frontiers o f China (New York: American Geographical Society,
1940), esp. 53-102; Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier Nomadic Empires and China. 221 BC to
AD 1757 (London: Blackwell, 1989); Keegan, History of Warfare. 155-217. The most important
difference between steppe populations and North America's Woodland Indians was the horse, which
proved to be most terrifying weapon o f the Huns, Vandals, Turks, Mongols and other groups. Horse-led
charges made these people a far more imposing military force than the Wabanakis, allowing them to
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supply and forced them to negotiate a peaceful settlement with their English neighbors,
closing a long chapter o f violent conflict between the two groups.64

The Territorial Consequences o f the War
By the Seven Years War, Maine was no longer a central theater o f battle in North
America, and the extinction o f French claims to its possession was a consequence o f
losses at Louisbourg, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Quebec, not o f battles fought in
Maine itself. Fittingly, the military struggle over control o f the region, which had long
depended on supplies sent from distant political centers, was ended by the siege o f a city
over a hundred miles away. The causes and consequences o f the British victory at
Quebec are well known, and it would be redundant to retrace General Wolfe's footsteps or
to explain how the aftermath o f the Seven Years War led to the outbreak o f the American
Revolution. But it may be worthwhile to consider how the nature o f the military effort
set the terms by which the English occupied the conquered lands o f Maine.
The Seven Years War in America resembled a European campaign far more than
any previous colonial conflict. In the North American version o f the War o f the League
of Augsburg (1688-98), there were never more than 2,000 men under arms on either the
French or English side at any time - a tiny number compared to the 400,000 men who
fought for Louis XIV in Europe. By and large, the fighting consisted o f raids and
skirmishes conducted by small companies and Indian warriors, combined with plunder

conquer and rule vast empires. Wabanakis, on the other hand, were dependent on military and economic
aid from a neighboring state and had difficulty defending even their own territory.
64 On the strategic logic of Kennebec River forts and Fort Pownall, see William Shirley to Lord Halifax,
Falmouth in Casco Bay, August 20,1754, in Pargellis, Military Affairs. 23-24; Gordon E. Kershaw,
"Gentlemen of Large Property & Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors. 1749-1775 (Portland. Me.:
Maine Historical Society, 1975), 122-49; Robert L. Bradley, The Forts o f Maine: An Archaeological and
Historical Survey (Augusta. Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission. 1981), 18-20.
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and privateering expeditions against merchant vessels and French settlements. There
were no battles that could even begin to compare with the prolonged sieges that
characterized the war in Europe. For the most part, assaults were indistinguishable from
the kind of guerrilla warfare that characterized King Philip's War in New England or the
colonial piracy and privateering ventures o f the mid-seventeenth century. The aims o f
war were rather modest: with only a few exceptions, attacks were intended to result in
plunder, captives, revenge, or intimidation, rather than the outright seizure o f territory.65
The scale o f conflict grew larger with each successive imperial war and
increasingly came to resemble the struggles o f the European theater, both in aims and
conduct. Ambushes and raids remained important tactics, but they were overshadowed
by sieges of forts and cities, backed by trains o f heavy artillery and massed infantry firing
in volley. Although colonial armies continued to hire Indian warriors and backwoods
sharpshooters, increasingly commanders turned to farmers, laborers, and artisans who had
no military experience but could be quickly trained and disciplined. Many officers turned
their noses up at the "skulking" tactics o f guerrilla warfare and looked to European drill
manuals as a guide to training their troops. The proportion o f Indian soldiers in New
England's armies dwindled, as recruiters saw less value in their tracking skills and more
to fault in their lack o f discipline. The rapid escalation in the scale o f warfare caught
many by surprise. The defensive walls o f Montreal had been built between 1717 and
1744 on the assumption that an assault on the city could only be carried out by a massed
attack o f colonial infantry, and that the rapids along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River
prevented the transportation o f heavy artillery. When General Jeffrey Amherst
surrounded Montreal in September 1760 with several batteries o f artillery —the pieces

65 Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars. 1689-1762 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1964), 2.
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transported from Quebec, Oswego, and Lake Champlain —the city's architects were
proven wrong.66
Because it involved lengthy supply lines, large armies, and massive investments
in arms and ammunition, siege warfare demanded a much greater commitment on the part
o f this colonies, both in men and expenditures. The demands were met in part assistance
from the mother country. For the first time, Britain intervened decisively in the military
affairs o f its colonies, posting 42,000 troops in North America by 1758 and deploying a
quarter o f the British Navy -- then the largest in the world -- to American waters.
Parliament also compensated its colonial partners for their military expenditures, to the
tune o f over £1 million. The contribution o f Massachusetts to the war effort was, in per
capita terms, even greater. A third o f its duty-eligible males were pressed into service,
with total enlistments for the war numbering over 30,000. The provincial government,
while partially compensated by parliamentary subsidies, spent nearly £1 million on the
war and very nearly collapsed into bankruptcy. That the province had financed and
fought costly campaigns against Louisbourg and Canada a decade earlier made its
contribution all the more impressive.67
The large scale o f warfare made the provincial government more active than ever
before, forcing it to demand more from its citizens and creditors than in previous wars.

66 Starkey, European and Native American Warfare. 97-103; Douglas E. Leach, Roots o f Conflict: British
Armed Forces and Colonial Americans. 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North Carolina Press,
1986), 64-162; John M. Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony: The Transformation of Provincial
Massachusetts" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1966), 61-148; Andre Charbonneau, Marc Lafrance, and
Monique Poirier, "The Fortifications o f Montreal," in Phyllis Lambert and Alan Stewart, eds., Opening the
Gates of Eiehteenth-Centurv Montreal (Montreal: Centre Canadien d'Architecture/Canadian Centre for
Architecture, 1992), 19-30.
67 Anderson, A People's Armv. 58-61; Gwyn, "Financial Revolution," 70-75; idem, "The Royal Navy in
North America, 1712-1776," in Jeremy Black and Philip Woodfine, eds., The British Navv and the Use of
Naval Power in the Eighteenth Century (Leicester Leicester University Press, 1988), 129-47; Guy
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Fearing that the very existence o f their colonies was at stake, the members o f the General
Court temporarily set their factional disputes aside and rallied to the defense o f their
colony. Not only did the House o f Representatives regularly vote for the enlistment of
thousands o f troops between 1755 and 1762 -- particularly after the high-handed Lord
Loudoun was removed as commander o f the British forces in late 1757 —it also
borrowed over £1 million and levied a tax averaging £80,000 new tenor from 1756 to
1760. All told, the General Court was forced to cover three-fifths o f its expenditures
during the war and raised between 1,000 and 7,000 troops every year between 1755 and
1762. O f course, it was the inhabitants o f Massachusetts, as soldiers and taxpayers, who
ultimately bore the burden o f fighting the war. The high levels o f recruitment represented
a virtual levee en masse in the Bay colony, and in both emotional and material terms New
Englanders were asked to make a sacrifice comparable to the military efforts o f the
Revolution, the Civil War, and the World Wars o f the twentieth century.68
This high degree o f popular mobilization left the provincial government with a
substantial debt to its citizens at the end o f the war. In part, this debt consisted o f arrears

Fregault, Canada: The War o f the Conquest, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 1969), 202-294.
68Anderson, A People's Armv. 1-25; William Pencak, War. Politics, and Revolution in Provincial
Massachusetts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 135-37. Needless to say, the sacrifice was
not borne evenly, and some even benefited from the war. Merchants accrued ample returns on money they
lent to the government, and those who secured contracts to supply campaigns profited handsomely from
the war effort. The choicest contracts usually went to Bostonians, but merchants from Portsmouth and
Kittery also reaped rewards from the opportunity. Military suppliers from northern New England enjoyed
a trading boom during both sieges o f Louisbourg, since Piscataqua was closer to Cape Breton than any
other major English port. William Pepperrell, a merchant from Kittery, was the leader o f New England's
troops during the first siege, and used his position to open trading possibilities for himself, his son Andrew,
and fellow members o f the Piscataqua oligarchy. Not only did they assist in the outfitting of troops for the
siege, they also participated in the supply o f the citadel after its fall. Between 1745 and 1749, vessels from
Piscataqua supplied large quantities o f food, livestock, tools, building materials, wood, clothes, and sundry
other goods to the English soldiers stationed at Louisbourg. Between April to September in 1746, the port
of Piscataqua exported 1,591 tons of merchandise to Louisbourg; an impressive total given that the
monthly volume o f all trade cleared from the port in summer typically averaged a little over 1,000 tons.
The tonnage between April and September 1747 totalled 1,480. See, Public Record Office, C. 0 . 5/968,
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in pay and a moral obligation to provide for wounded veterans and war widows. Over
£800,000 in debt in 1763, the General Court would have been hard pressed to provide for
these people monetarily. But military victories had left the province with a vast quantity
o f public lands at its disposal, allowing it to circumvent the problem o f revenues by
paying its soldiers with land grants. The practice was not new; Massachusetts had
distributed public lands to its veterans since the seventeenth century, and the provincial
government had parcelled out hundreds o f thousands o f acres to its soldiers since the
1720s.69
Nearly all the grants made to veterans following the Seven Years War were
located in frontier areas, particularly Maine. A township six miles square east o f the
Union River, facing Mount Desert Island, was granted to veterans in 1762, one o f twelve
townships created between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers in the same year. Mount
Desert Island itself was given to governor Francis Bernard. General Joseph Frye, a
veteran o f two wars, was allowed another six-mile township, now known as Fryeburg, at
a site not far from the old Wabanaki village o f Pigwacket, which had been virtually
abandoned following a bloody 1725 battle with the English. The House o f
Representatives granted two larger tracts adjacent to Fryeburg to Captain Henry Young
Brown in 1766 and 1770 (now called Brownfield). In all, between 1758 and 1770 the

fols. 81-85,91-94; Bvroti Fairchild. Messrs. William Pepperrell: Merchants at Piscataqua (Ithaca. N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1954), 182-83.
69 Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony," 118. Jack Radabaugh has estimated that the General Court
granted 451,163 acres, or 704 square miles, o f land to its veterans between 1675 and 1740. A large portion
of this acreage was allotted to the proprietors o f the "Narragansett" townships, seven towns created in 1733
to compensate the veterans o f King Philip's War and their descendants. Two o f the townships,
Narragansett No. I (Buxton) and Narragansett No. 7 (Gorham), were located in Maine. See Radabaugh,
"Military System," 209-14.
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Massachusetts government earmarked over 42 square miles o f territory in Maine for the
use o f military veterans.70
But the redistribution o f land was only part o f the bargain. The inhabitants o f
Massachusetts had been willing to bear the great burdens o f the war only because they
assumed that the crown and the provincial government would protect their interests.
Most New Englanders who enlisted in the army had done so with their eyes open,
believing that their very livelihood was threatened by the French. They had tacitly
entered into a social contract with their government, in which they agreed to make
sacrifices o f blood and taxes as long as the state continued to defend their lives, liberty,
property, and faith. Enlisting by the thousands and suffering great financial burdens, the
people had done their part; they now expected the government to keep its end o f the deal.
By demonstrating their exclusive allegiance to the crown and to their province during the
war, New Englanders had earned the right to the generosity and protection o f the state.
They expected that they would share in the spoils o f war, particularly the vast expanses o f
land that were opened up after the fall o f Quebec.71
At the same time, they assumed that groups who were disloyal, or whose loyalty
had been questionable, would be denied these same benefits. This reasoning was evident
in arguments for the expulsion o f Nova Scotia's Acadians from their homeland. Since the
cession o f their colony to Britain in 1713, the Acadians had attempted to remain neutral
in wars between the French and English, refusing to take oaths o f allegiance to the British

70 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 16:160; 17: 169-74,363,489-90; 18: 140,457. Even private land
companies used quasi-feudal rewards of land as a recruitment tool; the Pejepscot Company promised 100
acres to soldiers who volunteered to serve at nearby Fort George. See DHSM. 23:251-52.
71 On the connection between wars, citizenship, and state formation in the modern world, see Charles Tilly,
Coercion. Capital, and European States. AD 990-1992. rev. ed. (Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell, 1992), 67126; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
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king because they still held the hope that their territory would be reconquered by the
French.72 In a 1746 message to the governor, the members o f the Massachusetts House
o f Representatives complained o f the "Traitorous Disposition and practices" o f Acadians
who had lent tacit or clandestine aid to French and Indian forces planning an assault on
Annapolis Royal. They protested that Nova Scotia's French-speaking inhabitants were "a
People who have all the Priviledges o f his Majesty's other Subjects," and yet who "live
almost or quite without publick Taxes, while we their Neighbours... are burden'd almost
to ruin, by the necessary Charges o f the Government for the Defense and Protection" o f
Nova Scotia. The delegates jeered at the Acadians' description o f themselves as "Neutral
Subjects," calling it "a Contradiction in Terms, a Set o f People who have a right to
Protection, but no Obligation to Obedience, who are his Majesty's Subjects, and yet may
rebel against him and do what they please, have a Right to be defended by the King, and
yet not bound to defend the King."73
This logic applied a fortiori to the Wabanakis, a "savage" people whose claims to
the land were tenuous in English eyes. While Acadians practised plow-driven agriculture
and had avoided participation in imperial wars, Wabanakis were hunter-gatherers who
had played a leading role in attacks against New England's frontier communities for
nearly a century. Although most o f the Wabanakis remaining in Maine had sought to
remain neutral in the last two wars, their failure to side exclusively with the British was
seen by New England's leaders as a form o f treason that erased their pretensions to

Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), 169-191.
72 Naomi E. S. Griffiths, "The Acadians," Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, vol. 4: xxvii-xxxi; idem.,
The Contexts of Acadian History. 1686-1784 (Montreal: McGilt-Queen's Press, 1992), 69-77; John B.
Brebner, New England’s Outpost: Acadia Before the Conquest o f Canada (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1927).
73 DHSM. vol. 11:356-58.

Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

348
ownership o f the land. When governor Pownall met with several Wabanakis at Fort St.
George on his journey to Penobscot Bay in 1759, he informed them that "by breaking
their Faith and the Conditions o f their Treaties, they had forfeited their Lives, their
Liberties, and their Lands." He offered, as a token o f his magnanimity, to place them
"under his Protection": he would "Protect their Lives," while saying nothing about their
lands. Pownall's successor, Francis Bernard also promised to become a custodian o f the
Wabanakis1interests, but he, too, gave them no guarantees with respect to their lands.
Upon hearing Penobscot objections to the rapid pace o f English settlement near their
river, Bernard dismissed them out o f hand. Unlike past governors, he did not contend
that the English held legal title to the land; instead, he argued that they had won it by
military conquest. "The English have conquered this whole Country," he told them, "and
the Indians must not prescribe to them what shall be the bounds o f their settlements."74
As they witnessed a steady flow o f trappers, loggers, and farmers entering their
territory, Wabanakis had little reason to celebrate the British victory. Some lamented the
departure o f their French "fathers" and hoped that the children o f King Louis would
return to their shores. Others, like the Penobscot sagamore Tomah (Thomas), proposed
that the Indians begin a resistance movement against the English. According to Oso, a
Penobscot woman on friendly terms with the colonists, Tomah had introduced the idea at
a tribal council in 1764. "Why shall the English live upon our Lands?" he asked his
listeners. "Let us take them and drive them off... the English have no right to Command
us; let us be our own Masters and not be Slaves under them." But the majority o f the
council, knowing that they were outmatched by British arms, were unmoved. "What can
we do?" they asked. "The English have got possession o f our land." Wary o f the

74 "Journal o f Pownall," 372; DHSM. 24:129.
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colonists but weary o f war, they decided to follow the path o f peace: "It[']s best for us
now to live in Friendship."75

75 DHSM. 24: 124-25. On Wabanaki disappointment over the loss o f the French, see letter of Monsieur de
Meyon to Pontiac, 1763, PAC, AN, Serie C llA , vol. 105, fols. 418-19; James L. Whitehead, ed., "The
Autobiography o f Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, 1-111" Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography 63
(1939): 221-23.
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FIGURE 5.1. [FALMOUTH HARBOR] (DETAIL), FROM THE ATLANTIC
NEPTUNE, JOSEPH FREDERICK WALLET DES BARRES, [1776?]

One of over two hundred sheets from Neptune, possibly from its first printing in 1776. Des Barres studied
mathematical physics as a youth in Switzerland, and was trained as a military engineer at the Royal Military College at
Woolwich after emigrating to England. He conducted dozens of surveys from his base in Halifax between 1763 and
1774, and upon returning to England he worked with some twenty assistants to engrave plates for the maps. Des
Barres's technique, including his use of cross-hatching to represent topography, was typical of military cartography of
the time. After the American Revolution, both Des Barres and Holland returned to British North America; Des Barres
serving as governor of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island, and Holland playing an instrumental role in laying out
the townships of Upper and Lower Canada. Photocopied from the Smith Collection, Osher Map Library, University of
Southern Maine, Reel 26:12469.
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FIGURE 5.2. [PENOBSCOT BAY] (DETAIL), JOHN NORTH AND JOSEPH SMALL
[?], 1759.
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The map is based on several surveys, including those of North in I7S8 and Small in I7S9, and a concurrent survey and
sounding the upper reaches of the river by Lieutenant John McKechnie. The map indicates the place where governor
Thomas Pownall buried a leaden plate "as a Memorial of Possession" on May 2 3 ,17S9, with the words: "Province of
Massachusetts Bay - Penobscot —Dominions of Great Britain —Possession Confirm’d by Thos. Pownall, Govr."
Photocopied from William Otis Sawtelle, Thomas Pownall, Governor, Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings
63 (1929-30), overleaf, 270-71.
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FIGURE 5.3. "A MAP OF THE SOURCES OF THE CHAUDIERE, PENOBSCOT,
AND KENNEBEC RIVERS," (PORTION), JOHN MONTRESORE, 1761.
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The product of Montresor's second voyage into Maine; the primary purpose of his first voyage was to deliver military
dispatches between Quebec and New England. Montresor also drew a map after the latter trip, representing the river
route on an elongated strip of paper. The son of the chief military engineer of Gibraltar’s British forces, Montresor was
sent to North America in 17S4 and became the chief engineer ofMajor-General Edward Braddock, serving at
Louisbourg, Quebec, and later in Pontiac's Uprising and the American Revolution. Photocopied from the Library of
Congress.
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FIGURE 5.4. THE SPECTRUM OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE.
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The chart represents a continuum of correlated traits, running from the smallest to the largest armies. The two columns
represent ideal types; most armies fall somewhere between the two extremes. Large-scale professional armies differ
from small-scale bands at least three ways: (1) they are raised by societies with extensive communication networks,
advanced technology, and a complex division of labor, and are consequently able to produce violence more efficiently
and on a larger scale than their smaller counterparts; (2) large-scale societies have a much greater demand for
resources, and hence are far more interested in the conquest of land; (3) large-scale societies arc better able to pay for
soldiers and munitions, and, all things being equal, well-compensated soldiers are more likely to carry out orders
faithfully than their underpaid counterparts.
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FIGURE 5.5. DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH FORCES IN YORK COUNTY, MARCH
1748.

Distribution of soldiers, according to an order of the House of Representatives. Each bar represents ten soldiers; white
bars represent the number of soldiers to be drawn from local militias. The figures have only an approximate
correspondence to the actual number of soldiers posted at the garrisons; colonels and captains were constantly
scrambling to fill their muster rolls with the required numbers. The disposition of troops forms a long chain of
garrison houses and forts that protect the backs of frontier towns. The northernmost posting along the Kennebec River
were the 25 soldiers at Fort Richmond, the easternmost posting was at Fort S t George. Both were still a considerable
distance from Norridgewock and Panawapskik. Source: Acts and Resolves. 14:108*9.
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EPILOGUE
MOSES GREENLEAF’S MAINE

/ believed that the woods were not tenantless, but choke-full o f honest
spirits as good as m yself any day,— not an empty chamber, in which
chemistry was left to work alone, but an inhabited house,— and fo r a few
moments I enjoyedfellowship with them.
--Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods

In the decades that followed the American Revolution, thousands o f families
uprooted themselves from southern New England and made new homes in Maine.
Searching for the independence o f freehold land ownership, they cleared vast tracts o f
forest, raised thousands o f houses and bams, built hundreds o f meetinghouses and
schools. Entrepreneurs and settlers established new towns in the backcountry, launched
the region's first newspapers, chartered its first colleges, and advanced plans for new
roads and canals. Their collective efforts left a lasting impression on Maine and laid the
basis for its achievement o f statehood in 1820. In the fifty years between the Revolution
and the issue o f a state charter, Maine developed a distinctive character that has persisted
to the present day: a region o f tightly-knit communities and hard-working producers,
humble in their means but fiercely proud o f their singularity.1

1 Charles E. C lark, James S. Leamon, and Karen Bowden, eds., Maine in the Earlv Republic. 1783-1820:
From Revolution to Statehood (Hanover. N. H.: University Press o f New England, 1988); Ronald F. Banks,
Maine Becomes a State: The Movement to Separate Maine from Massachusetts. 1785-1820 (Middletown,
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press for Maine Historical Society, 1970); Laura Fecych Sprague, ed.,
Agreeable Situations: Society. Commerce, and Art in Southern Maine. 1780-1830 (Kennebunk. Me.: Brick
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During this same period, Maine was also taking hold as an idea. Before the Seven
Years War, Maine was a little-used term for Gorges's former province, and York County
was more an administrative category than a focus o f emotional attachment. But after
York was divided into smaller counties and renamed the District o f Maine, the revived
term increasingly became a source o f identity for settlers and a shorthand for a distinctive
regional culture. This change was actively promoted by the region's political and social
elite. Maine took shape in the maps o f Osgood Carleton, who, with encouragement from
the Massachusetts Historical Society, drafted several maps that were engraved and
published by John Norman in the 1790s. It also evolved in the written works o f James
Sullivan and William Williamson, who wrote the first book-length histories o f Maine.
Sullivan, a jurist and Federalist statesman originally from Berwick, wrote his History o f
the District o f Maine in 1795, squeezed between a treatise on the origins o f money, a
history of land titles in Massachusetts, and a dissertation on the freedom o f the press in
the United States. Twenty-seven years later, Williamson outdid Sullivan, publishing a
fact-filled if ponderous two-volume history o f Maine that has remained a standard
reference for historians even to the present day. Williamson had begun compiling
materials for the work in 1817 while he was postmaster o f Bangor and continued to work
on the book after his tenure as governor o f the state between 1821 and 1823.
Collectively, the work o f men such as Carleton, Sullivan, and Williamson promoted the
view that Maine was a unified region with its own distinctive history and destiny.2

Store Museum, 1987); Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on
the Maine Frontier. 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University o f North Carolina Press, 1990).
2 James S. Leamon, Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine (Amherst,
Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, for the Maine Historical Society, 1993), 193-97; William
Williamson, History o f the State o f Maine. 2 vols. (Hallowell, Me.: Glazier, Masters & Co., 1832; reprint
ed., Freeport, Me.: Cumberland Press, 1966).
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But few did more to create the idea o f Maine than Moses Greenleaf. Along with
the rest o f his family, Greenleaf had moved from Essex County to the District in 1790,
when he was thirteen years old. At the age o f twenty-two, he left the family farm and
opened a general store in his hometown o f New Gloucester in Cumberland County. A
few years later, he moved eastward: first to Poland, then Kenduskeag, and finally to
Bangor, where he remained in business until 1806. Struggling to stay in the black, he
decided to close shop and try his hand at real estate instead. He became a partner in the
newly-founded township o f Williamsburg in Piscataquis County in 1806, and in the years
that followed he took a passionate interest in promoting his holdings. By 1810, he had
moved to Williamsburg along with his wife and children. As he considered methods o f
developing the township and nearby areas, he found himself frustrated by a lack o f
reliable information about Maine's interior. For the next three decades, he set about
correcting this problem, gathering surveyor’s plats, land surveys, soil samples, historical
accounts, and census data. He also engaged in searches for stone and mineral deposits,
and lobbied for the construction o f roads, canals, and a railroad in Piscataquis County.3
After several years o f research, he decided to put his findings into print, believing
that the dissemination o f information about Maine's interior would be a spur to
commercial development. In 1815, he published a map o f Maine, accompanied the
following year by a 154-page volume entitled A Statistical View o f the District o f Maine.
The book contained a compendium o f information on subjects ranging from land values
and soil qualities to climactic variations and population levels. Its contents, as Greenleaf

3 "Greenleaf, Moses," in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary of American Biography. 10
vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952), vol. 4:582-83; Walter W. Ristow, American Mans and
Mapmakers: Commercial Cartography in the Nineteenth Century (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1985), 94-96.
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explained in his introduction, gave investors and public officials a thumbnail sketch o f
the District, allowing them to assess its economic potential and possibilities for
development. When Maine became a state in 1820, he printed a revised edition o f the
map and continued to gather information about its lands and people. In 1829, with the
aid o f a SI,000 grant from the state legislature, he published updated and expanded
versions of both the map and the statistical summary. Included in the new book were
several plates that used maps to illustrate various facets o f the state: its topography,
population, political divisions, and territorial history [see Figs. 6.1, 6 .2 ,6.3].4
Where the Maine o f Ferdinando Gorges had been a controversial claim, Moses
Greenleaf s Maine was an established fact, a unit o f analysis rather than a figment o f the
imagination. By 1829, the existence o f Maine was beyond dispute; while Gorges's
writings were marked by passionate advocacy, the tone o f Greenleaf s book was one o f
detached intellectual curiosity. His maps and statistical tables treated the region as an
object whose qualities could be empirically measured, tabulated, and analyzed; the reality
o f this object received daily confirmation in land registries and tourist maps,
congressional districts and legal jurisdictions, censuses and tax levies. Dozens o f
institutions and hundreds o f thousands o f people had a vested interest in the Maine
described by Greenleaf and few still believed that the region's territory might be
organized differently.
Greenleaf s maps and commentary marked the full flowering o f a view o f
territoriality that had taken root in the seventeenth century. It was based on four

4 Moses Greenleaf, A Survey of the State o f Maine, in Reference to Its Geographical Features. Statistics
and Political Economy (Portland, Me.: Shirley and Hyde, 1829). On the widely-held belief in the early
nineteenth century that the dissemination o f laiowledge was the key to a prosperous republic, see Richard
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premises: that land was a resource that could be possessed as private property, that
governments could grant and protect real property rights, that sovereignty over the land
could not be shared between states, and that boundaries were defined by objective
attributes rather than human relationships. This view o f the land had gained precedence
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries because it supported and was sustained by
a larger and more powerful coalition o f people and institutions than any other form o f
territoriality.
Indeed, the strength o f Greenleaf s Maine was that it was suited to a large-scale
society in which tens o f thousands o f strangers lived in close contact with one another.
Among small-scale polities such as the Wabanakis, disputes over land use could be
resolved through face-to-face mediation and the bonds o f trust that daily interaction
created among neighbors. But in cases where there was greater competition for resources
and a weaker emotional bond between disputants, personal diplomacy became more
difficult. Because the earliest English colonists were united more by their common
pursuit of material betterment than by ties o f kinship, they had little reason to trust each
other and had ample opportunities for conflict. Frustrated by the constant strife and
violence o f the early years o f settlement, colonists gradually put their trust in the
provincial government and county courts, expecting them to enforce contracts and
preserve civil order just as their counterparts had done in the mother country. Peaceful
relations were fostered not through personal mediation but by the establishment o f
institutions with executive power. The legitimacy o f these institutions came from their
willingness to adjudicate conflicts according to their legal merits, showing as little

D. Brown, Knowledee Is Power The Diffusion o f Information in Earlv America. 1700-1865 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. 197-244,268-96.
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favoritism as possible. In the case o f land disputes, this meant giving precedence to
objective criteria such as the contents o f formal deeds, improvements made to the land,
and surveys o f boundary lines. The land had to be viewed as something outside the
domain of human relations, something that could be measured or possessed but had no
active role in human affairs. The notion o f objectivity in this respect played much the
same role as divination and omens among the Wabanakis: it removed potentially
contentious questions from the social world and resolved them in a way that was
seemingly above politics.5
Paradoxically, Greenleafs objective view o f the land served a valuable subjective
purpose, preserving social harmony by divorcing the natural environment from human
relations and offering it up as a catalogue o f resources ready for exploitation.6 The image
o f Maine as a bounded area became the coin o f the realm because it reified the state's
exclusive and undisputed sovereignty over the land, which in turn protected the rights o f
English-speaking land owners. Competing visions o f territoriality that did not strike this
balance between an impersonal state and the interests o f property owners - such as
Gorges's plan for a seigneurial system o f land tenure or Wabanaki notions o f the land as a

5 On the tendency o f people in large-scale societies to place their trust in institutions and objective
knowledge, see Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power Two Works, trans. Howard Davis, ed. John Raffan and
Kathryn Rooney (Chichester: John Wiley, 1979); Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and
Science in Seventeenth-Centurv England (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1994); Keith Hart,
"Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization o f Migrants in an African City Slum," in Diego
Gambetta, ed.. Trust: Making and Breaking Coonerarive Relations (London: Blackwell, 1988), 176-93.
6 Treating the land in this way did not entirely remove the possibility of disputes; the decades that followed
the Revolution were marked by violent conflicts in Maine between squatters and absentee proprietors. But
the source of the disputes was the failure o f the county and provincial courts to decide trespass cases
impartially, giving a more favorable hearing to wealthy and well-connected proprietors than to
smallholders from the backwoods. The settlers who led the revolt against the proprietors did not reject the
rule of law but sought to redress its abuses by demanding that their rights o f ownership —established by
the objective facts o f having cleared and improved the land —be recognized. They emphatically rejected
the notion that social obligations should be attached to land use and embraced land ownership as a source
of economic independence and political liberty. Far from abandoning the concept o f private property, they
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shared source of nourishment among kin —fell away because they were supported by
smaller and less powerful coalitions.
Instead, an implicit bargain was negotiated between tens o f thousands o f land
holders and English governments at the local and provincial levels. On one hand, the
inhabitants of New England offered the state substantial support in the form o f taxes,
military enlistments, and voluntary labor. This popular backing made the provincial
army a formidable power and strengthened the state's claims to exclusive jurisdiction
over its territory. But English support for the army was predicated on the assumption that
the state existed to protect a collective claim to the land by all colonists; the French and
Indians were considered a danger because their own territorial claims conflicted with
those of the English. The other side o f the bargain was that the state would look after the
interests o f its citizens, particularly their property rights in land. The state's guarantee
that it would and could protect these rights - as when the provincial government finally
gave its approval to Samuel Waldo's claims to the Muscongus Patent - gave landholders
the incentive to develop their holdings, secure in the knowledge that the fruits o f their
labor would accrue to themselves or their children. Confident that their land claims
would be backed by the government, merchants such as Waldo invested considerable
sums into the development o f their holdings, tapping into international pools o f capital
and migrants to promote the settlement o f Maine. The state, in this sense, was Janus
faced: glowering outward to its frontier it projected a line o f forts and garrisons meant to
intimidate its external enemies, but smiling inward it presided over a peaceful, prosperous
commercial community. The potential for violence among competing land owners within

asserted that the state had a moral obligation to protect lands that were, from their point o f view, rightfully
theirs. See Taylor. Liberty Men. 61-121.
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the colony, ever present in the early years o f Maine's existence, was gradually directed
outward towards the enemies o f the empire as a whole.
While this arrangement suited those who received the state's protection, it was
catastrophic for those who did not. The growth o f English settlement in Maine, and the
attendant wealth it brought to both merchants and smallholders, was a direct result o f the
encroachment o f the colonists on lands that once belonged to the Wabanakis. While the
provincial government recognized that the Indians possessed a form o f aboriginal title to
the land, this right was weakly protected and frequently ignored. The defense o f
Wabanaki territory rested ultimately on their military strength, backed by the resources o f
the French state, which treated the Wabanakis as a proxy for its own imperial claims. For
nearly a century this compromise allowed Wabanakis to retain most o f their traditional
territories and forced the English to accommodate their demands for peaceful trade. But
when the French were removed from America in 1763, the Indians lost their most
effective barrier against incursions by their English-speaking neighbors.
By the end o f the eighteenth century, Wabanaki leaders knew that they could not
stem the tide of white settlement and tried to negotiate an arrangement that would
accommodate the immigrants while still allowing the Indians to gain a livelihood. In the
1790s, the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies, the two organized tribes remaining in the
District, ceded most o f their territories to the state o f Massachusetts in exchange for an
assortment of gifts, annuities, and fishing and hunting rights. Over the next forty years,
large portions o f their remaining lands were whittled away by a series o f sometimes
fraudulent purchases. As their territories shrank, it became impossible for Wabanakis to
survive solely by hunting, fishing, and gathering, and most families in the nineteenth
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century worked a variety o f occupations, from lumbering to basket weaving, to make
ends meet.
While some have described these changes as the passing o f a traditional way o f
life, they might equally be seen as a continuation o f the Wabanakis’ ability to adapt
subsistence strategies to changing circumstances. As in the past, they limited the risk o f
hunger by pursuing a variety o f activities, complementing hunting expeditions with stints
at farmsteads, shipyards, mills, docks, and logging camps. They also continued to view
the land in ways that would have been familiar to their ancestors, as the writer Henry
David Thoreau learned in the three trips he made to Maine's interior in 1847,1853, and
1857. On portions o f each trip he was accompanied by Wabanaki guides, including Joe
Aitteon, who later became the first elected governor o f the Penobscots, and Joseph Polis,
a hunter from Old Town. Having consulted Greenleaf s map o f Maine in the first trip which he found to be "a labyrinth o f errors" as far as the rivers and lakes o f the interior
were concerned —Thoreau discovered an entirely different way o f mapping the land
among his guides. The Penobscots saw dozens o f animals hidden in the forest where
their guest could see none, told stories o f battles against the Mohawks at the sites where
they had taken place, carried on extensive discussions about the etymology o f
placenames, and were able to orient themselves simply by looking at the surfaces o f rocks
and trees. Although Thoreau never forgave the Indians for their failure to live up to his
romantic image o f the noble savage, he began in the final voyage to see their survival
skills as a form o f knowledge as rich and complex as his own scholarly learning. "I have
much to leam o f the Indian," he owned, "nothing o f the missionary."7

7 Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods: ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1972), cit. 15,181.
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Yet the Penobscots were increasingly aware that they needed additional skills to
survive in the modem world. Joe Polis was an accomplished hunter, but he was also
literate and a strong advocate o f formal education. A devout Protestant, Polis belonged to
the "New Party," a Penobscot faction that supported the establishment o f Englishlanguage schools at Old Town. He told Thoreau that he wanted his children to attend
college, since with an education "you could keep'em property -- no other way." Although
Polis continued to travel along the paths o f his ancestors, he also understood that the
landscape made by maps, deeds, and surveys was too powerful to deny. Because it was
supported by a coalition o f hundreds o f thousands o f people, Maine's sovereignty over its
lands was unquestionable. If the Indians were to win redress for the wrongs that had been
committed against them, they would have to do so through the courts and the legislature,
basing their arguments on treaty provisions and legal precedent rather than subjective
considerations o f need.8
Polis would have been disappointed to learn that the Penobscots were to wait
another 123 years before they received compensation for their losses. But when
restitution finally came in 1980, the legal case launched by the Indians revived many
questions that had laid dormant since the early nineteenth century. What was the basis o f
the state's sovereignty over its territory? How did groups establish rights o f ownership to
their lands? Is the legal system adequate to resolve disputes between indigenous peoples
and their settler neighbors? Although the Indians withdrew their case after receiving a
settlement from state, the questions remain. The history o f the region's colonization has a
very direct bearing on such issues, and if there is a lesson to be drawn from this study it is
that all representations o f the land —even the scientific and dispassionate maps drawn by

8 Ibid., 293.
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Moses Greenleaf and later cartographers ~ are social in character. As vast tracts o f
Maine's forests are sold by timber companies to real estate developers, and as land use
becomes an increasingly prominent subject o f public discussion, we would do well to
remember that determining ownership o f the land is more than a matter o f jurisprudence.
Behind deeds, treaties, and surveys lies the more fundamental question o f what
responsibilities we have to each other, and to the plants and animals around us. It is not
too late to heed the advice o f Wabanaki conference speakers, who knew that it was
unwise to take from the land without giving something in return.
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FIGURE 6.1. PLATE I, FROM MOSES GREENLEAFS ATLAS ACCOMPANYING
HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 1829.
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The first plate of Greenleafs atlas depicts the topography of the state; Henry David Thoreau found his representation
of the lakes and mountains of the region to be a "labyrinth of errors." Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of
Congress.
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FIGURE 6.2. PLATE 5, FROM MOSES GREENLEAF’S ATLAS ACCOMPANYING
HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 1829.

The fifth plate depicts the state's counties, listing their populations and the value of their taxable property; dotted lines
represent the progress of white settlement since theAmerican Revolution. Photocopied from the Library of Congress.
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FIGURE 6.3. PLATE 6, FROM MOSES GREENLEAF’S ATLAS ACCOMPANYING
HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE. 1829.
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The sixth plate represents grants of land in the state. Tracts marked "M" in the northeastern part of the state are
townships allotted to Massachusetts after Maine was granted statehood. Photocopied at the Library of Congress.
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